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Krishna Kishore De v. Amarnath Kshettry
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal was brought by the plaintiff in a suit seeking to declare invalid, so far as it affected land situated beyond the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court, the decree in a mortgage suit (Suit No. 1083 of 1912). The plaintiff's contention was that leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent could not properly have been granted and that the decree was therefore, to that extent, made without jurisdiction.
Material facts (not in controversy): On 30 August 1907 certain persons (described as the Mookerjees) and their trustee Bhattacharjya executed a simple mortgage in favour of Banerjee to secure Rs. 25,000, charged upon a share of lots Santoshpur and Mandalika, Patni Mahals in sub-district Howrah (district of Hooghly) — i.e., moffusil property. On 13 December 1907 Banerjee executed a mortgage in favour of the Khettrys to secure Rs. 20,000; that mortgage included a share of two parcels in the town of Calcutta and the interest of Banerjee as mortgagee under the 30 August 1907 document.
On 23 September 1911 the patni taluk Mandalika was released and discharged from the mortgage of 30 August 1907 on payment of Rs. 10,000 with concurrence of interested parties. On 25 November 1912 the Khettrys instituted Suit No. 1083 of 1912 on the Original Side to enforce their security of 13 December 1907 against Banerjee, the Mookerjees and Bhattacharjya. The suit was in essence composite: (a) to enforce a right of sale of Calcutta properties under the 13 December mortgage; and (b) to enforce a right of sale of moffusil properties under the 30 August mortgage by virtue of the Khettrys' derivative title from Banerjee.
The Khettrys obtained leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent on the assumption the clause was applicable. The suit was decreed ex parte on 2 September 1914 and the preliminary decree was made absolute on 24 August 1917. Meanwhile, the plaintiff De purchased the rights of the Mookerjees and Bhattacharjya at an execution sale on 20 June 1916 and, on 29 July 1918, instituted the present suit to impeach the decree's validity in so far as it affected moffusil land beyond the local limits of the High Court's Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. In the Court below Mr. Justice Greaves had held that the High Court was competent to grant leave under clause 12 and that the decree was made with jurisdiction.
The appeal contested the grant of leave under clause 12 and the resultant jurisdiction to decree sale of moffusil properties by a suit on the Original Side that joined distinct causes of action affecting different sets of persons and properties lying partly outside the High Court's Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent could properly be granted to entertain a composite suit on the Original Side that sought, by derivative title, to enforce a mortgage affecting moffusil property situated beyond the local limits of the High Court's Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction.
- Whether the inclusion of Calcutta property in a sub-mortgage by the mortgagee (thereby giving the sub-mortgagee a Calcutta property interest) entitles the sub-mortgagee to alter the forum for enforcement of the original mortgage against the original mortgagor so as to permit suit on the Original Side in respect of moffusil properties.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The leave under clause 12 was improperly granted and, consequently, the decree is without jurisdiction so far as it affects moffusil land beyond the local limits of the High Court's Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction.
- Where the original mortgage related to moffusil property and the original mortgagor could only have been sued in the moffusil Court, a sub-mortgagee cannot, by including Calcutta property in a mortgage given to him by the mortgagee, change the forum so as to make the original mortgagor liable to be sued in a Court (the High Court Original Side) not contemplated by the original mortgage contract.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents (the Khettrys) relied on authority indicating that where some mortgaged properties are within and some are without the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, the High Court has jurisdiction to grant leave to sue in respect of all the properties (citing Matigara Coal Co., Ltd. v. Shragers, Ltd. and Sarat Chandra Roy Chowdhry v. M.M Nahapiet).
