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Pentapathi Venkatramana And Others v. Pentapathi Varahalu And Others.
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit for the taking of accounts of certain dissolved partnerships carried on by members of a single family of the Vysia community who belonged to different branches. The litigation concerns three separate businesses described in the record as Kottu No. 1, Kottu No. 2 and Kottu No. 3. Kottu Nos. 2 and 3 were carried on in the name of the first defendant; Kottu No. 1 in the name of the second defendant. It was admitted that specified fractional shares existed in Kottu Nos. 1 and 2 among the family branches; the dispute was whether the plaintiff and his branch (and related defendants 24 and 25) were entitled to a three-anna (expressed ultimately as three-sixteenths in the court's conclusion) share in Kottu No. 3 or whether Kottu No. 3 was exclusively the concern of defendants 1 to 3. The subordinate (trial) judge had found that Kottu No. 3 was the exclusive concern of defendants 1 to 3. The present opinion addresses the merits of Kottu No. 3 and the admissibility of a statement (Ex. LXIX) recorded by the Income-tax Officer.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Kottu No. 3 was exclusively the concern of defendants 1 to 3 or whether the plaintiff's branch (and allied defendants) was entitled to a three-sixteenths share in Kottu No. 3.
- Whether the statement Ex. LXIX (a statement on oath by the first defendant recorded by the Income-tax Officer) was admissible in evidence in the suit despite the confidentiality and non-production provisions of Section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff (for himself and as representing his branch) contended that their branch was entitled to a three-anna (three-sixteenths as ultimately expressed) share in Kottu No. 3, as in Kottu No. 2.
- Evidence supporting that contention included entries in the account books of Kottu No. 3 (Ex. A series) showing the 24th defendant writing pages over a period; payments in respect of transactions with Kottu No. 3 being paid to the 24th defendant (as shown in Ex. 1 produced by D.W.2); and the testimony of D.Ws. 2 and 3 that the 24th defendant had been actively working in Kottu No. 3.
- The plaintiff relied on Ex. LXIX, a sworn statement by the first defendant before the Income-tax Officer, in which the first defendant stated that Kottu No. 3 "was a branch of the house (inti) shop, i.e. No. 2" and that "the shares of the partners are the same as those of the main shop, i.e., the house shop (Kottu No. 2)." The plaintiff argued this document was admissible and proved the plaintiff's entitlement.
Contesting Defendants' Arguments
- Defendants 1 to 23 maintained that Kottu No. 3 was exclusively their concern and that the plaintiff's branch and the branch of defendant 28 had no interest in it.
- They contended that Ex. LXIX was not admissible in evidence, relying principally on Section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which declares certain particulars in income-tax documents to be confidential and directs that no court shall insist on their production by a public officer.
- The defendants relied on decisions (including Rangoon High Court decisions) that had treated certified copies of income-tax documents as inadmissible or had refused court assistance to obtain such documents.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jalobratam Dey v. Bulloram Dey | Mentioned as a decision which may not be good under the stricter Section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. | The court observed that earlier decisions such as this may not remain good law under the 1922 Act, but did not rely on it to bar admission of Ex. LXIX. |
| Venkatachella Chettiar v. Sampathu Chettiar | Similarly mentioned as a decision which might not be good under the wider scope of Section 54 (Income-tax Act, 1922). | The court noted the possibility that such earlier authorities are limited by the newer statutory provision and did not apply them to exclude Ex. LXIX. |
| Anwar Ali v. Tafozal Ahmad (Rangoon High Court) | Relied upon by defendants to support the contention that income-tax documents or copies should be excluded from evidence or not obtained via court assistance. | The court distinguished the present case from the situation addressed in that decision and did not follow it as a bar to admitting Ex. LXIX. |
| Ma Hla Mra Khine v. Ma Hla Kra Pru (Rangoon High Court) | Relied upon by defendants; involved attempted court assistance to obtain income-tax materials and the court's refusal in that context. | The court held that the actual decision there had little bearing, because that case sought the court's aid to obtain the information rather than admitting a certified copy already given to an interested party. |
| Devidutt v. Shriram | Discussed in relation to whether an income-tax return is a "public" document and the admissibility of certified copies; the learned judges there were inclined to think Section 54 did not preclude secondary evidence but held specific certified copies inadmissible in that case. | The present court cited Devidutt to explain distinctions: in Devidutt the return was not treated as a public document; here the original was a public document (a statement recorded by the Income-tax Officer), and a certified copy would be secondary evidence of a public document and thus admissible in the court's view. |
| 2 Rang. 391 (reported Rangoon decision) | Held that a certified copy of an income-tax return produced by the defendant was inadmissible because the Evidence Act did not make admissible copies unlawfully issued and certified. | The court declined to accept the full reasoning of 2 Rang. 391 for the circumstances of the present case, distinguishing that the original in the present case was a public document (a statement by an Income-tax Officer) and treating a certified copy as secondary evidence permissible under the Evidence Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in stages in its analysis.
