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Kissen Gopal Ganwariwala v. Madan Lal

Patna High Court
Mar 15, 1937
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Case Summary — Appeal from order dismissing objections in execution (Dhavle, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit resulted in a decree on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court against Kishun Gopal and Rameshwar Lal personally and against two minors, Sitaram and Gigla, in respect of their shares in the joint family estate. The decree ordered payment of over Rs. 19,000 (precisely Rs. 19,767-7-3) with interest and costs; the minor Sitaram alone was made liable for a difference in costs arising from defended versus undefended suit treatment.

Execution was initiated in the Subordinate Judge's Court at Purulia in October 1934. The judgment-debtors repeatedly filed objections under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure; one such objection was disallowed in April following its filing. While objections remained pending, the parties filed a compromise on 29 April 1935 under which the judgment-debtors undertook to pay Rs. 5,500 within two months in full satisfaction of the decree, and the decree-holder was permitted to proceed with execution if the sum was not paid within that period. The compromise also included a clause by which the judgment-debtors undertook not to raise certain objections in the future.

The Subordinate Judge stayed execution until 29 June 1935. After the two-month period expired without payment, the decree-holder moved on 4 July 1935 for sale proclamations and continued the execution process. Several further objections were filed by the judgment-debtors (including objections as to valuation, the effect of Gigla's alleged death before decree, and whether the decree bound individuals as opposed to a firm). The Subordinate Judge heard objections and allowed the sale to proceed, finding the objections untenable. The present appeal challenges the order dismissing those objections in the execution proceeding.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under the compromise of 29 April 1935, the decree-holder was precluded from proceeding with execution once the two-month period expired without payment of Rs. 5,500.
  2. Whether time was of the essence of the compromise and, relatedly, whether the Court had power to relieve against forfeiture or to extend the time for payment without the consent of the decree-holder.
  3. Whether the compromise obliged the decree-holder to accept Rs. 5,500 in full satisfaction after the stipulated time (i.e., whether execution could be levied only for Rs. 5,500 or for the whole decretal amount).
  4. Whether the original decree was a nullity because one defendant (the minor Gigla) had died before the decree was passed, rendering the decree a joint decree invalid as to the deceased's liability.
  5. Whether the decree bound the personal properties of the individual judgment-debtors where it was argued to be a decree against a firm rather than against the individuals.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Judgment-debtors') Arguments

  • Under the compromise of 29 April 1935 the decree-holder agreed to accept Rs. 5,500 in full satisfaction; the appellants contended that time was not of the essence, so they were bound to pay that amount within a reasonable time rather than strictly within two months.
  • They submitted that the Court had power to relieve against forfeiture and therefore should relieve them if the two-month term had been missed.
  • They alleged (first expressly in an objection of 21 September) that they had been ready to pay Rs. 5,500 but that the decree-holder was unwilling to accept that payment.
  • They also contended that the decree was void (a nullity) because Gigla had died before the decree was passed, making the joint decree invalid as to the deceased; and separately urged that the decree, being against a firm, could not be levied against the personal properties of the judgment-debtors.
  • They raised a contention (briefly) about the meaning of a clause in the compromise as to whether the decree-holder's right to levy execution was limited to Rs. 5,500 or extended to the full decretal amount.

