Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Gopal Krishna Sil v. Abdul Samad Chaudhuri

Calcutta High Court
Aug 23, 1921
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns a suit filed by Muslim residents of the village Talberia seeking to establish a prescriptive right to bury their dead on a disputed hillock, which was part of a government reserve forest until 1907 and thereafter settled to the defendant who has possessed it since. The plaintiffs alleged that they had used the hillock as a burial ground openly, continuously, and without interruption for over a century, but were resisted by the defendant in 1914. The suit, instituted in 1916, sought a permanent injunction to prevent interference with this alleged right. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiffs had not established a prescriptive right or any easement, as there was no evidence of burial use before 1911. On appeal, the District Judge reframed the issue to whether the plaintiffs had acquired a customary right to bury on the land and remanded the suit for retrial on this basis. The defendant appealed against the order of remand.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs had acquired a prescriptive right to bury their dead on the disputed land.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs had acquired a customary right to bury their dead on the disputed land.
  3. Whether the new issue of customary right framed by the District Judge was properly raised and could be entertained on appeal despite not being pleaded initially.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs claimed a prescriptive right to use the hillock as a burial ground, asserting continuous, open, and uninterrupted use for over a century.
  • On appeal, they shifted to claim a customary right to bury, contending that such a right existed locally and was valid.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant denied the prescriptive right claim both factually and legally.
  • They challenged the introduction of the customary right issue on appeal, arguing it was not pleaded and should not be entertained without proper procedure.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Wooldridge v. Smith Prescriptive right to bury the dead was negated; easement by prescription cannot arise merely from burial use. Supported the view that burial on land does not create a prescriptive easement.
Hira Lal v. Loke Nath Court will not create new species of easement, especially if it constitutes a nuisance. Used to reject the creation of a new easement based on burial rights.
Mohidin v. Shivlingappa Recognition of a customary right to bury confined to a limited class and area as a valid local custom. Referenced as authority for the plaintiffs' attempted customary right claim, though court expressed no opinion on its correctness here.
Mahamaya v. Haridas Essential attributes of custom: immemorial, reasonable, uninterrupted, and certain in nature, locality, and affected persons. Outlined the criteria necessary to establish a valid customary right.
Ram Chandra v. Secretary of State Appellate courts may remit for rehearing on new issues only in exceptional cases, with good cause and cost payment. Applied to hold that the District Judge erred in framing a new issue not arising from pleadings without good cause.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the plaintiffs’ claim of a prescriptive right to bury the dead on the disputed land and found that such a right does not qualify as an easement under the Indian Easement Act, as it is not a right for the beneficial enjoyment of land and lacks a dominant heritage. The Court noted that while courts may prevent desecration of graves when owners acquiesce, this does not create an easement by prescription. The Court further distinguished between prescriptive rights and customary rights, emphasizing that the latter must be specifically pleaded with all essential requisites proved. The Court criticized the District Judge’s framing of a new issue on customary right at the appellate stage without it arising from the pleadings or any new facts, referring to established authority that such remand should be exceptional and justified. The plaintiffs’ attempt to shift from a prescriptive to a customary right was deemed procedurally improper, as it would require fresh pleadings and evidence. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the remand order, and restored the original decree dismissing the suit.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed. The order of the District Judge remanding the suit for retrial on the issue of customary right is set aside, and the decree of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the suit is restored with costs.

The decision directly affects the parties by reaffirming that prescriptive rights to bury the dead on another’s land are not recognized as easements under Indian law and that new issues not pleaded cannot be introduced on appeal without proper procedure. No new legal precedent beyond the application of established principles was set.

Show all summary ...

Mookerjee, J.:— This appeal is directed against an order of remand made in a suit for the establishment of prescriptive right to bury the dead in the disputed land, for a permanent injunction to restrain interference with such right and for incidental reliefs. The subject-matter of the litigation is a hillock which was included in the reserve forest of the Government up till 1907. In that year the defendant obtained a settlement from the Government and has since then been in possession. The plaintiffs who are Moslem residents of the adjoining village of Talberia allege that the Moslems of the locality have in the past buried the dead in the disputed tract, but were resisted by the defendant on the 26th October, 1914. They assert that from time immemorial and for more than a century the hillock has been used as a burial ground, openly, continuously, without interruption and as of right, and that they have thereby acquired prescriptive right therein. They accordingly instituted this suit on the 1st November, 1916, for the establishment and enforcement of the alleged prescriptive right. The defendant repudiated the claim as neither founded on fact nor sustainable in law. On these pleadings, twelve issues were raised. It is sufficient to refer to the eighth issue which was framed in the following terms: “Is there any public or private easement?” The Subordinate Judge answered the question in the negative. He held that the evidence did not establish that the plaintiffs or the other villagers of Talberia had ever buried their dead in the hillock before 1911 and that the plaintiffs could not claim a right to use the land as a graveyard by prescription. In this view the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. Upon appeal it was argued before the District Judge that what the plaintiffs claimed was not a prescriptive right, but a customary right. The District Judge thereupon framed the following new issue and remanded the suit for retrial.

