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Akhoy Kumar Soor v. Bejoy Chand Mohatap (Minor)
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Hill and Brett, JJ.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, Akhoy Kumar Soor, was mortgagee of one Hira Lal Sarkar by a bond dated 25 November 1886 covering, among other property, a one-third share in the darpatni (occupancy) tenure of the taluk Rampore. The Maharaja of Burdwan (the respondent) was the owner of the superior patni tenure.
Akhoy Kumar Soor sued on his mortgage in 1891 and obtained a decree against Hira Lal Sarkar on 11 January 1892 (made absolute 26 May 1892). Separately, the Maharaja obtained a decree against the mortgagor and co-sharers for arrears of darpatni rent (decree 30 March 1893), and the darpatni was put up for sale and purchased by the Maharaja on 11 December 1893; the sale was confirmed 9 June 1894 and a sale certificate issued 18 March 1895.
The appellant executed his mortgage decree against other property and, to recover the balance, applied on 29 January 1901 for execution by sale of the mortgagor's interest in the darpatni tenure. Because the Maharaja had purchased the darpatni, he was made a party to the execution proceedings (notice served on the Maharaja 2 February 1901). On 13 March 1901 the Maharaja (through an application to the Collector under s.167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act) sought service on the appellant of a notice annulling the mortgage as an encumbrance; on 23 March 1901 the Maharaja objected under s.244, Civil Procedure Code, to execution against the share in the darpatni.
The Subordinate Judge of Hooghly allowed the Maharaja's objection on the ground that the objector's position as a minor brought his application beyond the special one-year limitation in s.167 by virtue of s.7 of the Limitation Act, and held the notice valid. The appellant appealed from that order; the appellate court (Hill and Brett, JJ.) heard the appeal and set aside the Subordinate Judge's order, directing execution to proceed and decreed the appeal with costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Maharaja's application under s.167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to annul the appellant's mortgage as an encumbrance was barred by the one-year limitation prescribed by s.167.
- Whether the notice under s.167 served on the appellant (signed by a Deputy Collector, Mr. Deb) was validly issued under the Act.
- Whether the property sold to the Maharaja in execution of his rent decree was the darpatni tenure itself (with power to annul encumbrances) or merely the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtors therein, with corresponding consequences for the purchaser's power to avoid encumbrances.
- Whether the appellant's mortgage was a "protected interest" within the meaning of s.160, cl. (g) of the Bengal Tenancy Act (and relatedly whether it was a registered/notified encumbrance under s.161 cl. (b)).
- Whether, after the mortgagee had sued on the mortgage and obtained a decree, the mortgage lien was extinguished and became a judgment debt which could not be annulled under s.167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Akhoy Kumar Soor) — arguments in support of execution
- The sale by the Maharaja was, in substance, a sale under the Code of Civil Procedure (attachment and sale of the debtors' right, title and interest), not a sale of the darpatni tenure under the Bengal Tenancy Act, so the purchaser did not acquire a right to annul encumbrances.
- The mortgage was a "protected interest" within s.160 cl. (g) of the Bengal Tenancy Act (submission relied upon to resist annulment), and therefore could not be avoided by the purchaser.
- The notice served under s.167 was invalid because it was signed by Mr. Deb (a Deputy Collector) who was not proved to have been empowered by Government to issue such a notice; Mohabut Singh v. Umahil Fatima was relied on for this contention.
- The Maharaja's application for the service of notice was made on 13 March 1901 — more than seven years after the sale (11 December 1893) — and therefore barred by the one-year limitation prescribed by s.167 (or at least not made within one year of first notice of the encumbrance).
- Alternatively, after enforcement and decree in the mortgagee's favour, the mortgage lien had become a judgment debt and thus could not be annulled under s.167 (so the Maharaja's remedy, at most, would be a first charge for rent under s.65 of the Act).
Respondent (Maharaja of Burdwan) — arguments in support of objection
- The Maharaja contended that he had purchased the darpatni tenure at a sale for arrears of rent with the right to annul all encumbrances and therefore could avoid the appellant's mortgage.
