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Baij Nath Ram Goenka v. Nunda Kumar Singh
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Rampini, J. (with Sharfuddin, J. concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff owned a mehal that was sold by the Collector of Monghyr on 2 January 1900 for arrears of Government revenue. Appeals were preferred to the Commissioner by the plaintiff and by certain co-sharers. The minor plaintiff's appeal was dismissed for not making the auction-purchaser a party. The appeal of other co-sharers succeeded and, on 23 March 1900, the Commissioner set aside the sale. On 21 June 1900 the Commissioner purported to review his earlier order of 23 March and affirmed the sale. The Collector of Monghyr thereafter put the defendants first party into possession of the mehal. The plaintiffs then sued (1) for a declaration that the Commissioner's 21 June 1900 order was illegal and ultra vires and for recovery of possession and mesne profits, and (2) alternatively, to set aside the sale on grounds of irregularity in service of process and inadequacy of price.
The Subordinate Judge held that the Commissioner had no power to review and set aside his 23 March order, and therefore the 23 March order setting aside the sale remained valid. The Subordinate Judge also found (in the alternative) that there was no proof of service of the notice of sale and that the sale price was inadequate, but that there was no direct evidence linking inadequacy of price to the non-service of notices. The judge accordingly decreed for the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Commissioner had the power under Act XI of 1859 (the Sale Law) to review and set aside his own earlier order (the order of 23 March 1900) cancelling the sale.
- If the Commissioner did have such power, whether the plaintiffs must establish the specific grounds set out in section 33 of Act XI of 1859 (as argued by the appellants).
- Whether the Subordinate Judge was correct in holding there was no proof of service of notices of sale and whether non-service affected adequacy of price.
- Whether the Civil Court could question the propriety of the Commissioner's having reviewed his own order.
- Whether the Subordinate Judge was justified in permitting amendment of the plaint and allowing certain defendants to become co-plaintiffs after remand.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The Commissioner's order of 21 June 1900, setting aside his previous order annulling the sale, was within his powers.
- If the Commissioner had power to review, then the plaintiffs must establish the grounds specified in section 33 of Act XI of 1859.
- The plaintiffs never pleaded lack of notice of the application for review; no issue on that point was raised; and no evidence was adduced—so the Subordinate Judge erred in finding the review order bad for want of notice.
- The Commissioner could, in any case, discharge his previous order of 23 March and the Civil Court cannot call in question the propriety of his doing so.
- All notices of sale were duly served and there was a certificate of sale; therefore the Subordinate Judge should not have inquired into service.
- The sale price was adequate.
- There is no direct evidence connecting any inadequacy of price with non-service of notices.
- The Subordinate Judge should not have allowed the plaint to be amended and certain defendants to join as co-plaintiffs after remand by this Court.
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The 21 June 1900 order of the Commissioner reviewing and setting aside his earlier order of 23 March 1900 was illegal and ultra vires under the Sale Law (Act XI of 1859).
- The plaintiffs sought possession of the mehal and mesne profits on that basis.
- In the alternative, the plaintiffs sought to set aside the sale on grounds of irregularity in service of process and of inadequacy of the sale price allegedly resulting from non-service.