- Issue framing: The court first considered the fate of Kottu No. 3 — if it were indeed exclusively the concern of defendants 1 to 3 (as found by the subordinate judge), the plaintiff's claim would fail for that concern. If not, the plaintiff claimed a three-sixteenths share, particularly because accounts of Kottu No. 3 were not taken into account previously (Exs. IV and V).
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Evidential facts favouring the plaintiff: The court recited evidence supporting the plaintiff's claim that his branch had an interest in Kottu No. 3:
- Admissions and entries: The admission of D.W.18 and entries in the Kottu No. 3 account books (Ex. A series) showed the 24th defendant had written several pages over more than a year.
- Witness testimony: Testimony of D.Ws. 2 and 3 (whose reliability the court accepted) established that the 24th defendant had actively worked in Kottu No. 3 for a long time; Ex. 1 supported D.W.2's evidence showing payments to the 24th defendant in respect of transactions with Kottu No. 3.
- Logical inference: The court noted no satisfactory explanation was offered for the 24th defendant's active role if he had no interest.
- The pivotal documentary admission — Ex. LXIX: The court placed particular weight on Ex. LXIX, a sworn statement by the first defendant before the Income-tax Officer in October 1926, in which the first defendant described Kottu No. 3 as a branch of Kottu No. 2 and stated that the partners' shares in Kottu No. 3 were the same as those of the main shop (Kottu No. 2). The court observed that if admissible, Ex. LXIX "clearly proves the truth of the plaintiff's case."
- Objection under Section 54 (Income-tax Act, 1922) and the lower court's ruling: The contesting defendants argued, and the lower court accepted, that Ex. LXIX was inadmissible under Section 54, which declares certain particulars confidential and directs that no court shall insist on their production by a public officer; a penalty clause was also noted in relation to disclosure by public servants.
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The court's statutory and evidential analysis:
- Scope of Section 54: The court considered whether the confidentiality declaration in the first part of Clause (i) of Section 54 effectively precluded admissibility of a certified copy that had been given to a partner by income-tax authorities, even when the copy was before the court without any summons to a public officer.
- Distinguishing facts and prior decisions: The court reviewed Rangoon High Court decisions relied upon by defendants and expressed reluctance to accept the reasoning of 2 Rang. 391 as controlling here. It explained that cases dealing with copies of returns (which might not be "public" documents) differ from the present situation where the original was a statement recorded by an Income-tax Officer (a public document).
- Evidence Act provisions: The court treated a certified copy of an order of assessment (or a statement recorded by an Income-tax Officer) as secondary evidence of a public document. It regarded Section 76 of the Evidence Act as an enabling provision for the issue of certified copies and declined to interpret it as an exhaustive or prohibitory provision rendering certified copies illegal.
- Devidutt v. Shriram: The court noted that in that case the judges inclined to think that Section 54 did not preclude proper secondary evidence but nonetheless held the certified copies inadmissible; the present court distinguished Devidutt because the original here is a public document recorded by an Income-tax Officer.
- Practical and textual considerations: The court observed that Rule 99 under the Income-tax Act expressly provides for a copy of the assessment order to be granted to the assessee, suggesting it would be odd to treat an assessee as being disallowed any copy of an assessment or related statement. The court also reasoned that the term "disclosure" in the second clause of Section 54 implies disclosure to a stranger rather than to the person who made the statement, and it would be meaningless to treat a statement as "confidential" for the very person who made it.
- Legislative policy pointer: The court referenced a proviso to Section 54 (regarding documents relating to procedures under Section 26-A, registration of partnerships) as indicating the legislature did not intend to preclude court access to information about precise relationships between partners.
- Conclusion of analysis: On these bases the court held Ex. LXIX admissible and found that it established the plaintiff's claim that his branch was entitled to a three-sixteenths share in Kottu No. 3.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that Ex. LXIX (the sworn statement by the first defendant recorded by the Income-tax Officer) is admissible in evidence and that it establishes the plaintiff's claim that the plaintiff's branch was entitled to a three-sixteenths share in Kottu No. 3.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The opinion resolves the dispute over Kottu No. 3 in favour of the plaintiff's branch by recognizing its entitlement to the stated share (three-sixteenths) and admitting the material evidence (Ex. LXIX) that supports that entitlement.
- On admissibility law: The court's reasoning clarifies that a certified copy of a statement recorded by an Income-tax Officer (a public document) can amount to admissible secondary evidence despite Section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, in circumstances where the copy has been validly obtained by an interested party and is before the court without the need to summon the public officer. The court distinguished prior decisions that had excluded certain certified copies where the originals were not public documents or where the facts involved court assistance to obtain the material.