- He placed reliance on having served the required notice under s.167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (the suggestion being that the notice was properly issued), and urged that the mortgage was not a protected interest within s.160 cl. (g).
- The Maharaja argued that he had first notice of the mortgage only when he received notice of the execution application on 2 February 1901; thus the application under s.167 made on 13 March 1901 was within one year of first notice.
- The Subordinate Judge accepted an argument (based on the Maharaja's status as a minor) that s.7 of the Limitation Act extended the one-year period of s.167 so that the Maharaja's application was not time-barred.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohabut Singh v. Umahil Fatima | Relied on by appellant to support the contention that a notice under s.167 signed by a Deputy Collector (rather than the Collector) may be invalid for want of statutory authority. | The court noted the case was relied upon but found the objection to the notice insubstantial: the application was made to the Collector and the Deputy Collector may have signed for the Collector; accordingly the notice's signing by Mr. Deb did not invalidate it for the purposes of this appeal. |
| Dwarkanath v. Aloke Chunder Seal | Relied on by the appellant in support of the argument concerning the nature of the sale and its effect on encumbrances. | The court held the present case was not on all fours with Dwarkanath v. Aloke Chunder Seal and did not accept the appellant's reliance to the extent urged. |
| Jotendro Mohun Tagore v. Jogul Kishore (Privy Council) | Principle that terms like "right, title and interest" in sale documents must be construed with reference to the proceedings and true nature of the sale; used to interpret whether tenure or merely interest was sold. | The court applied this principle (as explained and applied in later cases) to construe the sale documents and concluded that, despite wording, the sale was intended to be of the entire tenure under the Bengal Tenancy Act rather than merely of the judgment-debtors' interest. |
| Nityai Behary Shaha Paramanick v. Hari Govinda Saha | Applied the principle derived from Jotendro Mohun Tagore regarding construction of sale descriptions in the context of tenancy sales. | The court referred to this case as an application of the Privy Council principle and used it as supporting authority for construing the sale here as of the tenure under the Tenancy Act. |
| Maharaj Kumar Guneshwar (Goneshwar) Sing v. Jagadhatri Persad (Prasad) Narain Singh | Relied on by the Subordinate Judge to support the view that s.7 of the Limitation Act could extend the one-year period applicable to the objector (a minor). | The appellate court held that the Subordinate Judge's reliance on this case was misplaced: s.7 of the Limitation Act did not apply to an application under s.167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and the case was therefore inapplicable to avoid the bar of limitation here. |
| Girija Nath Roy Bahadur v. Patani Bibee | Accepts the view that s.7 of the Limitation Act does not apply to an application governed by the special limitation provisions of s.167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. | The court expressly agreed with the view taken in this case to support the conclusion that s.7 could not extend the period of s.167, reinforcing the limitation bar against the Maharaja's application. |
| Ishan Ckunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar | Authority for treating a purchaser of the tenure (the Maharaja) as the representative of the original judgment-debtor for execution proceedings. | The court held that, following this authority, the Maharaja is the representative of the original judgment-debtor for purposes of execution, and therefore execution could proceed against the share now in the Maharaja's hands. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The appellate court framed its decision primarily on limitation grounds and analysed several subsidiary legal points, applying statutory provisions and prior authorities as follows.
-
Construction of the sale and nature of property sold:
- The court observed that, although some sale documents used the wording "right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor," the proceedings, application forms and the context showed the Maharaja intended to sell and did sell the tenure itself under the Bengal Tenancy Act (s.163 procedure was invoked), notwithstanding lapses in the particular form used for proclamation and in the sale certificate wording.
- The court applied the principle from the Privy Council in Jotendro Mohun Tagore (and as applied in Nityai Behary) that such phrases must be interpreted with reference to the nature of the decree and the proceedings leading to the sale; on that basis the sale was of the entire tenure and not merely of the debtors' personal interest.
