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Gopal Laskar Petitioner, v. Harihar Mukherjee And Anr. Opposite Parties,

Calcutta High Court
May 9, 1946
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Structured Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents obtained a decree for arrears of rent against the appellant and, in execution, caused the property to be put up for sale and purchased it at auction. After confirmation of the sale the respondents obtained delivery of possession. The appellant subsequently applied to set aside the sale and, on 27 March 1939, the original Court set the sale aside. The decree-holders-auction-purchasers (the respondents) appealed against that order, but that appeal was dismissed on 4 September 1939. In September 1939 the appellant recovered possession of the property.

On 20 July 1942 the appellant filed an application claiming by way of restitution mesne profits for the period during which the auction-purchasers possessed the land. The learned Munsif treated the application as one under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.), assessed mesne profits at Rs. 575, and allowed the application with costs. The respondents appealed to the Subordinate Judge (1st Additional Court, Alipore). The Subordinate Judge agreed the application was not strictly under section 144 but under section 151, and held the application barred by limitation because it had been filed more than three years after the date the sale was set aside. The Subordinate Judge observed that had the application been in time the Munsif had correctly assessed the mesne profits at Rs. 575; nonetheless he allowed the appeal, set aside the Munsif’s order and dismissed the application. The appellant then appealed to the court giving the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal lies from an order of restitution when the trial Court acts under section 151, C.P.C., rather than under section 144, C.P.C. (i.e., the question whether the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to entertain the respondents' appeal).
  2. Whether an application under section 151, C.P.C. for restitution is subject to a period of limitation, and if so, which period applies.
  3. If a limitation period applies (identified as Article 181 of the Limitation Act in the opinion), from which date does limitation commence to run — the date the sale was set aside by the original Court, the date of dismissal of the appeal against that order, or the date on which the appellant actually recovered possession?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that the application before the Munsif was not one under section 144, C.P.C., but under section 151, C.P.C., and that consequently no appeal lay from the Munsif's order; therefore the Court of Appeal below purportedly lacked jurisdiction.
  • The appellant relied on Tarak Ch. Roy v. Panchanan Banerjee (Mukherjea, J.) for the proposition that "no appeal could possibly lie from an order under section 151, C.P. Code, taken by itself".
  • On limitation, the appellant argued (invoking Jai Barham v. Kedar Nath Marwari and the dictum of Lord Cairns in Rodger v. Comptoir de-Escompte de Paris) that the Court, independently under section 151, could grant restitution without regard to limitation; alternatively, if limitation did apply, the appellant argued that limitation should run from either (a) the date when the appeal against the order setting aside the sale was dismissed (4 September 1939), or (b) the date on which the appellant actually recovered possession of the property (September 1939), which would render the 20 July 1942 application within time.

Respondents' / Court-below Position (as presented in the opinion)

