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Bipat Mahton v. Kulpat Mahton
Summary of Opinion — Dhavle, J. (with concurrence of Macpherson, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit was brought by the plaintiff (Bipat) claiming title to 37 bighas of land in mauza Sarouni, Kalan, based on a registered kabala (sale-deed) executed by Musammat Chando in October following the death of Tulsi Bhagat. After Tulsi's death in Baisakh, 1326, his widow Musammat Chando came into possession and later sold the land to the plaintiff. In 1924 a dispute over possession produced proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Magistrate, with three parties claiming rights: the plaintiff (relying on Chando's sale-deed), Kankal Mahton (defendant no. 1) claiming as an adopted son of Tulsi, and Jaggshwar (Jagdeo) Mahton (defendant no. 2) claiming 5 bighas under a sale from Tulsi. The Magistrate could not determine who was in possession and attached the land under section 146 CrPC in June 1924.
The present suit was filed in April following the attachment by the plaintiff seeking a declaration of title on the footing that Chando had sold the land to him "for satisfaction of the dues of her husband and legal debts." Kulpat (claiming kinship with Tulsi) and others were impleaded and contested the sale as collusive and invalid. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, finding the kabala was not collusive and had consideration; Kulpat and Kankal appealed. The Additional District Judge (first appellate court) accepted execution of the kabala but held the plaintiff had not proved either payment of full consideration or legal necessity for the sale by a Hindu widow and therefore dismissed the suit. The present appeal to this Court followed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the kabala (sale-deed) executed by Musammat Chando in favour of the plaintiff is a valid sale (i.e., whether it is collusive, executed for consideration, and a valid alienation).
- Whether the plaintiff has any right to the land in suit and is entitled to the declaration prayed for (including whether the plaintiff had established legal necessity or payment of consideration).
- Whether, as a matter of law, an alienation by a Hindu widow unsupported by legal necessity is void as against all persons or merely voidable at the instance of reversionary heirs (i.e., who may challenge such an alienation).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Plaintiff — Bipat)
- Relied on a registered kabala from Musammat Chando as the basis of an absolute title to the land.
- Asserted the kabala was executed to satisfy the dues of her husband and legal debts and alleged payment of consideration.
- Argued (on appeal) that even if the lower court found legal necessity or full consideration not proved, the sale-deed was not ipso facto void but voidable only at the instance of Tulsi's reversioner; therefore, the plaintiff should be entitled to a decree.
Respondents / Opponents (Kulpat, Kankal and others)
- Alleged that the suit and sale were collusive and fraudulent and that the widow had no right to sell the property.
- Contended the kabala was nominal, baseless, illegal and wrongful, executed without consideration and without right or possession.
- Kulpat, asserting kinship with Tulsi and potential reversionary interest, challenged the validity of the widow's alienation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah | Restrictions on a Hindu widow's power of alienation are "inseparable from her estate"; Crown (escheat) entitled to challenge alienation unsupported by legal necessity. | Used to show that certain challengers (such as reversioners or the Crown by escheat) may impugn a widow's alienation; does not establish that all third parties may do so. |
| Bhagwat Dayal Singh v. Debi Dayal Sahu | An alienee from a Hindu widow must prove genuineness of the conveyance, that the woman understood the transaction, and that it was justified by legal necessity; the alienee must satisfy himself by reasonable inquiry. | Noted by the Court as authority on what an alienee must prove, but the Court observed this principle was applied in disputes with reversioners and assignees, and has limited application as between alienee and third parties. |
| Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi | A Hindu widow is owner of her husband's property subject to restrictions on alienation and to its devolving upon husband's heirs; her alienation is prima facie voidable at the election of the reversionary heir. | Relied on to support the proposition that a widow's alienation, even without legal necessity, is valid as against strangers to the reversion and can be impeached only by those with reversionary rights. |
| Nisa Chand Gaita v. Kanchiram Bagani | In ejectment suits, plaintiff must prove a subsisting title (not merely prior possession) if suit not brought within six months of dispossession; otherwise the suit may fail. | Referenced to explain what type of suit would have been necessary had the plaintiff simply sought to remove the bar of the Magistrate's attachment; the Court noted later decisions that doubted or distinguished this rule. |