- The plaint alleged that the plaintiffs had no information of the review proceedings (i.e., there was no notice), and that allegation was not traversed by the contesting defendant (per Sharfuddin, J.'s summary of the record).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Tuffuzzool, Hossein v. Raghoo Nath Pershad | Relied on by appellant to support the proposition that revenue authorities have power to review or set aside their own orders. | The court observed that cases relied on by the appellant relate to Acts other than Act XI of 1859 and therefore do not control the present matter under the Sale Law; the court rejected their application here. |
| Laliteawar Singh v. Mohant Gonesh Das | Relied on to support alleged inherent or recognised review power of revenue authorities. | Court noted it relates to other Acts; held that such authorities under Act XI of 1859 have no analogous power to review an already-effective order setting aside a sale. |
| Nusseeroodin Khan v. Indro Narayan Chowdhury | One of the authorities cited for the existence of review/revision powers of revenue officers. | Court treated it as one of several cases under other enactments and declined to accept it as establishing a review power under Act XI of 1859. |
| Badaricharya v. Ram Chandra | Cited by appellant in support of review powers of revenue authorities. | Regarded as inapposite because it concerns Acts other than Act XI of 1859; court did not apply it to allow review here. |
| Ram Chandra v. Draupadi | Cited in the cluster of authorities relied upon to assert review power. | Not applied to permit review under Act XI of 1859 for reasons explained by the court (different statutory schemes). |
| Matangini Debi v. Girish Chunder Chongdar | Cited by appellant; in the reported facts the certificate officer set aside a sale and later reviewed that order; the Commissioner exercised revision under sec. 33 of the Act relevant in that case. | The court (Sharfuddin, J.) analyzed this authority: its head-notes are potentially misleading; the case involved different statutory provisions (including sec. 33) and pointedly did not resolve whether a certificate officer could review his own order where no statutory power exists. The present court treated Matangini Debi as not controlling the present case under Act XI of 1859 but acknowledged it was relied upon by the appellants. |
| Hiralal Mukerji v. Premamnyee Debi | One of the authorities cited to support review/revision powers. | Court remarked that such authorities relate to other Acts and therefore cannot be read as authorising review under Act XI of 1859. |
| Lala Pryag Lal v. Jai Narain Singh | Held that provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to review of judgments have not been extended to proceedings under Bengal Acts VII of 1868 and VII of 1880; thus an order passed on review confirming a sale was ultra vires and void. | The court relied on this decision as decisive: it established that review powers from the Civil Procedure Code are not extended to the statutory regime governing sales for arrears, that review is not inherent, and that the proper remedy is revision by the Board of Revenue (not review by the same revenue officer). This case settled the question against the appellants. |
| Sadhu Saran Singh v. Panchdeo Lal | Interpreted in the opinion as authority on applicability of appeal provisions to certain Acts and their proceedings. | Court cited it for the proposition that appeal provisions in Bengal Act VII of 1868 apply to proceedings under the Act of 1880 by reason of sec. 2 of that Act; used to show that review provisions of the Civil Procedure Code were deliberately omitted and that other remedial mechanisms (e.g., Board of Revenue supervision) exist. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court framed the decisive issue as whether the Commissioner had power on 21 June 1900 to review and set aside his prior order of 23 March 1900 which had cancelled the sale. The analysis proceeded in the following steps, relying strictly on the material and authorities discussed in the opinion:
- Admission and administrative view: It was noted that the Commissioner himself admitted on 13 July 1900 that his 21 June order was illegal and that he had no power to review an order once legally passed under the Sale Law (Act XI of 1859). The Board of Revenue expressed the same view (order of 5 September 1900).
- Statutory silence on review: The court observed that Act XI of 1859 contains no express provision enabling a Commissioner or revenue authority to review or set aside an order once legally passed under the Act.
- Appellant's reliance on other authorities: The appellants relied on multiple cases to argue for an inherent or recognised review power and urged a narrow meaning of the word "final" in section 25 (as amended). The court rejected these contentions because the cases relied on relate to statutes other than Act XI of 1859 and therefore cannot be read as establishing a review power in respect of sales under the Sale Law.
- Controlling precedent (Lala Pryag Lal): The court held that the decision in Lala Pryag Lal v. Jai Narain Singh settled the matter: the Code of Civil Procedure provisions relating to review of judgments were not extended to proceedings under the relevant Bengal Acts; consequently, a power of review is not to be assumed as inherent in every judicial or revenue officer. Where the statute provides alternative supervisory mechanisms (notably Board of Revenue revision/supervision), the legislature has signalled that orders passed by Commissioners are not open to review but are open to revision by superior authority.