  • The respondents appealed the Munsif's order; before the Subordinate Judge it was held that the application (though under section 151 in form) was subject to limitation and that it had been filed more than three years after the date on which the sale was set aside; accordingly the Subordinate Judge held the application to be barred by limitation and allowed the appeal, setting aside the Munsif's order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tarak Ch. Roy v. Panchanan Banerjee Mukherjea, J.'s dictum that "no appeal could possibly lie from an order under section 151, C.P. Code, taken by itself." The court treated Mukherjea, J.'s observations as obiter in the circumstances of that case (because that case was not an appeal from an order under section 151) and therefore not decisive for the present appeal; the court did not adopt the absolute proposition that no appeal can lie in every case where section 151 is invoked.
Maharaja Sasikanta Acharjee v. Jalil Baksha Munshi Where section 144 does not apply but the Court acting under section 151 exercises the same jurisdiction which section 144 gives it, an order of restitution so made is appealable. The court held itself bound by this decision and applied the principle to conclude the Court of Appeal below was competent to entertain the respondents' appeal.
Gnanada Sundari Mojumdar v. Chandra Kumar De Earlier decision relied upon in support of the proposition that an order of restitution under section 151, where the court is exercising the same jurisdiction as section 144, is appealable. Cited as an authority followed by Maharaja Sasikanta Acharjee; used to support the conclusion that the appeal was competent.
Jai Barham v. Kedar Nath Marwari Judicial Committee cited Lord Cairns' dictum (Rodger v. Comptoir de-Escompte de Paris) stressing the Court's duty to ensure its acts do not injure suitors; relied on to argue that courts may grant restitution without reference to limitation. The court rejected the contention that the Court could grant relief without application and without regard to limitation; it held that an application was necessary and that Article 181 of the Limitation Act applied.
Rodger v. Comptoir de-Escompte de Paris (dictum of Lord Cairns) Dictum relied on in Jai Barham about the duty of courts to prevent their acts causing injury to suitors. The dictum was noted but the court refused to accept it as allowing restitution to be granted without an application or without consideration of limitation; the court required an application and applied Article 181.
Parmeshar Singh v. Sitladin Dube (Full Bench, Allahabad) Full Bench divided on when limitation runs for restitution applications: one view (Sulaiman, C.J.) that it begins from the date of the second appellate judgment; other views that, for mesne profits, limitation begins from recovery of possession. The court declined to follow this Allahabad Full Bench decision, describing it as contrary to Calcutta decisions and therefore not binding on the court in the present case.
Hari Mohan Dalai v. Parmeshwar Shau (Special Bench, Calcutta) Held that limitation in the case of an application under section 144, C.P.C., commences to run from the date on which the decree was set aside in the first Appellate Court. The court treated this Calcutta Special Bench decision as binding and followed it, concluding that limitation commences from the date the sale was set aside (27 March 1939).
Sarojebhusan Ghosh v. Debendranath Ghosh Calcutta decision following Hari Mohan Dalai on commencement of limitation. Cited as further supporting authority; treated as binding and used to reinforce the conclusion that limitation begins from the date the sale was set aside.
Bhabaranjan Das Dewri v. Nibaran Chandra Gupta Another Calcutta decision following the rule in Hari Mohan Dalai. Also relied upon as a binding Calcutta ruling consistent with the view that limitation commences from the date the sale was set aside.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two principal stages: (A) the question of appealability (jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal) and (B) the question of limitation as applied to the restitution application.

A. Appealability / Jurisdiction

The court acknowledged the general statement by Mukherjea, J. in Tarak Ch. Roy that "no appeal could possibly lie from an order under section 151, C.P. Code, taken by itself." However, the court treated that observation as not determinative for the present circumstances because earlier Calcutta decisions (notably Maharaja Sasikanta Acharjee and Gnanada Sundari Mojumdar) had held that where section 144 does not apply but the Court acting under section 151 exercises the same jurisdiction as section 144, the resultant order of restitution is appealable. The court considered those Calcutta decisions binding and therefore concluded that the Court of Appeal below was competent to entertain the respondents' appeal and to pass the order it did.

B. Limitation

The court accepted that the trial Court has power under section 151, C.P.C. to grant restitution, but emphasised that the Court cannot act without an application; an applicant must file a petition to obtain relief. Given that an application was filed, the court treated the applicable limitation as Article 181 of the Limitation Act (the residuary article for applications), which prescribes a three-year period commencing from the time when the right to apply accrues.

The court examined competing views as to when the right to apply accrues. The appellant urged that limitation should run from either the date the appeal dismissing the respondents' appeal was dismissed (4 September 1939) or from the date the appellant recovered possession (September 1939), which would make the 20 July 1942 application within three years. The court considered the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Parmeshar Singh, where the judges were divided — but found that decision to be contrary to Calcutta authority.

The court followed Calcutta precedents, in particular the Special Bench decision in Hari Mohan Dalai v. Parmeshwar Shau, and subsequent Calcutta rulings (Sarojebhusan Ghosh and Bhabaranjan Das Dewri). Those decisions hold that limitation for an application of this nature (under section 144 or, where section 151 is exercising similar jurisdiction, effectively the same) commences to run from the date on which the decree (or sale) was set aside in the first Appellate Court. Applying that principle, the court held limitation began on 27 March 1939 (the date the sale was set aside). Because the restitution application was filed on 20 July 1942 (more than three years later), it was barred by limitation.

The court therefore agreed with the learned Subordinate Judge's conclusion that the application was time-barred (while noting that, had it been in time, the Munsif's assessment of mesne profits at Rs. 575 was correct).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED with costs.

