- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Syama Charan Das v. Satya Prosad Choudhury
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns two appeals from a decree in a suit for recovery of possession of immoveable property upon establishment of title. The disputed lands were described in two schedules to the plaint and originally belonged to a family of Choudhuris. In 1900 the plaintiff's father, Rasik Chandra, instituted a suit against his two brothers for declaration of title to various properties as joint family property, for partition, for accounts and incidental reliefs. That litigation was contested but ultimately settled by a petition of compromise filed on 20th July 1904 and a consent decree made on 30th July 1904.
During the pendency of the 1900 suit, some of the properties were sold. The first-schedule lands were sold in execution against Ramratna and purchased by Naba Kisor Chaudhury in April 1904 and later sold (in April 1906) to Syama Charan Das (the first defendant in the present suit). The second-schedule lands were sold for arrears of revenue in September 1902 and purchased by Sarada Charan Guha (the second defendant), whose retrospective title dated from 26th June 1902.
On 15th July 1916 the present suit was instituted by the plaintiff to establish title and recover possession. He joined his surviving uncle and cousins and the purchasers from the execution and revenue sales as defendants. The suit was contested only by the two purchaser-defendants. The trial court dismissed the suit as regards the first defendant (Syama Charan Das), but on appeal the Subordinate Judge reversed and awarded the plaintiff a decree for a one-fourth share (on the basis of the petition of compromise), not the one-third share the plaintiff had claimed. The second defendant's title (from the revenue sale) was held unimpeachable and the suit against him was dismissed by the Courts; that defendant is not an issue in the present appeal.
Two appeals were preferred: (1) by the first defendant, on grounds that the suit was not maintainable and was barred by limitation; and (2) by the plaintiff, contending he should have been awarded a one-third share rather than one-fourth. The court identified three questions for decision: (i) is the suit maintainable; (ii) is the suit barred by limitation; and (iii) is the plaintiff entitled to one-third or one-fourth share.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the present suit is maintainable given the prior consent decree in the earlier litigation (i.e., can a fresh suit be brought on the basis of a previous decree or is such a suit barred where the decree could have been enforced by execution).
- Whether the present suit is barred by limitation, having regard to alleged earlier loss of possession and the intervening consent decree.
- Whether the plaintiff is entitled to one-third share (as claimed) or is bound by the consent decree to accept one-fourth share.
Arguments of the Parties
First Defendant / Defendant-Appellant's Arguments
- The defendant-appellant contended that the present suit is in substance a suit on the decree in the previous litigation and therefore not maintainable — particularly since execution of the prior decree, if applied for at the date of institution of the present suit, would have been successfully met by a plea of limitation.
- The defendant-appellant further contended that the claim is barred by limitation, arguing that the plaintiff's father had lost possession in 1897 (three years prior to the institution of the prior suit), and thus the cause of action pre-dated the prior litigation and is time-barred.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff appealed the Subordinate Judge's decree on the ground that he should have been awarded one-third share rather than the one-fourth share awarded on the basis of the prior compromise.
- Implicit in the plaintiff's position (as addressed by the court) is the contention that his independent right to a one-third share survived or was not extinguished by the consent decree in the earlier litigation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kali Charan Nath v. Sukhada Sundari Debi, 30 Ind. Cas. 824; 22 C.I.J. 272; 20 C.W.N. 58 | Principle that an action may be maintained on a judgment only where the judgment cannot be enforced in some other way (i.e., avoid bringing an action where execution would suffice). | The court relied on this case as the leading exposition of when suits on prior decrees are permissible and applied its qualification to the facts (distinguishing declaratory decrees from executable decrees). |
| Williams v. Jones (1845) 13 M. & W. 628; 67 R.R. 767; 2 D. & L. 680; 14 L.J. Ex. 145 | English authority cited for the proposition that a legal obligation arises from a judgment adjudicating a sum due, on which an action may be maintained. | Used to illustrate the general principle that actions on judgments can lie when those judgments establish enforceable debts; considered within the qualification that such actions are improper if the judgment can be enforced otherwise. |
