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Rajendra Prosad Bose And Another v. Gopal Prasad Sen Opposite Party.

Patna High Court
Sep 19, 1930
Smart Summary (Beta)

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application in revision directed against an order of the Subordinate Judge of Cuttack. The Subordinate Judge had granted the opposite party time to move Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee for review of a judgment. That order was made in connection with an execution proceeding pending before the Subordinate Judge, which arose out of an order of His Majesty in Council transmitted at the instance of the petitioners to that Court for execution. The present application challenges the Subordinate Judge's order and seeks revisional intervention by a Vacation Judge sitting at Patna.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Vacation Judge sitting at Patna has jurisdiction to hear the revisional application in respect of a matter arising in the Division of Orissa, given Clause 35 of the Letters Patent and Rule 5, Chapter 22 of the High Court Rules which require that "all other cases arising in the Division of Orissa shall be instituted and heard in Orissa."
  2. Whether Rule 4, Chapter 2 of the High Court Rules (which empowers a single Judge acting as a Vacation Judge to exercise "the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court" in certain urgent execution-related matters) authorises the Vacation Judge at Patna to hear cases that Rule 5, Chapter 22 declares must be heard in Orissa, or whether R.4 is confined in effect to non‑Orissa matters / to Patna.
  3. What is the proper interpretation of the phrase "the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court" in R.4, Ch.2 — specifically, whether it can be read so as to override or operate independently of the territorial and discretionary limitations established by Clause 35 of the Letters Patent and the rules made under it (Ch.22).

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments for the Opposite Party (Mr. Sen)

  • Raised a preliminary objection to the Vacation Judge hearing the application at Patna.
  • Submitted that Clause 35, Letters Patent read with Rule 5, Ch.22 requires the case to be heard in Orissa, and therefore a Vacation Judge sitting at Patna lacks jurisdiction.
  • Contended that Rule 4, Ch.2 (the rule empowering a Vacation Judge) is concerned with Bihar matters and that the operation of Ch.2 is confined to Patna; it does not empower a Vacation Judge to deal with cases required by Ch.22 to be heard in Orissa.

Arguments for the Petitioners (Mr. Shiveshwar Dayal)

  • Accepted that R.5, Ch.22 governs the territorial rule but argued that R.4, Ch.2 must be read together with the rules in Ch.22.
  • Contended that the phrase "the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court" in R.4, Ch.2 is broad enough to include the discretionary power of the Chief Justice under Clause 35 to order that an Orissa case be heard at Patna, and therefore the Vacation Judge has power to hear such a case at Patna where conditions of R.4 are satisfied.
  • Maintained that the operation of Ch.2 is not confined to Patna and that certain rules in Ch.2 already apply to Judges visiting the Orissa Division (e.g., Judges sit singly on circuit under R.1, Ch.2), supporting an integrated reading.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds from textual interpretation of the Letters Patent and the High Court Rules, read in their context.

  1. The court identifies Clause 35 of the Letters Patent as the primary source governing the place where cases arising in the Division of Orissa are to be heard. Clause 35, together with the chapter of rules headed "Rules for cases arising in the Division of Orissa" (Ch.22), is intended to declare which Orissa cases shall be heard at Patna and which shall be heard in Orissa. R.2–R.5 of Ch.22 implement that scheme; in particular R.5 states that "all other cases arising in the Division of Orissa shall be instituted and heard in Orissa."
  2. The court recognises R.4 of Ch.2 (empowering a single Judge acting as a Vacation Judge to exercise "the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court" in urgent execution-related matters) and places it within its chapter's scheme. Ch.2 generally deals with constitution of Benches and powers of Benches, and many rules in Ch.2 arise from the High Court's rule‑making power under Section 108(1) of the Government of India Act.
  3. The court contrasts R.4's purpose with that of Ch.22. It concludes that R.4 is designed to dispense with the need for more than one Judge during vacation to decide certain classes of matters, and that the classification in R.4 is by the nature of the matter (e.g., urgency, execution‑related) rather than by territorial distinctions between Bihar and Orissa.
  4. Critically, the court holds that the discretion vested in the Chief Justice by Clause 35 (to order that any particular Orissa case be heard at Patna) cannot be governed by rules made by the High Court and therefore cannot be read into R.4. In other words, R.4 cannot be interpreted so as to override or circumvent the territorial and discretionary framework established by Clause 35 and the rules in Ch.22.
  5. Given that R.5, Ch.22 plainly requires that such Orissa cases be heard in Orissa in the absence of a Chief Justice's order to the contrary, and there was no such order (it was impossible in the circumstances because the case arose during vacation after the Chief Justice had left Patna), the court concludes that a Vacation Judge sitting at Patna lacks jurisdiction to hear this revisional application.
  6. The court acknowledges the practical inconvenience that may result from the absence of a Vacation Judge specifically empowered for Orissa, but rejects that practical consideration as a basis for reading R.4 in a manner inconsistent with its context and with Ch.22 and Clause 35.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the petitioners' revisional application and accordingly the Rule is discharged.