Consequences and immediate implications:

  • The court held that an order of restitution made where a court acting under section 151 exercises the same jurisdiction as section 144 is appealable; the Court of Appeal below had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal.
  • The court held that applications of this nature require an application by the aggrieved party and are subject to limitation under Article 181 of the Limitation Act (a three-year residuary period).
  • Applying binding Calcutta authority, the court held that the period of limitation commenced on the date the sale was set aside (27 March 1939) and that the application filed on 20 July 1942 was therefore time-barred.
  • Practical outcome for the parties: the Munsif’s order allowing restitution and awarding Rs. 575 was set aside by the Court of Appeal; the appellant's restitution claim failed for being time-barred. The appeal to the present court was dismissed with costs and the hearing-fee was assessed at one gold mohur.
  • No new legal principle or precedent was established by this judgment; the court followed and applied existing Calcutta decisions on appealability and commencement of limitation.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what the opinion expressly states.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was as follows:

1. This appeal arises out of an order for restitution. The material facts are as follows: The Respondents had obtained a decree for arrears of rent against the present Appellant and in execution of that decree had had the property with which we are concerned put up to sale and had purchased the same in auction. After the sale was confirmed the Respondents obtained delivery of possession. Thereafter the present Appellant applied to have the sale set aside and on the 27th March, 1939, the sale was set aside by the original Court. The decree-holders auction-purchasers, that is to say, the present Respondents, appealed against the order setting aside the sale but that appeal was dismissed on the 4th September, 1939. In the month of September, 1939, the present Appellant recovered possession of the property which had been sold. On the 20th July, 1942, the application out of which the present appeal arises was filed by the present Appellant in which he claimed by way of restitution, mesne profits for the period in which the land in question was in the possession of the decree-holders-auction-purchasers. The learned Munsif held that the application was not an application under sec. 144, C.P.C, but could be treated as an application under sec. 151, C.P.C He held that the amount of mesne profits was Rs. 575 only and he allowed the application with costs. The Respondents before me appealed against this decision and the appeal was heard by the Subordinate Judge, 1st Additional Court; at Alipore. The learned Subordinate Judge agreed with the learned Munsif that the application was not, strictly speaking, an application under sec. 144, C.P.C, but was an application under sec. 151. The learned Subordinate Judge then held that the application was barred by limitation having been filed more than three years after the date on which the sale had been set aside. The learned Subordinate Judge in his judgment held that if the application was in time the amount of mesne profit had been correctly assessed by the learned Munsif at Rs. 575. The appeal was accordingly allowed with costs, the order of the learned Munsif was set aside and the application was dismissed. Hence this appeal.

2. It has been argued in the first place on behalf of the present Appellant that the application was an application not under sec. 144, C.P.C, but under sec. 151, C.P.C, and therefore no appeal lay from the order of the Munsif and accordingly the order of the learned Subordinate Judge in the Court of Appeal below was without jurisdiction.

3. Reliance was placed for this view on the decision in the case of Tarak Ch. Roy v. Panchanan Banerjee(1). In that case the question before the Court concerned the amount of court-fees payable on a memorandum of appeal filed against an order passed in a proceeding for restitution under sec. 144, C.P.C Mukherjea, J., referred to a contention placed before him that the appeal before him might be treated as an appeal against an order under sec. 151 and not as an appeal against an order under sec. 144, C.P.C, Mukherjea, J., in dealing with the argument observed:

“Now an appeal is undoubtedly a creature of statute, and no appeal could possibly lie from an order under section 151, C.P Code, taken by itself.”

4. If the matter were res Integra I should be inclined to hold that no appeal lay from an order passed on an application under sec. 151, C.P.C, but in my opinion I am bound by the decisions of this Court. The decisions of this Court, which are binding on me, are all to the effect that an appeal does lie under the circumstances such as those with which I am now concerned. In the case of Maharaja Sasikanta Acharjee v. Jalil Baksha Munshi(2), it was held that when in a case to which sec. 144, C.P.C, does not apply, the Court acting under sec. 151, exercises the same jurisdiction which sec. 144 gives it, the order of restitution so made is appealable. The learned Judges who tried that case observed that they followed earlier decisions of this Court and that no authority of this Court was shown to them in which a different view had been taken. They referred particularly to the case of Gnanada Sundari Mojumdar v. Chandra Kumar De(3). In these two cases the facts were exactly similar to the facts of the present case and these two cases are authority for the view that an appeal would lie. In the case of Tarak Ch. Roy v. Panchanan Banerjee, Mukherjea, J., held that the case before him was not the case of an appeal from an order under sec. 151 and consequently his remarks as to the maintainability of an appeal from an order under sec. 151 were really obiter dicta. In any case, Mukher-jea, J., did not dissent from the decision in the case of Maharaja Sasikanta Acharjee v. Jalil Baksha Munshi, but, held that that decision could be justified on the second of the two reasons given by the Judges who gave the decision. There is therefore no authority of this Court for the view that the case of Maharaja Sasikanta Acharjee v. Jalil Baksha Munshi was wrongly decided. I am, therefore, bound by that decision and I must hold that the Court of Appeal below was competent to entertain the appeal and to pass the order which it did pass.