| Henley v. Soper (1828) 8 B. & C. 16; 2 Man. & Ry. 153; 6 L.J. (O.S.) K.B. 210 | Illustrates the qualification that courts should refuse actions on decrees when the court that made the decree can itself enforce it. | Quoted to support the view that actions on decrees are not to be allowed where enforcement by the decree-making court is available. |
| Sadler v. Robins (1808) 1 Camp. 253 | Authority supporting refusal to entertain actions on decrees where execution is available. | Referred to as part of the authorities demonstrating the principle that suits on decrees are improper when execution would be the proper remedy. |
| Carpenter v. Thornton (1819) 3 B. & Ald. 52 | Supports the general rule limiting suits on decrees where enforcement by the court is possible. | Included among English authorities used to frame the rule against collateral suits on enforceable decrees. |
| Henderson v. Henderson (1844) 6 Q.B. 288 | Authority on the proper scope of actions after prior adjudication. | One of the cited authorities illustrating the limited circumstances in which a fresh action on a prior decree is permissible. |
| English or Foreign Grant v. Easton (1884) 13 Q.B.D. 302 | Holds an action will lie on a judgment which finally establishes a debt. | Cited among authorities illustrating that actions can be brought on judgments that finally determine debts, subject to the qualification discussed in Kali Charan Nath. |
| Nouvion v. Freeman (1889) 15 App. Cas. 1 | Authority that actions can lie on judgments establishing debt. | Referenced in the line of authorities describing when actions on judgments are permissible. |
| Pemberton v. Hughes (1899) 1 Ch. 781 | Another decision on actions founded on judgments. | Used to support the explanatory survey of the law on actions on prior judgments. |
| Hodsoll v. Baxter (1858) El. B1. & El. 884 | Authority referenced in discussion of actions on judgments. | Included in the compilation of English authorities showing limits on actions on prior judgments. |
| Clydesdalf Bank v. Schroder and Co. (1913) 2 K.B. 1 | Authority on enforcement and actions on judgments. | Referred to in the context of precedent about actions on prior adjudications. |
| Gibson and Co. v. Gibson (1913) 3 K.B. 379 | Another English decision on actions on judgments. | Cited among cases illustrating the principle limiting suits on enforceable decrees. |
| Shaw v. Allen (1914) 30 T.L.R. 631 | Authority in the same line on the limitation of actions on prior decrees. | Listed among English cases supporting the established principle. |
| Pritchett v. English and Colonial Syndicate (1899) 2 Q.B. 428 | Held that where an English judgment can be enforced in some other way bringing an action upon it is an abuse of process. | Used to illustrate the abuse-of-process rationale that underlies the rule against suits duplicating execution remedies. |
| Lakhrani Kaur v. Dhanraj Singh, 32 Ind. Cas. 634 | Instance where a suit was held maintainable on a prior decree even though the decree was barred by limitation (decision by Walsh, J.). | The court noted this authority but observed that the view expressed was doubted on appeal and later overruled, and thus not followed as prevailing law. |
| Dhanraj Singh v. Lakhrani Kaur, 35 Ind. Cas. 601 | Appeal where earlier opinion was doubted though the decision was affirmed on other grounds. | Noted as part of the development of authority; the court treated the later overruling as persuasive against the earlier view. |
| Ramanand v. Jairam, 59 Ind. Cas. 632 | Case that overruled the view that suits may be maintained on decrees barred by limitation in the circumstances of Lakhrani Kaur. | Relied upon as part of the body of authority favoring the principle that a remedy by execution bars a fresh suit for identical relief. |
| Doobee Singh v. Jowkee, 3 Agra H.C.R. 381 | Authority supporting that a person who loses his remedy by execution by his own laches cannot bring a fresh suit for the identical relief. | Cited as supporting the view that where execution was the proper remedy, fresh suits are barred. |
| Ram Jus v. Ram Narain, 2 N.W.P.H.C.R. 382 | Supports the principle restricting fresh suits on decrees where execution was available. | Included among authorities showing the recognized rule in favour of enforcing decrees by execution rather than collateral suits. |
| Sheikh Golam Hossein v. Alla Rukhee Beebee, 3 N.W.H.C.R. 62 | Authority on the same principle as above. | Used as part of the support for the limitation on suits on prior decrees. |
| Sanjeeviyah v. Nanjiyah, 4 M.H.C.R. 453 | Madras High Court decision affirming that where remedy is by execution a suit on the judgment will not lie. | Cited among Madras decisions endorsing the rule that a decree-holder must proceed by execution, not by new suit, for identical relief. |
| Muttuvelu Pillai v. Vythilinga Pillai, 5 M.H.C.R. 185 | Madras authority supporting the execution-only remedy where judgment has determined rights. | Referenced in the catalogue of supporting decisions from Madras High Court. |
| Ranganasary v. Shappani Asary, 5 M.H.C.R. 375 at p. 377 | Madras decision illustrating the same principle. | Used as another supporting Madras precedent. |
| Sungam Narayan Pillay v. Sandira Pillai, 6 M.H.C.R. 13 | Madras decision on enforceability of decrees and suits thereon. | Cited among Madras cases upholding the execution remedy rule. |
| Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar, 27 M. 243; 14 M.L.J. 84 (F.B.) | Madras/F.B. decision relevant to limitation on suits following decrees. | Included to show consistent Madras authority on the point. |
| Manchharam Kalliandas v. Bakshe Saheb, 6 B.H.C.R. 231 | Bombay High Court decision affirming the rule that suits on judgments are not maintainable where execution was available. | Referred to among Bombay decisions supporting the execution remedy principle. |
| Kisan Nandram v. Anandram Pachaji, 10 B.H.C.R. 433 | Bombay authority on the same issue. | Listed as part of Bombay precedents upholding the rule against suits on decrees when execution is the remedy. |
| Sayad Nairudin v. Venkatesh Prabhu, 5 B. 382 | Bombay decision relevant to suits on judgments. | Included among Bombay cases cited for the general principle. |
| Fakirapa v. Pandurangapa, 6 B. 7 | Bombay authority mentioned in support of the rule. | Referenced among the cluster of Bombay precedents. |
| Merwanji Nowroji v. Ashabai, 8 B. 1 | Bombay case discussing practice regarding suits on judgments of Small Cause Courts. | Cited to show historical practice and the development of the rule in Bombay. |
| Savill v. Dalton (1915) 3 K.B. 174 | English decision concerning suits on judgments of Small Cause Courts and related practice. | Mentioned as part of the comparative jurisprudence on when suits on judgments have been permitted or prohibited. |
| Sandes v. Jomir Shaikh, 9 W.R. 399 | Earlier case reviewed in the development of the law. | Included in the review of earlier decisions underlying the court's understanding. |
| Moonshi Golam Arab v. Curreembux, 5 C. 294; 4 C.L.R. 477 | Early decision forming part of the judicial development on suits on decrees. | Reviewed as part of the historical development summarized in Kali Charan Nath. |
| Attermoney Dossee v. Hurry Doss Dutt, 7 C. 74 | Another early authority forming part of the review. | Noted in the survey of earlier case law the court relied upon. |
| Annoda Prasad v. Nobakishore Roy, 21 Ind. Cas. 519 | Case considered in the development of the rule limiting suits on prior decrees. | Reviewed as part of the body of Indian decisions analyzed by the court. |
| Ashi Bhushan Dasi v. Pelaram Mandal, 21 Ind. Cas. 519 | Decision forming part of the judicial history on the point. | Included in the review supporting the rule that a fresh suit cannot be brought where the decree would be enforceable by execution. |
| Kalikananda Mukherjee v. Bipro Das Pal Choudhury, 26 Ind. Cas. 436 | Case forming part of the Court's review of earlier authority. | Referred to in the historical survey underlying the court's approach. |
| Doobee Singh v. Jewkee Ram, 3 Agra H.C.R. 381 | Authority that a merely declaratory decree which does not direct action is incapable of execution and therefore a fresh suit may lie. | The court applied the principle to hold that the consent decree in the prior litigation was declaratory and not executable, so a fresh suit to enforce possession could be maintained. |
| Sri Krishna Tata Chariar v. Singara Chariar, 4 M.H.C.R. 453 | Madras authority that a declaratory decree not directing action is incapable of execution. | Used to support the finding that where a decree is merely declaratory, a separate suit will lie to enforce the rights declared. |
| Nawazish Ali Beg v. Vilaytee Khartum, 2 Agra H.C.R. 23 | Authority on decrees declaring rights to maintenance where execution for periodic payments is not provided. | Illustrative of the class of declaratory decrees for which separate suits may be required for enforcement; cited in contrast to executable decrees. |
| Madhavrao v. Ramrao, 22 B. 267 | Decision on the execution-appropriate form of decrees for maintenance allowances. | Cited as an example where a declaratory decree requires a fresh suit for enforcement if it does not provide for execution periodically. |
| Ashutosh Bannerjee v. Lukhimoni Debya, 19 C. 139 | Authority illustrating decrees capable of execution from time to time. | Contrasted with declaratory decrees to show when execution would be available and a fresh suit would be barred. |
| Matangini Dassee v. Chooneymoney Dassee, 22 C. 903 | Case illustrating decrees framed to be executable periodically. | Contrasted with the present consent decree which was found to be declaratory and non-executable. |
| Girija Kanta v. Mohim Chandra, 35 Ind. Cas. 294 | Authority dealing with recovery of possession in the context of decrees and their executability. | Cited as an example in the class of cases where separate suit may lie to enforce a declaratory decree declaring the right to possession. |
| Shama Charan Chatterji v. Madhub Chandra Mookerjee, 11 C. 93 | Decision relevant to recovery of possession and executability of decrees. | Included among authorities applied to the question whether a declaratory decree bars a separate suit for possession. |
| Goba Nathu Barola v. Sakharam Teju Patil, 59 Ind. Cas. 366 | Case concerning executability of decrees for possession. | Referenced in support of the proposition that a merely declaratory decree does not preclude a separate suit for possession. |
| Mahomed Ibrahim v. Meera Oommal, 7 Ind. Cas. 558 | Decision on executability and enforcement of decrees. | Cited as part of the authorities indicating when declaratory decrees permit separate suits for enforcement. |