-
Protected interest and registration:
- The court rejected the appellant's contention that the mortgage was a "protected interest" under s.160 cl. (g) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, noting it was not a registered and notified encumbrance within s.161 cl. (b) and finding no basis to read Regulation VIII of 1819 as giving the darpatnidar authority to create a mortgage bringing it into s.160 cl. (g).
- On the third point (whether a decree converts the mortgage lien into a judgment debt not avoidable under s.167), the court said it was inclined to think the appellant could succeed on that ground, acknowledging that once the mortgagee had enforced his lien and obtained a decree it was difficult to treat the decree as an encumbrance avoidable under s.167.
-
Validity of the s.167 notice:
- The court found little substance in the objection that the notice was signed by Mr. Deb, a Deputy Collector. Because the application was made to the Collector, the Deputy may have signed for the Collector; the court did not consider this flaw sufficient to invalidate the notice for present purposes.
-
Limitation (the decisive issue):
- The court regarded limitation as the determinative ground. It examined whether the Maharaja's application under s.167 (13 March 1901) was made within one year of the sale (11 December 1893) or within one year of first notice of the encumbrance.
- The court found evidence that the Maharaja had notice of the mortgage in 1894: the appellant's deposition, taken 5 May 1894 and given in evidence in a proceeding in which the appellant was examined on behalf of the Maharaja, stated that one-third of Rampore had been mortgaged to him. The court considered this, together with the Transfer of Property Act s.3, to constitute notice in 1894 — more than one year prior to the 1901 application.
- The court rejected the Subordinate Judge's reliance on s.7 of the Limitation Act to extend the one-year period because s.7 applies only where the period of limitation is provided in the third column of the second schedule of the Limitation Act; here, the period was governed by s.167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (a special statutory provision), so s.7 is inapplicable. The court aligned this conclusion with the authority of Girija Nath Roy Bahadur v. Patani Bibee.
- The court also rejected any argument that ss.184 and 185 of the Bengal Tenancy Act had the effect of extending s.7 to applications under s.167.
- As the application under s.167 was not made within one year of the sale or of first notice of the encumbrance, the court concluded the application was barred by limitation and could have no effect to defeat the appellant's claim.
-
Representative status for execution:
- The court held, relying on Ishan Ckunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar, that the Maharaja, having purchased the tenure, is the representative of the original judgment-debtor for purposes of the execution proceedings; therefore execution could proceed against the share now in the Maharaja's hands.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED.
Direct holding:
- The appellate court set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge which had allowed the Maharaja's objection and held that execution should proceed against the one-third share (the 5 annas' odd share originally belonging to Hira Lal Sarkar) in the darpatni tenure of Rampore, which is in the hands of the Maharaja respondent.
- The appeal was decreed and costs were awarded to the appellant.
Implications:
- The immediate effect is that the appellant's execution to recover the balance due under his mortgage decree is permitted to proceed against the property now owned by the Maharaja.
- The court's reasoning emphasises that an application under s.167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is subject to the one-year limitation in that section and that s.7 of the Limitation Act does not extend that special statutory limitation; therefore similar applications made after the one-year period (or one year after first notice of the encumbrance) will be time-barred.
- The court did not create a new general rule altering the characterization of tenancy sales; rather it applied existing principles of construction (as in Jotendro Mohun Tagore and related authorities) and statutory limitation rules to the facts at hand. No broader precedent beyond the confines of the applied authorities was asserted by the court.
Note: This summary is strictly limited to information explicitly contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts not stated by the court.
Hill and Brett, JJ.:— This is an appeal against the order of the Subordinate Judge of Hoogbly, dated the 22nd April, 1901 allowing on objection raised by the respondent in certain execution proceedings to which he had been made a party by the appellant. The order was to the effect that no execution could proceed against him.