- No sweeping rule beyond the case facts: The opinion grounds the admissibility conclusion on the particular nature of the document (a public document recorded by the Income-tax Officer), the fact that the copy was in the hands of an interested party, and textual and purposive readings of Section 54 and related rules; the court did not purport to lay down an unconditional rule covering all documents or scenarios beyond those considered.
This summary is confined strictly to the material contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal propositions beyond what the opinion itself states.
- This appeal arises out of a suit for the taking of the accounts of certain dissolved partnerships. The parties belong to the Vysia community and are members of one family though belonging to different branches which had become divided many years ago. Defendants 1, 2 and 3 are the eldest members in the group and they are the sons of one Chinna Venkanna. Defendants 4 to 23 are the descendants of defendants 1 to 3. Chinna Venkanna had two sons Appayya and Venkanna. The plaintiff and defendants 24 and 25 are the sons of Appayya. The 28th defendant is a grandson of Venkanna, the brother of Appayya. The 26th, 27th and 29th defendants are respectively the sons of defendants 24, 25 and 28. These families had admittedly been carrying on trade in Vizianagaram; for the purpose of the present suit, it is necessary to deal with three businesses which are referred to in the record as Kottu No. 1, Kottu No. 2 and Kottu No. 3. Kottus Nos. 1 and 3 seem to have been carried on in the market and Kottu No. 2 in the house. Kottus Nos. 2 and 3 were carried on in the name of the first defendant while Kottu No. 1 was carried on in the name of the 2nd defendant. It is admitted that in Kottu No. 1 defendants 1, 2 and 3 had an eight annas share as representing their family, defendants 24 and 25 had a four annas share as representing their joint family including the plaintiff, and defendant 28 had the remaining four annas share. It is also admitted that in Kottu No. 2, the family of defendants 1 to 3 had a twelve annas share, the family of defendants 24 and 25 had a three annas share and the 28th defendant had a one anna share. As regards Kottu No. 3, the plaintiff and defendants 24 and 25 contend that their branch was entitled to a three annas share in this also as in Kottu No. 2; but defendants 1 to 23 maintain that this Kottu was their exclusive concern and that the branch of the plaintiff and defendants 24 and 25 or the branch of defendant 28 had no interest in it.
* * * Proceeding now to the merits, we may first dispose of the case as regards Kottu No. 3. If it was the exclusive concern of defendants 1 to 3 as found by the learned subordinate judge, no further question will arise in respect of it in this suit. But if, as the plaintiff for himself and as representing the other members of his branch would be entitled to three sixteenth share in the assets of that concern on the taking of accounts; because it is the common case, as we have already pointed out, that the accounts of this Kottu were not taken into consideration at all at the time of Exs. IV and V. It is proved by the admission of D. W. 18 and by the entries found in several pages in Ex. A series, the account books of Kottu No. 3 that during a period of more than a year the 24th defendant had off and on written several pages in these accounts. The explanation given by D. W. 18 in respect of this circumstance is obviously absurd, namely, that the 24th defendant was there to train one of the witnesses sons in the business because the witness son referred to has long ago had his training in business. The evidence of D. Ws. 2 and 3, whose reliability we see no reason to doubt, proves that for quite a long time the 24th defendant had been working in Kottu No. 3 and the evidence of D. W. 2 is supported by the entries in the account book (Ex. 1) produced by him showing that moneys payable by the witness in respect of transactions between him and Kottu No. 3 has on many occasion been paid to the 24th defendant. No reason has been suggested why if the 24th defendant had no interest in this concern, he should have been taking so much active part in its conduct. But all doubt on the matter is set at rest by the admission made in Ex. LXIX by the first defendant in whose name this business stood. It is a statement on oath made by him before the Income-tax Officer in October 1926. It deals with the various concerns in which the parties were interested and the accuracy of the statements there made in respect of Kottu No. 1 and Kottu No. 2 has not been disputed. Dealing with Kottu No. 3 he said that it was a branch of the house (inti) shop, i.e. No. 2. He added
"the shares of the partners are the same as those of the main shop, i.e., the house shop (Kottu No. 2)."In a previous paragraph he had stated who the partners in Kottu No. 2 were and what their respective shares were. If this statement is admissible in evidence, there can be no doubt that it clearly proves the truth of the plaintiffs case.