Consequences and immediate effect on the parties:

  • The revisional application could not be heard by the Vacation Judge at Patna because R.5, Ch.22 requires the case to be heard in Orissa and there was no Chief Justice's direction to hear it at Patna.
  • The court discharged the Rule and awarded costs to the opposite party in the amount of three gold mohurs.

Broader implications:

The decision applies the text and context of Clause 35 of the Letters Patent together with Ch.22 of the High Court Rules to restrict the reach of R.4, Ch.2; the opinion does not purport to create or announce a novel judicial precedent beyond this interpretation. No wider principle beyond the immediate territorial and rule‑interpretive conclusion is stated in the opinion.

End of summary — based exclusively on the provided opinion text.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an application in revision against an order of the Subordinate Judge of Cuttack granting the opposite party time to move their Lordships of the Judicial Committee for review of a judgment. The order of the Subordinate Judge was passed in connexion with an execution proceeding pending before him in consequence of an order of His Majesty in Council which was transmitted at the instance of the petitioners to that Court for execution.

2. Mr. Sen, who appears for the opposite party, has raised a preliminary objection to the hearing of the application by me. He contends that under Cl. 35, Letters Patent of this High Court, read with R. 5, in Ch. 22 of the Rules of the High Court, the Vacation Judge has no jurisdiction to hear the matter since it is required by the provisions indicated to be heard in Orissa. As to the powers given to the Vacation Judge by R. 4 in Ch. 2 of the Rules of the High Court, Mr. Sen argues that the rule refers to Bihar cases and that the operation of Ch. 2, the chapter in which that rule occurs, is confined to Patna as distinguished from Orissa. Mr. Shiveswar Dyal who appears for the petitioners does not dispute the position that the case would be governed by R. 5 in Ch. 22, but he contends that rule like the rest of Ch. 22 must be read with the rules in Ch. 2 and that

“the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court”

3. Which is referred to in R. 4, Ch. 2, means the jurisdiction of the High Court apart from the mode and conditions of its exercise and includes the discretionary power of the Chief Justice under Cl. 35, Letters Patent, to order that any particular case arising in the Division of Orissa shall be heard at Patna. According to Mr. Shiveshwar Dayal the Vacation Judge has power to hear a case coming within R. 5, Ch. 22, and hear it at Patna, provided of course that the other conditions laid down in R. 4, Ch. 2, are satisfied. I understand from the parties that the matter is one of first impression. Clause 35, Letters Patent, in effect provides that every case arising in the Division of Orissa shall be heard by one or more Judges of this Court visiting that division by way of circuit, unless it is a case or falls within the class of cases which the rules declare “shall be heard at Patna,” or unless the Chief Justice in his discretion has ordered that it shall be heard there the rules framed under this clause of the Letters Patent are contained in Ch. 22 of the Rules of the High Court, headed

“Rules for cases arising in the Division of Orissa.”

4. I do not say that the rules in the chapter purport to be made under Cl. 35, Letters Patent, but the important rules in that chapter are clearly referable to the clause and it is immaterial in this connexion that some of the rules, such as those relating to the Registrar, are referable to Cl. 38, Letters Patent. R. 2, Ch. 22, specifies what cases subject to the power reserved to the Chief Justice by Cl. 35, Letters Patent, shall be heard at Patna. Rr. 3 and 4 deal with certain criminal cases which are to be heard at Patna, unless the persons accused or convicted wish them to be heard in Orissa. Then comes R. 5 which provides that

“all other cases arising in the Division of Orissa shill be instituted and heard in Orissa,”

5. Mr. Sen has argued that the present is a case coming within R. 5 and Mr. Shiveswar Dayal has been content to argue the case on that footing. There is no specific order of the Chief Justice that the case shall be heard at Patna. Indeed there could not be any, as the case arose three or four weeks after beginning of the vacation and after the departure of the Chief Justice from Patna. Mr. Sen therefore contends that sitting as I do at Patna I have no jurisdiction to hear the case. If the case be entirely governed by R. 5, Ch. 22, it is quite clear that it would have to be heard in Orissa. Mr. Sen's further contention is that R. 4 in Ch. 2 which gives certain powers to the Vacation Judge, the capacity in which I am sitting at present, does not contain anything to enable me to deal with a case which R. 5 in Ch. 22, required to be beard in Orissa. This R. 4 in Ch. 2 runs:

“Except in a case, which the law requires to be heard by a Bench of two or more Judges, a single Judge, while acting in a long vacation as a Vacation Judge, may exercise the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court:

In any matter, which he considers urgent, connected with, relating to, or arising out of the execution of a decree.”

