- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Lachhmi Chand v. Madan Lal Khemka
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a decree passed by the learned Civil Judge in favor of the plaintiff, B. Madan Lal Khemka, Secretary of Baba Kali Kamliwala Panchaiti Kshatra, Rishikesh, a registered society. The suit was based on a promissory note dated 25th August 1928 executed by defendant Lala Lachhmi Chand for Rs. 10,000 with subsequent renewals and partial payments. The defendants, Lala Lachhmi Chand and his son Onkar Prasad, contested the suit. During the pendency of the appeal, Lala Lachhmi Chand died, leaving Onkar Prasad as the sole appellant. The suit claimed recovery based on the original and renewed promissory notes, asserting the plaintiff’s entitlement despite limitation defenses, relying on acknowledgments and renewals. The Civil Judge decreed the suit with costs and interest, finding the plaintiff entitled to recover the amount and the defendants liable to pay in installments.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff, not being the payee of the original promissory note, was entitled to sue under the Negotiable Instruments Act.
- Whether the suit was maintainable given the status of the plaintiff as a registered society and the payee being an individual.
- Whether the defendants, as agriculturists, were entitled to relief under the Agriculturists' Relief Act.
- Whether the suit was barred by limitation or saved by subsequent acknowledgments and renewals.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The plaintiff was not the payee of the promissory note and therefore lacked the right to sue under sections 8 and 78 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
- The suit was misconceived as the cause of action did not exist in favor of the plaintiff.
- The defendants, being agriculturists, were entitled to benefits under the Agriculturists' Relief Act, including reduction of interest and installment payments.
Respondent's Arguments
- The plaintiff relied on the registered society’s status as the real creditor, asserting that the promissory notes and loan advances were connected to the society’s funds.
- The plaintiff contended that limitation was saved by subsequent acknowledgments and renewals of the promissory notes.
- The plaintiff implied that the society had the right to enforce the promissory notes despite the payee named being an individual.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ghanshyam Das v. Ragho Sahu | Strict construction of section 78 of the Negotiable Instruments Act; only payee or holder can discharge the maker by payment. | Supported the principle that a promissory note executed in favor of a benamidar cannot be challenged by the promisor on that ground. |
| Reoti Lal v. Manna Kunwar | Application of section 78 regarding discharge of liability to the holder of the instrument. | Reinforced that only the holder or payee can discharge the maker and that suits must be brought by the holder. |
| Dori Lal v. Sewak Ram | Negotiable Instruments Act principles on holder and payee rights. | Confirmed the requirement that suits must be brought by the holder or payee of the promissory note. |
| Hari Kishore Barua v. Guru Mia Chowdhry | Doctrine of benami and rights of holders under the Negotiable Instruments Act. | Supported the exclusion of benami claims in suits on negotiable instruments. |
| Raghubir Mahto v. Ramasray Bhagat | Holder’s entitlement to sue under the Negotiable Instruments Act. | Affirmed that only the named holder or payee can sue on the instrument. |
| Sadasuk Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Pershad | Importance of clear identification of liable parties on negotiable instruments. | Emphasized that the person liable must be clearly named on the instrument for enforceability. |
| Subba Narayana Vathiyar v. Ramaswami Aiyar | Suit maintainability only by payee or holder despite undisclosed principal principles. | Held that defendants cannot plead that the payee or endorsee is a mere benamidar in suits on negotiable instruments. |
| Sewa Ram v. Hoti Lal | Real owner can sue if holder is party and discharge can be secured from holder. | Allowed suit by real creditor with proviso for discharge from holder to maker. |
| Surajman Prasad Misra v. Sadanand Misra | Real owner’s right to sue when holder is party and discharge can be given. | Confirmed that suit can be maintained by real owner under such conditions. |
| Sarjug Singh v. Deosaran Singh | Section 78 does not bar real beneficiary from suing if discharge can be given. | Held that suit is maintainable if the ostensible holder is party and willing to discharge maker. |
| Swaminatha Odayar v. Subbarama Aiyar | Application of section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act and suit by real beneficiary. | Allowed decree in favor of real beneficiary with holder’s consent to discharge. |
| Brojo Lal Saha Banikya v. Budh Nath Pyari Lal Das | Obiter view that real owner may sue even if not holder. | Supported broader interpretation allowing suit by real owner with discharge condition. |