| Shyama Charan Ray v. Surya Kanta Acharya | Distinguished Nisa Chand Gaita; recognized circumstances where prior possession may suffice (and raised questions about the strictness of the Nisa Chand rule). | Cited to show that the present case does not raise the same ejectment/possession question, and to indicate the existence of differing authorities on the role of prior possession. |
| Sahodra Kuer v. Gdbardhan Tewari | Accepted Shyama Charan Ray as good law in that court. | Referenced to show acceptance of alternative views on possession-based claims in some decisions. |
| Chaturbhuj Singh v. Sarada Charan Guha | Discussed earlier cases and held in some circumstances a plaintiff in ejectment may succeed on the strength of prior possession alone. | Referenced to demonstrate that Nisa Chand Gaita has been doubted and that prior possession has been treated as sufficient in certain cases. |
| Manik Borai v. Bani Charan Mandal | Did not fully accept Shyama Charan Ray; reflects divergent case law on possession and title. | Cited by the respondent; used by the Court to show the conflicting state of authority. |
| Naba Kishore Tilakdas v. Paro Bewa | Distinguished Shyama Charan Ray by indicating it turned not on mere prior possession but also on title. | Noted by the Court as a recent distinction illustrating that decisions on possession versus title vary and must be read narrowly. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by examining the factual findings of the lower courts and the legal principles applicable to alienations by Hindu widows. The key analytical steps were:
- The Magistrate's procedural act: the land had been attached under section 146 CrPC in June 1924 because the Magistrate could not determine possession under section 145 CrPC; that attachment remained in force until a competent court determined rights or the person entitled to possession.
- The trial court findings: the Subordinate Judge found the kabala executed by Musammat Chando was not collusive and had been executed for consideration; he concluded Kulpat had no locus to question the sale and decreed the suit for the plaintiff.
- The first appellate court findings: the Additional District Judge accepted that the kabala had been executed but held the plaintiff had not discharged the burden to prove either payment of full consideration or that the sale was justified by legal necessity — a burden the appellate judge believed lay on an alienee from a Hindu widow.
- The Court reviewed relevant authorities and clarified the legal position: decisions such as Collector of Masulipatam and Bhagwat Dayal Singh relate to challenges by reversioners or the Crown and to the standard the alienee must meet in those contests. But these cases do not hold that an alienation unsupported by legal necessity is void as against all persons; rather, such alienation is prima facie voidable at the election of reversionary heirs and is valid as against strangers to the reversion.
- The Court then examined the form in which the plaintiff had presented his case: he had sued on the footing of an "absolute title" (pleading legal necessity and payment of consideration and seeking a declaration based on those assertions). The plaintiff did not advance an alternative or contingent claim based on possession alone, nor did he ask simply to remove the obstacle to possession created by the Magistrate's attachment.
- The Court considered whether, on the specific facts found by the lower appellate court, the plaintiff should nonetheless have received a modified declaration. It observed numerous adverse findings of fact against the plaintiff: absence of the widow's thumb impression on the kabala and earlier mortgage bond, failure to prove payment of creditors or passing of full consideration, the widow's remarriage shortly after the sale, the existence of Tulsi's daughter Razia (an heir), and inferences of suspicious circumstances suggesting fraud upon Razia and possibly upon the widow.
- Given these findings and the fact that the plaintiff had elected to run the case as one of absolute title supported by assertions of legal necessity and payment, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had not made out his pleaded case and that the lower appellate court was justified in dismissing the suit.
- Concurrence: Macpherson, J. agreed, adding that even if the plaintiff had relied on prior possession or appealed the Magistrate's attachment, he would have failed because, at the date the suit was brought, he would have had to show entitlement to possession against the whole world.
Holding and Implications
Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.
Direct effect and immediate consequences:
- The plaintiff's suit was dismissed and he was held not entitled to the declaration of title he sought based on the kabala from Musammat Chando.
- The Court accepted that a Hindu widow's alienation, if unsupported by legal necessity, is not ipso facto void as against all persons but is prima facie voidable at the election of reversionary heirs; however, on the facts found against the plaintiff (non-payment of consideration, suspicious circumstances, widow's remarriage, existence of an heir), the plaintiff failed to establish the rights he pleaded.