The appellant, Akhoy Kumar Soor, was the mortgagee of one Hira Lal Sarkar who, by a bond dated the 25th November, 1886, mortgaged with other property his one-third share in the disputed taluk Rampore. The present respondent, the Maharaja of Burdwan, was the owner of the whole of the superior patni tenure. In 1891 the appellant, Akhoy Kumar Soor, sued on his mortgage and obtained a decree against his mortgagor, Hira Lal Sarkar, on the 11th January, 1892, which, on the 26th May, 1892, was made absolute.
Meanwhile, the mortgagor and his co-sharers had defaulted in paying their darpatni rent for the years 1889 to 1892; and, in consequence, the Maharaja, the patnidar, sued them and obtained a decree on the 30th March, 1893; on the 27th July, 1893, the Maharaja applied for execution of his decree against the property of the debtors and the darpatni was put up for sale and purchased by the Maharaja on the 11th December, 1893. The sale was confirmed on the 9th June, 1894, and a sale certificate delivered to the purchaser on the 18th March, 1895.
After having obtained the decree on his mortgage against Hira Lal Sarkar, the appellant, Akhoy Kumar Soor, took out execution against various properties of his mortgagor other than the darpatni tenure and realized some portion of his debt. For recovery of the balance he applied, on the 29th January, 1901, for execution by sale of the mortgagor's interest in the darpatni tenure; and, as the Maharaja of Burdwan had in the meanwhile sold up and purchased the darpatni, he applied that he should be made a party to the execution proceedings. Notice of the application was served on the Maharaja on the 2nd February, 1901; and the suggestion which has been made in his behalf is that this was the first notice he had of the appellant's mortgage. On the 13th March, 1901, application was made on behalf of the Maharaja under s. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to the Collector of Hooghly for the service on the appellant of a notice annulling his mortgage as being an encumbrance on the darpatni tenure which, under his sale and purchase, he had a right to avoid; and, on the 23rd March, 1901, the Maharaja put in an objection under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, in the execution proceedings taken by the present appellant. In that objection he contended that the proceedings could not be taken out against him for sale of the mortgagor's 5 annas' odd share in the darpatni, as he was not the representative of the debtor; that he, the Maharaja, had purchased the darpatni tenure at a sale for arrears of its rent with the right to annul all encumbrances thereon; that he had duly served the mortgagor, the appellant, with a notice under s. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act annulling his encumbrance; that appellant's mortgage was not a “protected interest” within the meaning of the Bangal Tenancy Act; and that, accordingly, the prayer for execution by sale of the share in the darpatni might be rejected.
This objection has been allowed by the Subordinate Judge, and against his order this appeal is preferred.
In support of the appeal our attention has been drawn to the proceedings taken in execution of his decree for rent by the Maharaja, the present respondent. In the application for execution it is prayed that the decretal amount be realized by attachment and sale of the property in arrears mentioned in a separate sheet of the paper (the schedule), and in the schedule the property is described as “lot Rampore, bearing an annual jama of Rs. 201, situate under chowki Jahanabad, division Khanakool, and recorded in the name of the darpatnidar, Kailash Chundra Koer, in the sherita of the decree-holder, Bahadur, being the property in arrear. One item, value Rs. 500.” The sale proclamation was an incorrect form under cl. 2(b) of s. 163 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and declared that “the said jote with right of occupancy shall be sold by auction with power to annul all encumbrances.” In the sale certificate dated the 18th March, 1895, the property is described as “the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor in the properties in arrears mentioned in the schedule,” although, in the schedule, after the description of the property, the addition occurs, “the said lot in arrears.” And in the order of the 9th June 1894, confirming the sale, the property sold is described as the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtors in the lot Rampore as described in the schedule attached to the sale certificate.