| Harikishore Barna v. Gura Mia Chowdhry | Dissenting view that real owner cannot sue even if holder is party and willing to discharge. | Presented a narrower interpretation restricting suit to holder or payee only. |
| Balanna v. Firm Khudal Nazar Khan | Doctrine of benami in negotiable instruments and real owner’s right to sue. | Left open the question but expressed preference for broader view allowing suit by real owner with discharge. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, especially sections 8 and 78, which define the "holder" and require payment to the holder or payee to discharge the maker’s liability. The Court emphasized that the holder must be "entitled in his own name" and that the doctrine of benami does not extend to negotiable instruments to avoid uncertainty in commercial transactions. The Court reviewed numerous precedents that strictly construe section 78, holding that only the payee or holder can sue to enforce the instrument. However, a broader principle recognized in some cases permits the real owner to sue if the holder is a party to the suit and a valid discharge can be given to the maker.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that all promissory notes were in favor of Shri 108 Baba Kali Kamliwala Ramnath Maniramji, an individual, not the plaintiff society. The plaintiff society was not the payee or holder of the notes and was not shown to be in a position to secure a discharge from the defendants. The Court noted the absence of evidence about the death or heirs of Ramnath Maniramji and found that the plaintiff society could not enforce the notes in its own name.
Consequently, the Court held that the suit was not maintainable by the plaintiff society under the Negotiable Instruments Act as it was neither the payee nor the holder entitled in its own name, and the broader principle allowing the real owner to sue was inapplicable because the holder was not a party capable of giving discharge.
Holding and Implications
The Court ALLOWED the appeal, set aside the decree of the Civil Judge, and DISMISSED the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent with costs throughout.
The decision directly affects the parties by denying the plaintiff society the right to enforce the promissory notes in its own name, emphasizing strict adherence to the Negotiable Instruments Act’s provisions regarding the holder’s rights. No broader precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles concerning the identity of the holder and the necessity of discharge to the maker.
Wali-ullah, J.:— This is an appeal by the defendants against the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge decreeing the claim due on the basis of a promissory note dated the 25th of August, 1928. The suit was instituted by B. Madan Lal Khemka as Secretary of Baba Kali Kamliwala Panchaiti Kshatra, Rishikesh, a registered society under Act XXI of 1860. The two defendants impleaded were Lala Lachhmi Chand and his son, Orikar Prasad. As mentioned above, the suit was decreed against the defendants, both of whom filed an appeal, in this Court. Lala Lachhmi Chand died during the pendency of the appeal leaving his son-Onkar Prasad, appellant No. 2, as his sole legal representative. The position, therefore, is that Onkar Prasad is the sole appellant an this case.
The case set out in the plaint was to this effect: A pro-note was executed by Lala Lachhmi Chand, defendant No. 1, on the 25th of August, 1928, for a sum of Rs. 10,000. The rate of interest stipulated was twelve annas per cent, per mensem. It was in favour of Shri 108 Baba Kali Kamliwala Ramnath Maniramji of Rishikesh. On the 28th of July, 1930, a sum of Rs. 4,800 was paid by the defendant No. 1 through one Musammat Draupadi. On the 25th of August, 1932, a fresh pro-note was executed in renewal of the previous pro-note by both Lala Lachhmi Chand and Onkar Prasad for a sum of Rs. 8,363 the total amount then found due. On the 5th of November, 1934, another pro-note by way of renewal was executed by Lala Lachhmi Chand alone. In November, 1937, another pro-note is said to have been executed in respect of the amount found due on the previous pro-note and handed over to the creditor. Along with this pro-note a letter (Ex. 5.) dated 3rd of November, 1937, acknowledging the liability for payment of. Rs. 2,024-1-6 then due was sent over the signatures of both Lala Lachhmi Chand and Onkar Prasad. Lastly, on the 14th of November, 1939, a pro-note was executed by both Lachhmi Chand and Onkar Prasad for a sum of Rs. 13,302-11-9. This purported to be byway of renewal of the pre-existing liability under the former pro-note. The plaint was filed on the 4th of November, 1942, with the allegations set out above and it was specifically stated in paragraph 7 of the plaint that the cause of action for the suit arose on the 25th of August, 1928, the date of the original transaction, and it was stated that limitation was saved by reason of the subsequent acknowledgment in the form of pro-notes executed from time to time by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff.
