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Ram Racha Dube v. Gokul Rai
Judgment Summary — Second Appeal in Suit for Ejectment
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a second appeal by the defendants of the second party (appellants) in a suit for ejectment. Three sets of parties were involved: the plaintiff Gokul Rai; the defendants of the first party (including Gaya Singh and others), and the defendants of the second party (including Ram Racha Dube and others), who are the appellants before the Court.
The core facts as stated in the opinion:
- The defendants of the first party had mortgaged their zamindari rights in a four‑annas fractional share of the village Mahrauli to the plaintiff by a mortgage by conditional sale.
- Some specified plots of sir land alleged to appertain to that fractional share were subsequently mortgaged (with possession) to the defendants of the second party.
- The plaintiff sued on the mortgage, obtained a foreclosure decree and was put into possession on 4 July 1904, but was prevented from obtaining the benefit of his decree in respect of the sir lands by both sets of defendants.
- The plaintiff then sued the defendants of the first party for determination of rent, accepted a compromise decree determining rent (year 1905), obtained a decree for arrears on 21 September 1906, and ejected the defendants of the first party under the Agra Tenancy Act, obtaining possession on 10 February 1907.
- Despite these steps, the plaintiff was unable to secure peaceful enjoyment of rents from the sir lands and was compelled to bring a civil suit to eject both sets of defendants, who disputed his right to possession.
The trial Court and appellate process addressed (a) the conduct and pleas of the defendants of the first party (including invocation of Section 202 of the Agra Tenancy Act), (b) the legal position of the defendants of the second party who held possession as mortgagees over specified plots, and (c) the effect, if any, of a prior consent decree in unrelated litigation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the tenant rights of the defendants of the first party were terminated by lawful ejectment and whether any continued interference with the plaintiff's possession amounted to trespass.
- Whether the defendants of the second party (appellants), holding possession as mortgagees of certain plots, retained enforceable mortgagee possession rights after the plaintiff's foreclosure decree and after the ejectment of the ex‑proprietary tenants.
- Whether invocation of Section 202 of the Agra Tenancy Act by the defendants of the first party required the civil Court to stay or defer action (and whether the defendants' conduct in relying on Section 202 was legitimate or an artifice for delay).
- Whether a prior consent decree (dated 10 September 1908) in other litigation operates as res judicata or otherwise binds the plaintiff so as to protect the appellants' mortgage possession over the contested plots.
- Whether the authority of Sham Das v. Batul Bibi supports the appellants' contention that mortgagee rights enure in respect of ex‑proprietary tenancy post‑foreclosure, and whether that authority remains applicable after the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants (Defendants of the Second Party)
- The appellants contended that while the foreclosure extinguished any proprietary interest they might once have had, their mortgagee rights survived and enured in respect of the ex‑proprietary tenancy created by statute in favour of the defendants of the first party, from the date of the foreclosure decree. They relied on the decision in Sham Das v. Batul Bibi for this proposition.
- They further contended that their rights could not be affected by the decree for arrears of rent or the subsequent ejectment of the defendants of the first party because the appellants were not parties to those proceedings.
- They pleaded that a consent decree dated 10 September 1908 in earlier litigation operated as res judicata in their favour (or, alternatively, that the compromise embodied in that decree amounted to an agreement binding the plaintiff to leave them in possession until their mortgage debt was repaid).
Defendants of the First Party (as described in the opinion)
- The first‑party defendants pleaded that they were still in possession of the land, or of part of it, as tenants holding from the plaintiff, and invoked Section 202 of the Agra Tenancy Act to claim procedural protection (i.e., that the matter should be dealt with in the revenue Court).
- The opinion records that their written statement was obscure and that they had filed a revenue suit within the three‑month period under Section 202 but permitted it to be dismissed for default and subsequently instituted a fresh suit after the three‑month period had expired.
Plaintiff (as reflected by the pleadings and proceedings)
- The plaintiff enforced his mortgage rights by foreclosure, obtained possession, pursued rent determination and arrears proceedings against the ex‑proprietary tenants (defendants of the first party), obtained ejectment under the Agra Tenancy Act, and then instituted the present civil suit to secure possession and rents against both sets of defendants.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sham Das v. Batul Bibi | Authority for the proposition that mortgagee rights may enure in respect of an ex‑proprietary tenancy (i.e., that a mortgagee could claim possession related to the tenancy after foreclosure). | The Court considered the decision but questioned its present applicability in view of changes in the law effected by the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901 (and by implication the distinction from the old Rent Act of 1881). Even treating the authority as applicable, the Court held that, on the facts, any mortgagee possession rights the appellants might have had were extinguished by the ejectment of the ex‑proprietary tenants; accordingly the precedent did not help the appellants in the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeds in distinct strands addressing the first‑party defendants and the appellants (second‑party defendants), and then addressing the submission based on the prior consent decree.