On these materials it is contended that the sale was, in fact, under the Code of Civil Procedure and not under the Tenancy Act; that the property sold was the right, title and interest of the debtors in the darpatni and not the tenure itself; and that, under the sale, the purchasers acquired no right to annul encumbrances. It is further suggested that the mortgage of the appellant was a “protected interest” within the meaning of s. 160, cl. (g) of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
It is contended, in the second place, that even if the mortgage did not amount to a protected interest, but was an encumbrance only within the meaning of s. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, then the notice served was not a legal notice, as it was signed by Mr. Deb, a Deputy Collector, who is not proved to have been vested under the Act by Government with power to issue a notice under s. 167. The case of Mohabut Singh v. Umahil Fatima is relied on in support of this contention; and further it is urged that, even if the notice were otherwise valid in law, the application of the Maharaja for the service of the notice having been made on the 13th March, 1901, which was more than seven years from the date of the sale, i.e, the 11th December 1893, the application was barred by limitation as not being made within one year from the date of the sale, or the date on which the Maharaja had first notice of the encumbrance.
And, thirdly, it has been contended that after the applicant had sued on his mortgage and had obtained a decree, the mortgage lien had been extinguished and had become a judgment debt, which could not be annalled under the provisions of s. 167 of the Tenancy Act. At most, the Maharaja, by virtue of s. 65 of the Act, could claim that he had a first charge on the tenure for the rent.
It is not, in our opinion, necessary to go at length into the first and third contentions, as we consider that the Appeal must succeed on the ground of Limitation.
There can be little doubt that what the Maharaja intended to bring to sale in satisfaction of his decree for the rent of the darpatni was the tenure itself, and that was in fact what he prayed for in his application. By carelessness or oversight a wrong form was used for the proclamation of sale: that is to say, a form suitable for the sale of an occupancy holding with power to annul all encumbrances. The result was that in the sale certificate and order confirming the sale, the property was wrongly described as the right, title and interest of the debtor in the darpatni tenure although, in the schedule attached to each, it is specified as “the lot,” or property itself “in arrears.” The case is not on all fours with that of Dwarkanath v. Aloke Chunder Seal, on which reliance is placed for the appellant, but seems to us to fall rather within the principle laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Jotendro Mohun Tagore v. Jogul Kishore, as explained and applied in this Court in the case of Nityai Behary Shaha Paramanick v. Hari Govinda Saha(3). We consider that the terms “right, title and interest of the debtors,” as used in the sale certificate and order, must be construed with reference to the circumstances under which the suit was brought and the true meaning of the decree under which the sale took place, as well as the proceedings leading up to the sale. In this instance, the proceedings were taken under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and application made for the simultaneous issue of the order of attachment and proclamation as provided in s. 163, and we are of opinion that in this case what was intended to be sold was the entire tenure and not merely the right, title and interest of the defaulters therein.
We may say that we are quite unable to accept the suggestion by the learned pleader for the appellant that the mortgage amounted to a “protected interest” within the meaning of s. 160, cl. (g) of the Tenancy Act, or that, having regard to the provisions of ss. 164 and 165, it was necessary for the Maharaja to put up the tenure for sale first, subject to registered and notified encumbrances, and afterwards with power to avoid all encumbrances. It is impossible, in our opinion, so to read the provisions of ss. 3 and 4 of Regulation VIII of 1819 as to hold that, by them, the landlord expressly gives the darpatnidar permission to create a mortgage so as to bring the mortgage within the provisions of s. 160, cl. (g) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. This mortgage, too, was admittedly not a registered and notified encumbrance within the meaning of s. 161, cl. (b) of the Act. On the first point therefore the appellant fails.
On the third point, we are inclined to think that he would be entitled to succeed. After, as in this case, the mortgagee had enforced his lien and obtained his decree, it seems difficult to hold that the decree would remain as an encumbrance on the tenure which could be avoided under the provisions of s. 167 of the Tenancy Act.
On the second point, however, we think the appellant must succeed. There is, in our opinion, not much substance in the objection raised on the ground that Mr. Deb, who signed the notice, was a Deputy Collector and not the Collector. The application was undoubtedly made to the Collector, and it seems not impossible that, if Mr. Deb had no power under the Act to issue a notice under s. 167, he may have signed for the Collector.
