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Muhammad Habibullah v. Mushtaq Husain And Ors.
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from insolvency proceedings under Act III of 1907 concerning Mushtaq Ahmad, a resident of Mauza Kara (district of Allahabad) who carried on business as a contractor and dealer in timber. Habibullah, a merchant of Agra, sued Mushtaq Ahmad for Rs. 2,468 for breach of contract; the plaint is verified on 15 April 1913, which is treated as the date of institution. Habibullah obtained orders on 16 April 1913 for attachment of a bank deposit and an injunction restraining Mushtaq Ahmad and the bank, but the bank stated it had paid the money before service. A decree was later obtained against Mushtaq Ahmad and transferred for execution to Bilaspur, where attachment proceedings were taken against a stack of sleepers belonging to him.
Mushtaq Ahmad applied to be adjudicated an insolvent on 23 December 1914 before the District Judge of Allahabad. In the schedule of creditors Habibullah was listed first (Rs. 2,500 under a decree in Suit No. 93 of 1913), followed by Safdar Ali (Rs. 450), and two alleged dower debts: one in favour of Ashiq Husain (the insolvent's son) for Rs. 4,100 and another for Rs. 300 in favour of Saiyed-un-nissa. The insolvent admitted that his son, Ashiq Husain (who had attained majority), had taken the theka of a jungle and that the insolvent worked under a power-of-attorney on his son's behalf. Habibullah alleged that the son’s claim was a device to protect property and that another listed debt was bogus.
The District Judge examined the insolvent on 6 March 1915 and inquired about two transfers dated in May 1913 (one dated 23rd and the other 30th May 1913 in the record) by which the insolvent had transferred valuable property to his son and other family members, purportedly to satisfy dower claims. The Judge directed that the Rs. 4,100 claim not be entered without his special order and fixed 16 April for adducing evidence under Section 36 of Act III of 1907 to determine whether the transfers should be set aside and whether the insolvent should be punished under Section 43 if transfers were fraudulent.
The Court below ultimately held, by an order of 24 July 1915, that the transfer of 30 May 1913 was fraudulent and set it aside, but upheld the earlier transfer of 23 April 1913. Habibullah appealed the portion upholding the earlier (23 April 1913) transfer. The transferees objected under Rule 22 of Order XLI as to the portion setting aside the 30 May transfer.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the transfers made by the insolvent (those dated in May/April 1913) were fraudulent or fictitious transfers intended to protect property from creditors and should therefore be set aside under Section 36 of Act III of 1907.
- Whether the transfers were invalid as being in contravention of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act (i.e., whether they were made with intent to defeat or delay creditors or were gratuitous or for grossly inadequate consideration).
- Whether the Court below had jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for setting aside the transfers only on the grounds specifically mentioned in Sections 36 and 37 of Act III of 1907.
- Specific factual and valuation questions remanded by the Court for determination: (1) whether the transfers were real or fictitious; (2) the legal amount of dower debt due to the heirs of the first wife and to the second wife at the dates of the transfers; (3) the market value of the property conveyed on those dates; (4) whether the transfers were made in good faith and for valuable consideration; (5) if not, whether there was want of good faith on the part of the transferee.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Habibullah; represented by Dr. Sen)
- Habibullah alleged that the transfer of the theka in his son's name was a sham intended to defraud creditors and that the real thekadar was Mushtaq Ahmad himself.
- He alleged that one of the listed debts (the fourth item) was bogus.
- Dr. Sen, on behalf of the appellant, argued that the transfer was bad under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Transferees' Arguments (represented by Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru)
- Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru objected under Rule 22 of Order XLI to the setting aside of the transfer of 30 May 1913.
- He contended that the Court below had no jurisdiction to set aside the transfers except on the grounds mentioned in Sections 36 and 37 of Act III of 1907.