The defendants resisted the suit on various grounds. Of them the most material pleas were these: (i) The suit was misconceived inasmuch as the plaintiff was not a payee under the pro-note of 1928 and consequently was not entitled to sue under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act (ii) that the cause of action on the basis of the pro-note of 1928, as set out in the plaint, did not exist and (iii) that, in any event, the defendants were “agriculturists” and as such entitled to the benefit of the Agriculturists' Relief Act in the matter of reduction of interest and the grant of instalments. It may be mentioned here in passing that the plaintiff admitted that the defendants were agriculturists. It is also a matter of admission that both the defendants were members of a joint Hindu family and Lachhmi Chand was the Karta of that family.
The facts, as set out in the plaint, were substantially admitted. The defendants led no oral evidence while the plaintiff contented himself with the production of one witness, Bishambhar Sahai the Karinda of the plaintiff. Bishambhar Sahai produced the plaintiff's bahi khatas from Sambat 1995 to Sambat 1998. His evidence was to the effect that the plaintiff's accounts were kept, regularly and defendants' accounts were sent to them regularly. His evidence was also intended to prove that all the loans advanced by Baba Ramnath Maniraji were actually advanced by the Kshetra Kali Kamliwala which was the real creditor. The documentary evidence in the case consists of various pro-notes executed from time to time and the correspondence exchanged between the parties as well as the statement of the defendants accounts as they stood in the bahi khatas of the plaintiff.
The learned Civil Judge, on a consideration of the materials on the record, came to the conclusion that the defendants were “agriculturists” but that the plaintiff was not a “creditor” within the meaning of section 32 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. He also found that the interest claimed was not excessive and that owing to the declaration given by the plaintiff under section 4 of the Debt Redemption Act, the provisions of that Act were not applicable. He also recorded a finding that the loans advanced by Baba Ramnath Maniramji including the loan in question in the present case were advanced out of the funds of Kshetra Kali Kamliwala which is a religious and charitable institution at Rishikesh. On the main question, whether the plaintiff was debarred from suing on the pro-note dated the 25th of August, 1928, the learned Civil Judge seems to have missed the real point which had to be decided. He came to the conclusion, to quote his own words, that there was no legal defect in the plaint and in view of the renewals of the original loan he held that the suit was within limitation. In view of the findings recorded by him, he decreed the claim with costs and pendente lite and future interest at 3 per cent, per annum payable by monthly instalments of Rs. 500 each, first instalment falling due on the 1st of September, 1943. On failure to pay any three instalments, the whole amount due was directed to be recoverable at once.
A large number of points have been raised in the memorandum of appeal. Of them the first and foremost point obviously is the question whether the plaintiff's suit, as framed, was maintainable. If it be held that the suit, as instituted, cannot succeed, no other questions need be considered.
Learned counsel for the appellant has strongly contended that the plaintiff not being the “payee” of the pro-note could not by reason of section 78 read with section 8 of the Negotiable Insurants Act successfully enforce the liability of the defendants under the pro-note. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at great length on the question. Our attention has been invited to a large number of rulings both of this Court as well as of other High Courts. The relevant provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act are contained in sections 8 and 78 of the Act. Section 8 defines the “holder” of a promissory note, bill of exchange or a cheque. It say's—
“The holder of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque, means any person entitled in his own name to the possession thereof and to receive or recover the amount due thereon from the parties thereto.”
Section 78 reads thus:—
“Subject to the provisions of section 82, clause (c), payment of the amount due on a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque, must, in order to discharge the maker or acceptor, be made to the holder of the instrument.”