The point which to us seems to be of most importance, and on which the decision of the appeal turns is, however, whether, when the application under s. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was made on behalf of the Maharaja to the Collector on the 13th March, 1901, that application was barred under the provisions of the section by reason of the fact that it was not made within one year from the date of the sale or the date on which he first had notice of the encumbrance.
The view taken by the Sub-Judge on this point was “that the objector's position as a minor brings his application, by virtue of the provisions of S. 7 of the Limitation Act, beyond the special limitation of one year prescribed by s. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act,” and he relied on the case of Maharaj Kumar Guneshwar Sing v. Jagadhatri Persad Narain Singh in support of that opinion. He accordingly held that “no limitation applied to the Maharaja's application under s. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and that the notice issued was valid.”
On behalf of the Maharaja, it has been contended that the first notice he had of the encumbrance was when he received, on the 2nd February, 1901, notice of the application to take out execution against the share in the darpatni tenure and to make him a party to the execution proceedings. The only evidence, if it can be regarded as such, which appears on the record to support this allegation is the attested copy of the petition made to the Collector of Hooghly for the issue of the notice under s. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. This petition appears to have been put in by one Nil Madhub Majoomdar on behalf of the manager and guardian of the Maharaja. It was not verified and may be nothing but a mere hearsay statement. On the other side, there is the deposition of the appellant, Akhoy Kumar Soor, taken before the Subordinate Judge, in which he says that, in May, 1894, he was cited to give evidence on behalf of the Maharaja in a proceeding taken on a petition filed by Hira Lal Sarkar praying that the sale of the darpatni tenure in satisfaction of the Maharaja's decree for rent might be set aside. In his evidence, he stated that one-third of Rampore (the darpatni tenure) had been mortgaged to him, and he adds that it was on being interrogated by the pleaders for the Raj estate and for the judgment-debtor that he spoke about the aforesaid mortgage. And in corroboration of his statement, his deposition, taken on the 5th May, 1894, has been put in and proved.
The learned Advocate-General has contended that the statements made in that deposition in diverso in tuitu cannot be taken as amounting to notice of the mortgage. We are unable to agree with him in that view or to hold that in this case anything of the nature of a formal notice of the mortgage was necessary. We are of opinion that, having regard to the provisions of s. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Maharaja, the objector, had notice of the mortgage in the year 1894, which is certainly more that one year before the date on which the application under s. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was made on his behalf to the Collector; and apart from this, as already intimated, the Maharaja had adduced no evidence to prove at what time he first cams to know of the mortgage.
Further, we are unable to agree with the Subordinate Judge in holding that the provisions of S. 7 of the Limitation Act are sufficient to avoid in this case the bar of limitation. The case of Maharaj Kumar Goneshwar Singh v. Jagadhatri Prasad Narain Singh on which the Subordinate Judge relies has no application. S. 7 of the Limitation Act allows a minor a further period of limitation in the case of a suit or application for which the period of limitation is provided in the third column of the second schedule of the Act. In this case the limitation is determined by the provisions of s. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. S. 7 cannot therefore have any application to the present case. This is in accordance with the view which has been taken in the case of Girija Nath Roy Bahadur v. Patani Bibee with which we agree. Nor have ss. 184 and 185 of the Bengal Tenancy Act the effect of extending the provisions of S. 7 of the Limitation Act to an application under s. 167.
The application, then, not having been made within one year from the date of the sale or the date on which the Maharaja first had notice of the encumbrance, was barred by limitation and the proceedings taken thereunder could have no effect to defeat the claim of the appellant.
We may add that, in our opinion, the case of Ishan Ckunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar is sufficient authority for holding that the Maharaja is the representative of the original judgment-debtor for the purpose of the execution-proceedings.
We, accordingly, set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge and direct that execution do proceed, as prayed for by the appellant, against the share which originally belonged to Hira Lal Sarkar in the darpatni tenure of Rampore and which is now in the hands of the Maharaja respondent. The appeal is decreed with costs.
S.C.G
Appeal allowed.
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