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Raghunandan Prasad v. Mahabir Mahton, And Another
Summary of the Opinion — Dawson-Miller, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal brought on behalf of Baghunandan Prasad, Defendant No. 2 in the suit, from a decision of the Additional District Judge of Patna affirming a decree of the Munsif. The underlying suit was instituted in May 1920 by Mahabir Mahton and his son to set aside a deed of sale executed by Bishun Mahton's widow, Sakli Kuer, in favour of the appellant Raghunandan. The land transferred comprised about 17 bighas which the widow claimed to have inherited from her husband Bishun Mahton (the plaintiff's brother). The plaintiffs contended that the plaintiff and Bishun were joint in estate and remained joint up to Bishun's death in 1918. Both the trial Court and the lower appellate Court found that the brothers were joint and that the widow had no interest to transfer. From that decision a second appeal was preferred to this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the two brothers (the plaintiff and Bishun Mahton) were joint in estate at the date of Bishun's death in 1918.
- Whether the trial Court erred in refusing to admit/or procure the original Chaukidari Register (or evidence from the Collector) which the defendants sought to place before the Court shortly before final hearing, such that the case should be remanded for further hearing.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant placed strong emphasis on paragraph 4 of the plaint, which he contended amounted to an admission by the plaintiffs that there had been a separation between the brothers, because the plaint alleged that the entire kasht land was divided by the panchayat under an ekrarnama dated 17th Pus 1321 (even though "the said deed never came into force").
- The defendants also argued that certain evidence (a certified copy of an entry in the Chaukidari Register and a late request to obtain the original register from the Collector) was improperly shut out by the trial Court and that the omission prejudiced them, warranting a remand so the excluded evidence could be taken and the questions reconsidered.
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The plaintiffs' case, as accepted by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court, was that the panchayat's decision merely addressed the correctness of the entry in the Survey Khatian and did not effect an actual partition; it did not express any clear and unequivocal intention by either brother to separate and hold shares separately.
- Documentary and other evidence was produced to show that the brothers remained joint up to Bishun's death and that after his death the plaintiffs paid the relevant taxes (Chaukidari), performed obligations, and otherwise dealt with the property, indicating continuous jointness and ownership conduct by the plaintiffs rather than the widow.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenkatachala Moniagar | Authority for the proposition that the mere ascertainment of shares or the institution (and even withdrawal) of a partition suit is not necessarily conclusive evidence of an effective partition; a clear and unequivocal expression of intention to separate is required. | The Court relied on this authority to support the view that the panchayat's action and the plaint's wording did not automatically establish a partition; the Court required proof of an express intention to partition, which it found lacking on the facts presented. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court characterized the central dispute—whether the brothers were joint at Bishun's death—as essentially a question of fact. Both the trial Court (the Munsif) and the lower appellate Court had examined the evidence and drawn inferences, concluding that the brothers remained joint and that the widow had no transferrable interest. The present Court found no error of law in those factual findings and regarded them as binding in the second appeal.
On the contention derived from paragraph 4 of the plaint (which refers to an ekrarnama and a panchayat division that "never came into force"), the Court noted that although the paragraph might at first sight suggest separation, it is expressly qualified by the statement that the deed never took effect. The Courts below accepted evidence from the plaintiffs that the panchayat merely dealt with the correctness of the Survey Khatian entry and did not record any express intention by either brother to partition and hold separate shares. The Court emphasized the legal principle (supported by Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenkatachala Moniagar) that ascertainment of shares or mere steps short of a clear and unequivocal expression of intention to separate do not amount to an effective partition.
On the exclusion of the Chaukidari Register evidence, the Court described the procedural facts: defendants had filed a certified copy on 13 July 1921 and, on 3 August 1921 (the day before final hearing), applied for the trial Court to send for the original register from the Collector (or have it produced). The Munsif refused, saying it was too late and would not adjourn. The Court observed that Order 16, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code permits summonses for production of documents, and that the application for sending a peon to the Collector was effectively an application of the same character and could have been complied with even at a late stage. The Court acknowledged there was "some force" in the contention that the trial Court should have granted the application.
