Gupta, J.:— This is an appeal against an order of a learned Single Judge of this Court by which a petition filed by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution was dismissed. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at some length we are of the opinion that this appeal must be allowed.

2. The appellant is the owner of considerable land in Tanakpur. On the 1st of April, 1964, a notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was published, in which it was stated that about 6 acres of land were required for a public purpose and that the provisions contained in Sec. 17 of the Act were applicable. The details of the area measuring approximately 6 acres sought to be acquired were stated in the notification as follows:—

“Zila — Nainital. Pargana — Tanakpur. Mauza — Tanakpur.”

3. After this came a statement that the land was required for building a Roadways Workshop and for a parking place for buses. This statement was followed by a note to the effect that a site-plan of the above land could be seen in the office of the Collector at Nainital.

4. This was followed by a notification under Sec. 6 of the Act dated the 7th of May, 1964, in which the description of the property and the purpose for which it was required were repeated as above and there was an identical note that the site-plan might be inspected at the office of the Collector, Nainital.

5. The appellant filed the petition giving rise to this appeal claiming a writ of certiorari quashing the above notifications under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Act on a number of grounds. Out of those grounds the only one which has been pressed before us was to the effect that the description of the property in both the notifications was too vague to satisfy the requirements of the law. The learned Single Judge took the view that since the location of the land could be ascertained on seeing the site-plan in the office of the Collector, Nainital, none of the notifications was bad and having found the other grounds raised in support of the petition not sustainable, he dismissed the petition.

6. At the hearing before us it has been urged that both the notifications are bad because the description of the property in both the notifications was extremely vague and there was no justification in law for expecting a large number of persons living in Tanakpur, far away from Naini Tal, to proceed to Naini Tal to look into the site-plan to find out as to whether and if so which of them were affected or likely to be affected by the proceedings under the Act.

7. As regards the notification under Sec. 6 of the Act, the law requires that it must specify the particular land sought to be acquired. A notification stating merely that 6 acres of land situate in Mauza Tanakpur, Pargana Tanakpur, in the district of Nainital, are needed is wholly insufficient to satisfy the requirement that the notification must state the particular land sought to be acquired. Tanakpur is a rail head and at the census in 1951, it was found that Mauza Tanakpur covered an area of 690 acres (Vide district Census Handbook, Uttar Pradesh, vol. 36, relating to Nainital District, at page 144). In the absence of any indication as to the locality in which the 6 acres sought to be acquired were situate it appears manifest that, in view particularly of the large acreage covered by Mauza Tanakpur, the notification is too vague to be accepted as satisfying the requirements of the law. As regards the plea that the particular land sought to be acquired could be found out by looking at the site-plan at the Collectorate at Nainital, we are faced with the situation that Tanakpur has a large population. According to the census mentioned earlier, the population of Tanakpur in the year 1951 was 2665. As regards this large population, the assertion of the appellant was that most of them owned land. Even in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the state, it was stated that the total number of tenants at Tanakpur were 172 persons; and apart from the tenants, it is obvious that owners of the land and licensees too would be persons who would be interested in objecting to proceedings involving the acquisition of their land. It would, therefore, appear that an inspection of the site-plan in the office of the Collector at Nainital would involve two or three hundred persons taking a journey from Tanakpur to Nainital for the purpose merely of finding out whether they had anything to do with the land sought to be acquired. And this journey, as far as we have been able to gather, would mean covering almost of hundred miles by a circuitous route. We consider that to expect such a large number of persons to take such a long journey for the purpose mentioned above is placing on a large section of the public of Tanakpur too onerous a burden. A similar situation arose, in respect of similar notifications, before a Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us was a member, in Kunwar Ram Pratap Narain Singh v. The land Acquisition Officer, Deoria Civil Misc. Writ No. 1237 of 1959, decided on 21st of Sept., 1961.. In that case the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act described the land sought to be acquired by stating merely that an area of O. 216 acres was required in the district of Deoria, Pargana Sidhuwa Jobana, village Padrauna. In the notification under Sec. 6 of the Act the description of the property was no better, and there was a note at the foot of that notification that a plan of the land might be inspected in the office of the Collector at Deoria. Both the notifications were quashed.

8. In the case of Ram Sewak v. State of U.P A.I.R 1963 Alld. 24. Jagdish Sahai, J. held, in respect of a notification under Sec. 6 of the Act, that the land sought to be acquired must be particularised in a definite manner and that though it was not necessary in every case to mention the numbers of the plots or the names of the persons whose land was sought to be acquired, it was necessary to disclose enough information to indicate to the public and to the persons concerned as to which property was being acquired. It was observed that if the notification suffered from a defect of want of particularity it was not in accordance with law.

9. We have no hesitation in accepting the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the notification under Sec. 6 of, the Act, in the present case, does not satisfy the requirements of the law and must be quashed.

10. Turning now to the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act, learned counsel for the State urged that the amount of particularity required in a notification under Sec. 6 of the Act was not required in a notification under Sec. 4 of the Act; and further, that in view of the fact that the provisions of Sec. 17 of the Act had been applied by the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act, no prejudice could possibly be caused to any interested person. After examining this contention at some length we find it devoid of merit.