6. Mr. Shiveshwar Dayal's contention is that the powers so conferred on the Vacation Judge do enable me to deal with a case like the present notwithstanding R. 5 in Ch. 22. This contention is rested on an interpretation of the words:

“original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court,”

7. Used in the rule. The words are apparently wide enough to do so, but it is necessary to consider the scheme of the chapter in order to appreciate the scope of the rule. The heading of the chapter is:

“Constitution of Benches and powers of Benches and of the Registrars.”

8. We may here leave the Registrar out as the rules relating to him are referable to Cl. 38, Letters Patent, and have nothing to do with the matter in dispute before me. The other rule in Ch. 2(1) seem to have been made under Section 108(1) of the Government of India Act, which empowers the High Court to provide by rules for the exercise of its jurisdiction by one or more Judges or by Division Courts. The general rule in Ch. 2 seems to be R. 10:

“Save as provided by law or by these rules or by an order of the Chief Justice every other case shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges.”

9. The first rule in the chapter provides what matters may be heard and disposed of by a single Judge, while rules like seven to nine deal with matters which shall be heard by a Bench of three Judges. R. 4 seems to qualify what I have called the general rule, namely R. 10, and subject to certain exceptions it empowers a single Judge while acting in a long vacation as a Vacation Judge, to hear certain-matters. This seems to be quite a different matter from regulating what Orissa cases shall or may be heard at Patna, a subject dealt with in Ch. 22 of the rules. Mr. Shiveshwar Dayal has contended that the operation of Ch. 2 is not confined to Patna, but that this chapter must be read along with Ch. 22 for certain purposes. It is perfectly clear that Mr. Shiveshwar Dayal's contention is correct. It is, for instance, under R. 1, of Ch. 2 that Judges of this Court visiting the Orissa Division by way of circuit sit singly to hear certain matters there, but does it follow from this that the jurisdiction vested in the Court which the Vacation Judge may exercise under R. 4, Ch. 2, is free from the restrictions imposed on its exercise by Cl. 35, Letters Patent, and the rules made thereunder? I observe in the first place that whatever the expression

“the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court,”

10. Used in R. 4, Ch. 2 may mean, it cannot include the discretion conferred on the Chief Justice in the proviso in Cl. 35, Letters Patent, to order that any particular case arising in the Division of Orissa shall be heard at Patna or in that division. This discretion cannot be governed by any rules made by the High Court. But apart from the exercise of such discretion by the Chief Justice no Judge sitting at Patna in term time has power to exercise the jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of cases arising in the Orissa Division except in accordance with the rules made under that clause of the Letters Patent “declaring what cases or class of cases arising in the Division of Orissa shall be heard at Patna.”

11. The dominant provision about Orissa is that cases arising in that division shall be heard in Orissa. Judging from its position in Ch. 2 the object of R. 4 seems to be no more than to dispense with the-necessity of having more than one Judge in the vacation to dispose of certain cases or class of cases, the classification being made not with reference to the territorial distinction between Bihar and Orissa, but with reference to the nature of the cases as requiring one Judge or more to deal with them in term time. On, careful consideration, it seems to me impossible to treat R. 4 in Ch. 2 as a rule intended to operate not merely under Section 108(1) of the Government of India Act, but also under C. 35, Letters Patent. Mr. Shiveshwar Dayal has argued that in this view there will be no Judge empowered to do for cases from Orissa what the Vacation Judge can do for the rest of this Province. That may possibly be so. Mr. Sen has said that except when Judges are visiting the Orissa division by way of circuit, that Bench of this High Court which is commonly called the circuit Court is rarely in vacation, though if this be so, we shall have to say that it is in vacation but without a Vacation Judge; but I do not think that is a sufficient reason for reading into R. 4 in Ch. 2 something which does not seem to have been intended by the framers of the rules and which involves a construction of the expression

“the original and appellate jurisdiction vested an the Court”

12. Independently of Cl. 35, Letters Patent. The Registrar of Orissa has much wider powers than the Registrar at Patna. It may be that even so, there ought to be a Judge clothed with the authority of the Vacation Judge for the purpose of cases arising within the Orissa Division on lines similar to those found in R. 4, Ch. 2. R. 4, Ch. 2, does not contain anything bearing on territorial distinctions and cannot therefore be said by itself to exclude Orissa. But it is not permissible to read it shorn of its context. Taken with the context in which it occurs, the rule does seem inapplicable to Orissa cases except when they come within R. 2 to 4, Ch. 22. Whether a Vacation Judge is necessary for Orissa may be examined on a suitable occasion. But I must, I think, accept Mr. Sen's contention that the possible inconvenience arising from the absence of a Vacation Judge for Orissa is no reason for placing upon R. 4 an interpretation which it will not bear if regard is had to the other rules contained in that chapter and also to the rules in Ch. 22 read with Cl. 35, Letters Patent.

13. In this view I hold that it is not open Ito me to hear the revisional application of the petitioners. The Rule is accordingly discharged with costs. I assess the costs at three gold mohurs.

K.N/R.K

14. Rule discharged.