- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Krishan Lal v. Des Raj .
Judgment Summary — J.V. Gupta, J. (C.R. Nos. 2022 & 2023 of 1987)
Factual and Procedural Background
The two petitions (C.R. Nos. 2022 and 2023 of 1987) arise from the same facts. The landlord, Des Raj, filed an application under section 13-A of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949 seeking summary ejectment of his tenant, Krishan Lal, from House No. 8, Street No. DS-11, Ferozepur City, on the ground of personal necessity. The landlord alleged that he had retired on 11.12.1975 on superannuation and that the accommodation occupied by him and his family was insufficient because he had four sons and four daughters (with their own children). The tenant was occupying one room on the ground floor and the remaining accommodation was said to be insufficient for the family. A retirement certificate from the Cantonment Board, Ferozepur, was filed in support.
Procedurally, summons were issued for 17.12.1986 and were served on the tenant on 8.12.1986. No one appeared on 17.12.1986; the matter was taken on 18.12.1986 when the tenant appeared but did not file the required application/affidavit for leave to contest. On 2.1.1987 the tenant filed an application for leave to contest, asserting inter alia that the premises were not a residential building but had been used as a shop for about 30 years and that the landlord had suitable accommodation elsewhere. The landlord opposed the application as barred by time, contending it was filed after more than 15 days from service. The Rent Controller dismissed the tenant's leave application as time-barred and passed the ejectment order on 9.4.1987. The tenant challenged both the order refusing leave to contest and the ejectment order by filing these petitions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether section 18-A of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949 prescribes any limitation period for moving an application to obtain leave from the Controller to contest an ejectment application under section 13-A.
- Whether the tenant's application for leave to contest, made after the expiry of a 15-day period specified in the summons, was properly dismissed as time-barred.
Arguments of the Parties
Tenant's (Appellant's) Arguments
- Section 18-A does not prescribe any time limit for filing an application for leave to contest; therefore the application filed on 2.1.1987 could not be dismissed as time-barred.
- The tenant's affidavit stated that the premises had been used as a shop for the last 30 years; hence the building was not a residential building and an ejectment under section 13-A was not maintainable.
- The landlord had suitable accommodation available, so the landlord's claim of personal necessity was unsustainable.
- In support, counsel cited two decisions: C.R. No. 851 of 1987 (6.8.1987) and C.R. No. 2500 of 1986 (9.12.1986).
Landlord's (Respondent's) Arguments
- The 15-day period is specified in the form of summons issued under sub-section (2) of section 18-A; because the tenant failed to move the necessary application within 15 days of service, the leave application was rightly dismissed as time-barred.
- The landlord's other contentions (regarding necessity and absence of suitable accommodation) were also supported and controverted the tenant's claims.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shri B.D. Thapar v. Shri Pal Singh, 1987-1 PLR 344 | Held that the form of summons in Schedule II (specified under sub-section (2) of section 18-A) requires the tenant to file the application to obtain leave to contest within fifteen days of service. | The court relied on this earlier decision to interpret that the 15-day period specified in the summons applies to both appearance before the Controller and to filing an application for leave to contest; the decision supported the conclusion that the leave application filed after 15 days was time-barred. |
| C.R. No. 851 of 1987 (decided 6.8.1987) | This decision was cited by the tenant in support of his contention (specific rule/principle from the decision was not described in the opinion). | The opinion records that the tenant's counsel referred to this decision, but the court's reasoning does not rely on it and it was not applied in the judgment. |
| C.R. No. 2500 of 1986 (decided 9.12.1986) | This decision was cited by the tenant in support of his contention (specific rule/principle from the decision was not described in the opinion). | The opinion records that the tenant's counsel referred to this decision, but the court's reasoning does not rely on it and it was not applied in the judgment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the statutory scheme and the prescribed form of summons under section 18-A read with Schedule II. The reasoning proceeded by textual analysis of the summons and the relevant subsections:
- The Court observed that sub-section (2) of section 18-A requires the Controller to issue summons in the form specified in Schedule II after receipt of an application under section 13-A.
- The Schedule II form of summons explicitly states that the tenant is summoned to appear before the Controller "within fifteen days of the service thereof and to obtain the leave of the Controller to contest the application for eviction" and warns that in default the applicant (landlord) will be entitled after expiry of the fifteen days to obtain an order for eviction.
- Reading the summons as a whole, the Court rejected the tenant's argument that the 15-day period applied only to appearance and not to obtaining leave to contest. The Court held that such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of section 13-A read with section 18-A and the summons itself.
- Although the tenant argued that the 15-day period was not expressly provided in the text of section 18-A, the Court reasoned that the form prescribed by sub-section (2) (Schedule II) is part of the provision and therefore the period specified therein is to be treated as integral to sub-section (2) of section 18-A.