11. Counsel for the State placed reliance on certain observations of Jagdish Sahai, J. in Ram Sewak v. State of U.P in respect of a notification under Sec. 4 of the Act. It was observed by the learned Judge as follows:—

“It is clear that the law does not require that the notification under Sec. 4 should mention the specific plots or the names of the persons whose land is sought to be acquired. All that is required by the section is that the notification must mention the locality in which the land is being acquired. In the present case the village, the pargana and the district have been clearly mentioned in the notification. The area has also been mentioned. It thus appears to me that the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act was in conformity with the law and does not suffer from any defect for not mentioning the names of the persons whose land was sought to be acquired as also the numbers of the plots. I find support for the view that I am taking from the case of Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay A.I.R 1960 S.C 1203..”

12. The notification in the case which gave rise to the above decision was in respect of 31.05 acres land sought to be acquired in village Gohand situate in Pargana Rath in the district of Hamirpur. It may be that the learned Judge took the view that the mention of village Gohand was sufficient to meet the requirement that the notification must mention the locality in which the land is being acquired. For all we know, village Gohand may be a very small village, with only a few acres of land, and in that context the mention of the village may have been treated as sufficient compliance with the requirement that the locality must be mentioned. As regards Tanakpur, however, we are of the opinion that having regard to the large population living in that village, as also the large acreage of land comprised in that village, it is not possible to accept the contention that the mere mention of village Tanakpur constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirement of Sec. 4 of the Act that the notification must mention the locality in which the land sought to be acquired is situate. The learned Judge referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay. We have perused the decision of the Supreme Court in the above case and we are of the opinion that there is nothing therein to lend support to the view that, in every case, the mere mention of the name of the village where the land sought to be acquired maybe situate constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirement of the law. The question which arose for consideration by the Supreme Court was as to whether the acquisition of land for a certain purpose constituted acquisition for a public purpose and, secondly, whether it was necessary that the fact that land was needed for a public purpose must expressly be mentioned in the notification. There was neither any controversy nor any discussion in the above case as regards the question of mentioning the locality or the particulars of the land sought to be acquired. We are unable to accept that the decision of Jagdish Sahai, J. in Ram Sewak's case lays down that in every case the mere mention of the village in a notification under Sec. 4 of the Act amounts to sufficient compliance with the requirement that the locality must be stated in the notification. We would like to add, moreover, that if the learned Judge intended to lay down such a proposition, we respectfully differ from the same. We should also like to add that the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Kunwar Ram Pratap Narain Singh v. The Land Acquisition Officer, Deoria, referred to earlier in this judgment, fully supports our view that a notification under Sec. 4 of the Act must give sufficient particulars of the land sought to be acquired and that the mere mention of the name of a village which has a fairly large area and a considerable population is wholly insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the law.

13. Reference may also be made to the decision of a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Iftikhar Ahmed son of Dost Mohammad v. State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R 1961 M.P 140., which is in accord with the view we are taking.

14. As regards the contention based on the fact that the provisions contained in Sec. 17 of the Act were applied by the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act, we are of the opinion that circumstance makes no difference to the requirement as to the description of the land sought to be acquired. Certain disabilities follow a notification under Sec. 4 of the Act. For example, in order to assess the compensation payable the value of the land as it was on the date of the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act is taken into consideration. If the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act were permitted to be vague merely because the provisions contained in Sec. 17 had been applied, unwary persons would run the risk of getting no compensation for making improvements or raising constructions on their land. This very contention was considered by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Iftikhar Ahmed referred to above, in para. 11 of the said report it is stated as follows:—

“It is contended on behalf of the State that as the application of Sec. 5-A of the Act has been dispensed with, there is no prejudice to the petitioner as he could not prefer any objections in any case. That is so; but there is another effect which the notification under Sec. 4 produces. Under Sec. 23, clause firstly, the market value of the land as existed on the date of that notification is fixed for purposes of compensation. If a vague notification, like the present one, is allowed to pass muster, it can be used to freeze the value of any 6 acres of land in the big city of Bhopal. This would surely be far from the intention of the Act.” We respectfully agree with the above reasoning. We would, however, like to observe that we express no opinion as regards the question whether the consequence of applying the provisions of Sec. 5-A of the Act is that a person interested is deprived of a right to prefer objections. The Supreme Court in the case of Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. The State of Uttar Pradesh A.I.R 1967 S.C 1081. has held that the power to apply the provisions contained in Sec. 17 of the Act is confined to waste land or arable land and that if those provisions are applied to land which is neither waste nor arable, the jurisdiction of the Government to invoke Sec. 17 does not exist. It may very well be that in case the provisions of Sec. 17 of the Act are applied in respect of land which is neither waste or arable, a party interested may be entitled to approach the government with a representation against invoking the aid of the provisions contained in Sec. 17 of the Act. We, however express no opinion on this matter as it is not necessary for the purpose of deciding this appeal. Suffice it to say that the mere fact that the provisions of Sec. 17 of the Act have been applied does not lead to the result that the necessity of specifying adequate particulars of the property sought to be acquired can be dispensed with. There is no doubt a difference between the particularity required to be notified under Sec. 6 of the Act and the particularity required to be notified under Sec. 4 of the Act, but for the reasons given by us earlier, the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act in the present case does not satisfy even the minimum which appears to us to have been necessary. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the contention based on the application of the provisions contained in Sec. 17 of the Act has also no merit. In our opinion, both the notifications under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Act, which have been sought to be impugned, are bad and must be quashed.

15. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Judge whereby the appellant's petition was dismissed and direct the issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the notifications dated the 1st of April, 1964, under Sec. 4 of the Act, and dated the 7th May, 1964, under Sec. 6 of the Act. The appellant shall be entitled to his costs in the writ petition as also in this appeal.

Appeal allowed.