5. It has next been contended that inasmuch as the application to the learned Munsif was not an application under sec. 144 there is no period of limitation prescribed by law which is applicable in the present case. My attention was drawn to the language used by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Jai Barham v. Kedar Nath Marwari(4) in which they cited with approval the dictum of Lord Cairns in Rodger v. Comptoir de-Escompte de Paris(5) and pointed out that it was one of the first and highest duties of all Courts to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors. It was argued from this that independently of any application being made by the parties the Court had jurisdiction to grant the restitution prayed for in this case and could do so without considering any questions of limitation. I have no doubt whatever that the Court has power under sec. 151, C.P.C, to grant the relief which the present Appellant sought in the Court of first instance, but I am unable to accept the view that the Court could grant relief without any application being made. From the Court records the Court would not be in a position to determine that any relief was necessary, and in my opinion it was necessary for a person who desired, relief to make an application to the Court in order to obtain relief. Such being the case, an application must necessarily be filed and in the present case an application was in fact filed. Once it is conceded that an application is necessary, the period of limitation for making the application is clearly the period of limitation provided by Article 181 of the Limitation Act. Article 181 is the residuary article for applications and provides a three-year period of limitation starting from the time when the right to apply accrues. I am satisfied, therefore, that the learned Judge in the Court below was right in holding that there was a period of limitation applicable to the present case and that the period of limitation was that provided in Article 181. It has been argued on behalf of the Appellant that even if the three-year limitation provided in Article 181 does apply then limitation should start to run either from the date on which the appeal from the order setting aside the sale was dismissed or from the date on which the Appellant actually recovered possession of the property which had been sold. The date on which the sale was set aside was the 27th March, 1939. The date on which the application for restitution was filed was the 20th July, 1942. Therefore if the period of limitation begins to run from the date on which the sale was set aside the application was barred by limitation. An appeal against the order setting aside the sale was dismissed on the 4th September, 1939. If limitation begins to run from the date of the appellate order the application for restitution was within time. I am further informed that the Appellant actually recovered possession of the property sold, in the month of September, 1939, and if so and if limitation commences to run from the date of recovery of possession then the application was within time. In support of the view that the period of limitation does not run from the date on which the sale was set aside reliance was placed on the case of Parmeshar Singh v. Sitladin Dube(6). This was a decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The learned Judges were divided as to the date on which limitation in the case of an application under sec. 144 would begin to run but they all agreed that where the decree of the first Court was set aside in appeal and that a second appeal was preferred against the appellate judgment limitation would not begin to run from the date of the first appellate judgment. Sulaiman, C.J, was of opinion that limitation would begin to run from the date of the second appellate judgment. The other two learned Judges were of opinion that limitation would begin to run, in so far as restitution on account of mesne profits was concerned, from the time of the recovery of possession of the land. This decision, however, is contrary to all Calcutta decisions on the subject. The matter was considered by a Special Bench of this Court in the case of Hari Mohan Dalai v. Parmeshwar Shau(7). In that case it was held that limitation in the case of an application under sec. 144, C.P.C, commences to run from the date on which the decree was set aside in the first Appellate Court. That case has been followed in two other Calcutta cases, namely, Sarojebhusan Ghosh v. Debendra-nath Ghosh(8) and Bhabaranjan Das Dewri v. Nibaran Chandra Gupta(9). These Calcutta rulings are binding upon me and I am constrained to hold that limitation in a case like the present commences to run from the date on which the sale was set aside and that therefore the application filed by the present Appellant in the Court of the Munsif was barred by limitation.

6. In this view of the matter, the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge in the Court below was correct and this appeal must be dismissed with costs—the hearing-fee is assessed at one gold mohur.