- He further argued that the dower debt is like an ordinary debt and therefore constitutes valuable consideration; he relied specifically on the case Suba Bibi v. Balgobind Das to support that a transfer made to satisfy dower may be considered valuable consideration.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Suba Bibi v. Balgobind Das (A. W. N. (1886) 51; 4 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 1149) | Relied upon for the proposition that a dower debt may be treated as valuable consideration for a transfer to the wife. | The Court noted the reliance but said it was necessary to ascertain the exact amount of dower due to decide the point; it did not decide the question on the record and remanded factual inquiries. |
| Mackintosh v. Pogose (1895) 1 Ch 505 | Authority for the proposition that it is not necessary to prove lack of good faith in respect of each transfer in every case (i.e., absence of good faith need not be proved for both transfers on the part of the transferee). | The Court invoked this principle to explain that absence of good faith need not be shown for both transfers; nonetheless, the Court emphasised other matters that must be investigated. |
| Nilmoni Chowdhuri v. Basanta Kumar Banerjee (29 Ind. Cas. 814; 19 C.W.N. 865) | Stated the onus is on the transferee to prove his good faith. | The Court applied this principle: it placed the onus of proving good faith on the transferee and observed that the Court below had not resolved this or related factual matters, thus necessitating a remand. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a statute-to-statute comparison and a factual triangulation to arrive at its conclusions and directions for remand. Key elements of the analysis as contained in the opinion are:
- Statutory comparison: The Court compared Section 36 of Act III of 1907 with analogous provisions such as Section 47 of the English Bankruptcy Act of 1883 and earlier statutes (13 Elizabeth Ch. V and 27 Elizabeth Ch. IV), noting differences in language and scope. It concluded that Section 36 of Act III of 1907 is wider in scope than Section 53 of Act IV of 1882 (the Transfer of Property Act as cited).
- Consequence of statutory comparison: Under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, intent to defeat or delay creditors is a relevant element and gratuitous or grossly inadequate transfers are presumptively intended to defeat creditors. Under Section 36 of Act III of 1907, however, the Court observed that no such specific intent needs to be shown; rather, the operative requirement is that the transfer be made within two years of adjudication of insolvency. Both statutes, the Court noted, protect transferees in good faith and for valuable consideration; Section 36 also expressly protects transfers "made before and in consideration of marriage."
- Application to the facts: The Court concluded that neither transfer before it was a transfer "made before and in consideration of marriage" because the transfers occurred long after marriage and were advanced as satisfying dower debts. Therefore, the marriage exception in Section 36 did not apply in these cases as per the Court's reading.
- Dower and limitation issues: The Court observed that treating dower as valuable consideration (as argued from Suba Bibi) required a factual determination of the exact amount of dower due to each claimant and could involve limitation questions (Articles 103 and 104 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act and Section 7 of that Act, because some heirs were minors). These matters required careful factual enquiry.
- Good faith and valuation inquiries: The Court emphasised that it was not necessary to prove absence of good faith in respect of both transfers (citing Mackintosh v. Pogose), but that the onus of proving good faith lay with the transferee (citing Nilmoni Chowdhuri). Other relevant factual matters included whether the transfers were real or fictitious, the market value of property at the time of transfer, who made alterations to buildings, and who had been realising rents and profits.
- Conclusion on present record: The Court held that the lower Court had not determined several of these essential factual and legal points and that the record lacked sufficient material for a satisfactory final decision. Accordingly, the Court remanded the specific issues it listed (see next section) to the Court below under Rule 25 of Order XLI of the Code for full determination, permitting additional evidence.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appellate Court REMANDED TO THE COURT BELOW FOR FURTHER DETERMINATION the enumerated issues concerning the genuineness of the transfers, the legal amount of any dower debts, the market value of the properties at the dates of the transfers, whether the transfers were in good faith and for valuable consideration, and whether any want of good faith was attributable to the transferees.
Implications and direct consequences as set out in the opinion:
- The Court held that Section 36 of Act III of 1907 is broader in scope than Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, and therefore it was unnecessary for counsel to rely on Section 53 in order to challenge the transfers under the insolvency statute.
- The Court found that the record lacked sufficient material on key factual matters (dower amounts, valuation, good faith), and therefore remanded those issues to the Court below under Rule 25 of Order XLI for full inquiry.
- The parties were permitted to adduce additional evidence before the Court below. The findings made together with the evidence were to be returned to the appellate Court, which allowed the usual ten days for objections to those findings.
- The opinion does not purport to set a final ruling on the validity of the transfers; rather, it ordered thorough factual enquiries to be conducted below and deferred final determination to the lower Court, with further appellate consideration to follow on receipt of the findings and evidence.
Note: This summary is strictly confined to the content of the provided opinion and does not infer facts or outcomes beyond what is stated in the text.