Decree-holder / Respondent's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The decree-holder agreed to accept Rs. 5,500 only if paid within the two-month period; having received nothing within that time, he legitimately moved for sale proclamations and proceeded with execution for the decretal amount.
  • The decree-holder relied upon the terms of the compromise (which expressly authorized him to proceed with execution if payment was not made within the stipulated time) and on the judgment-debtors' undertaking in the compromise not to raise certain objections in future.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kandarpa Nag v. Banwari Lal (cited: 33 CLJ and directly as Kandarpa Nag) The general rule about forfeiture of money as laid down by Mookerjee, J. — principles governing relief against forfeiture in money agreements. The court stated that the rule in Kandarpa Nag was relied upon by appellants but found it of no assistance because the present case falls within the principle of Ford v. Chesterfield.
Ford v. Chesterfield Principle that where a creditor agrees to remit part of his claim only in consideration of punctual payments, punctuality/time is the essential consideration and equity will not relieve against the provision as to time. The court held the present case falls within this principle and therefore time was of the essence of the compromise; relief against forfeiture was not available to the appellants on these facts.
6 CLJ 176 (Mookerjee, J.) Equitable rule: relief against forfeiture will be given where forfeiture is caused by accident, fraud, surprise or ignorance; equity will refuse to aid a defaulter where forfeiture is wilful or due to gross negligence. The court quoted this principle to explain the narrow circumstances in which equity will relieve against forfeiture and found those circumstances not to exist here.
19 Beav 428 Authority for the proposition that if a creditor agrees to accept part of the debt only if paid within a stated time, equity will not relieve against the time condition. Cited as supporting the proposition that equity will not relieve against a time provision of this type; the case was noted as having been distinguished by Lord Kingsdown in 8 MIA 239.
8 MIA 239 (Lord Kingsdown's distinction) Referenced as a distinguishing treatment of 19 Beav 428 in the existing authorities. The opinion records the distinction and relies on the line of authority that treats punctuality as the essence where a creditor's indulgence is given in exchange for punctual payment.
16 Ch D 675 Reference to the doctrine of penalties (and its inapplicability in the present context). The court observed there was no scope for the doctrine of penalties or analogous equitable relief on these facts.
17 PLT 940 (Full Bench reference) Reference to a pending Full Bench consideration of a related question (whether executing Court can extend time without decree-holder's consent). The court noted the reference had been decided subsequently but "without pronouncing on the general question" relevant to the present appeal.
2 PLJ 164 Expresses a view (in this Court) that time fixed for payment by consent in execution proceedings cannot be extended by the Court without the consent of the parties. The opinion cites this decision as part of a line of authorities supporting the inability of the executing Court to extend time without consent; used to reinforce the conclusion reached.
9 Pat 332 Similar view that time fixed by consent in execution cannot be extended by the Court without consent. Cited with 2 PLJ 164 and 13 Pat 18 to show courts in this jurisdiction have taken that position in comparable circumstances.
13 Pat 18 Case where payment punctuality was a term and courts held the executing Court could not extend time without consent. Used as further precedent supporting the court's reluctance to extend time without decree-holder's agreement.
2 Pat 906 (Mullick, J.) Mullick, J. referred to 1891 WN 170 and 33 CLJ 244 and held that where an agreement prescribes a date and default causes forfeiture, courts must determine on the facts whether relief should be given; suggested the court may have power to extend time. The opinion recounts this authority and notes it as part of a contrary line of reasoning but concludes that the present case is governed by the Ford v. Chesterfield principle, not by Mullick, J.'s formulation.
1891 WN 170 Referenced (via Mullick, J. in 2 Pat 906) as part of an exhaustive discussion on relief against forfeiture in money agreements. The opinion records the citation as part of the background judicial debate; no distinct application beyond noting Mullick, J.'s reliance on it.
33 CLJ 244 Described as an exhaustive discussion of the question of relief against forfeiture and extension of time. Referenced (through Mullick, J.'s reasoning) as part of the discussion but not treated as determinative of the present appeal.
9 CLJ 251 (Mookerjee, J.) Held that an executing Court had no jurisdiction to extend time except by assent of each and every party to the agreement. Cited to support the proposition that modification of a consent order as to time requires concurrence of all consenting parties; relied upon in the court's analysis.
23 CWN 439 (Teunon & Newbould, JJ.) Illustrative exception where time fixed for payment by compromise decree was extended because the mortgagee did not press his objection to the Court's jurisdiction to extend time. Noted as an instance where the court extended time because the creditor did not seriously press his objection; distinguished from the present case.
6 PLT 511 Referenced in the context of related authority concerning the jurisdiction of executing Courts to act regarding time conditions. Mentioned as supportive background authority in the chain of cases cited; no further specific application was made in the opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from the text and context of the 29 April 1935 compromise and the conduct of the parties in the execution proceedings.

  1. Compromise terms and conduct: The compromise expressly provided that the judgment-debtors had two months to pay Rs. 5,500 "in full satisfaction" and authorised the decree-holder to proceed with execution if that payment was not made within the time. The decree-holder moved for execution after the period expired without payment; the Court emphasised both the written term and the practical reason for the limited-time offer (to prevent further delay caused by the judgment-debtors' repeated objections).
  2. Failure to prove readiness to pay: The appellants only first alleged that they had been ready to pay and that the decree-holder was unwilling to accept the payment in an objection dated 21 September — almost three months after the two-month period and after a sale date had already passed. The court noted there was no prior credible pleading of this contention and no attempt below to adduce evidence or to seek an adjournment to prove the allegation. The court treated the mere allegation as insufficient proof.
  3. Waiver and undertaking in the compromise: The court relied on the language of the compromise by which the judgment-debtors withdrew certain objections and undertook not to raise them regarding valuation and execution. The compromise further provided that they would not be competent to raise objections regarding execution for the decretal amount if they failed to pay Rs. 5,500 within the stipulated period.
  4. Equity's limited relief against forfeiture: The court explained the narrow equitable grounds for relief against forfeiture (accident, fraud, surprise or ignorance) and cited precedent that a court will not relieve a defaulter where forfeiture results from wilful default or gross negligence (citing Mookerjee, J.). Applying that principle, the court concluded that this case did not present equitable grounds for relief: the judgment-debtors had not established accident, fraud, surprise, or ignorance, nor had they shown a bona fide and timely attempt to pay which failed through no fault of theirs.
  5. Time as the essence and relevant precedents: The court analysed relevant authorities and concluded that where a creditor's indulgence is given in exchange for punctual payment, punctuality is the very consideration for that indulgence — i.e., time is of the essence (Ford v. Chesterfield and other authorities). The court distinguished authorities cited by the appellants (such as Kandarpa Nag) as inapplicable to the present factual pattern, and noted a chain of decisions in this Court taking the view that time fixed by consent in execution cannot be extended without consent of the parties.
  6. Jurisdictional question left unnecessary: Having held that the compromise made time of the essence and that no satisfactory evidence of readiness-to-pay/unwillingness-to-accept was placed before the Court, it found it unnecessary to decide the broader question of whether an executing Court can extend time for payment against the will of the decree-holder.
  7. Other objections: The court found the objections actually argued below (e.g., that the decree was void because Gigla died before the decree or that the decree was against a firm and not individuals) to be clearly untenable on the facts and therefore did not sustain them.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The decree-holder was entitled to proceed with execution after the judgment-debtors failed to pay Rs. 5,500 within the stipulated two-month period as per the compromise; the lower Court's order allowing the sale to proceed and dismissing the objections stands.
  • Relief against forfeiture: On these facts, equitable relief against forfeiture was not available to the judgment-debtors because they did not establish circumstances (such as accident, fraud, surprise or ignorance) that would justify such relief nor did they credibly prove a timely attempt to pay which was thwarted through no fault of theirs.
  • Jurisdictional point not decided: The opinion expressly avoids pronouncing a general rule on the broader question whether an executing Court can, without the consent of the decree-holder, extend time fixed by a consent in execution; the court observed existing authority on both sides of the question but concluded that determination was unnecessary in the present case.
  • Precedential posture: The decision applies existing principles (notably the Ford v. Chesterfield principle and related local authorities) to the facts; the court did not purport to establish a novel general rule beyond the application of those principles to these particular facts.