| Mohammad Nasiruddm v. Bhagwana, 22 Ind. Cas. 663 | Case concerning decrees and the right to recover possession. | Included in the set of precedents showing that declaratory decrees may allow fresh suits for enforcement. |
| Moti Lal v. Karrabuldin, 24 I.A. 170 | Authority on effect of involuntary purchase and operation of Section 52, Transfer of Property Act. | Quoted to show that a purchaser pendente lite is bound by the decree in the previous suit and cannot escape Section 52's operation, even if purchase was involuntary. |
| Bharat Ramanuja Das v. Sarat Kamini, 66 Ind. Cas. 273 | Authority that a purchaser pendente lite is bound by the decree even when the suit terminated in a consent decree. | Applied to conclude the first defendant, who purchased pendente lite, is bound by the prior consent decree. |
| South American & Mexican Co., In re (1895) 1 Ch. 37 | Authority cited for the general proposition that a compromise or judgment can bind the parties and bar inconsistent claims. | Used in the discussion that the consent decree binds the plaintiff and prohibits claiming a greater share than fixed by the compromise. |
| Huddersfield Banking Co. v. Lister (1895) 2 Ch. 273 | Another authority on the binding effect of settlements and decrees. | Referenced in support of the proposition that the plaintiff is bound by the consent decree and cannot claim more than the share fixed by it. |
| Wentworth v. Bullen (1829) 9 B. & C. 840 | Old authority concerning the effect of agreements and decrees on subsequent claims. | Cited in the passage establishing that the consent decree operates to bind the parties and estop inconsistent claims. |
| Kanhai Lal v. Lala Brij Lal, 47 Ind. Cas. 207 | Indian authority on the binding effect of prior decrees/compromises. | Used as part of the array of authorities showing that a plaintiff cannot claim a share larger than fixed by a consent decree. |
| Fateh Chand v. Narsingh Das, 16 Ind. Cas. 988 | Authority on the effect of prior adjudication binding parties' subsequent claims. | Cited in support of the court's conclusion that the consent decree barred the plaintiff's claim for one-third. |
| Rampat v. Durga Bharthi, 60 Ind. Cas. 440 | Case concerning the binding effect of prior decrees/compromises on subsequent claims. | Included among authorities establishing that the consent decree precludes the plaintiff from claiming an increased share. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the three identified issues in sequence.
1. Maintainability: The court began by examining whether the present suit is essentially a suit on the prior decree and therefore barred. It relied principally on the rule explained in Kali Charan Nath v. Sukhada Sundari Debi that an action founded on a prior judgment is permissible only if the judgment cannot be enforced by some other means (execution). The court reviewed an extensive body of English, Indian, Madras and Bombay authority which collectively establish the qualified rule: where a former adjudication gives a party a remedy by execution for the recovery of possession (or other relief), and the party by his own laches loses that remedy, he cannot revert and bring a fresh suit for the identical relief. However, the court recognized a clear distinction: a decree that is merely declaratory and does not provide for enforcement by execution is incapable of execution and therefore a separate suit will lie to enforce the rights declared.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court examined the petition of compromise and the resulting consent decree in the prior litigation. It found that the clause of the compromise relevant to the properties in question merely fixed the shares of the parties (four annas to plaintiff, four annas to second defendant, eight annas to representatives of first defendant) and did not state that the parties were entitled to take possession of their shares by execution. Thus the consent decree was essentially declaratory in character and did not entitle the then plaintiff to take possession by execution. Because the decree did not direct actionable enforcement by execution, the present suit for recovery of possession could not be deemed barred on the ground that execution was the exclusive remedy.
2. Limitation: The defendant-appellant's limitation argument assumed the present suit was founded on the original dispossession (1897). The court rejected that assumption. It held that upon the consent decree the parties became co-owners in joint possession from the date of the decree; any prior adverse possession lost its hostile character as between the parties. Accordingly, occupation after the decree could only be as joint owners, not as hostile possessors. In any event, the court noted that none of the defendants had been in adverse possession for twelve years from the date of the consent decree, so the present suit was not barred under Article 144 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. The court also held that the first defendant, who purchased pendente lite, is bound by the prior decree and by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act; purchase pendente lite does not place him in a better position.