1. This appeal arises out of proceedings instituted under Act III of 1907. One Mushtaq Ahmad, who is a resident of Mauza Kara in the district of Allahabad, used to carry on business as a contractor and dealer in timber. He entered into a contract for the supply of certain number of sleepers to one Habibullah, a merchant of Agra. He was not able to perform his part of the contract and Habibullah consequently brought a suit against him on the 15th of April 1913, for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 2,468 for the breach of the contract. The exact date on which the suit was filed is not noted on the copy of the plaint on the record, but the copy shows that it was verified by the plaintiff on the 15th of April 1913, which we take to be the date of the institution of the suit. Soon after the institution of the suit the plaintiff Habibullah applied for the attachment of a deposit held by a Bank, which is described as Jamal Ahmad Bank at Kara. The Court granted the application on the 16th of April 1913, and directed the issue of an injunction to Mushtaq Ahmad restraining him from drawing the deposit as also an order to the Bank restraining it from paying it off to Mushtaq Ahmad. Both these orders were handed over in a cover to one Ali Muhammad, who was a servant of Habibullah, to expedite the delivery to the Civil Court at Allahabad for service on the persons concerned. It, however, appears that Mushtaq Ahmad was not found at hid house in Kara and the injunction issued to him was affixed to his house and the Bank returned an answer that it had paid away the money before service of the injunction. A decree for the amount claimed was passed by the Agra Court in due course and transferred for execution to Bilaspur in the Central Provinces, where Mushtaq Ahmad bad a stack of sleepers owned by him. The proceedings were taken to attach and bring to sale the sleepers at Bilaspur. Mushtsq Ahmad thereupon applied on 23rd December 1914 to the District Judge of Allahabad to be adjudicated an insolvent under Act III of 1907. In the schedule of creditors attached to the application the name of Habibullah stands first as a creditor for Rs. 2,500 under a decree in Suit No. 93 of 1913. This is the Agra suit to which reference has already been made. The next creditor set out is one Safdar Ali of Allahabad, who had a decree for Rs. 450 of the Court of Small Causes at Allahabad. The third creditor is Ashiq Husain, son of the insolvent, but who is described as son of Nabir-un-nissa, the first wife of the insolvent. The amount of the debt is said to be Rs. 4,100 due on a ruqqa on account of dower debt, which the insolvent had executed in the name of his son. The last creditor is, one Saiyed-un-nissa, who is said to be the wife of a brother of the insolvent or some other near relative. The amount of debt is Rs. 300 under a ruqqa. It may be noted that Ashiq Husain, the son of the insolvent, is quite a young man who has attained majority. The insolvent in this case has admitted that his son has taken the theka of a jungle in the Central Provinces, and that he, Mushtaq Ahmad, is working on his behalf under a, power-of-attorney executed by his son. The creditor Habibullah complains that, this is a mere blind to defraud the creditors, the real thekadar being Mushtaq Ahmad himself who has used his son's name to protect the property. He also alleges that the debt alleged under the fourth, item is also a bogus debt. In the schedule of property owned by the insolvent the stack of sleepers is mentioned as also a few trumpery articles of very little value. No zamindari or house property which is said to belong to the debtor is set out. The learned Judge on the 6th of March 1915 examined the insolvent. He was asked about the two transfers which he had made on the 23rd of May, 1913 and the 30th of May 1913.
2. By the first of these transfers he had disposed of a valuable house and other property to his son, Ashiq Husain, and two other minor children he had by his first wife, for a sum of Rs. 900. He also disposed of another item of property said to be worth Rs 100 in favour of his second wife. The transfer is said to have been made to satisfy the claim for dower which the heirs of the first wife had against him as also the claim for the dower which the second wife had on the husband. The second document is for Rs. 400, which is said to be the balance of the dower debt due to the second wife. By these two documents he disposed of practically all his property and if these documents are upheld, the claims of the creditors will be defeated for all practical purposes. The learned Judge, therefore, in his order of 6th March 1915, directed that the sum of Rs. 4,100 said to be due to the insolvent's son, Ashiq Husain, should not be entered in the schedule without his special order, and he also further directed as follows.
"April 16th will be fixed for the parties to adduce their evidence under Section 36 of the Act as to whether the transfers in favour of the applicant's sons and wife should be set aside, and in case these transfers are found to be fraudulent to show cause, why he should not be punished under Section 43 of the Act."It is under this order that the proceedings from which this appeal has arisen were initiated.
3. Notice of these proceedings does not seem to have been given to the transferees but the matter is of no importance, as Babu Datti Lal appeared on their behalf on the 2nd of July 1915 and he was also present (as would appear from the order-sheet) on the 24th of July 1915, the date on which the order appealed against was made. The learned Judge by his order of that date held that one of the transfers, namely that of the 30th of May 1913, was fraudulent, and he set it aside But he held that the other transfer of the 23rd of April 1913 must be upheld. Habibullah, the creditor, has appealed to this Court against so much of the order as dismisses the claim in respect of the earlier transfer of the 23rd of April 1913. Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru on behalf of the transferees has preferred objections under Rule 22 of Order XLI against so much of the order of the Court below as has set aside the second transfer of the 30th May 1913. Dr. Sen on behalf of the appellant has urged that the transfer was bad under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The proceedings in the Court below were taken under Section 36 of Act III of 1907. Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru in reply has argued that the Court, below had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings for setting aside the transfers except on grounds mentioned in Sections 36 and 37 of the Act.
