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Kanti Chandra Mukerji v. Al-I-Nabi

Allahabad High Court

Jan 25, 1911

Judgment

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Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns a dispute arising after the death of Musammat Shib Kali Debia. She made a will on 11 January 1891 and died on 8 April 1897. Probate was granted to one of the executors, Durga Shankar, on 12 June 1899. On 21 June 1899 Durga Shankar and two defendants, Syed Al-i-Nabi and Syed Shah Tasaddnk Husain, executed an administration bond whereby the sureties undertook responsibility for the due administration of the estate until Durga Shankar discharged his duties.

Durga Shankar misappropriated the assets instead of administering them. The plaintiff (the deceased testator's step-son) obtained letters of administration with the will annexed on 16 August 1904 and secured assignment of the administration bond on 10 April 1907. He then sued the representatives of Durga Shankar (including his widow) and the sureties to recover the misappropriated assets.

At trial the lower court decreed the plaintiff's claim against the sureties (defendants 1 and 2) and against the widow of Durga Shankar to the extent of Rs. 4,891-8-0, but dismissed the claim against defendants 3–6 (three brothers and a nephew of Durga Shankar). The plaintiff appealed to the court whose opinion is summarized here; there was also a connected cross-appeal by one surety, Syed Al-i-Nabi.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the court below was correct in dismissing the suit as against defendants 3–6 (three brothers and a nephew) — i.e., whether those persons could be treated as representatives of Durga Shankar and be made liable for the misappropriated assets.
Whether the family compromise provision that on the death of a brother without male issue his share shall go to the surviving brothers is repugnant to Hindu law or contravenes section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, making the defendants 3–6 not proper parties representing Durga Shankar's estate.
Whether the suit against the sureties is barred by limitation on the ground that time began to run on a breach of a bond condition (an inventory provision), as contended by the surety Syed Al-i-Nabi.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff)'s Arguments

The court below was wrong to dismiss the suit as against defendants 3–6; those persons should be liable as representatives of Durga Shankar for the misappropriated assets.
By implication, the plaintiff relied on the transfer of the administration bond to him and on the existence of assets which could come into the hands of the defendants representing Durga Shankar.

Defendants 3–6 (the brothers and nephew)

They contended that the family-compromise provision (that a brother's share on his death without male issue goes to the surviving brothers) is repugnant to Hindu law and therefore not enforceable.
They argued that the clause purported to transfer only an expectancy and was in contravention of section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, so they did not represent Durga Shankar's estate and could not be sued as his representatives.
Implicitly they relied on the Dayabhaga school of law contention that the widow is the heir and thus the proper person representing the estate.

Bishnu Shankar (one brother) — as stated in his written statement

Denied being in possession of any property left by Durga Shankar.
Stated that after Durga Shankar's death the family members paid his debts and paid Rs. 25 per mensem to Durga Shankar's widow (Musammat Sarojini Debi) for maintenance.
Asserted that, even if some property in his possession were part of Durga Shankar's estate, having regard to the payments and the family dealings he could not be held responsible to pay the claimed amount.

Surety Syed Al-i-Nabi (in his examination / cross-appeal)

Stated (in uncontroverted evidence) that the property of Durga Shankar passed under the family compromise into the hands of his heirs/brothers (named Shikari Shankar, Bishnu Shankar, Sarat Shankar, Addiya Shankar, and Musammat Sarojini Debi).
In his cross-appeal he argued that a breach of a bond condition (specifically the obligation to exhibit an inventory within a certain time) began the running of the period of limitation and therefore the suit against the sureties was time-barred.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ram Nirunjrm Singh v. Prayag Singh	Authority for the proposition that a family compromise provision whereby surviving brothers succeed to the share of a brother who dies without issue is not necessarily repugnant to Hindu law and may be enforced.	The court found the present case very similar to that precedent, agreed with the view that such a provision is not illegal under Hindu law, and followed the precedent to hold that defendants 3–6 should not have been exempted from liability as representatives of Durga Shankar.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in the following steps, based strictly on the material in the opinion:

Establishment of the basic facts: Durga Shankar obtained probate and executed an administration bond with sureties; he misappropriated estate assets; plaintiff later obtained letters of administration with the will annexed and assignment of the bond, then sued to recover the misappropriated assets.
Examination of the disposition of Durga Shankar's proprietary interest under a pre-existing family compromise: evidence (uncontroverted) from the surety Al-i-Nabi showed that, under the compromise and consequent decree, Durga Shankar's share passed to his brothers on his death. This demonstrated that the brothers did in fact hold property that had once been Durga Shankar's.
Consideration of the defendants' argument that the family-compromise provision was repugnant to Hindu law or was merely an inchoate expectancy prohibited by section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. The court rejected that argument, stating that Durga Shankar was not dealing with an expectant interest but with property that belonged to the parties at the time of the compromise. The court was unable to hold that a provision in a family settlement, whereby brothers agreed that on the death of any without male issue his share should go to the surviving brothers, was repugnant to Hindu law or contravened the Transfer of Property Act.
Reliance on precedent: the court found the present case similar to Ram Nirunjrm Singh v. Prayag Singh, where the same kind of family settlement provision was held not to be illegal under Hindu law. The court agreed with that decision and applied it to reach the same conclusion here.
On the legal status of the brothers and nephew as defendants: the court analyzed the concept of "representatives" under the Code of Civil Procedure. It emphasized that a "representative" includes a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and also includes any person who intermeddles with the estate. Section 52 of the Code prescribes execution against such representatives. The court noted that a plaintiff may sue representatives and obtain a decree even if it is not proved that assets have yet come into their hands; it is sufficient that there are assets of which they may become possessed. Because the existence of assets was not denied, defendants 3–6 were properly treated as representatives.
On the limitation (cross-appeal of surety Al-i-Nabi): the court rejected the submission that the date of breach of the inventory condition of the bond was the starting point of limitation. The bond expressly provided that the obligation continued until Durga Shankar discharged the duties of administration (probate had been granted to him). Since Durga Shankar died on 12 July 1903, time began to run only on his death; the suit was brought within six years of that date, so it was not time-barred.
Conclusion as to relief and costs: the court concluded that the lower court erred in exempting defendants 3–6 and varied the decree accordingly, while dismissing the cross-appeal of the surety on limitation grounds.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court varied the decree of the lower court and held that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for Rs. 4,891-8-0 against:

Defendants 1 and 2 (the sureties) jointly and severally; and
Defendants 3–7, to be satisfied out of any assets of Durga Shankar which have come to or may hereafter come into their hands.

The court thereby overruled the lower court's exemption of defendants 3–6 and dismissed the appeal of the surety Syed Al-i-Nabi (i.e., the cross-appeal on limitation was rejected).

Implications and direct effects:

The plaintiff's appeal is allowed insofar as the lower court had dismissed the suit against defendants 3–6; those defendants are to be treated as representatives and may be made liable from assets of Durga Shankar that come into their hands.
The cross-appeal by the surety on limitation grounds is dismissed; the obligation in the bond continued until the administrator (Durga Shankar) failed to discharge his duties and, since he died on 12 July 1903, limitation ran from that date. Six years had not elapsed before suit was brought.
The court allocated costs: "The costs of this appeal will be borne by the defendants 3–6. Those defendants and defendant No. 7 will bear their own costs in both courts." (As stated in the opinion.)
No new legal principle or departure from cited precedent was announced; the court expressly followed the reasoning in the cited authority (Ram Nirunjrm Singh v. Prayag Singh) and applied established rules about representatives under the Code of Civil Procedure and about the running of limitation in the circumstances described.

Decree varied.

