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Badam Khan v. Mahraj Suraj Narain

Allahabad High Court
Nov 19, 1946

Sinha, J.:— This is an application in revision under Section 115 of the CPC and arises out of an application under Section 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. The facts, very briefly, are these: There was one Himmat Khan who died many years ago leaving a widow, Mt. Munni, and two sons, Minda Khan and Kammu Khan. On 13-7-1843 Mt. Munni and Kammu Khan made a usufructuary mortage of a half share in favour of one Laljimal for a sum of Rs. 175. On 12-6-1844, Minda Khan, through his mother, granted a usufructuary mortage of the other half to the same mortgagee for the same amount of Rs. 175. It appears that Mt. Munni associated herself with the mortgage although she had no interest in the property, perhaps by way of precaution. Nothing however turns on it.

2. On 13-3-1848, Mt. Munni and Minda Khan Sold the equity of redemption with respect to the half covered by the later mortgage of 1844 to the mortgagee, Laljimal. On 6-2-1883 Laljimal having died, his heir Shibcharan sold his rights in respect of both the items of property to the heirs of the present opposite party with the result that the latter acquired full proprietary rights with respect to a half covered by the mortgage of 1844 and mortgagee rights with respect to the property embraced by the earlier mortgage of 1843.

3. In 1905 an application for mutation of names was made by a number of people including the applicants, viz. Badam Khan, Mt. Abadi Begam, Afsar Khan and Majid Khan. Their attempt at substitution was resisted and once failed, but they ultimately succeeded and their names were substituted by an order of the revenue Court in place of the mortgagors. On 5-2-1943, the present application for redemption was made under Section 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. Various defences were raised, the principal of them being that the plaintiffs were not the heirs of the mortgagors, the mortgage was not a subsisting mortgage and the claim was barred by limitation.

4. The learned Revenue Officer in a careful judgment, came to the conclusion that the pedigree set up by the plaintiff was proved. He also found that the mortgage was a subsisting mortgage and the claim was not barred by limitation. He decreed the suit unconditionally on the finding that the entire debt had been wiped off.

5. It might be mentioned that on the question of the right of the plaintiffs to bring the action as heirs of the original mortgagors, the revenue officer based himself largely upon the order of the revenue Court passed in the year 1905 under which the mutation of names was effected in favour of the applicants. This order was challenged on appeal. The learned District Judge found that the pedigree set up by the plaintiffs was proved. He also agreed with the Court of first instance that the mortgage was a subsisting mortgage and that the action was not barred by limitation. He, however, found against the applicants on the ground that their ancestors as also the ancestors of the mortgagors were Hindus and no relationship could subsist as between them and they could not, therefore, be the mortgagor's heirs. The plaintiffs have come to this Court in revision.

6. The learned counsel contends that the precise point on which the Court below has decided the case against them, was never raised even in the memorandum of appeal and it was, therefore, not open to the learned Judge to allow it to be raised, more particularly when the question involved was a mixed question of law and fact. Reliance has been placed on 1926 A.L.J 9201 and 1930 A.L.J 16012. The case in 1926 A.L.J 920 is authority for the proposition that:

“The lower appellate Courts and the High Court sitting either in Letters Patent or in second appeal ought not to entertain points which should have been alleged in the pleadings and made the subject of an issue and argument and of decision by the trial Court and also stated in the grounds of appeal clearly and directly.”

7. This case was noticed in the later case. The Full Bench case in 1930 A.L.J 1601 does not go the whole length with the case in 1926 A.L.J 920 but has summed up the true position in these words at p. 1606:

“From all the very numerous cases to which we have referred, and many others, we deduce the following principles, which we approve:

A point not taken in the Court below whether the omission was by the appellant in that Court or whether the respondent failed to support his decree by taking the point, will not be permitted to be raised, except possibly, I. Where the point may be described as involving a question of public policy e.g, (1) involving jurisdiction; (2) involving the principle of res judicata; (3) where the decision of the point would prevent future litigation.”

8. It is true that the learned Judges in 1930 A.L.J 1601 made a departure from the extreme view taken in 1926 A.L.J 920 but it is impossible to say that the present case answered the test laid down by them. The question involved was not one of jurisdiction nor was it one of principle. It was, on the other hand, essentially, if not entirely, a question of fact. It is not difficult to conceive of a case where the parties are Hindus and are not strictly governed by the Hindu law; they are governed by some custom. It is also possible to conceive of a case where the parties have ceased to be Hindus; they have either embraced Islam or Christianity but still retain the Hindu law or are governed by some special custom. It is obvious that the learned Judge should not have allowed such a point to be raised before him for the first time in appeal.

9. In cases of this class where the transaction in dispute is an ancient transaction more than a hundred years old and lapse of time must obliterate at least some, if not the greater part of the evidence and where the success of the plaintiff depends not only upon the proof of a pedigree but upon the establishment of a particular relationship, the best course is to light upon some land-mark, if one such is available, Fortunately such a one is available in this case. It is the order of the mutation Court passed in the year 1905 when the matter was fresher and more details were available.

10. The learned counsel for the opposite party contends that order cannot have the force of res judicata. It is true, but it is an order passed by a competent Court and must have been passed after due and proper enquiry.

11. There is another circumstance which lends added weight to that order.

12. Ordinarily mutation is based upon possession, but the present is not a case of that character. It was a usufructuary mortgage and it was the mortgages who must have been in possession of the property. What had remained with the mortgagors or then heirs was the equity of redemption. The order must have been based on the result of an enquiry into the question of title. A finding in favour of the plaintiffs on the question of title must, in the peculiar circumstances, needs involve a finding as regards the legal relationship.

13. On a consideration of all the facts, we have come to the conclusion that the learned Judge acted illegally and with material irregularity in allowing a new point to be raised before him. We, therefore, allow this application, see aside the order of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the Court of first instance with costs in all Courts.

14. Application allowed.