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Abbas Dhali v. Masabdi Karikar
Facts:
The defendant appeals a decision regarding a suit for recovery of possession of land. The plaintiff, who claims ownership, has initiated a legal action to reclaim possession. However, despite a transfer of ownership, Gopal, the defendant, has remained in possession of the property in question. The key issue arises from the plaintiff's claim being dismissed by the Court of First Instance, which ruled that the suit was barred by limitation.
Issue:
The primary legal question presented in this appeal is whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by the statute of limitations, specifically considering the implications of successive transfers of property ownership.
Holding:
The appellate court finds that the suit is indeed barred by limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act.
Reasoning:
The Court of First Instance dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the grounds that the plaintiff had not been in possession of the property within the twelve years preceding the filing of the suit. The appellate court concurs with this assessment, emphasizing the applicability of Article 136 to the circumstances of the case.
The court notes that allowing the limitation period to be extended indefinitely through successive transfers would not align with legislative intent. In situations where multiple transfers have occurred, and all vendors have been out of possession, Article 136 should be interpreted to include the first vendor in the series as the party entitled to sue for possession. Therefore, the plaintiff's claim, based on ownership transfer without possession, fails to meet the statutory requirements for recovery.
Conclusion:
The appellate court affirms the lower court's ruling, holding that the plaintiff's suit for recovery of possession is barred by limitation due to the lack of possession within the requisite time frame. The interpretation of Article 136 reinforces the principle that ownership alone does not confer the right to possession if the owner has not exercised that right within the statutory period. The appeal is dismissed, and the decision of the Court of First Instance stands.
Dissent/Concurrence:
[If applicable, include any dissenting or concurring opinions here.]
Notes:
[Any additional notes or comments regarding the case or its implications may be included here.]
1. This appeal by the defendant in a suit for recovery of possession of land raises an important question of limitation. For this purpose the facts found by the Subordinate Judge may be briefly stated. The property originally belonged to a man named Gopal. On 22nd March 1893 Gopal conveyed the property to two persons Krishna and Jadu. Notwithstanding this transfer however Gopal continued in possession of the property. On 29th February 1900 Krishna and Jadu, who had never obtained possession of the property, conveyed it to Ibrahim Ibrahim also never obtained possession and on 21st March 1904 conveyed the property to the plaintiff. The plaintiff commenced this action on 14th March 1910 against the defendant who, it has been found, has no title. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit as barred by limitation on the ground that the plaintiff had no possession within twelve years of the date of suit. No reference was expressly made to any provision of the Limitation Act, but apparently Article 142 was applied.
2. It is obvious however that Article 142 has no application, because that article contemplates a suit for possession of immoveable property when the plaintiff, while in possession, has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession. Upon appeal the Subordinate Judge held that Article 144 was applicable and came to the conclusion that as the defendant had not proved adverse possession for more than 12 years, the title of the plaintiff had not been extinguished. It is plain however that recourse cannot he had to Article 144 till it has been established that the suit is not covered by any other provision of the Limitation Act. In our opinion Article 136 is clearly applicable to the circumstances of this case.
3. Article 136 provides that a suit by a purchaser at a private sale for possession of immovable property sold when the vendor was out of possession at the date of the sale roust be commenced within 12 years from the date when the vendor is first entitled to possession. This suit has been brought by a purchaser at a private sale for possession of immoveable property sold to him by his vendor who was out of possession at the date of the sale and is consequently within the scope of Article 136: Gopal v. Krishna Rao . [1901] 25 Bom. 275. The question thus arises: Has the suit been commenced within twelve years from the date when the vendor was first entitled to possession?
4. On behalf of the respondent it has been argued that the vendor of the plaintiff was first entitled to possession when his title accrued, namely, when be acquired title by purchase on the 21st 1904. This contention, it may be conceded, is supported by the language of Article 136 if the words are literally taken. This literal interpretation, however defeats the very object of Article 136, which embodies the principle that a purchaser at a private sale when the vendor was out of possession at the date of sale is in no better position than his vendor and has to bring his suit within the same period as would be allowed to his vendor. This doctrine was recognized in the case of Bhikare Panda v. Ajoodhya Persad . [1865] 3 W.R 176. which laid down the fundamental principle that a vendor cannot confer upon the transferee a better title than he himself possesses. In the case before us the vendors of the vendor of the plaintiff were bound to sue within 12 years from 22nd March 1893, that is, before 22nd March 1905. The vendor of the plaintiff could be in no better position than, his vendors, and was consequently bound to sue before 22nd March 1905. The plaintiff under his conveyance only acquired a title to recover the property by a suit instituted before 22nd March 1905, and the mere fact that he has purchased the property does not give him a fresh start. As was observed by Lord Kingsdown in the case of Prannath Roy Chowdry v. Rookea Begum . [1857-59] 7 M.I.A 323 a cause of action is not prolonged by mere transfer of title. If this view were not adopted, the period of limitation might be indefinitely extended by successive transfers, which could never have been the intention of the legislature. In a case like the present, where there have been transfers by successive vendors, who have all been out of possession, Article 136 may well be construed so as to include in the term “vendor” the first in the series of vendors who was entitled to sue for possession. In this view the suit is clearly barred by limitation.
5. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decree of the Subordinate Judge set aside and that of the Court of first instance restored with costs both here and in the Court of appeal below.
V.B/R.K
6. Appeal allowed.
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