1. On the conduct and rights of the defendants of the first party:
- The Court found that the written statement of the defendants of the first party was obscure and possibly deliberately evasive. Their invocation of Section 202 of the Agra Tenancy Act (Local Act 2 of 1901) appeared to be used as an artifice of delay and vexation.
- The Court noted that Section 202's provisions are mandatory and that civil Courts should be on guard against such artifice. While the Subordinate Judge could not prevent the defendants from pleading they held as tenants, he could have required that the plea be specific and, if found to be wilfully false, dealt with accordingly.
- The first‑party defendants had filed a revenue suit within the three‑month period prescribed by Section 202 but permitted it to be dismissed for default and later instituted a fresh suit after the period had expired; the Court treated this conduct as deliberate and vexatious.
- On this basis, the Court held that the lower courts properly concluded that the ex‑proprietary tenant rights of the first‑party defendants were terminated by lawful ejectment and that any present interference with the plaintiff's possession by them constituted trespass without title.
2. On the appellants (defendants of the second party) and their mortgagee rights:
- The appellants had been impleaded in the foreclosure suit and thereby obtained the opportunity to redeem the mortgage; they did not redeem.
- The appellants argued that foreclosure only extinguished proprietary rights and that their mortgagee possession rights continued vis‑à‑vis the ex‑proprietary tenancy created in favour of the first‑party defendants, relying on Sham Das v. Batul Bibi.
- The Court scrutinized that authority and observed that a significant factor in it had been the treatment under the older Rent Act of 1881, which permitted occupancy tenants to transfer possession by usufructuary mortgage. The Court doubted whether Sham Das remained reliable after the Agra Tenancy Act of 1901 altered the legal position.
- Even assuming arguendo that the appellants had some right to possess certain plots as mortgagees prior to the ejectment, the Court held that those rights were extinguished by the lawful ejectment of the ex‑proprietary tenants: after the ejectment there was no ex‑proprietary holding over which the appellants could exercise mortgage possession.
- The Court further observed that the appellants had not been and could not have become tenants of the plaintiff; they had not pleaded any landlord‑tenant relationship with the plaintiff. At best their possession was comparable to that of a sub‑tenant against the ex‑proprietary tenants and that form of possession was extinguished when the plaintiff obtained possession after ejecting the first‑party defendants for non‑payment of rent.
3. On the plea of res judicata / effect of the prior consent decree (10 September 1908):
- The appellants relied on a consent decree and underlying compromise in earlier litigation involving Behari Rai (son of Gokul Rai) to argue that their right to remain in mortgage possession was res judicata or bound the plaintiff.
- The Court examined the earlier record and found that Behari Rai had mortgagee rights in respect of a different fractional share in the same mahal and that the earlier litigation and its compromise addressed sir lands appertaining to that different fractional share.
- There was no evidence that Gokul Rai (the present plaintiff) was litigating under Behari Rai's title in the former suit; Gokul Rai's present claims derived from a different mortgage over a different fractional share, obtained by foreclosure five years earlier.
- Accordingly the Court held that the earlier consent decree did not operate as res judicata in the present suit, nor did the compromise bind Gokul Rai with respect to sir lands appertaining to the different fractional share. There was no basis on the record to conclude that Behari Rai had any power or claim to bind his father by an agreement regarding sir lands belonging to a different share.
Bringing these strands together, the Court concluded that none of the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants furnished a defence to their dispossession: the rights they asserted were either extinguished by the lawful ejectment of the ex‑proprietary tenants or were not established on the pleadings and record.
Holding and Implications
Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.
Direct consequences and immediate effects on the parties:
- The appeal by the defendants of the second party is dismissed with costs, including fees on the higher scale (as expressly ordered by the Court).
- The Court upheld the determination that the defendants of the first party had ceased to be ex‑proprietary tenants by lawful ejectment and that any interference by them with the plaintiff's possession is trespass without title.
- The Court held that the appellants (defendants of the second party) did not retain enforceable mortgagee possession over the specified plots after the plaintiff's foreclosure and the subsequent ejectment of the ex‑proprietary tenants; their asserted rights were extinguished on the facts before the Court.
Broader implications: The opinion questions the continued applicability of Sham Das v. Batul Bibi in light of legislative change effected by the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, but the judgment is decided on the facts of this litigation. The opinion does not purport to establish a new, general rule beyond the conclusions reached on the facts; therefore, no broader precedent‑creating holding is articulated beyond the case outcome.