Note: All statements above are based exclusively on the material contained in the provided opinion; no facts or inferences have been added beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Stanley, C.J and Banerji, J.:— This appeal arises under the following circumstances:—One Musammat Shib Kali Debia of Benares made a will on the 11th of January, 1891, and thereby bequeathed her property for certain purposes and appointed six persons executors. She died on the 8th of April, 1897, and thereupon an application for probate was made by one of the executors, Durga Shankar, now deceased, and probate was granted to him on the 12th of June, 1899. On the 21st of June, 1899, an administration bond was executed by Durga Shankar and the defendants, Syed Al-i-Nabi and Syed Shah Tasaddnk Husain, as his sureties for the due administration of the estate of Musammat Shib Kali Debia. In this bond the executants undertook responsibility for the due administration of the estate by Durga Shankar, and it was provided by it that the obligation under the bond was to remain in force until Durga Shankar had discharged the duties of the administration of the estate. Durga Shankar did not administer the assets as he had undertaken to do, but misappropriated them, and in consequence the plaintiff, who is the step-son of Musammat Shib Kali Debia, applied for letters of administration of her estate with the will annexed, and such letters were granted to him on the 16th of August, 1904. He further applied to the District Judge for an assignment of the administration bond executed by Durga Shankar and his sureties, and this bond was transferred to him on the 10th of April, 1907.

The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was then instituted by the plaintiff to recover from the representatives of Durga Shankar, including his widow, and also from the sureties, the amount of the assets which had been misappropriated by Durga Shankar.

A defence to the suit was filed by both the sureties and also by Bishnu Shankar, one of the brothers of Durga Shankar.

The court below decree 1 the plaintiff's claim as against the sureties and also as against the widow of Durga Shankar to the extent of Rs. 4,891-8-0. The decree was passed against the defendants 1 and 2 as sureties only and as against the widow of Durga Shankar as his heir. The claim was dismissed as against the defendants 3-6, who are three of the brothers and a nephew of Durga Shankar.

This appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff, and the contention put forward on his behalf is that the court below was wrong in dismissing the suit as against the defendants; 3 to 6. There defendants, we have said, are the brothers and a nephew of Durga Shankar, and liability is sought to be fixed on them by reason of the following facts. Prior to the 11th of October, 1890, Durga Shankar an 1 his brothers and a nephew had disputes in regard to family property. They entered into a compromise whereby the ancestral property was divided between them and this compromise was subsequently embodied in a decree. One of the terms of the compromise was that if Durga Shankar or any of his brothers should die without leaving male issue, then the surviving brother would by division in equal shares take possession of and enjoy and appropriate the share of the person so dying. Durga Shankar having died without male issue, the allegation of the plaintiff is that his share of the property comprised in the aforesaid compromise and decree passed to his brother and nephews and that the defendants, the brothers and one of the nephews of Durga Shankar, are actually in possession of Durga Shankar's share of the family property.

In the written statement of Bishnu Shankar it is denied by him that he is in possession of any property left by Durga Shankar. He states that after the death of Durga Shankar he, along with the other members of the family, paid debts due by Durga Shankar and had been paying Rs. 25 per mensem to the widow of Durga Saankar, namely, the defendant, Musammat Sarojini Debia, for her maintenance; and he put forward the defence that if any portion of the property possessed by him were considered to be of the estate of Durga Shankar, having regard to the above facts he could in no wise be held responsible to pay the amount claimed.

The surety Al-i-Nabi was examined, and he in his evidence, which has not been controverted, alleged that the property which belonged to Durga Shankar was still in the possession of his heirs, namely, Shikari Shankar, Bishnu Shankar, Sarat Shankar, and Addiya Shankar, his brothers, and Musammat Sarojini Debi, his widow. This evidence was, as we have said, not controverted, and it shows that the property of Durga Shankar did pass under the compromise upon his death into the hands of his brothers.