- Result on ultra vires: Applying the foregoing, the court concluded the Commissioner's order of 21 June 1900 affirming the sale was ultra vires and of no effect; the earlier order of 23 March 1900 setting aside the sale therefore stands.
- Service and adequacy issues: Although the Subordinate Judge found no evidence of service of sale notices, Rampini, J. disagreed and considered there was sufficient evidence of service (noting chowkidars denying service were not truthful). The court also observed that the auction-purchaser had obtained a certificate of sale which, under section 8 of Act VII of 1868, would bar any contention as to non-service of notice. Nevertheless, the Subordinate Judge had found there was no direct evidence connecting inadequacy of price to non-service, and the appellate decision did not disturb that particular factual conclusion.
- Amendment of plaint and joinder: The court found no reason to fault the Subordinate Judge in allowing the plaint to be amended after remand and permitting certain defendants to become co-plaintiffs; their suit was not time-barred and the judge limited their mesne profits claim to commence from the date of decree.
- Concurrence and additional observations: Sharfuddin, J. concurred and added that provisions relied upon in Lala Pryag Lal (secs. 19 and 24 of Act VII of 1880) had been reembodied in later legislation (repealing Act I of 1895). He revisited Matangini Debi and explained why that decision does not mandate a different result in the present matter because it concerned different provisions (including sec. 33 in that statute) and presented differing factual and statutory circumstances.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The court held that the Commissioner's order of 21 June 1900, purporting to review and set aside his earlier order of 23 March 1900, was ultra vires and of no effect. The 23 March 1900 order setting aside the sale therefore remains valid, and the Subordinate Judge's decree in favour of the plaintiffs is upheld.
Consequences and immediate effects:
- The plaintiffs are entitled to the relief awarded by the Subordinate Judge (possession and mesne profits as decreed).
- The purported review by the Commissioner under Act XI of 1859 is invalid; where a statutory regime omits review, the remedy for dissatisfaction with a Commissioner's order is revision/supervision by the Board of Revenue (as established by Lala Pryag Lal and related statutory interpretation in this opinion).
- Although the appellate court disagreed with the Subordinate Judge's factual finding on service (finding sufficient evidence of service), that disagreement did not alter the final result because the Commissioner's review was ultra vires.
- Amendment of the plaint and joinder of co-sharers as plaintiffs after remand was properly permitted by the Subordinate Judge; the court limited costs and mesne profits appropriately (Sheodin to get only costs incurred after remand when he became plaintiff).
- The respondents' cross-appeal was not pressed and was dismissed.
Broader legal implication (as discussed in the opinion): The judgment reads sectional and statutory omissions (absence of provisions for review in the Sale Law and related Bengal Acts) as deliberate, implying that orders of Commissioners under these enactments are not to be treated as subject to internal review by the same officer but are subject to revision by a superior administrative authority (the Board of Revenue). The court relied on precedent (Lala Pryag Lal) to underscore that the power of review under the Civil Procedure Code does not apply where the statute has not extended it.
No new expansive principle was declared beyond the application of existing precedent and statutory interpretation to these facts; the decision confirms the limitation on a Commissioner's power to review his own order in the context of sales under Act XI of 1859.
Appeal dismissed.
Costs: appeal dismissed with costs; Sheodin to recover only costs incurred after the order of remand when he became plaintiff; respondent's cross-appeal dismissed (not pressed).
Rampini, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit brought (1) to obtain a declaration that an order by the Commissioner of Bhagalpore, dated the 21st June 1900, reviewing and setting aside an order of his of the 23rd March 1900, by which he had set aside a sale for arrears of Government revenue, was illegal and ultra vires, and to recover possession and mesne profits of the mehal and (2) in the alternative to set aside the sale on the ground of irregularity in the service of processes and of inadequacy of price resulting therefrom.