Despite that acknowledgment, the Court declined to remand. It examined the copy of the Chaukidari Register already on the record and the other documentary evidence: the copy indicated that shortly before Bishun's death both brothers were entered separately in respect of Chaukidari tax for different portions, but subsequent Chaukidari receipts, produced by the plaintiffs, showed that after Bishun's death the plaintiffs paid the entire Chaukidari tax and not the widow. The Court found a substantial mass of documentary and other evidence supporting the plaintiffs' position that the brothers were joint and that the plaintiffs thereafter exercised acts of ownership. The Court held that this case fell squarely within the provisions of Section 167 of the Indian Evidence Act (as quoted in the opinion) and concluded that even if the original register had been obtained and admitted, it would not have made the slightest difference to the decisions of the trial Court or the District Judge on appeal.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal was dismissed with costs. The Court, in adopting the reasoning above, effectively affirmed the findings of the trial Court and the Additional District Judge that the two brothers were joint in estate at the date of Bishun's death and that the widow had no interest in the property that could be validly transferred to the appellant.
Implications:
- The decree of the Munsif, as affirmed by the Additional District Judge of Patna, stands and the appeal does not succeed.
- The practical consequence for the parties is that the attempted transfer by the widow in favour of the appellant did not give the appellant a valid interest because the widow had no inheritable interest in the property at the time of Bishun's death (as found by the lower Courts and affirmed).
- The Court did not set or announce any new legal precedent; it applied existing principles (including the principle in Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenkatachala Moniagar and provisions of Section 167 of the Indian Evidence Act) to the facts and concluded that excluded late evidence would not have altered the outcome.
Dawson-Miller, C.J:— This is an appeal on behalf of Baghunandan Prasad, the Defendant No. 2 in the suit, from a decision of the Additional District Judge of Patna affirming a decree of the Munsif. The suit was instituted in May 1920, by Mahabir Mahton and his son, to set aside a deed of sale executed by his deceased brother's widow, Sakli Kuer, in favour of the appellant Raghunandan. The property which was transferred by the widow to Raghunandan consisted of about 17 bighas of land which she claimed to have inherited from her husband Bishun Mahton, the brother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that he and his brother Bishun were joint in estate and remained joint up to the time of the hitter's death in the year 1918.
2. Both the trial Court and the lower appellate Court have found that the two brothers were joint and that the widow of Bishun had no interest in the property which who could transfer to, the appellant Raghunandan. Prom that decision the appellant has preferred a second appeal to this Court. The, only question for determination in this appeal is whether the two brothers, were or were not joint in estate at the date of Bishun's death in 1918.
3. The question is essentially one of fact. Both the Courts below have considered the evidence in the case and have drawn inferences from that evidence and both have arrived at the conclusion that the brothers were joint and, in my opinion, they have not committed any error of law in arriving at that conclusion and their findings are binding upon this Court in second appeal.
4. The appellant, however, has laid great stress upon the fact that in para. 4 of the plaint there is an allegation which he contends amounts to an admission of a separation of the two brothers. It appears that in the year 1911 a Record of Bights was finally published in which the property owned by the two brothers was entered in the Survey Khatian showing about 22 bighas held by Bishun Mahton and about 10 or 11 bighas held by the plaintiff Mahabir, In 1914 some question arose as to the correctness of the entry in the Record of Bights. Apparently one, if not both of the brothers were contending that the entry did not show that the property was held! by them separately in the proportions which would appear from the Record of Bights. It is not very clear whether at that time the deceased brother Bishun acquiesced in the position taken up by the; plaintiff, but however that may be, the matter was referred to a panchayat and the result of their decision is stated in para. 4 of the plaint; in these terms:
Thereafter, owing to the bad tamper of defendant No. 1, a dispute arose between plaintiff No. 1 and the said Bishun Chand Mahtan deceased and the entire kasht land was divided by the panchayat between Plaintiff No. 1 and the Said Bishun Chand Mahton under an ekrarnama dated the 17th Pus 1321. But the said deed never came into fores. Although the above measures were adopted, yet only Defendant No. 1 (that is the wife of Bishun Chand Mahton) continued to have a separate mess of her own, whereas plaintiffs and Bishun Chand Mahton Plaintiff No. 1's full brother continued to live jointly and on friendly terms all along.
5. It is contended that the allegations, there made are an admission by the plaintiffs of a separation, that the matter was referred to the panchayat and the panchayat gave a decision on the question, and that the parties having expressed an intention to have the property divided, that intention was finally carried out by the decision of the panchayat. A great deal of evidence was given at the trial, and it appears from the decision of the learned Munsif that it was the plaintiffs' case that what the panchas really settled was that the entry in the Survey Khatian was wrong and that it would not affect the right of either brother in the joint family property and that they merely declared that the shares of each brother had been ascertained, each being entitled, if he should wish to separate, to a moiety. It can hardly be contended that the mere fact that the shares which co-parceners would be entitled to in the event of partition had been ascertained necessarily amounts to a partition of the property. It does not necessarily amount to any intention to separate. In order to effect a partition although it is not necessary that the property should actually be divided by metes and bounds still it is necessary that there should be a clear and unequivocal expression of intention on the part of one or more of the co-parceners to separate from the rest of the joint family and to hold his or their share or shares separately. Even the fact that a suit has: been brought for a partition, if the suit is subsequently withdrawn is not in itself conclusive evidence that there ever was in effective partition by the party who instituted the suit. This would appear from the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenkatachala Moniagar(1) affirming the decision of the Madras High Court.