- The Magistrate's order of attachment under section 146 CrPC remains in force "until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto, or the person entitled to possession thereof," as noted in the opinion.
- An application by Musammat Razia to be added as a respondent was filed late and was not entertained; the Court observed she still had time to establish her rights by ordinary proceedings.
Broader implications: The opinion discusses and applies existing principles about the limited class of persons who may attack a widow's alienation and the evidentiary burden on an alienee where appropriate; it does not purport to create a new general precedent beyond applying and distinguishing earlier authorities. The direct effect is limited to dismissal of the plaintiff's claim on the facts and pleadings before the Court.
Disposition: Appeal dismissed (per Dhavle, J.; Macpherson, J. concurred).
Dhavle, J.:— This is an appeal by the plaintiff in a suit concerning 37 bighas of land once held by Tulsi Bhagat in mauza Sarouni, Kalan on the death of Tulsi in Baisakh, 1326, his widow Musammat Chando came into possession of the land; and she sold it to the nlaintiff by a registered kabala executed in the following October. In 1924, there was a dispute regarding the possession of the land, which led to proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Magistrate. There were three parties in these proceedings: (1) Bipat, the plaintiff, in the present suit who relied on the sale-deed from Musammat Chando; (2) Kankal Mahton, defendant no. 1 who claimed as an adopted son of Tulsi; and (3) Jaggshwar Mahton, defendant no. 2, who claimed 5 bighas out of the disputed land under a deed of sale from Tulsi. The Magistrate was unable, on the evidence produced before him, to satisfy himself as to which of the parties was then in possession of the land, and therefore attached it under section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This was in June, 1924, and the present siyt was brought in the following April by Bipat, basing his claim on the sale-deed from Musammat Chando and asking for a declaration of his title on the footing that Chando had sold the land to him “for satisfaction of the dues of her husband and legal debts” Kankal, defendant no. 1, though impleaded as a major, appeared to be a minor, and a written statement was put in on his behalf by his father, Kulpat Mahton, alleging that the suit was collusive and fraudulent, that the widow had no right to sell the property and that Kankal would be greatly prejudiced, if the case was allowed to go on without deciding in the first place “with whom the title to these lands goes and continues”. A reference was made in Kankal's written statement to a written statement that had been previously filed by Kulpat Mahton, alleging that he was Tulsi's father's brother's son and joint with him, that Musammat Chando, who had been married by Tulsi “in chumawan form” after the death of his first wife, had been turned out of the house by Tulsi and had then married Jageshwar (before Tulsi's death), and that the sale-deed obtained by Bipat from Chando was
“a nominal, baseless, illegal and wrongful deed of sale………… without any consideration and without any right and possession.”
The trial court added Kulpat as a defendant, overruling the objection of the plaintiff who had himself travelled beyond the parties to the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by impleading Jageshwar's brother Kohdil as defendant no. 3. As to. Jageshwar and Kohdil, the plaintiff's case was that they were merely arzidars of Tulsi; and this was upheld by the trial court and need not be further considered. As regards plaintiff's own title, the learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that Kulpat was not a cousin of Tulsi, that even if he were a cousin, he was not joint with Tulsi at the time of the death of the latter, that Chando was married to Jagdeo not in the life-time of Tulsi but after his death, and that her kabala was
“not a collusive document and was executed for consideration.”
He also considered that Kulpat had no locus standi to question the validity of the sale by Chando to the plaintiff and, therefore, upheld the sale without going into the question whether it was supported by legal necessity. The suit was decreed, and Kulpat and Kankal appealed.
The learned Additional District Judge who heard the appeal found that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff to prove the execution of the kabala by Musammat Chando was quite satisfactory. He was, however, of opinion that on the pleadings in the case it was incumbent on the plaintiff,
“who wants to enforce a certain conveyance made in his favour by a Hindu widow.”
to state and prove that the sale by the widow was justified by legal necessity. His conclusion was as follows:—
“* * * though the kebala was executed by Musammat, plaintiff failed to prove either the passing of the full consideration money thereof or the existence of the legal necessity for the - same, so that in view of the principles of law laid down by the Privy Council in the cases quoted above the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden which lay on him to prove his title under the conveyance from the widow who has only limited interest in the properties of her husband the kebala therefore is not valid in the eye of the Law so as to make the title of the plaintiff complete in respect of the property conveyed to him under it. The widow having remarried, her life interest too has come to an end. Consequently the kebala cannot be validated till she lives.”