3. Quantum of Share (one-third v. one-fourth): The plaintiff contended he was entitled to a one-third share independently of the compromise. The court reasoned that the consent decree bound the plaintiff as well as the defendants and therefore effectively barred any claim in excess of the one-fourth share fixed by the compromise. The court relied on authorities demonstrating that parties to a settlement or decree are bound by it and cannot thereafter claim inconsistent rights.
Synthesis: On the combined analysis the court concluded that (a) because the prior decree was declaratory and non-executable the plaintiff could institute a separate suit for recovery of possession; (b) the present suit was not barred by limitation given the legal effect of the consent decree and Article 144; and (c) the plaintiff was bound by the consent decree to the extent it fixed his share at one-fourth, so he could not recover a one-third share.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The decree made by the Subordinate Judge (awarding the plaintiff a one-fourth share and recovery accordingly) is AFFIRMED, and both appeals are dismissed with costs.
Implications:
- The plaintiff's appeal seeking a one-third share was dismissed; the plaintiff remains bound by the consent decree and is limited to the one-fourth share fixed by the compromise.
- The defendant-appellant's contentions that the suit was not maintainable or was barred by limitation were rejected because the prior consent decree was declaratory (not executable) and because the decree converted any prior adverse possession into joint possession for limitation purposes; the suit was therefore maintainable and not time-barred.
- The first defendant who purchased pendente lite is bound by the prior decree and cannot avoid the effect of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act; purchase pendente lite does not improve his position.
- No new legal principle or precedent was announced; the court applied and affirmed established authorities distinguishing declaratory decrees (which may permit a fresh suit for enforcement) from executable decrees (which should be enforced by execution and generally bar a fresh suit for identical relief).
This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.
1. These appeals are directed against the decree in a suit for recovery of possession of immoveable property upon establishment of title. The lands are fomprised in two schedules attached to the plaint and originally belonged to a family of Choudhuries, whose pedigree is set out below:
GURITDAS CHOUDHURI |
------------------------------------------------
"2. On the 9th February 1900 Rasik Chandora, the father of the plaintiff, instituted a suit against his two brothers, Ramratana and Chaitanyacharan, for declaration of title to various properties which, he asserted, belonged to the joint family, for partition, for accounts and for incidental reliefs. The claim was contested; but on the 20th July 1904 a petition of compromise was filed in Court and on the 30th July 1904 a consent decree was made thereon in due course. During the pendency of that litigation the properties now in dispute had been sold and had passed but of the hands of the members of the family. The lands comprised in the first schedule were brought to sale in execution of a decree for money against Ramratna and were purchased by one Naba Kisor Chaudhury on the 8th April 1904, that sale was confirmed on the 18th April 1904. The purchaser, as has transpired, sold the property on the 18th April, 1906, to Syama Charan Das, who is the first defendant in this litigation. The lands in the second schedule were sold for arrears of revenue on the 10th September 1902 and were purchased by Sarada Charan Guha, the second defendant in this litigation, whose title took effect retrospectively from the 26th June 1902, the date of default. On the 15th July 1916 the plaintiff commenced this litigation for establishment of his title and for recovery of possession. He joined as defendants his surviving uncle and his cousins, as also the assignee from the purchaser at the execution sale and the purchaser at the revenue sale. The claim was contested only by the two purchasers defendants. As regards the second defendant, the suit has been dismissed by both the Courts, inasmuch as he acquired an unimpeachable title by his purchase at the sale for arrears of revenue, and we are not concerned with him in this appeal. As regards the first defendant, the Trial Court dismissed the suit; but upon, appeal, the Subordinate Judge-has reversed that decision. The plaintiff has, however, been awarded a decree, not in respect of an one-third share as claimed' by him, but only with regard to "fan one-fourth share, on the basis-of the petition of compromise which eliminated iii the consent decree in the previous litigation. Two appeals have been preferred against this decree. The first defendant has appealed on the two-fold ground that the suit is not maintainable and that the claim is barred by limitation. The plaintiff has appealed on the ground that he should have been awarded a one-third instead of a one-fourth share. Three points have thus emerged for consideration from the arguments addressed to us, namely, first, is the suit maintainable; secondly, is the suit barred by limitation; and thirdly, is the plaintiff entitled to an one-third or an one-fourth share."
