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Jitendra Nath Bera And Ors. v. Makhan Lal Bera Opposite Party.

Calcutta High Court
Mar 19, 1942
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This Rule was obtained by the judgment-debtors and challenges an order of the Munsif rejecting an application for review made under section 36(6) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.

The underlying decree was passed on 17 August 1933. It is conceded in the record that the decree infringes provisions of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.

In Execution Case No. 702 of 1934 a property was put up for sale and purchased by the Opposite Party for Rs. 210 on 6 July 1934. Possession of that property was delivered in August 1935.

The judgment-debtors are the sons of the executant of the hand-note on which the suit was founded, and the decree is to be executed against such property of their father as may be within their hands.

The judgment-debtors' mother filed an application under Order XXI, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure; that application was pending on 1 January 1939.

The principal procedural question is whether the mother's O.21, r.90 application (or, by reason of it, Execution Case No. 702 of 1934) constitutes "a suit to which [the Bengal Money-Lenders] Act applies" within the meaning of section 2(22) of the Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application under Order XXI, Rule 90, Code of Civil Procedure (an application to set aside a sale) is "a suit to which this Act applies" within the meaning of section 2(22) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.
  2. Whether, by virtue of such an application, an earlier execution proceeding (Execution Case No. 702 of 1934) is transformed into "a suit to which this Act applies" under section 2(22).

Arguments of the Parties

Learned Munsif's View

  • The Munsif held that the application under O.21, r.90 (and thus Execution Case No. 702) was not a "suit to which this Act applies" because the application was rejected by him.
  • He expressed the view that if the application had been successful, the petitioners (judgment-debtors) would have been entitled to a review.

Argument by Mr. Mitter

  • Mr. Mitter conceded that a dishonest petition designed to produce the effect in question would not have that effect.
  • He contended that whether an application should be treated as having that effect must be a question of fact in each case — i.e., whether the application is bona fide.

Court's Note on Parties' Positions

  • No attempt was made before the court to support the Munsif's view that a successful application would entitle the petitioners to a review.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by addressing the statutory language: under section 2(22) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, a "proceeding in execution" is described as "a suit to which this Act applies."

The court analysed the ordinary meaning of a proceeding in execution and held that such proceedings are those in which the decree-holder asks the court to assist him to realise the money due under the decree. That is, execution proceedings are initiated by the decree-holder for enforcement of the decree.

The court found it "meaningless" to treat an application brought by a third party (for example, an application to set aside a sale under O.21, r.90) as a proceeding in execution of the decree. The judge explained that although success of such an application could lead to the decree-holder either resting content with what he had already realised by earlier execution or bringing a new application (which would then be a suit to which the Act applies), that consequence does not convert the third-party application itself into a suit under the Act.

The court rejected the position (advanced by Mr. Mitter in part) that a distinction could practically be drawn between bona fide and dishonest applications for the purpose of determining whether an application becomes a "suit to which this Act applies." The judge held it was impossible to draw such a distinction in the statutory context.

On these bases the court concluded that an application under Order XXI, Rule 90 cannot be regarded as "a suit to which this Act applies" and that an old execution case is not thereby converted into such a suit merely because of the filing of that application.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Rule obtained by the judgment-debtors is discharged.

The court expressly made no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties is that the challenge to the Munsif's order (rejecting the review application under section 36(6) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act) failed and the Rule is discharged.
  • The opinion clarifies, as applied in this case, that an application by a third party under Order XXI, Rule 90 is not itself a "suit to which the Act applies" within the meaning of section 2(22), and that the mere filing of such an application does not convert an earlier execution proceeding into a suit under the Act.
  • No broader precedent or new legal rule beyond this interpretation was articulated in the opinion; the decision is stated in terms of its direct application to the issues and parties before the court.

End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion text.

Show all summary ...

1. This Rule has been obtained by the judgment-debtors and is directed against an order of the Munsif, rejecting an application for review under sec. 36 (6) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.

2. The decree was passed on the 17th of August, 1933.

3. It is conceded that it infringes the provisions of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. In the course of Execution Case No. 702 of 1934 a certain property was put up to sale and purchased by the Opposite Party for Rs. 210 on the 6th of July, 1934. Possession of the property was delivered in August, 1935. It may be noted that the judgment-debtors are the sons of the executant of the hand-note upon which the suit was based and the decree is to be executed against such property of their father as may be within their hands. Their mother filed an application under Or. 21, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was pending on the 1st of January, 1939. The question now at issue between the parties is whether in view of that application it can be said that either that application or Execution Case No. 702 of 1934 is a suit to which this Act applies within the meaning of sec. 2 (22).

4. The learned Munsif held that it was not, because the application was rejected. He thought that if it had been successful, the Petitioners would have been entitled to a review. No attempt has been made to support that view here.

5. Now, if it can be said that the application under Or. 21, r. 90 is a suit to which this Act applies or that as a result of it Execution Case No. 702 of 1934 is such a suit, then a judgment-debtor can always make a good case for himself by filing a futile application under this rule. Mr. Mitter conceded that a dishonest petition would not have such an effect and argued that it must be a question of fact in each case whether the application is bona fide or not.

6. In my judgment it is impossible to draw any such distinction. Under sec. 2 (22) a proceeding in execution is “a suit to which this Act applies”; but proceedings in execution must be proceedings in which the decree-holder asks the Court to assist him to realise the money due under that decree, It is meaningless to say that an application by somebody else to set aside a sale is a proceeding in execution of the decree. It is quite true that if such an application is successful, the decree-holder will either have to rest content with what he has already got by previous executions or file a new application which will certainly become “a suit to which this Act applies.” This is probably what the learned Munsif had in his mind when he gave his decision. But it affords no ground for saying that an application under Or. 21, r. 90 is “a suit to which this Act applies” or has the effect of turning an old execution case into such a suit.

7. The Rule is discharged.

8. I make no order as to costs.

P.C