Reading the two sections together it is clear that the person to whom the payment should be made in order to discharge the maker or the acceptor from all liability under the instruments is the “holder” of the instrument or his accredited agent, such as a banker acting as an agent for collection. The “holder” of a promissory note is essentially the person who is “entitled in his own name”. The words “entitled in his own name” are obviously most significant. The legislature appears to have clearly intended to prevent any one from claiming the rights of “holder” under the Act on the ground that the ostensible holder is a mere name lender. The term “holder”, therefore, does not include a person who, though in possession of the instrument, has not the right to recover the amount due thereon from the parties thereto. The principle enshrined in section 78 of the Act is clearly in accord with the basic principle underlying the law relating to negotiable instruments, viz. that the doctrine of benami will introduce an element of uncertainty greatly hampering the free circulation of negotiable instruments. The Negotiable Instruments Act has been enacted for encouraging trade and commerce and the underlying principle undoubtedly is that promissory notes, bills of exchange and cheques should be negotiated as apparent on their face without reference to the secret title to them. It is for this reason that the provisions of section 78 provide that in order to discharge the maker or acceptor from liability payment must be made to the “payee” or the “holder” of the intsrument. Section 48 of the Act provides for the negotiation of a promissory note by the holder by means of an endorsement and delivery. The effect of such endorsement and delivery is to transfer to the endorsee the property in the note with a right to negotiate it still further. It would appear, therefore, that the property, or ownership, in a promissory note including the right to recover the amount due thereon is vested by statute in the holder of the note. The express words of section 78 no doubt do not negative a right of suit but the effect of allowing a suit by anyone except the payee or the holder of the note would necessarily be to put the maker or the acceptor of the instrument in a most difficult situation. As has been said, a person so circumstanced is liable to be shot at twice: once by the person who is the “real” holder and then again by the person who is the “holder” within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Under the general law a principal can institute a suit to enforce a contract entered into by his agent though his name is not disclosed but section 78 of the Negotiable Instruments Act clearly implies that there is an exception to the general rule so far as negotiable instruments are concerned. There are numerous cases in the reports—and quite a number of them have been brought to our notice in the course of arguments by the learned counsel—in which section 78 of the Act has been strictly construed and it has been held that a valid discharge can be given to the maker or acceptor of the instrument only by the payee of the note or the holder thereof. It has further been clearly laid down that there is no such thing; for this purpose as a benami promissory note taken in the name of one person but really meant for the benefit of another. Reference might be made to the cases of Ghanshyam Das v. Ragho Sahu(1); Reoti Lal v. Manna Kunwar(2); Dori Lal v. Sewak Ram(3); Hari Kishore Barua v. Guru Mia Chowdhry(4) and Raghubir Mahto v. Ramasray Bhagat(5). The sum total of the principles enunciated in the cases referred to above comes to this: Where a hand-note is executed in favour of a benamidar, it is not open to the promissor to assert that the holder of the note is not the beneficial owner. Conversely, if a suit is to be based upon the hand-note it must be instituted by the holder whose name appears on the note and not by any person who alleges that the original holder is his benamidar and that he is the beneficed owner. Reference might also be made here to the case of Sadasuk Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Pershad(6) and to the case of Subba Narayana Vathiyar v. Ramaswami Aiyar(7). It was observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Sadasukh Janki Das that—
“It is of the utmost importance that the name of a person, or, firm to be charged upon a negotiable document should be clearly stated on the face or on the back of the document, so that the responsibility is made plain and can be instantly recognized as the document passes from hand to hand…. It is not sufficient that the principal's name should be ‘in someway’ disclosed, it must be disclosed in such a way that on any fair interpretation of the instrument his name is the real name of the person liable upon the bills.”
With reference to the contention based on sections 26, 27 and 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act their Lordships observed:—
“These sections contain nothing inconsistent with the principles already enunciated, and nothing to support the contention, which is contrary to all established rules, that in an action on a bill of exchange or promissory note against a person whose name properly appears as party to the instrument, it is open either by way of claim or defence to show that the signatory was in reality acting for an undisclosed principal.”