- The Court noted that sub-section (5) of section 18-A (reiterated in the last paragraph of the summons) allows the Controller to grant leave if the tenant's affidavit discloses facts that would disentitle the specified landlord from obtaining possession — but the schedule still prescribes the 15-day period within which an application for leave must be filed.
- Consequently, the Court held that the tenant who decides to contest must apply for leave within 15 days of service; failure to do so entitles the landlord to obtain an eviction order after expiry of that period.
- The Court found no illegality or infirmity in the Rent Controller's order dismissing the leave application as barred by time and in the consequent ejectment order. The Court also observed that the Rent Controller was satisfied on the landlord's affidavit that the landlord required the premises for his own occupation and had no other suitable accommodation in the relevant area.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petitions are dismissed. The court affirmed the Rent Controller's dismissal of the tenant's application for leave to contest as time-barred and upheld the consequent ejectment order dated 9.4.1987.
Implications and immediate consequences:
- The tenant's petitions challenging both the refusal of leave to contest and the ejectment order were dismissed with costs.
- The tenant was granted two months' time to vacate the premises, conditioned upon payment or deposit of all arrears of rent up to date within a fortnight and upon giving a written undertaking that vacant possession will be handed over after the expiry of the two-month period.
- If the tenant fails to comply with these conditions, the landlord is entitled to obtain vacant possession in accordance with the ejectment order.
- The court based its decision on the interpretation of the summons form prescribed in Schedule II (as part of sub-section (2) of section 18-A) and on a prior decision (Shri B.D. Thapar v. Shri Pal Singh, 1987-1 PLR 344). The opinion does not state that a new legal precedent was being created beyond the application of these statutory provisions and the earlier authority it cited.
R.M.S
Petitions dismissed.
J.V Gupta, J.:— This judgment will dispose of C.R Nos. 2022 and 2023 of 1987, as the facts are the sams in both the cases.
2. The landlord Des Raj filed ‘an application under section 13 (A) of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short the ‘Act’) against his tenant Krishan Lal for vacating House No. 8, Street No. DS-11, in Ferozepur City, on the ground of personal necessity as he had retired on 11.12.1975, after attaining the age supernnuation According to the landlord, the accommodation presently in occupation by him and his family members was insufficient to make up their requirements as he has four sons and four daughters who are married and have their own children also. The tenant Krishan Lal was occupying only one room on the ground floor of the residential building, the remaining portion of which was insufficient keeping in view the members of the family. He also filed certificate that he was retired from the cantonment Board, Ferozepur, on 11.12.1975, after attaining the age of supernnuation. Thus, he being the specified landlord under the Act, was entitled to the Summary ejectment of his tenant Krishan Lal.
3. Summons were issued to the tenant for 17.12.1986 Admittedly summons were served on him on 8.12.1986 No one appeared on 17.12.1986, as it was alleged that the lawyers were on strike. However, the case was taken up on 18.12.1986 when the tenant was present but he did not file any application or affidavit for obtaining the leave to contest. The case was adjourned to 2.1.1987 on which date, he moved an application for leave to contest the ejectment application inter alia on the ground that the building in dispute was not a residential building as he was occupying the same for the last 30 years as a shop. Moreover, the landlord had suitable accommodation with him which was sufficient for his requirements. The said application for leave to contest was opposed mainly on the ground that it was barred by time as it was filed after more than 15 days after the service of the summons. The learned Rent Controller dismissed the said application for leave to contest as barred by time vide its order dated 9.4.1987 and consequently passed the ejectment order on the same date. Dissatisfied with the same, the tenant has filed these two petitions challenging the order of ejectment as well as the order refusing leave to contest the ejectment application.
4. The learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner contended that under section 18 (A) of the Act, there was no limitation prescribed for making an application for obtaining leave to contest the ejectment application. Thus, argued the learned counsel, the application filed on 2.1.1987, for obtaining leave to contest could not be dismissed as barred by time. Moreover, argued the learned counsel, in the affidavit filed by his client he stated that he was occupying the premises in dispute for the last 30 years as a shop and hence it could not be held to be residential building. Moreover, suitable accommodation was already there with the landlord and hence no petition under section 13 (A) of the Act, was maintainable. In view of these averments in the affidavit, it was a fit case where leave to contest should have been granted. In support of this contention, he referred to C.R No. 851 of 1987 decided on 6.8.1987 and C.R No. 2500 of 1986 decided on 9.12.1986
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the period of 15 days is given in the summons which are issued under sub section 2, section 18 (A) of the Act and since the tenant failed to move necessary application within 15 days from the date of service, his application has been rightly dismissed as barred, by time. He also controverted the other contentions raised oh behalf of the tenant.