6. It seems to me that in each of the cases the question is purely one of fact and of the proper inferences to be drawn from the facts proved in the case, and although para. 4 of the plaint is worded in such a way that it might perhaps at first sight appear to indicate a state of separation still it is qualified by the succeeding words, which show that the deed never came into force, and it is further qualified by the evidence given at the trials which was to the effect that what the panchas really had to deal with was the question whether the Record of Bights recorded the position of the two brothers with regard to the property which belonged to them. The panchas merely decided if the evidence of the plaintiffs is accepted, and it was accepted by both the trial Court and the lower appellate Court, that there never really was any express intention to partition the property between them, but merely that the brothers really were joint and being only two of them they were each entitled on partition, if that event should in the future take place, to a moiety of the property. It seems to me that the lower Courts were perfectly entitled to take into consideration not merely the statement in the plaint, which might be of ambiguous import but also the evidence given by the parties in the case, and the lower appellate Court was the ultimata tribunal for deciding the facts. In these circumstances it seems to me that this appeal on that part of the case must fail.
7. The only other question which was raised was that certain evidence was improperly shut out by the trial Court, and we are asked on that account to remand the case in order that the evidence shut out should be taken and the whole of the questions considered again in the light of that evidence. What happened was that the defendants obtained a certified copy of an entry in the Chaukidari Register of the village in which this property is situated. That was filed on the 13th July, 1921. This document, however, the Court was apparently never asked to admit in evidence. On the 3rd August, 1921, the day before the case had been fixed for final hearing, the defendants applied to the Court to call for the original Chaukidari Register containing the entry, a copy of which had already been filed. They apparently asked that a messenger should be sent to the Collector to ask him to produce the book or send it to Court for the purpose of having it placed on the record. The Munsif said that it was too late to make an application of that sort then, and that he was not going to adjourn the trial for any such purpose. I should point out, however, that it would not have been necessary to adjourn the trial, because the defendants merely asked that a messenger should be sent at their own risk, and if the register was not produced in time, then, of course, it could not be put in evidence. The Court, however, refused the application and it is contended that thereby valuable evidence was shut out which the Court ought to have admitted. I think that there is some force in this contention as to the duty of the Court to have granted the application. By O. 16, R. 1 of the CPC, it is provided that
At any time after the suit is instituted, the parties may obtain, on application to the Court or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf, summonses to persons whose attendance is required either to give evidence or to produce documents.
8. It is true that the Court was not asked for a summons upon any person to produce a document in Court, but the Court was asked to do something very like it, that is, send a Court peon with an order to the Collector either to send his servant with the book, or to deliver it over to the Court peon, and I see no reason why even at a late stage the application should not have been complied with. But even assuming that we should be of opinion that the trial Court failed in its duty in granting the application, still it seems to me that is no reason in the present case why we should remand the case for a further hearing. We have seen, the copy which was filed with the record in this case and all that appears from that copy is that at one time shortly before Bishun Mahton's death in 1918, both parties, that is to say, Bishun Mahton an the plaintiffs, were entered in the Chaukidari Register in respect to a separate Chaukidari tax, one of them in respect of one portion of the property and the other, in respect of the other. But the later Chaukidari receipts, which have been put in evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs, show that after Bishun's death the whole of the Chaukidari tax was paid by the plaintiffs Mid not by the widow who claims to have succeeded to Bishun's portion of the property after his death. There was a great deal of evidence, documentary and otherwise produced on behalf of the plaintiffs to show that these two brothers were joint right up to the date of Bishun's death and that the plaintiffs dealt with the property afterwards, that is to say, they paid taxes and carried out the duties that one would expect an owner to do. In these circumstances, therefore, it seems to me that it is a case clearly falling within the provisions of Section 167 of the Indian Evidence Act. (Here the section was quoted.) Having regard to the mass of evidence there was on the side of the plaintiffs, I cannot find that the admission of this Chaukidari Register, assuming it to show what appears in the copy, would have made the slightest difference to the decision other of the trial Court or of the District Judge on appeal.
9. For these reasons I think that this appeal must be dismissed with costs.
10. Foster, J.:— I agree.
11. Appeal dismissed.
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