The question, then, for our determination is whether or not the court below was right in exempting the brothers and nephew, defendants 3 to 6, from the operation of the decree. It is contended on their behalf that the provision in the compromise which provided that on the death of any brother without male issue his share shall go to the other brothers is repugnant to Hindu Law being repugnant to the ordinary rule of succession to property and that the defendants 3 to 6 have not been properly sued, inasmuch as they do not represent Durga Shankar's estate. It is said that the parties are governed by the Dayabhaga School of law and that the widow of Durga Shankar is his heir, and, as such, entitled to the estate of Durga Shankar. It is further contended that the provision to which we have referred above purports to be a transfer of a mere expectancy and is in contravention of section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. We are of opinion that there is no force in this contention. Durga Shankar was not dealing with an expectant interest in property. He and the other parties to the agreement of compromise were dealing with the property, which at the time belonged to them, and we are unable to hold that a provision, whereby, upon a family settlement, such as this was, brothers agreed that upon the death of any of them without male issue the share to which he should be entitled, should go to the other brothers, is in contravention of Hindu Law, or obnoxious to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.

This case is very similar to the case of Ram Nirunjrm Singh v. Prayag Singh. In that case two of four brothers had disputes in regard to the property of their father. They entered, into a compromise for themselves, and one of them also as guardian of his two minor brothers, whereby it was agreed that with the exception of certain trust property the estate of their father should be divided equally between the four brothers, with this provision superadded that “if any of the brothers should die without any issue, then the surviving brothers should succeed to his heritage in equal shares, none of them having any claim or contention against the other on the score of commensality or joint tenancy.” It was contended in that case that this provision was repugnant to Hindu Law and could not therefore be enforced. Mitter and Maclean, JJ., held that there was nothing in the Hindu Law which made such an agreement illegal. The provision in the present case is similar to that which was considered in case just cited, and we see no good reason for disagreeing with the views of the learned Judges who decided it. Defendants 3-6 ought not, therefore, to have been exempted from liability as representatives of Durga Shankar.

It may be that they have not received any portion of the assets of Durga Shankar, and it may be that they will not recover any portion of his assets; but if this be so, they will not be damnified by the decree which we propose to pass against them. These defendants are representatives of the deceased Durga Shankar within the meaning attached to that term by the Code of Civil Procedure. A representative means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of a deceased person. Section 52 of the Code prescribes the mode of execution of a decree against such a representative. A plaintiff has a right to sue the representatives of his deceased debtor and to obtain a decree against them, although it is not proved that assets have come into their hands. It is sufficient to prove that there are assets of which they may become possessed. In this case the existence of assets is not denied. We, therefore, upon this question, overrule the decision of the court below.

The only remaining question is raised in the connected cross appeal. It is an appeal on the part of one of the sureties, Syed Al-i-Nabi, and the only ground of appeal which has been pressed before us in argument is the first, namely, that the suit is time-barred. The contention of this defendant is that one of the provisions of the bond was that an inventory should be exhibited within a certain time, and that on a breach of this condition of the bond time began to run as against the sureties and the suit is time-barred. We do not think that the date on which one of the conditions of the bond was broken is the starting point, from which limitation is to be calculated in a case such as the present in which the plaintiff's case is that Durga Shankar in his lifetime failed to administer the assets of the deceased. The bond itself, as we have pointed out, expressly provides that the obligation undertaken in it was to remain in force until Durga Shankar fulfilled the duties of the administration of the estate, probate of which had been granted to him. Durga Shankar died on the 12th July, 1903. Time did not begin to run against the plaintiff until his death, and six years did not elapse between the date of the death of Durga Shankar and the bringing of the suit.

The appeal therefore of Syed Al-i-Nabi must be dismissed. We vary the decree of the court below, and we give a decree to the plaintiff for Rs. 4,891-8-0 against the defendants 1 and 2 as sureties, to be satisfied by them jointly and severally, and against the defendants 3-7, to be satisfied out of any assets of Durga Shankar which have come to or may hereafter corns to their hands. The costs of this appeal will be borne by the defendants 3-6. Those defendants and defendant No. 7 will bear their own costs in both courts. In other respect's we affirm the decree of the court below.