6. The main controversy between the parties, is whether there is any limitation prescribed under section 18 (A) of the Act, for moving an application to obtain leave to contest the ejectment application or not. This matter came up for consideration earlier before me in a case reported as Shri B.D Thapar… v. Shri Pal Singh…. . 1987-1 PLR 344., wherein it was observed that “for filing an ejectment petition under section 13-A, form of summons is prescribed ander the Act itself, as given in Schedule II thereof. It has been categorically provided therein that the application to obtain the leave of the Controller to contest the application for eviction under section 13-A should be filed within 15 days of the service thereof. Thus, it could not be successfully argued that the tenant was misled in any manner”. Sub Section 2 of section 18-A provides that after an application under section 13-A is received, the Controller shall issue summons for service on the tenant in the form specified in Schedule II. Sub section 4 thereof further provides that the tenant on whom the service of summons has been declared to have been validly made under sub section (3), shall have no right to contest the prayer for eviction from the residential building or scheduled building, as the case may, unless he filed an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Controller as thereunder provided
7. From these provisions, it is quite evident that summons are issued under sub-section (2) of section 18-A in the form prescribed in Schedule II, which may be reproduced as under:—
“Form of summons in a case where recovery of possession of residential building or scheduled building is prayed for under section 13-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949
(Name, description and place of residence of the tenant)
Whereas Shri---------------------------------------has filed an application (a copy of which is annexued) for your eviction from-------------------- (here insert the particulars of the residential building or scheduled building) under section 13-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949;
Now, therefore, you are hereby summoned to appear before the Controller within fifteen days of the service thereof and to obtain the leave of the Controller to contest the application for eviction under section 13-A of the said Act in default whereof, the applicant will be entitled at any time after the expiry of the said period of fiteen days to obtain an order for your eviction from the said residential building or scheduled building.
Leave to appear and contest the application may be obtained on an application to the Controller supported by an affidavit as is referred to in sub-section (5) of section 18-A of the said Act.”
8. According to the learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner, the tenant is to appear before the Controller within 15 days of the service of the summons but in order to obtain the leave of the Controller to contest the application, this period of 15 days could not be applied. According to the learned counsel, since this period of 15 days was not provided under section 18-A as such, therefore, the same could not be read in the summons. In any case, even in the last para of the summons though it has been provided that leave to appear and contest the application may be obtained on an application to the Controller supported by an affidavit as referred to in sub-section 5 in section 18-A of the said Act but no period as such of 15 days has been given therein.
9. If the summons are read as a whole, it could not be successfully argued on behalf of the tenant-petitioner that the period of 15 days was provided only for the appearance before the Controller and not for obtaining the leave to contest the application. To put any other interpretation will be defeating the very purpose of the provisions of section 13 (A) read with section 18-A of the Act. If no period of 15 days as such is prescribed for making an application for obtaining the leave of the Controller, to contest and it is left open to the tenant to move such an application as and when it is convenient to him, it will be violative of the language used in the summons. It may be that the period of 15 days was not provided under section 18-A of such but the form of the summons has been specified in sub-section 2 of section 18-A of the Act in Schedule II. Thus the said form will be deemed to be a part of sub-section 2 of section 18-A of the Act. The last para of the summons only reiterates the provisions of sub-section 5 of Section 18-A of the said Act, which provide that the Controller may give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the specified landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the residential building. Apart from that, 15 days period is given for appearan e as well as to obtain leave of the Controller to contest the application under section 13 (A) of the Act. It is not obligatory on the tenant to put in appearance unless he has the inclination to contest the eviction petition. That itself is enough to suggest that if he, makes up his mind to appear, he must apply for leave to contest within the period allowed i. e. 15 days from the date of service. In default, the landlord will be entitled at any time after the expiry of the said period of 15 days to obtain an order for his eviction as provided in the summons itself. That further makes the period of 15 days relevant. In these circumstances, I do not find and illegality or infirmity in the order of the Rent Controller as to be interfered with in this petition.
10. Once the application to obtain leave to contest is dismissed as barred by time, the landlord was entitled to obtain an order for eviction. Moreover, in the present case, the Rent Controller was satisfied from the affidavit filed by the landlord in support of his application of ejectment that the landlord required the premises for his own occupation as he does not possess any other suitable accommodation in the area concerned Consequently both the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. However, the tenant is allowed two months time to vacate the premises provided all the arrears of rent up to-date are deposited or paid within a fortnight with a further undertaking in writing that after the expiry of the said period, vacant possession will be handed over to the landlord.
R.M.S
Petitions dismissed.
Alert