“Have the plaintiffs acquired a customary right to bury their dead in the suit land? If so, is this right valid to the extent that defendant must be restrained by a perpetual injunction from interfering with that right? and is that customary right to be held as existing over the whole of the suit land? If not, to which part of the suit land, if any, is that customary right to be held to exist?”

2. The defendant has appealed against the order of remand.

3. No authority has been produced in support of the claim put forward in the plaint, namely, that the plaintiffs had acquired a prescriptive right to use the disputed land as a burial ground by reason of the internment of dead bodies therein for more than a century, openly, continuously, without interruption and as of right. Such a prescriptive right was asserted in the case of Wooldridge v. Smith (1); but was negatived by a Full Bench of the Missouri Supreme Court. Land for use as a burial ground may be acquired through purchase or dedication. But law does not recognise that an easement by prescription can be created by the mere fact that dead bodies are placed in graves on the land of another and permitted to remain there for the prescriptive term. The Indian Easement Act contains the following definition of an easement:

“An easement is a right which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses as such, for the beneficial enjoyment of that land, to do and continue to do something, or to prevent and continue to prevent something being done, in, or upon, or in respect of, certain other land not his own. The land for the beneficial enjoyment of which the right exists is called the dominant heritage, and the owner or occupier thereof the dominant Owner; the land on which the liability is imposed is called the servient heritage, and the owner or occupier thereof the servient owner.”

4. By no stretch of language can the right to bury in a given tract of land be deemed a right imposed for the beneficial enjoyment of land. In such a case, there is no such thing as a dominant heritage to which the easement right can attach and the right to bury upon a tract of land in no sense falls within the general definition of the term “easement”. It may be conceded that where the owner of land has acquiesced in the burial of dead bodies on his property, apart from all questions of acquisition of title by adverse possession, a Court of justice may prevent the desecration of the graves.

5. But this does not justify the inference that the placing of dead bodies in graves upon the land of another creates an easement by prescription. Such an easement is unknown to law and it is well settled that the Court will not create a new species of easement specially if the easement claimed constitutes a nuisance: Hira Lal v. Loke Nath (2). In view of these difficulties, the plaintiffs set up a customary right to bury the dead on the disputed tract; they may have been encouraged to put forward such a claim at the appellate stage by reason of the decision in Mohidin v. Shivlingappa (3). That case is an authority for the proposition that where a certain section of the Moslem community had been for many years in the habit of burying their dead near a Darga on the land of the plaintiff who sued for an injunction to restrain them in future, the right of burial claimed by the defendants was not an easement but a customary right which being confined to a limited class of persons and a limited area of land was sufficiently certain and reasonable to be recognised as a valid local custom. We do not desire to express an opinion upon the view adopted in the case just mentioned. The question, when it arises, may require careful consideration, whether a customary right of user of a place as a burial ground or a cremation ground may be acquired especially as against the Crown. Before such a custom can be recognised, it will be necessary to investigate whether it possesses what has been considered as the essential attributes of a custom, namely, that it must be immemorial, it must be reasonable, it must have continued without interruption since its immemorial origin, and it must be certain in respect of its nature generally as well as in respect of the locality where it is alleged to obtain and the persons whom it is alleged to affect: Mahamaya v. Haridas (4). But it is indispensable that when a customary right is claimed, it should be specifically pleaded; all the essential requisites to its validity and binding effect must be averred and the custom so pleaded must when put in issue be proved as laid. When a plaintiff sets up a prescriptive right, he cannot in fairness to the defendant be allowed to succeed on the basis of a customary right. The two are fundamentally distinct, for as has been well said, custom differs from prescription in the fact that prescription is the making of a right while custom is the making of a law. The District Judge in this case has framed a new issue apparently under Order 41 Rule 25 but this should not have been done as the new issue framed did not arise upon the pleadings. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Ram Chandra v. Secretary of State (5), where Lord Parker observed that even if an appellate Court be deemed competent to remit a case for rehearing on an issue not raised in the pleadings nor even suggested in the Trial Court, this ought only to be done in exceptional cases, for good cause shown, and on payment of all costs thrown away. In the present case, the respondents showed no ground whatever for the indulgence they claimed and obtained in the lower Appellate Court; they did not suggest that they had been in any way taken by surprise or had discovered fresh facts of which they were unaware when the case was tried before the primary Court. They came into Court on a specific allegation of prescriptive right of a novel character. That case was completely met by the defendant and the Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the evidence of prescriptive user was in a large measure unreliable. When they went on appeal, they realised that the decision of the Trial Court was unimpeachable both on the facts and the law, and accordingly set up a new case of customary right. If this case is entertained, the plain must be amended and the defendant permitted to file a new written statement. The new case would then have to be tried on fresh evidence. This is a procedure which cannot be seriously defended.

6. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the order of the District Judge set aside and the decree of the Court of first instance restored with costs throughout.

7. Appeal allowed.