The facts are that the Plaintiff's mehal was sold by the Collector of Monghyr on the 2nd January 1900 for arrears of revenue. Appeals were afterwards preferred to the Commissioner both by the Plaintiff and by certain co-sharers of his. The minor Plaintiff's appeal was dismissed on the ground that he had not made the auction-purchaser a party. The appeal of the other co-sharers was successful and the sale was set aside on the 23rd March 1900. On the 21st June 1900, the Commissioner reviewed his order cancelling the sale, set it aside and affirmed the sale. The Defendants first party have now been put in possession of the mehal by the Collector of Monghyr.
Hence the suit for the reliefs mentioned above.
The Subordinate Judge has held that the Commissioner could not review and set aside his order of the 23rd March, and, therefore, that the order of that date setting aside the sale holds good. The Plaintiffs are accordingly entitled to possession. He further holds in the alternative that there is no proof of the service of the notice of sale, that the property was sold for an inadequate price, but that there is no direct evidence to show that the inadequacy of price is the result of the non-service of the notices of sale.
He has accordingly given the Plaintiffs a decree.
The Defendants appeal. On their behalf it has been urged (1) that the Commissioner's order of the 21st June 1900, setting aside his previous order annulling the sale was within his powers. (2) That the present suit must accordingly fail, unless the Plaintiffs can establish the grounds specified in sec. 33 of Act XI of 1859. (3) That the Plaintiffs never pleaded that no notice of the application for review was given, no issue on this point was raised or any evidence adduced in support of it and therefore the Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the order of review was bad for want of notice of the application for review. (4) That the Commissioner could in any case discharge his previous order of the 23rd March and the Civil Court cannot call in question the propriety of his having done so. (5) That all notices of the sale of mehal were duly served and a certificate of sale obtained and the Subordinate Judge could not go into the question of the service of the notices. (6) That the price for which the property was sold was adequate. (7) That there is no direct evidence to connect the inadequacy of price with the non service of the notices and (8) that the Subordinate Judge should not have allowed the plaint to be amended and some of the Defendants to become co-Plaintiffs, as was done after the remand by this Court.
The decision of the case really turns on the question whether the Commissioner had power on the 21st June to review his previous order of the 23rd March setting the sale aside. It is to be noted that sale was entirely set aside, and though this was done at the instance of some of the Plaintiff's co-sharers, the order was obviously one which affected all the owners of the estate.
Now the Commissioner himself admitted on the 13th July 1900 that his order of the 21st June was illegal, and that he had no power to review an order once legally passed under the provisions of the Sale Law, Act XI of 1859. The Board of Revenue was clearly of the same opinion. See its order of the 5th September 1900.
Then it is obvious and admitted that there is no express provision in Act XI of 1859 by which a Commissioner or any revenue authority can review or set aside an order once legally passed under the Act.
The learned pleader for the Appellant, however, relies on the following cases: Tuffuzzool, Hossein v. Raghoo Nath Pershad(1), in which a passage at page 48 is especially cited, Laliteawar Singh v. Mohant Gonesh Das(2), Nusseeroodin Khan v. Indro Narayan Chowdhury(3), Badaricharya v. Ram Chandra(4), Ram Chandra v. Draupadi(5), Matangini Debi v. Girish Chunder Chongdar(6) and Hiralal Mukerji v. Premamnyee Debi(7). On the authority of these cases the learned pleader for the Appellant argues (1) that a Commissioner or any revenue authority has always power to review or set aside an erroneous order of his, and that it is his duty to do so and (2) that the word “final” in sec. 25 of Act XI of 1859, as amended by sec. 2, Act VII, B.C, of 1868, on which it has been argued that the power to review an order under the Act is expressly barred, means no more than “not open to appeal,” and does not prohibit either review or revision. We are unable to agree to either of these contentions. A Commissioner or revenue authority who has once set aside a sale under Act XI of 1859, as was done in this case, and which was actually carried into effect, has no power such as may or may not be inherent or vested by statutory enactment in a. Civil Court to revoke or modify an order passed by him under the Act, and the word “final,” whatever its meaning may be in other Acts (for all the cases relied on by the learned pleader for the Appellant relate to Acts other than Act XI of 1859), must, I think, in sec. 25 of Act XI, be interpreted as meaning at least “not open to review.”