It was contended on behalf of the contesting defendants that the statement Ex. 69 was not admissible in evidence, and this contention was accepted by the lower Court. We are unable to accede to this contention. The objection is based on Section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922. There can be no doubt that this contention. The objection based on Section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922. There can be no doubt that this provision is stricter and wider in scope than the corresponding provision in the Act of 1886 and decisions like those in Jalobratam Dey v. Bulloram Dey and Venkatachella Chettiar v. Sampathu Chettiar may not be good under this section. But the question for decision in the present case is not whether the court can compel any public servant to produce before it any document of the kind mentioned in Section 54, but whether the court is precluded from admitting in evidence a certified copy which has been given to one of the partners by the Income-tax authorities, even when such a statement is otherwise relevant under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Clause (1) of Section 54 first declares that all particulars contained in certain documents "shall be treated as confidential" and it then proceeds to direct that no court shall insist on their production by a public officer. Clause (ii) enacts a penalty in respect of the disclosure of such particulars by any public servant. It has been maintained before us that the declaration in the earlier part of Clause (i) has a wider effect than the direction in the latter part of the clause and prevents the admissibility of the copy in evidence even though it is available before the court without any summons to a public officer. Reliance has been placed in this connection upon two decisions of the Rangoon High Court reported in Anwar Ali v. Tafozal Ahmad and Ma Hla Mra Khine v. Ma Hla Kra Pru. The actual decision in the latter case has little bearing on the question now before us, because the aid of the court was there sought to obtain the information; only, instead of asking the court to send a summons to the income-tax authorities the defendant attempted to circumvent the prohibition in Section 54 by requesting the court to compel the plaintiff to obtain and produce certified copies of the return made by the plaintiff and of a statement made by the plaintiffs agent before the Income-tax Officer.
In 2 Rang. 391, certified copy of an income-tax return made by the plaintiff had been obtained by the defendant and was produced by him, the learned judge held it to be inadmissible, on the ground that the Evidence Act did not make admissible copies which have been unlawfully issued and certified. We do not wish to be understood as accepting the reasoning in this judgment; it is unnecessary for the purpose of this case to express a definite opinion on the point then before the learned judge. That case had to be dealt with under Clause (f) of Section 65 of the Evidence Act, which is restricted to cases in which the original is a document of which certified copy is permitted by that Act or by any other law to be given in evidence; because, the copy there produced was of an income-tax return which cannot itself be said to be a "public" document (Devidutt v. Shriram). In the case before us the original was itself a public document because it was a statement recorded by the Income-tax Officer; we have only got to see whether what is produced before us is secondary evidence. A certified copy is certainly secondary evidence of a public document. Section 76 of the Evidence Act to which reference has been made in 2 Rang. 391 and in Devidutt v. Shriram is, in our opinion, only an enabling section as regards the issue of certified copies. We are not, as at present advised, prepared to read it as an exhaustive provision much less as a provision declaring the grant of copies illegal in any particular case. In Devidutt v. Shriram the learned judges were apparently inclined to think that Section 54 of the Income-tax Act did not preclude proper secondary evidence being given of the contents of documents of the kind referred to in that section, but they held that the certified copies were not admissible. Assuming that this view could be maintained as regards copies of the return, we are with all respect, unable to agree that a certified copy even of the order of assessment granted to the assessee, will be inadmissible. In holding that even the assessee is not entitled to obtain the certified copy of the assessment, the learned judge seems to have lost sight of the fact that in the rules made under the Income-tax Act, there is an express proviso for a copy of the order being granted to the assessee (See R. 99). There is, however, no express provision either enabling or prohibiting the grant of copies of sworn statements even to the assessee.
In the present case, Ex. LXIX appears to have been obtained by one of the assessee because assessment was imposed upon all the members of the firm, though the statement was made by only one of them, namely, the first defendant. Even assuming that the strict view taken in 2 Rang. 391 is correct, it is difficult to see anything illegal in the grant of copies of such documents to the assessee himself. The use of the word disclosure in the second clause of Section 54 of the Income-tax Act implies that the disclosure must be to a stranger and not to the party who made the statement. Where one partner makes a statement on behalf of the partnership, we do not think it reasonable to hold that the grant of copies of that statement to other members of the partnership is illegal. It is not clear whether the declaration of the confidential character of such statements under Section 54 was intended to have a wider scope than the enactment in the latter part of the provision. But even so, it will be meaningless to talk of a statement as confidential in respect of the very person who made the statement. If one is to have regard to the general policy of the legislature in matters of this kind, we may point out that in the penultimate proviso to Section 54 of Income-tax Act an exemption has been made in respect of documents etc., relating to a procedure under Section 26-A of the Act. That section relates to proceedings taken for the registration of partnerships for the purpose of the Act and the proviso to Section 54 distinctly contemplates that an Income-tax Officer may even be compelled to produce documents which will show the precise relationship between partners. Though Ex. LXIX was not made in proceedings under Section 26-A of the Act, the above provision is some indication that it was not the policy of the legislature to preclude from the cognisance of the court information of the kind now sought to be obtained from Ex. LXIX. We accordingly hold that Ex. LXIX is admissible in evidence and that it establishes the truth of the plaintiffs claim that the plaintiffs branch was entitled to the three-sixteenths share in Kottu No. 3.
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