In the case of Subba Narayana Vathiyar v. Ramaswami Aiyar (ubi supra) the Full Bench of the Madras High Court held that—
“According to the law merchant which governed negotiable instruments in this country before the passing of the Negotiable Instruments Act, no person could sue on a negotiable instrument unless he were named therein as payee or unless he had become entitled as endorsee or bearer. Sections 8, and 78 of the Negotiable Instruments Act have reproduced the law as is stood before the passing of the Act. The general provisions of the Indian Contract Act as regards the rights and liabilities of undisclosed principals were not intended to alter these well established rules as to negotiable, instruments. In a suit on a negotiable instrument by the payee named therein or the indorsee, it is not open to the defendant to plead that such payee or indorsee is a mere benamindar.”
As a corollary to the general rule above indicated, it has been held that the “real” creditor, as distinguished from the payee or the holder of the instrument, cannot be allowed to fall back upon the original consideration and to sue for the money advanced by him independently of the promissory note by proving the actual loan. On the contrary, obviously with a view to moderate the rigour of the general rule above indicated, it has been held in a number of cases that section 78 does not in reality deal with a right of suit and looking to the language of section 78 is obviously correct. It has accordingly been held that the real owner is entitled to sue provided he is in a position to obtain a good discharge from liability from the maker or acceptor of the instrument. The fact that a person who is not the holder of the instrument cannot claim, the privileges of a “holder”, so it has, been held, does not disentitle him from suing. Thus in a suit brought by the “real” creditor to which the maker and the holder of the promissory note were parties a decree was passed against the maker with a proviso that payment shall be made to the real creditor only on his securing a valid discharge of the maker from the holder of the note vide Sewa Ram v. Hoti Lal. The contention that the real creditor, the holder of the promissory note being his benamidar, is precluded from maintaining a suit for enforcement of the liability incurred by the maker under the pro-note was repelled. With the utmost respect to the two learned Judges, Sen and Niamatullah, JJ., who decided that case, we must say we find ourselves in full agreement with their views. Similarly in Surajman Prasad Misra v. Sadanand Misra it has been held by two learned Judges of the Patna High Court that—“In a suit on a pro-note in which the holder though not a plaintiff is a party and the plaintiff the real owner is in a position to give to the drawer through the holder a discharge, the plaintiff can maintain the suit.”
To the same effect is the decision of a learned single judge of the Patna High Court in Sarjug Singh v. Deosaran Singh where it was held that — “Section 78 does not debar the real beneficiary under the promissory note from suing on the basis of the note if he can give a discharge to the maker of the promissory note. The object of section 78 is to secure a valid discharge to the maker of the note. If the person who is ostensibly the holder of the promissory note is made a party to the suit and in his presence it is alleged that the plaintiff is the real beneficiary and that the ostensible holder was not the real holder of the instrument, and he can prove his allegation by evidence or by the admission of the ostensible holder of the instrument, there is no reason why such a suit should not be maintainable.
The same principle has been followed in the case of Swaminatha Odayar v. Subbarama Aiyar. In this case plaintiff No. 1 sold some properties to the defendant and for part of the purchase money took from the defendant a promissory note in favour of his mother, plaintiff No. 2. Plaintiff No. 1 then instituted a suit for enforcing his lien on the property, sold for the part of the purchase money represented by the promissory note. It was held that his lien under section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act, was extinguished, but as the holder of the promissory note (plaintiff No. 2) was willing that a simple money decree on the basis of the note be passed in favour of plaintiff No. 1 (the beneficiary), such a decree could be passed. Similarly in Brojo Lal Saha Banikya v. Budh Nath Pyari Lal Das, two learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court expressed this view, though by way of obiter—“Section 78 does not prohibit any person other than the holder to bring a suit, if that person is the true owner.” They further observed that it would be a very good defence for the maker or acceptor of a promissory note to say that unless the plaintiff in the suit gets him a discharge I from the holder of the instrument he is not bound to pay. It must, however, be mentioned here that in a later Calcutta case Harikishore Barna v. Gura Mia Chowdhry, two other learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court dissented from the view expressed in the case of Brojo Lal Saha Banikya aforementioned and held that the real owner cannot sue even though the holder of the note is impleaded as a defendant to the suit and is willing to give a good discharge. Again, in Balanna v. Firm Khudal Nazar Khan, Bose, J., while agreeing with his own decision in the case of Gulabgir v. Nathmal that the doctrine of benami could not be applied to negotiable instruments held that the question whether the real owner could in the special circumstances institute a suit when he was in a position to give a good discharge was left open in that case. He expressed his clear preference for the broader view taken in Patna and Allahabad cases. He went on to observe:—
“Although the doctrine of benami does not apply as such to negotiable instruments, the decisions of the Privy Council upholding benami transactions cannot be altogether ignored. I see no reason why a narrow view of the law which would defeat a just claim should be taken. I do not think section 78 deals with a right of suit, for as I have already pointed out, there are cases in which a person who is not the ‘holder’ can sue.”