- As an alternative or last resort, respondents argued that the jurisdictional objection should have been raised in the original suit and, since it was not, the rule of constructive res judicata should apply — i.e., the parties should be placed in the position as if the point had been raised, contested and decided in favour of the Khettrys.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Shankar Lal v. Ganesh Prasad | That a sub-mortgagee is entitled to bring a suit against his mortgagor to realise dues on his mortgage by sale or foreclosure. | Used to establish the settled principle that a sub-mortgagee can sue to enforce his security. |
| Muthu Vijia Raghunatha Ramachandra Vacha Mahali Thurai v. Venkatachallam Chetti | Same principle: entitlement of sub-mortgagee to sue the mortgagor. | Grouped with other authorities to show the established right of sub-mortgagees to sue. |
| Narayan Vithal Maval v. Ganoji | Same principle regarding rights of sub-mortgagee. | Cited to support the proposition that sub-mortgagees may enforce their security. |
| Bansi Lal Bhagat v. Durga Prasad | Same principle regarding rights of sub-mortgagee. | Included among authorities establishing the sub-mortgagee's right to sue. |
| Zaki Hasan v. Deo Nath Sahai | That a sub-mortgagee may, at his election, frame his suit so as to enforce the original mortgage against the mortgagor of his mortgagor (by virtue of derivative title). | Relied on to explain the nature and limits of the derivative right of a sub-mortgagee. |
| Matigara Coal Co., Ltd. v. Shragers, Ltd. | That where some mortgaged properties are within and some without the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, the Court has jurisdiction to grant leave and entertain a suit in respect of all such properties. | Cited by respondents; Court held this authority was not of assistance for a composite suit joining distinct causes of action affecting different persons and properties entirely in the moffusil. |
| Sarat Chandra Roy Chowdhry v. M.M. Nahapiet | Same principle as Matigara regarding mixed-location mortgages and leave under clause 12. | Court observed that this principle might assist a suit against the mortgagee alone but not a composite suit that attempted to alter forum in relation to the original mortgagor. |
| Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhuri v. Hari Dasi Debi (judgment of Lord Moulton) | Referenced in relation to the proposition that a decree made without jurisdiction must be deemed so. | Cited by way of comparison/confirmation for the conclusion that the decree affecting moffusil properties was without jurisdiction. |
| Rajlakshmi Dasee v. Katyayani Dasee | Authority concerning the principle that an order or decree of a Court without jurisdiction is void and cannot be made the basis of res judicata. | Used to support the rejection of the respondents' res judicata argument and to state the controlling principle. |
| Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrikah Singh | Same strand: reviewed decisions on voidness of orders from courts lacking subject-matter jurisdiction. | Referenced to show the recent decisions reviewing prior law on jurisdiction and res judicata. |
| Ramjit Misser v. Remador Singh | Same strand: supports proposition that lack of subject-matter jurisdiction renders an order void and not res judicata. | Referred to as part of the body of authority reviewed to reject the respondents' contention. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a sequence of legal observations and applications strictly grounded in the materials and authorities cited in the opinion:
- Confirmed established principles: The court accepted that it is well settled a sub-mortgagee may sue his mortgagor to realise his security and, by virtue of derivative title, may (if he elects) frame a suit to enforce the original mortgage against the original mortgagor. (Citations: the group of sub-mortgagee cases and Zaki Hasan v. Deo Nath Sahai.)
- Identified the jurisdictional problem arising from mixed-location properties: The court observed that where the properties comprised in the original mortgage are situated in the moffusil while additional properties included by the mortgagee are in Calcutta, a question arises whether the inclusion of Calcutta property in a sub-mortgage permits alteration of the forum for enforcement of the original mortgage against the original mortgagor. The court answered this question negatively.
- Analyzed the parties' relative positions and the contractual bargain: The court reasoned that a sub-mortgagee can do no more in respect of the original mortgagor than the mortgagee himself could have done. Because the original mortgagor could only have been sued in the moffusil Court with respect to the original mortgage liabilities, the mortgagee's grant of a sub-mortgage that includes Calcutta property cannot be permitted to prejudice the original mortgagor by rendering him liable to be sued in the High Court Original Side — a forum not contemplated by the original contract.
- Interpreted clause 12 of the Letters Patent: The court read clause 12 (quoted in the opinion) and held that its language does not justify straining it to cover a composite suit of the sort before the Court in which distinct causes of action affecting different sets of persons (one set with properties entirely in the moffusil) are joined to make the whole suit maintainable on the Original Side.
- Distinguished precedents urged by respondents: The court accepted that authorities such as Matigara Coal Co. and Sarat Chandra Roy Chowdhry show that where some mortgaged properties are within and some without the local limits, the Court may have jurisdiction to grant leave to sue in respect of all properties. However, the court found those authorities inapplicable to a composite suit that joins distinct causes of action affecting different defendants and where one set of defendants' properties are entirely outside the local limits; such authorities would be relevant to a suit against the mortgagee alone but not to the present composite suit.