In this view the learned Judge held that the plaintiff was
“not entitled to the declaration prayed for by him.”
The appeal was, therefore, allowed and the suit dismissed.
It has been urged on behalf of the plaintiff, who has now appealed to this Court, that even on the findings of fact of the lower appellate court that legal necessity for the sale and the passing of full consideration has not been established, Musammat Chando's sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff was not ipso facto void, but was only voidable at the instance of Tulsi's reversioner and that the plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to a decree. Referring to the observation of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah that the restrictions on a Hindu widow's power of alienation are “inseparable from her estate” the learned Judge apparently considered “that even if there be no reversioners, she cannot alienate the corpus of the property except for a legal necessity”. He has also cited Bhagwat Dayal Singh v. Debi Dayal Sahu for the proposition that “an alienee who claims title under a conveyance from a Hindu widow must prove genuineness of his conveyance, also that the woman understood the full import and nature of the transaction she was entering into, and that it was justified by legal necessity, (as to) the existence of which the alienee must satisfy himself by reasonable enquiry. In neither of these cases, referred to by the learned Judge, however, was it decided that an alienation of a husband's property by a Hindu widow, if unsupported by legal necessity, is void, or that its validity can be impugned by any party other than those who would be entitled to the property by survivorship, inheritance or escheat. In the case of Collector of Masulipatam what was decided was that the Crown, taking by escheat the property left by a Hindu husband, was entitled to challenge his widow's alienation of it as unsupported by legal necessity. In the case of Bhagwat Dayal Singh it was by a reversioner and his assignees that the claim of the alienee from the widow was resisted, and the observations of the Judicial Committee” in that case regarding what must be proved by the alienee have no application to cases between such alienees and third parties. As their Lordships had pointed out in Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi, a Hindu widow, is the owner of her husband's property subject to certain restrictions on alienation and subject to its devolving upon her husband's heirs upon her death, and her alienation is not absolutely void but is only prima facie voidable at the election of the reversionary heir. There can be no question that an alienation by a Hindu widow even without legal necessity is valid as against strangers to the reversion, and that such questions as those of legal necessity and the adequacy and the passing of the consideration can only be raised by a limited class of parties, and not by such strangers. It is doubtless on this account that the learned Judge below finally found that the kabala was not “valid in the eye of the law so as to make the title of the plaintiff complete”. The question is whether on the title found, the plaintiff was not entitled to a modified declaration. The Magistrate's order of attachment under section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure remains in force
“until a competent come has determined the rights of the parties thereto, or the person entitled to possession thereof.”
The plaintiff, however, did not frame his suit in such a way as merely to get rid of the bar to possession caused by the Magistrate's order, doubtless because Kankal had claimed the land as Tulsi's adopted son. Had he been dispossessed by Jagdeo and Kankal, and had there been no order passed by the Magistrate under section 146, he would have had to sue in ejectment: and according to the leading Calcutta case of Nisa Chand Gaita v. Kanchiram Bagani such a suit would not have succeeded, as not brought within six - months of the dispossession, unless he proved a subsisting title as distinguished from mere prior possession, while on the findings of the lower appellate court, his title came to an end on Chando's remarriage, an event which according to a former deposition of Jagdeo (apparently accepted by the lower courts) took place in Magh, 1327, i.e, a couple of months or so after her sale to the plaintiff. But that question does not arise in a case like the present as was pointed out in Shyama Charan Ray v. Surya Kanta Acharya to which our attention was drawn on behalf of the appellant. In this decision Nisa Chand Gaita v. Kanchiram Bagam was distinguished and doubted, nor has this last case been accepted as good law in this court—see Sahodra Kuer v. Gdbardhan Tewari and other cases referred to in Chaturbhuj Singh v. Sarada Charan Guha* in which the plaintiff in an action of ejectment was held entitled to succeed on the’ strength of his prior possession only. Shyama Charan Ray case was not quite accepted in Manik Borai v. Bani Charan Mandal, cited for the respondent, and was recently distinguished in Naba Kishore Tilakdas v. Paro Bewa as really turning not on mere prior possession but also on title, but it was apparently: accepted as good law in Sahodra Kuer's case. This does not, however, entitle the appellant to succeed in his present suit, brought as it was on the definite footing of “an absolute title” (see paragraph 12 of the plaint) for the reason already indicated: he alleged not only legal necessity in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the plaint but also actual payment of the consideration in paragraph 5, and one of the declarations sought in the relief portion of the plaint was that Musammat Chando had sold the property to the plaintiff “for satisfaction of the dues of her husband and legal debts”. No alternative claim was made based upon possession. The material issues framed were—
3. Is the kabala of the plaintiff a collusive document and for consideration and is the sale under the kabala a valid sale?