The learned Judge was quite clear that the real owner was entitled to sue provided he was in a position to obtain a good discharge for the defendant.
As must have been noticed from the discussion and the decisions in the cases above referred to, judicial opinion on the question whether a suit lies at the instance of the real holder as distinguished from the payee or the endorsee of a promissory note is far from unanimous. The broader view, however, which has been accepted in some of the cases referred to above e.g in the case of Sewa Ram v. Hoti Lal (ubi supra), the case of Surajman Prasad Misra v. Sadanand Misra (ubi supra) and the case of Balanna v. Firm Khudal Nazar Khan, (ubi supra) appeals to us as the one more in consonance with the dictates of justice and fairplay. It must, however, be carefully noted that in all these cases, with the exception of the Nagpur cases the “holder” of the note was himself a party to the suit. In the Nagpur case, however, the promissory notes in question were in favour of Khudai Dad Khan and not in favour of the firm of partnership that had instituted the suit. In that case Khudai Dad Khan does not appear to have been impleaded as party but he had entered the witness-box and was evidently agreeable to the decree being passed in favour of the plaintiff (the partnership) Under those circumstances the decree in favour of the firm was maintained provided the firm obtained within one month from the date of the decision a proper discharge from Khudai Dad Khan exonerating the defendant from all liability to him under the pro-note.
Reverting to the facts of the present case we find that the pro-note dated the 25th of August, 1928, as also the pro-note executed subsequently by the defendants were all in favour of Shri 108 Baba Kali Kamliwala Ramnath Maniramji of Rishikesh that is to say, in favour of an individual person, namely Ramnath Maniramji of Rishikesh. It is true that on the pro-note dated the 5th of November, 1934, Baba Ramnath Maniramji is described as “the Owner and manager of the Kshetra Baba Kali Kamliwala” but that cannot be of any help to the plaintiff-respondent in this case. It is beyond dispute therefore that the original pro-note as well as the pro-notes executed subsequently were in favour of Ramnath Maniramji Maharaj. It may be that he was the owner and manager of what became a registered society as Baba Kali Kamliwala Panchaiti Kshetra, Rishikesh, in the year 1932—we are informed that the society was registered on the 4th of January, 1932—but that fact, in our judgment, cannot make any real difference. The position, therefore, is that the suit has been instituted in the name of a registered body and the payee of the promissory note in question is not a party to the suit. During the course of the hearing of this appeal we were informed by the learned counsel that Ramnath Maniramji Maharaj was dead Beyond this statement of the learned counsel for the respondent however, there is no other indication in the record as to whether he is dead or alive and also, if he died, when be died and whether he left any heir and who that heir is. From the unrebutted evidence of Bishambar Sahai, the karinda of the plaintiff-respondent, it appears that the consideration of the pro-note in question may very possibly have come out of the funds of the Kshetra Baba Kali Kamliwala, the registered society, but in the present case we find it impossible to hold that the plaintiff (the registered society) was (while the suit was pending in the court below), or even now, in a position to secure a discharge of the defendants from all liability under the pro-note in suit. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the present case does not fall even within the scope of the “broader principle” referred to above. In this view of the matter the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant must be accepted. It follows, therefore, that the suit as instituted by the plaintiff-respondent could not succeed. As the decision on this question is fatal to the claim of the plaintiff-respondent we do not discuss the other questions raised in the case.
In the result, therefore, this appeal must be allowed, the decree of the court below set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent dismissed with costs throughout. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs throughout.
Alert