- Rejected the res judicata / waiver argument: The court held that an objection as to want of jurisdiction cannot be cured by failure to raise it in the original suit. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is essential; an order or decree made by a Court lacking jurisdiction is void and cannot operate as res judicata. The court relied on recent decisions (Rajlakshmi Dasee, Gurdeo Singh, Ramjit Misser) and on the principle underlying section 11 CPC that res judicata presupposes a judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction.
- Concluded on jurisdiction and remedy: On these bases the court concluded that the High Court was not competent to grant leave under clause 12 for the composite suit so as to affect moffusil properties, and that the decree insofar as it affected those properties must be treated as made without jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED.
Direct consequences and relief awarded by the Court (as stated in the opinion):
- The preliminary decree in Suit No. 1083 of 1912 (passed 2 September 1914), the decree absolute (24 August 1917), and all subsequent orders made on their basis are set aside insofar as they affect properties in the moffusil (i.e., beyond the local limits of the High Court's Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction).
- Suit No. 1083 of 1912 is to stand revived at the stage when leave under clause 12 was granted. The Khettrys, as plaintiffs in that suit, are at liberty to amend their plaint if they so desire. If the suit is limited to enforcing the mortgage of 13 December 1907 against Banerjee alone, it will be tried on the merits.
- The appellant is entitled to costs both in the High Court and in the Court below, including costs of the order made on 7 August 1918.
- Fletcher, J. agreed with the judgment (concurring).
Broader implications discussed by the Court (limited to the content of the opinion): The Court explained and applied the legal principle that a sub-mortgagee's derivative rights are limited by the forum rights of the original mortgagee and original mortgagor; it declined to extend clause 12 of the Letters Patent so as to permit alteration of the forum in a manner that would prejudice the original mortgagor. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel procedural rule beyond these applications; it applies settled principles concerning jurisdiction, derivative rights of sub-mortgagees, and the voidness of judgments rendered without subject-matter jurisdiction.
Additional Procedural and Party Information
The judgment records the attorneys of record:
- Attorney for the appellant: H.C. Ghose.
- Attorney for the respondents: J.K. Dutt.
Mookerjee, J.:— This is an appeal by the plaintiff in a suit to declare the invalidity of the decree in a mortgage suit in so far as such decree affects land situated beyond the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court, on the ground that leave under clause 12 could not have been granted and the decree was consequently to that extent made without jurisdiction. The question raised is of first impression, and the facts material for its determination are not in controversy.
On the 30th August, 1907, certain persons who may be called the Mookerjees and their trustee, one Bhattacharjya (represented by defendants Nos. 4-9 in the present litigation), executed a simple mortgage in favour of Banerjee (defendant No. 3), to secure the repayment of a loan of Rs. 25,000, which was charged upon a share of lots Santoshpur and Mandalika, Patni Mahals in sub-district Howrah within the district of Hooghly. On the 13th December 1907, Banerjee executed a mortgage in favour of the Khettrys (represented by defendants Nos. 1 and 2) to secure a loan of Rs. 20,000. The properties conveyed and assured by this mortgage included a share of two parcels of land in the town of Calcutta as also the interest of Banerjee as mortgagee under the document of the 30th August, 1907. On the 23rd September, 1911, the patni taluk Mandalika was released and absolutely discharged from the mortgage of the 30th August, 1907, upon payment of Rs. 10,000 by the original mortgagors and with the concurrence of all the parties interested. On the 25th November 1912, the Khettrys instituted a suit (No. 1083 of 1912) on the Original Side of this Court to enforce their security of the 13th December, 1907, against Banerjee, the Mookerjees and Bhattacharjya. It is necessary to observe that the suit was brought by the Khettrys not only against their mortgagor Banerjee but also against the mortgagors of Banerjee under the transaction of the 30th August, 1907. The reason for this was that the Khettrys sought, not merely to enforce their security against their mortgagor Banerjee and to cut off his equity of redemption under the mortgage of the 13th December, 1907, but also to enforce the mortgage held by Banerjee against the Mookerjees and Bhattacharjya under the deed of the 30th August, 1907; this relief they claimed under their derivative title from Banerjee who had granted a mortgage of his interest as mortgagee. The suit was thus in essence a composite suit wherein two distinct reliefs were claimed by the Khettrys, namely, first, to enforce a right of sale of Calcutta properties under the mortgage of the 13th December, 1907, and, secondly, to enforce a right of sale of moffusil properties under the mortgage of the 30th August, 1907. The Khettrys, accordingly, prayed for and obtained leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent on the assumption that the clause was applicable. The suit was decreed ex parte on the 2nd September, 1914, and the preliminary decree then passed was made absolute on the 24th August, 1917. Meanwhile, the plaintiff De had purchased the right, title and interest of the Mookerjees and Bhattacharjya at an execution sale on the 20th Jane, 1916, and on the 29th July, 1918, he instituted the present suit to impeach the validity of the decree in the suit of the Khettrys in so far as it affected land beyond the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court. Mr. Justice Greaves has held that the Court was competent to grant leave under clause 12 and that the decree was consequently made with jurisdiction.