The matter would seem to be set at rest, so far as this Court is concerned, by the decision in Lala Pryag Lal v. Jai Narain Singh. In this case it has been laid down that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to reviews of judgment have not been extended to proceedings under Bengal Acts VII of 1868 and VII of 1880, and consequently, in that case, it was held that the order passed on review, confirming the sale, was ultra vires and of no effect.
In the judgment it is said: “I cannot admit that such a power (of review) is inherent in every Judicial or Revenue officer. It is a power expressly given by law to Judicial officers under certain conditions, and therefore it cannot be assumed that, when not so given, it is inherent in every officer. If this had been so, there need not have been any legislation: on the subject. We cannot hold that all this legislation was unnecessary. But in respect of the matters now before us, we find that those portions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which confer the power to review a judgment and regulate the exercise of such powers, have not been extended to proceedings under the Bengal Acts of 1868 and 1880; sec. 19 of the Act of 1880 declares that certain portions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be applicable to proceedings taken in regard to certificates, but we find that the portion of the Code which refers to reviews of judgment forms no part of the law set out in that section. The sections of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to appeals are also omitted, but the reason for this omission is clear. The right of appeal is conferred by Bengal Act VII of 1868, sec. 2, and this, as it was held in the case of Sadhu Saran Singh v. Panchdeo Lal(9), (1) in which we concur, was held to be applicable to proceedings under the Act of 1880 by reason of sec. 2 of that Act. There is no provision made for an application for review of judgment passed on appeal by a Commissioner under the powers conferred by sec. 2 of Bengal Act VII of 1868. The Acts of 1868 or 1880 are both of them silent in this respect. We find, rather, that the law has provided other means for correcting an order passed by the Commissioner on appeal, for sec. 24 of the Act of 1880 has conferred on the Board of Revenue the power of general supervision and control over proceedings of Commissioners under that Act, so that any person who may be dissatisfied with an order passed by a Commissioner on appeal has thus his remedy by bringing it under consideration of the Board of Revenue. By not providing for a review of such an order, either expressly or by extending to such orders the Code of Civil Procedure relating to reviews of judgment and by giving to a superior authority, the Board of Revenue, the power to supervise and control any order passed by a Commissioner, the Legislature has, in my opinion, declared an intention that such an order shall not be open to review, but is open to revision by the Board of Revenue with the same result.” With these observations I entirely concur, and have nothing to add to them.
It is therefore unnecessary to discuss in detail the judgments cited by the learned pleader for the Appellant or his other pleas, tending to show that the Commissioner's order of the 21st June 1900 was good and within his powers.
This practically settles the appeal and it is useless to consider whether the sale could be set aside. The sale was rightly or wrongly set aside by the Commissioner and his subsequent order affirming the sale was ultra vires and of no effect.
At the same time I would observe that I entirely disagree with the Subordinate Judge in holding that there was no evidence of the service of the notices of sale. I consider that there is sufficient evidence of that. The chowkidars who deny the service are not telling the truth. Then, if there was any sale, the Appellant has obtained a certificate of sale which, under sec. 8, Act VII of 1868, debars any contention as to the non-service of the notice being raised. Whether the price at which the estate was sold was adequate or not, the Subordinate Judge has himself found that there was no direct evidence to connect the inadequacy of price with the non-service of the notices.
There remains the question whether the Subordinate Judge was justified in allowing the plaint to be amended after the remand of the case by this Court. I see no reason why the plaint should not have been amended, and the Defendant's co-sharers allowed to join the Plaintiff in the suit. Their suit was not barred by limitation and the Subordinate. Judge has only allowed them mesne profits from the date of the decree.
I would accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs. Sheodin will only get the costs incurred by him after the order of remand when he was made Plaintiff.
The Respondent's cross-appeal is not pressed and is therefore dismissed.