3. As regards the first question, the defendant-appellant has contended that this is in substance a suit on the decree in the previous litigation, and a suit of this description is not maintainable, specially as an application granted for execution of the former decree, if made at the date of institution of the present suit, would have been successfully met by the plea of limitation. The question, how far a suit is maintainable on the basis of a decree in a previous litigation between the same parties, was investigated by this Court in the case of Kali Charan Nath v. Sukhada Sundari Debi 30 Ind. Cas. 824 : 22 C.I.J. 272 : 20 C.W.N. 58. It there pointed out that the principle on which an action is allowed to be maintained on a judgment is that where a Court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated a certain sum to be due from one person to" another, a legal obligation arises to pay that' sum on which an action of debt to enforce the judgment may be maintained; see the decision of Baron Parks in Williams v. Jones (1845) 13 M. & W. 628 : 67 R.R. 767 : 2 D. & L. 680 : 14 L.J. Ex. 145 : E.R. 262. But this principle is subject to the qualification that an action is permissible only where the judgment cannot be enforced in some other way. This was indicated by Lord Tenderden, C.J., in Henley v. Soper (1828) 8 B. & C. 16 : 2 Man. & Ry. 153 : 6 L.J. (O.S.) K.B. 210 : 108 E.R. 949 when he observed as follows: there is a great difference between the "decree of a Colonial Court and of a Court of Equity in this country. The Colonial Court cannot enforce its decrees here, a Court of Equity in this country may, and, therefore, in the latter case there is no occasion for the interference of a Court of Law, in the former there is to prevent a failure of justice." This shows that the Courts should refuse to take cognizance of actions on decrees, when the Court which made the decree can enforce it, thereby rendering the action superfluous:. Sadler v. Robins (1808) 1 Camp. 253; Carpenter v. Thornton (1819) 3 B. & Ald. 52 : 22 R.R. 299 : 106 E.R. 582; Henderson v. Henderson (1844) 6 Q.B. 288 : 66 R.R. 384 : 13 L.J.Q.B. 274 : 9 Jur. 755 : 115 E.R. 111. Consequently, although it has been held that an action will lie on a judgment which finally establishes a debt, whether the judgment be English or Foreign Grant v. Easton (1884) 13 Q.B.D. 302 : 53 L.J.Q.B. 68 : 49 L.T. 645 : 32 W.R. 239; Nouvion. v. Freeman (1889) 15 App. Cas. 1 : 59 L.J. Ch. 337 : 62 L.T. 189 : 38 W.R. 581; Pemberton v. Hughes (1899) 1 Ch. 781 : 68 L.J. Ch. 281 : 47 W.R. 354 : 80 L.T. 369 : 15 T.L.R. 211; Hodsoll v. Baxter (1858) E1. B1. & E1. 884 : 113 R.R. 929 : 28 L.J.Q.B. 61 : 4 Jur. (N.S.) 556 : 6 W.R. 686 : 120 E.R. 739; Clydesdalf Bank v. Schroder and Co. (1913) 2 K.B. 1 : 82 L.J.K.B. 750 : 106 L.T. 955 : 17 Com. Cas. 210 : 56 S.J. 519; Gibson and Co. v. Gibson (1913) 3 K.B. 379 : 82 L.J.K.B. 1315 : 109 L.T. 445 : 29 T.L.R. 665, Shaw v. Allen (1914) 30 T.L.R. 631 still, if an English judgment can be enforced in some other way it is an abuse of the process of the; Court to bring an action upon it: Pritchett v. English and Colonial Syndicate (1899) 2 Q.B. 428 : 86 L.J.Q.B. 801 : 47 W.R. 577 : 81 L.T. 206.
4. The rule enunciated in Kali Charan Nath v. Sukbada Sundari Debi 30 Ind. Cas. 824 : 22 C.L.J. 272 : 20 C.W.N. 58 has been substantially accepted elsewhere. We are not unmindful that in Lakhrani Kaur, v. Dhanraj Singh 32 Ind. Cas. 634 : 14 A.L.J. 102 Walsh, J. held that a suit was maintainable on the basis of a prior decree, even where the decree was barred by limitation. The opinion expressed by Walsh, J., was, however, doubted by Sir Henry Richards C.J., and Rafique, J., on appeal, though they affirmed his decision on other grounds; Dhanraj Singh v. Lakhrani Kaur 35 Ind. Cas. 601 : 38 A. 509 : 14 A.L.J. 709 and the case was subsequently overruled in Ramanand v. Jairam 59 Ind. Cas. 632 : 18 A.L.J. 1001 : 2 U.P.L.R. (A) 379 : 43 A. 170. The balance of judicial opinion is thus in favour of the view that where by a former adjudication a, person became entitled to a" remedy by process (c)f execution for the recovery of possession, and has, by