It is now well settled by decisions in all the Indian High Courts that a sub-mortgagee is entitled to bring a suit against his mortgagor and to realise the dues on his mortgage by sale or foreclosure: Ram Shankar Lal v. Ganesh Prasad , Muthu Vijia Raghunatha Ramachandra Vacha Mahali Thurai v. Venkatachallam Chetti , Narayan Vithal Maval v. Ganoji and Bansi Lal Bhagat v. Durga Prasad . It is also open to a sub-mortgagee, but by no means obligatory on him, to frame his suit in such a way as not only to enforce his rights under his own mortgage, but to enforce the original mortgage against the mortgagor of his mortgagor: Zaki Hasan v. Deo Nath Sahai . A sub-mortgagee may thus be content to cut off the equity of redemption of his mortgagor, or he may, at his choice, by a suit properly framed, cut off the equity of redemption not merely of his mortgagor but also of the mortgagor of his mortgagor. This he is able to accomplish by reason of his derivative title. Where a mortgagee transfers his interest by way of a mortgage, his mortgagee, that is, the sub-mortgagee, takes it subject to the original mortgagor's right to redeem; consequently, the sub-mortgagee who holds a fragment of the interest of the mortgagee may achieve what the mortgagee might have obtained, namely, to cut off the equity of redemption of the original mortgagor. The form of the decree to be made in such a suit, where two-fold relief is claimed by the sub-mortgagee against his mortgagor and the mortgagor of that mortgagor is set out in Seton on Judgments (1912) page 2009 (Derivative Mortgagee v. Mortgagee and Mortgagor) and the Code of Civil Procedure, Appendix D, form 9. No difficulty arises in a suit of this description when the properties included in the original mortgage as also the additional properties, if any, comprised in the mortgage by the mortgagee are situated within the same jurisdiction. Where, however, as here the properties comprised in the original mortgage are situated in the moffusil and the additional property included in the security granted by the mortgagee is situated in the town of Calcutta, an important question of some nicety arises. The original contract of mortgage plainly contemplates a suit in the moffusil Court for its enforcement. Is the mortgagee, by the grant of a sub-mortgage along with a mortgage of property in the town of Calcutta, entitled to have the forum altered in relation to the enforcement of the original mortgage? We are clearly of opinion that the answer should be in the negative. As between the mortgagee and the sub-mortgagee a suit to enforce the security may fittingly be instituted on the Original Side of this Court; this is in conformity with the intention of the parties as indicated by the inclusion of the Calcutta property in the mortgage. If, however, the sub-mortgagee is not content with relief against his mortgagor alone and claims to have a remedy against the mortgagor of his mortgagor, the situation becomes entirely changed. As he can claim this relief only by virtue of title derived from his own mortgagor in respect of the moffusil property, he can do neither more or less than what his mortgagor could have done towards the original mortgagor. The original mortgagor, as we have seen, could have been sued by his mortgagee in respect of liabilities arising out of the mortgage transaction, only in the moffusil Court. The mortgagee, by granting a mortgage to a third person, of his interest as mortgagee and by including in that document a property in Calcutta cannot be permitted to prejudice the position of his mortgagor and to render him liable to be sued in a Court never contemplated by the parties at the time of the mortgage contract. We are of opinion that this view is consistent with a plain reading of clause 12 of the Letters Patent which, so far as it is material for our present purpose, provides as follows:
“The said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, shall be empowered to receive, try and determine suits of every description, if in the case of suits for land or other immovable property, such land or property shall be situated or, in all other cases, if cause of action shall have arisen either wholly, or, in case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of the said High Court.”