Sharfuddin, J.— I concur in the judgment of my learned brother but would add the following observations:—
It appears that in the case of Lala Pryag Lal v. Jai Narain Singh the learned Judges have relied upon the provisions of secs. 19 and 24 of Act VII (B.C) of 1880. I find that the provisions of these sections have been reembodied in the repealing Act I (B.C) of 1895 (vide secs. 19-30).
I find that the Appellants in the present appeal have relied upon many authorities, one of which is the case of Matangini Debi v. Girish Chunder Chongdar. The head-notes of this case are a little misleading. In this case it appears that a certain mehal was sold for arrears of cess under sec. 21 of Act 1 (B.C) of 1895 on the 31st January 1890. Thereupon, Plaintiff No. 3 applied to set aside the sale on making the necessary deposit under sec. 19 of that Act. The deposit was made, and the sale was set aside by the certificate officer on the 14th February 1896. The auction-purchaser then appeared and objected to the cancellation of the sale on the ground that the Plaintiff No. 3 was not a party entitled under sec. 19 of the Act to make the deposit and apply for the cancellation of the sale. The certificate officer held that he had the power to review his order under which the sale was set aside and confirmed the said sale on the 20th March 1896. On appeal the Collector restored the first order of the certificate officer cancelling the sale. The auction-purchaser then moved the Commissioner to revise the order of the Collector and the Commissioner held that the Collector had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal and, restoring the order of the certificate officer passed in review, confirmed the sale. It was held by the learned Judges that the Commissioner had the power revision under sec. 33 of the Act and that he having under that section affirmed the sale, it was unnecessary to consider the further question whether it was open to a certificate officer himself to review the order, when no such power is conferred on him by the Act. It was further hinted in this judgment that the case of Lala Pryag Lal v. Jai Narain Singh may lend some support to the Appellant's contention to the effect that the certificate officer had reviewed his own order without jurisdiction.
The present appeal is with reference to a review order passed by the Commissioner of Bhagalpore, under which he has cancelled his own order of the 23rd March 1900 and affirmed the sale.
Act XI of 1859 does not provide for any review by a Commissioner of his own order in the matter of sale.
It appears from the order-sheet that the Commissioner set aside the sale on the 23rd March 1900, but it would seem that the Personal Assistant to the Commissioner submitted the papers of that sale appeal to the Commissioner on the 27th April 1900 for any change the Commissioner might choose to make but the Commissioner observed on the 28th April that no application had been made to him to revise his orders setting aside the sale. Then on the 15th May 1900 a petition for revision of the order of the 23rd March 1900 was put in. Then on the 16th May the Commissioner fixed the 22nd June for the hearing and ordered a notice to be issued to the parties concerned. It does not appear from the record whether any such notice was served on the opposite party, but the allegation in the plaint is that the Plaintiffs had no information of that order and this statement has not been traversed by the contesting Defendant. The date originally fixed for the hearing was, as already observed, the 22nd June; but this was altered to the 21st June by the Personal Assistant to the Commissioner. The matter was heard and decided ex parte on the 21st June—the altered date—and the sale was affirmed on that date. Some of the authorities relied upon by the Appellants in this appeal relate to matters under Acts other than the Act XI of 1859 and they lay down that orders under those Acts are subject to review if they are ex parte, ultra vires, or improper. I find that these conditions are present in the present matter, because there is no provision in any of the Acts for a review of orders for sales for arrears of Government revenue and therefore the Commissioner's order of the 23rd March 1900 cannot be reviewed. The order reviewing it was therefore ultra vires, ex parte and improper. I have already observed that no review is allowed of an order by a Commissioner setting aside a sale, but if it were allowed or if by implication it be conceded that a review could be allowed under the authorities quoted by the Appellant, then it would be the order of the Commissioner, dated the 21st June, that would seem to be subject to review and not his first order of the 23rd March which was inter partes and within jurisdiction. For the above reasons and for the reasons stated by my learned brother, I concur with him in dismissing the appeal and cross-appeal.
N.G
Appeal dismissed.
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