Disposition: Appeal dismissed.
1. This is a second appeal by certain defendants in a suit for ejectment. There were three parties to the litigation, namely, the plaintiff Gokul Rai, Gaya Singh and others, described as the defendants of the first party, and Ram Racha Dube and others, described as defendants of the second party. It is these last who are the appellants now before this Court. The defendants of the first party mortgaged their zamindari rights in a certain four annas share in village Mahrauli to the plaintiff under a contract of mortgage by conditional sale. They subsequently mortgaged certain specified plots of sir land alleged to appertain to the share in question, with possession to the defendants of the second party. The plaintiff sued on the mortgage and obtained a foreclosure decree under which he was put into possession on 4th July 1904. He has nevertheless been successfully prevented by the defendants between them from getting the benefit of his decree so far as the sir lands are concerned up to the present time. He seems to have availed himself from the first of the proper legal remedies open to him. He sued the defendants of the first party, who had become his ex-proprietary tenants in respect of these sir lands, for determination rent and finally accepted a compromise decree determining the rent with retrospective effect at a certain sum in the year 1905. The rent was not paid, and on 21st September 1906 the plaintiff obtained a decree for arrears of rent. This decree was not satisfied and the plaintiff proceeded to eject the defendants of the first party from their tenancy under the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act. He obtained possession under that Act, on 10th February 1907. He has nevertheless failed the obtain peaceable enjoyment of the rents derivable from these sir lands and has been compelled to bring this suit in a civil Court to turn out the two sets of defendants, who continue persistently to dispute his right to possession over these lands. The defence set up by the defendants of the first party was obviously not conducted in good faith. Their written statement is extremely involved and obscure, and it may be that they have just avoided committing themselves to any express statement for verifying which they could be prosecuted before a criminal Court. They, however, did plead that they were still in possession of the land in suit, or at any rate of some part of the same, as tenants holding from the plaintiff, and on the strength of this plea they claimed the benefit of Section 202 of the Agra Tenancy Act (Local Act 2 of 1901). The provisions of that section are mandatory and I feel constrained Co. remark that civil Courts should be on their guard against the artifice which has obviously been employed in the present case by the defendants seeking to obtain the benefit of the section for purposes of mere vexation and delay. It is quite true that the learned Subordinate Judge could not prevent the defendants of the first party from pleading that they held these lands as tenants of the plaintiffs, but he could, by a proper exercise of his powers, have taken care that this plea was not entered in vague and general terms, but was put forward clearly and specifically in answer to the plaintiffs' plea that the tenant rights of these defendants had been terminated by their ejectment according to law. It may be that if these defendants had been properly questioned by the Court they would have shrunk from committing themselves to denial of this, and at any rate they could have been properly dealt with when it was found that their denial was a wilful falsehood. However, having been permitted in this unsatisfactory manner to claim the benefit of Section 202 of the Tenancy Act, the defendants first party duly filed a suit in the revenue Court within the prescribed period of three months, and then permitted it to be dismissed for default. Their conduct seems to have been a deliberate one, for it is clear that they made no attempt to obtain a rehearing of the order of dismissal by satisfying the Court that they had been prevented from prosecuting the suit by any sufficient cause. What they did was to institute, after the period of three months referred to in S. 202 aforesaid had expired, a fresh suit in the revenue Court for the same relief. One of the pleas in the memorandum of appeal now before me is that the civil Court was bound to wait for the result of this second suit. I am of opinion that there is no force whatever in his plea, and that the Court of first instance acted very properly in not permitting the defendants of the first party to continue indefinitely the game of obstruction and delay which they were obviously playing. Therefore, it has been properly decided, as against these defendants of the first party, that their rights as ex-proprietary tenants have been terminated by ejectment and that if they are interfering at present with the plaintiffs' possession in respect of any portion of the land in suit they are doing so as trespassers without a shadow of title.
2. The position of the defendants of the second party requires to be separately considered. They were impleaded as persons interested in a portion of the mortgaged property by the plaintiff in his suit for foreclosure. They thus obtained the only thing to which they had any right in law, viz. an opportunity of redeeming the mortgage in favour of the plaintiffs; of this they failed to avail themselves. The contention on their behalf however is that the result of the foreclosure suit was merely to extinguish any interests they might have previously possessed in the proprietary rights over the plots of land mortgaged to them but that their mortgagee rights enured in respect of the ex-proprietary tenancy created by statute in favour of the defendants of the first party from the date of the foreclosure decree. For this proposition of law the authority quoted is the case of Sham Das v. Batul Bibi (1).