4. Provisions analogous to those contained in Section 36 of the Act are to be found in Section 47 of the English Bankruptcy Act of 1883 and Statute 13 Elizabeth Ch. V and 27 Elizabeth Ch. IV. The language of each of these Statutes is slightly different. Each case, therefore, must be considered in the language of the Statute concerned. In our opinion Section 36 of Act III of 1907 is wider in its scope than Section 53 of Act IV of 1882. Under the latter Section transfers made with the intent to defeat or delay creditors or subsequent transferees are made voidable at the instance of the creditors so defrauded or defeated, and it is also declared that where such transfers have the effect of defeating or delaying creditors they would be presumed to have been made with that intent, if they are made gratuitously or for grossly inadequate consideration. Under Section 36 of the Act no such intent is necessary. All that is required is that it must be made within two years of the adjudication of the insolvency of the debtor. Under both these Sections transferees in good faith and for valuable consideration are protected. Section 36 also protects transfers "made before and in consideration of marriage." We think it is, therefore, not necessary for Dr. Sen to avail himself of the provisions of Section 53 of, the Transfer of Property Act.
5. Neither of these transfers are transfers "made before and in consideration of marriage" within the meaning of these words as used in the Section. No doubt in both these cases, as a part of the marriage, contract. some dower is made payable to the wife, butt the dower stands on the same footing as any ordinary debt. The transfers in these oases were made long after the marriage and not before or in consideration of the marriage. They were made to satisfy the dower debt long after the marriage had taken place. Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru has again argued that the dower debt is like an ordinary debt and that such a debt is valuable consideration; and a transfer made to the wife to satisfy the claim for dower is a transfer for valuable consideration. He relied upon the case of Suba Bibi v. Balgobind Das 8 A. 178 : A. W. N. (1886) 51 : 4 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 1149. To enable us, however, to decide the point, it is necessary to ascertain the exact amount of the dower due to each lady. The first wife is said to have died in 1909. A suit for recovery of a dower debt must be filed within the time prescribed by Articles 103 and 104 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act. For the purpose of considering the application of these Articles the nature of the dower debt would be an important element for consideration. The application of Section 7 of the said Act would also have to be considered as some of the heirs are still minors. In all these cases it is a matter for careful consideration whether a real transfer was intended by the transferor or whether it was merely fictitious and no transfer was intended. Another point for consideration would be whether the transfers were made in good faith. It is not, however, necessary to prove the absence of good faith in both the transfers on the part of the transferee. Mackintosh v. Pogose (1895) 1 Ch 505 : 64 L.J. Ch. 274 : 13 R. 254 : 72 L T. 251 : 43 W. R. 247 : 2 Manson 27. The value of the properly transferred would be another point for consideration. In this case it seems that the existing buildings have been altered by some party or other and it might be a question as to who has made these alterations, whether the transferee or transferor, and who has been realising the rents and profits of the property. All these and a number of other considerations will have a material bearing upon the question. The onus of proving the good faith of the transferee is upon him: Nilmoni Chowdhuri v. Basanta Kumar Banerjee 29 Ind. Cas. 814 : 19 C.W.N. 865. The Court below has not determined some of these points at all. There are no sufficient materials on the record to enable us to dispose of these points satisfactorily. We have, therefore, no option but to remand the following issues for determination to the Court below under Rule 25 of Order XLI of the Code. The issues foe determination are:
(1). Are the two transfers impugned real and genuine transfers or are they fictitious transfers made to protect the property from the creditors?
(2). Was there any, and if so, what dower, debt legally due to the heirs of the first wife and to the second wife respectively on the dates of the two transfers?
(3). What was the market value of the property conveyed in each case on the dates of the transfers?
(4). Were the transfers impugned made in good faith and for valuable consideration?
(5). If not, was there want of good faith on the part of the transferee?
6. We have, in our judgment, indicated generally the matters which the Court below should take into consideration in determining these issues. We have set them forth at some length, as we find that in many cases enquiries made under the Act are conducted rather summarily in the Courts below. It is scarcely necessary to say that enquiries under this Section are no less important that enquiries in regular suits and should be made as thoroughly and fully as in those cases.
7. The parties will be permitted to, adduce additional evidence. The findings together with the evidence taken will be returned to this Court and the usual ten days will, be allowed for objections.
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