his own laches, lost this remedy, he cannot be permitted to revert to the position which he held prior to the institution of that suit and to ask for a remedy in a fresh suit. This view is supported by the decisions in Doobee Singh v. Jowkee 3 Agra. H.C.R. 381 : Agra. F.B. Ed. 1874; 172; Ram Jus v. Ram Narain 2 N.W.P.H.C.R. 382; and Sheikh Golam Hossein v. Alla Rukhee Beebee 3 N.W.H.C.R. 62. The decisions of the Madras High Court in Sanjeeviyah v. Nanjiyah 4 M.H.C.R. 453; Muttuvelu Pillai v. Vythilinga Pillai 5 M.H.C.R. 185; Ranganasary v. Shappani Asary 5 M.H.C.R. 375 at p. 377; Sungam Narayan Pillay v. Sandira Pillai 6 M.H.C.R. 13; and Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar 27 M. 243 : 14 M.L.J. 84 (F.B.), affirm the view that as against the judgment-debtor himself or as against his legal representative who as such is equally bound by the, judgment, the remedy under the statutory processual law of this country is only, by way of execution of the decree, and no, suit can be brought upon the judgment to obtain the identical relief already granted thereby. To the same effect are the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Manchharam Kalliandas v. Bakshe Saheb 6 B.H.C.R. 231; Kisan Nandram v. Anandram Pachaji 10 B.H.C.R. 433; Sayad Nairudin v. Venkatesh Prabhu 5 B. 382 : 3 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 251; Fakirapa v. Pandurangapa 6 B. 7 : 3 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 461 and Merwanji Nowroji v. Ashabai 8 B. 1 : 4 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 375 where mention is made of the practice which at one time prevailed in Bombay and sanctioned the institution bf suits on judgments of Small Cause Courts of Savill v. Dalton (1915) 3 K.B. 174 : 84 L.J. K.B. 1583 : 113 L.T. 477 : 59 S.J. 562. The development of the law on the subject in this Court is outlined, in the case of Kali charan v. Sukhada Sundari Deli 30 Ind. Cas. 824 : 22 C.L.J. 272 : 20 C.W.N. 58 where the earlier decisions in Sandes v. Jomir Shaikh 9 W.R. 399; Moonshi Golam Arab v. Curreembux 5 C. 294 : 4 C.L.R. 477 : 2 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 798; Attermoney Dossee v. Hurry Doss Dutt 7 C. 74 : 4 Shome. L.R. 192 : 9 C.L.R. 357 : 3 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 597; Annoda Prasad v. Nobakishore Roy 21 Ind. Cas. 519 : 18 C.L.J. 362 : 18 C.W.N. 173; Ashi Bhushan Dasi v. Pelaram Mandal 21 Ind. Cas. 519 : 18 C.L.J. 362 : 18 C.W.N. 176 and Kalikananda Mukherjee v. Bipro Das Pal Choudhury 26 Ind. Cas. 436 : 19 C.W.N. 18 : 21 C.L.J. 265 are reviewed. The essence of the matter is that a suit is not maintainable en a prior decree if the relief claimed in the suit has already been granted by the decree and Could have been obtained by enforcement thereof in execution proceedings. The rule, recognised in this qualified form, avoids the danger of the possibility of an infinite succession of suits on decrees for the enforcement of a singly cause of action. The case: for the plaintiff must now be tested from this stand-point.
5. The previous suit instituted by the father of the plaintiff was for declaration of title to the properties then in dispute as joint family properties, for partition, for accounts, and for incidental reliefs. If the parties had proceeded to trial, and if the plaintiff had been successful, a decree to this effect would no doubt have been made in his favour. The parties, however, came to terms and a consent decree was passed. This decree, as appears from an examination of the petition of compromise, was merely declaratory of the rights of the litigants; it did not entitle the then plaintiff to take possession by execution. The properties now in suit were included in the second Clause of the petition of compromise which was in these terms that in the immoveable properties, which are mentioned in the plaint as the self-acquisitions of the plaintiff and the defendants, whether standing in their own names or in the names of others, the plaintiff will have a four-annas, share, the second defendant a four-annas share, and the representatives of the first defendant the remaining eight annas share.