3. A consideration of this ruling shows that one important factor in the decisions arrived at by the learned Judges who decided that case was the view taken by this Court that there was nothing in the provisions of the old Rent Act, of 1881 to prevent an occupancy tenant from transferring possession over his holding by way of usufructuary mortgage. It may be doubted therefore whether this case is any longer to be relied on since the alteration in the law affected by the passing of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1901. Even apart from this the defendants-appellants have in my opinion no case. Supposing that they were entitled to possession as mortgagees over some of the plots composing the ex-proprietary holding from which the defendants of the first party were ejected in 1907 it seems dear to me that even in this case whatever rights they possessed were extinguished by the ejectment. There ceased to be from the date of the ejectment any ex-proprietary holding over which these appellants could exercise their alleged right of mortgage possession. They should have protected themselves by seeing that the rent of the holding was duly and punctually paid.
4. The plea taken on their behalf is that their rights cannot be affected by the decree for arrears of rent against the defendants of the first party of the subsequent ejectment proceedings, because they were not made parties to those proceedings. Now it is clear that on no possible view of the case did these appellants become tenants of any of the plots of the land in suit on behalf of the plaintiffs; this was conceded in argument before me and as a matter of fact they never pleaded throughout the present suit that there existed any relationship of landlord and tenant as between them and the plaintiffs. The latter therefore could only take proceedings for the determination of rent and for subsequent realization of the same against the defendants of the first party who had become his ex-proprietary tenants by operation of law. The possession of the defendants of the second party was certainly no better in law than that of a sub-tenant of the holding that is to say they may have had as against the defendants of the first party a right to possession over some of the plots of land in suit so long as the tenancy of the defendants of the first party continued. This right was extinguished when the plaintiff obtained possession after ejecting the defendants of the first party for non-payment of rent.
5. There remains however one other point to be considered on behalf of these appellants. They have pleaded in this as in the lower appellate Court that a certain consent decree dated 10th September 1908 arrived at in the course of a certain other litigation operates as res judicata in the present case with regard to the right of these appellants to remain in mortgage possession over the plots of land in suit claimed by them. I find on examining the record previous litigation that Behari Rai son of Gokul Rai who is the plaintiff in the present case had acquired? mortgagee rights in respect of another fractional share in the same mahal. In seeking to enforce these rights Behari Rai became involved in litigation in the course of which a question was raised as to his right of possession over the sir lands appertaining to the mahak as a whole. To that litigation the present defendants-appellants were parties. It resulted in a compromise decree affirming the right of the present appellants to possession over certain specified plots of land. Now the plea of res judicata in the form in which it is put forward is clearly not sustainable. The evidence on the record would not justify a finding that Gokul Bar the plaintiff in the present suit is claiming under Behari Rai the plaintiff; in the former suit above referred to. It is moreover quite clear that Gokul? Rai is not in the present case litigating under the same title as was Behari Rai in the former suit. Whatever rights Gokul Rai is seeking to enforce in the-present case are derived from a different mortgage over a different fractional share in the mahal to that on the strength of which Behari Rai was litigating in the former suit. I have however considered this plea from a slightly different point of view from which it was pressed upon me in argument. The suggestion is that apart from any question of res judicata the compromise on which the consent decree of 10th September 1903 was based has the effect of an agreement binding upon Gokul Rai to leave these defendants in possession of the plots of land in suit until their mortgage-debt is repaid. I thought it right to give my best consideration to this plea because it involves the only substantial defence on the merits which these defendants-appellants have been able to put forward. It seems to me however that the effect of the compromise and the consent; decree of 1908 was not what the appellants contend. The present claim relates to certain plots of sir land all of which are specified as being fractional shares of larger plots and all of which have been expressly admitted on the pleadings is this suit to appertain to that fractional share in the mahal which was mortgaged by the defendants of the first party to the present plaintiff. The question raised in the suit decided by the consent decree of 1908 was as to the sir lands which should be presumed to appertain to another fractional share in the same mahal and in my opinion the agreement come to between the parties in that litigation of 1908 did not refer and was not intended to refer to sir lands not appertaining to the share in respect of which Behari Rai was enforcing his rights in that former suit. There is nothing whatever on the present record to show that Behari Rai either had or claimed to have any right to bind his father by any agreement covering the sir lands appertaining to a different share in the mahal a share in respect of which Gokul Rai had become full proprietor under a foreclosure decree obtained five years previously. For this reason I hold that there is no force in any of the contentions put forward in support of this appeal. I hereby dismiss it with costs including fees on the higher scale.
V.B/R.K
6. Appeal dismissed.
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