5. Has the plaintiff got any right to the land in suit and is the plaintiff entitled to a declaration prayed for?
These issues were discussed together by the trial court, and one does not in that discussion find a word about possession or any right based on it. Stress has been laid on behalf of the appellant on the order portion of the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge in which
“it is declared that he has title to the disputed land and he was in possession of it since his purchase till the date of attachment;”
and it has been urged that this implies a finding of possession which has not been set aside by the lower appellate court. No claim, however, appears to have been advanced before the lower appellate court on the basis of plaintiff's prior possession, and it is difficult to see why that court should be expected “to set aside an implied finding on which no claim was advanced before it. Even if the contrary were to be held, it does not seem that the present is a proper case in which to allow the appellant to change his ground from absolute title to a title which only lasted two on three months, though his possession may weir have continued for four or five years, and treat as surplusage “the satisfaction of the dues of her husband and legal debts” which the plaintiff had so deliberately made a part of his case. A declaration is essentially a discretionary relief. The lower appellate court as the final court of fact has found one suspicious circumstance after another against the plaintiff, beginning with the fact that the thumb impression of Musammat Chando was not taken either on the sale-deed, which is the basis of the plaintiff's title, (such as it was), or on the mortgage bond which the plaintiff had taken from her four months previously and within a couple of months of Tulsi's death. The sale-deed was (in the words of the learned District Judge) obtained from the widow
“in not haste without oaring to make any enquiry in respect of the debts, the creditors or the legal necessities thereof, and also without enquiring whether there was no sufficient income of the properties in the hands of the Musammat to satisfy those debts. Nor the Musammat was given any opportunity to have any independent advice in the matter. She, I am constrained to observe, could not fully understand the significance and effect of the transaction she was entering into……………… What did the Musammat get by the transaction? Nothing practically.”
Though the plaintiff set out to show that he had actually paid the widow's creditors, the finding of fact is that he has entirely failed on the point. Shortly after the sale to the plaintiff, Chando left the family and married Jagdeo; and
“it is an admitted fact on both sides that Tulsi left a daughter, Musammat Razia, who gave evidence in the case for the plaintiff (Sic. A mistake for the defence’).”
“it is an admitted fact on, both sides that Tulsi left a daughter, Musammat Razia, who gave evidence in the case for the plaintiff Sic. A mistake for the defenoe”
On these findings of fact the plaintiff's kabala, could not have stood against the widow nor against the admitted heir, if impleaded. It is pretty obvious on these findings that the plaintiff has played a fraud upon Razia, Tulsi's daughter by his former wife and aged only 16, if not also on his vendor, an illiterate Woman who left the family shortly after the sale. In these circumstances the lower appellate court was, in my opinion, entirely justified in holding the plaintiff to the precise claim put forward in the plaint and coming to the conclusion that he
“is not entitled to the declaration prayed for by him.”
The appeal fails and must be dismissed.
Long after the arguments in this appeal, and while this judgment was being typed, Musammat Razia applied to be added as a party respondent. The application was made, far too late to be entertained, and there is still time for her to establish her rights in the ordinary way.
Macpherson, J.:— I agree that the suit and this appeal must fail. The plaintiff-appellant made a case of title and failed to establish it. Further, speaking for myself, he must also have failed if he had come on previous possession (or practically, on appeal against the order under section 146), for (at least at the date when the suit was brought) he would have had to show that he was entitled to possession against the whole world.
Appeal dismissed.
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