" The petition of compromise did not state with regard to the properties comprised in this clause, or, indeed, with regard to the properties mentioned in the other clauses, that the contending parties would be entitled to take possession of their respective shares by execution. The compromise settled the extent of the right of each of the rival claimants, which was by no means identical in respect of the different properties; but there was no provision that the rights so fixed were to be enforced by execution of the decree. The decree was in essence declaratory in character, and tire plaintiff could not have recovered possession in execution thereof. This is in accord with the opinion expressed in Doobee Singh v. Jewkee Ram 3 Agra. H.C.R. 381 : Agra. F.B. Ed. 1874; 172. and Sri Krishna Tata Chariar v. Singara Chariar 4 M.H.C.R. 453; that a decree which merely declares the rights of parties and does not direct any act to be done, is incapable of execution. In such an event, a separate suit will lie to enforce the rights declared by the decree, and in fact a regular suit affords the only method of enforcement of such"right This doctrine has been applied in a familiar class of cases,, namely, where the right of the plaintiff to maintenance has been declared by the decree, but the decree does not direct the defendant to pay the allowance at stated periods. Nawazish Ali Beg v. Vilaytee Khartum 2 Agra H.C.R. 23; Madhavrao v. Ramrao 22 B. 267 : 11 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 761; but it is otherwise if the decree is so framed as to be capable of execution from time to time. Ashutosh Bannerjee v. Lukhimoni Debya 19 C. 139 : 9 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 538; Matangini Dassee v. Chooneymoney Dassee 22 C. 903 : 11 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 598. The distinction is illustrated by other class of cases including cases where the relief sought is recovery of Possession; Girija Kanta v. Mohim Chandra 35 Ind. Cas 294 : 23 C.L.J. 587 : 20 C.W.N. 657. Shama Charan Chatterji v. Madhub Chandra Mookerjee 11 C. 93 : 5 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 820; Goba Nathu Barola v. Sakharam Teju Patil 59 Ind. Cas. 366 : 44 B. 977 : 22 Bom. L.R. 1101; Mahomed Ibrahim v. Meera Oommal 7 Ind. Cas. 558 : (1910) M.W.N. 368 : 8 M.L.T. 379; Mohammad Nasiruddm v. Bhagwana 22 Ind. Cas. 663 : 12 A.L.J. 31 Here the principle applies that where a decreed merely declaratory and does not require to be carried into effect by process of execution, the right thereby ascertained and declared exists independently of any process for enforcing it, Consequently the present suit for recovery of possession cannot be deemed to be barred.
6. As regards the second point, the defendant has contended that the claim is barred by limitation, inasmuch as the father of the plaintiff had lost possession in 1897 three years prior to the institution of the previous suit. This argument is based on the fallacious assumption that the present suit is based upon the original dispossession a the cause of action. The truth is that When the consent decree was made, the prior adverse possession, if any, forthwith lost its hostile character. The legal effect of the consent decree was that the parties became, from the date thereof, co-owners of joint possession and if, thereafter the defendants to that litigation continued in occupation their possession could be attributed only to their character as joint owners. They could not secretly or surreptitiously, convert their occupation into hostile possession In any event, none of the defendants had been, at the date of this suit in occupation for twelve years since the date of the consent decree, and the suit is thus clearly not barred under Article 144 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. The first defendant, who purchased pendente lite is bound by the decree in the previous suit, and is in no better position than the other defendants, whose right, title and interest had vested in him. He cannot escape the operation of Section 52 Of the Transfer of Property Act, either because he purchased at an involuntary sale: Moti Lal v. Karrabuldin 24 I.A. 170 : 25 C. 179 : 1 C.W.N. 639 : 7 Sar. P.C.J. 222 : 13 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 121 : (P.C.) or because the suit terminated in a consent decree; Bharat Ramanuja Das v. Sarat Kamini 66 Ind. Cas. 273 : 49 C. 220 : 34 C.L.J. 96 : 25 C.W.N. 806 : (1922) A.I.R. (C.) 358.
7. As regards the third point, the plaintiff claims an one-third share independently of the compromise in the previous suit. But the consent decree binds the plaintiff equally with the defendants, and effectively bars a claim in excess of an one-fourth share; South American & Mexican Co., In re (1895) 1 Ch. 37 : 64 L.J. Ch. 189 : 12 R. 1 : 71 L.T. 594 : 43 W.R. 131, Huddersfield Banking Co. v. Lister (1895) 2 Ch. 273 : 64 L.J. Ch. 523 : 12 R. 831 : 72 L.T. 703 : 43 W.R. 567. Wentworth v. Bullen (1829) 9 B. & C. 840 : 9 L.J. (O.S.) K.B. 33 : 109 E.R. 313 : 33 R.R. 353; Kanhai Lal v. Lala Brij Lal 47 Ind. Cas. 207 : 45 I.A. 118 : 40 A. 487 : 22 C.W.N. 914 : 8 L.W. 212 M.L.T. 263 : 35 M.L.J. 459 : 16 A.L.J. 825 : (1918) M.W.N. 709 : 28 C.L.J. 394 : 5 P.L.W. 294 : 20 Bom. L.R. 1048 (P.C.). Fateh Chand v. Narsingh Das 16 Ind. Cas. 988 : 22 C.L.J. 383; Rampat v. Durga Bharthi 60 Ind. Cas. 440 : 23 O.C. 303 : 7 O.L.J. 547.
8. The result is that the decree made by the Subordinate Judge is affirmed and both the appeals are dismissed with costs.
Alert