In the case before us, the Khettrys as derivative mortgagees from Banerjee, could enforce the security of the 30th August, 1907, against the Mookerjees and Bhattacharjya, just as Banerjee himself might have done, in the moffusil Court. The Khettrys might also, as the mortgagees of Banerjee, have sued him alone on the Original Side of this Court and barred his equity of redemption. But the Khettrys plainly could not be allowed, by the inclusion of two claims in one suit against two sets of persons in respect of properties situated, as regards one set in the moffusil alone, to make the composite suit against both sets of defendants maintainable on the Original Side of this Court. The decisions in Matigara Coal Co., Ltd. v. Shragers, Ltd. and Sarat Chandra Roy Chowdhry v. M.M Nahapiet are of no avail to the Khettrys; they merely show that where some of the mortgaged properties included in the mortgage deed are Within and some without the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Court, the Court has jurisdiction to grant leave to sue and to entertain a suit on the mortgage in respect of all the properties including those situated beyond the local limits. This principle might be of assistance to the Khettrys in a suit by them against Banerjee alone on the mortgage of the 13th December, 1907, which included properties in the town of Calcutta as also mortgagee interest in property in the moffusil. But there is no foundation for the argument that the suit as framed could properly be treated as one to enforce a cause of action which had arisen partly within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction; the contention is fallacious, as the causes of action under the mortgage of the 30th August, 1907, and 13th December, 1907, were distinct and affected different sets of individuals, of whom one set held properties situated entirely in the moffusil. We do not think it would be right to strain the language of clause 12 of the Letters Patent with a view to cover a case of this description. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that the Court was not competent to grant leave under that clause, and the decree, in so far as it affects properties in the moffusil, must be deemed made without jurisdiction [cf. the judgment of Lord Moulton in Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhuri v. Hari Dasi Debi ].
As a last resort, it was faintly argued on behalf of the respondent that the objection as to jurisdiction might and should have been raised in the original suit, and as it was not be raised, the rule of constructive res judicata should be applied, in other words, that the parties should be placed in the same position as if the point had been raised, contested and determined in favour of the Khettrys. There is obviously no foundation for this contention. It is an elementary principle that where a Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action in which an order is made, such order is wholly void, for jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of parties and no waiver or acquiescence on their part can make up for the lack or defect of jurisdiction. If any authority were needed to support this proposition, reference might be made to the recent decisions in Rajlakshmi Dasee v. Katyayani Dasee , Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrikah Singh and Ramjit Misser v. Remador Singh where the earlier cases will be found reviewed. But if the decision of the Court is void for want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it cannot operate as res judicata; in order that adjudgment may be conclusive between the parties, the essential pre-requisite is that it should be the judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. In this case, as already stated, the question of jurisdiction was neither raised nor decided the position might have been different if the question had been raised and decided, for where a Court judicially considers and adjudicates the question of its jurisdiction and decides that the facts exist which are necessary to give it jurisdiction over the case, the decision is conclusive till it is set aside in an appropriate proceeding. But where there has been no such adjudication, the decree remains a decree without jurisdiction and cannot operate as res judicata.
The result is that this appeal is allowed and the preliminary decree in suit No. 1083 of 1912 passed on the 2nd September, 1914, the decree absolute made on the 24th August, 1917, and all subsequent orders made on the basis thereof must be set aside. The consequence will be that suit No. 1083 of 1912 will stand revived at the stage when leave under clause 12 was granted. The Khettrys as plaintiffs in that suit will be at liberty to amend their plaint if they so desire and in such manner as they may be advised; if the suit is limited as a suit to enforce the mortgage of the 13th December, 1907, against Banerjee, it will be tried on the merits. The appellant is entitled, to his costs both here and in the Court below including the costs of the order made on the 7th August, 1918.
Fletcher, J.:— I agree.
O.M
Appeal allowed.
Attorney for the appellant: H.C Ghose.
Attorney for the respondents: J.K Dutt.
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