Concurrence: Rowland, J. agreed with the reasoning and described the appeal as a frivolous attempt to delay execution.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed with costs.

Show all summary ...

Dhavle, J.:— This is an appeal by certain judgment-debtors from an order dismissing their objections in an execution proceeding. The decree under execution was passed on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court against Kishun Gopal and Rameshwar Lal personally, and also against Sitaram and Gigla, two minors, “out of their share or interest in the assets in or to come to their hands of the joint family estate of the defendants,” and it was a decree for over Rs. 19,000 besides interest and costs, the minor Sitaram alone being made liable for the difference between the costs of the suit as a defended suit and the costs as of an undefended suit. Execution was started in the Court of the Subordinata Judge of Purulia in October 1934. Two months afterwards the judgment-debtors filed an objection under Section 47 of the CPC, which was disallowed in the following April. While that objection was pending, the judgment-debtors filed another objection in February, stating that the decree-holder had been satisfied to the extent of Rs. 12,500 and urging that he was therefore not entitled to proceed in respect of the entire amount decreed. Next month they filed another objection urging among other things, that the decree was a nullity as it was a joint decree and one of the defendants, the minor Gigla, had died before the decree was passed. While these two objections were pending, the parties arrived at a compromise on 29th April 1935 according to which the whole decree was to be treated as satisfied if the judgment-debtors paid Rs. 5,500 to the decree-holder within two months, and the decree-holder was to proceed with the execution if the judgment-debtors did not pay the agreed sum of Rs. 5,500 within the time fixed. This compromise was filed in Court on the following day and the Subordinate Judge stayed the execution proceedings till 29th June 1935. On this day, the decree-holder applied for time to proceed, and on 4th July 1935 he asked for the issue of sale proclamations (certain properties of the judgment-debtors having already been attached) alleging that the judgment-debtors had not paid anything to him and that he was therefore entitled to realize the entire decretal amount. It appears from the order-sheet of the lower Court, which is before us, that on 2nd August 1935 Rameshwar Marwari filed an objection under S. 47, which was allowed on 10th August; we understand that was an objection regarding valuation. The sale was then fixed for 16th September 1935 on which day an objection was filed by Kishun Gopal urging among other things the old objection that on account of Gigla's death before the passing of the decree, the decree which was joint was null and void. The sale was not actually held on 16th September, but was “kept on hammer” from day to day till 21st September when the judgment-debtors filed another objection urging among other things that as the decree was against a firm, the personal properties of the judgment-debtors were not liable under it. The learned Subordinate Judge heard this objection and the objection of 16th September, together on 21st September and finding them untenable allowed the sale to proceed.

2. It is contended for the appellants that under the compromise of 29th April 1935 the decree-holder was not entitled to proceed with the execution. It is not pretended that the decree-holder was paid Rs. 5,500 or any part of it within the stipulated period of two months, but it is urged that time was not of the essence of the contract, that the judgment-debtors were therefore only bound to pay Rs. 5,500 within a reasonable time, that the Court had power to relieve against forfeiture, and that the learned Subordinate Judge should have investigated an allegation made in the judgment-debtors' petition of the 21st September that the decree-holder was not willing to take Rs. 5,500 though the judgment-debtors had been ready to pay it.

3. According to the terms of the compromise of the 29th April, the judgment-debtors had two months from that day to pay Rs. 5,500 to the decree-holder in full satisfaction of the decree. As I have already stated, the decree-holder moved the Court on the 4th July for the issue of sale proclamations on the ground that the judgment-debtors had not paid anything. It has not been claimed before us that in his objection of the 2nd August, Rameshwar Marwari said anything regarding: the readiness of the defendants to pay and the unwillingness of the decree-holder to receive Rs. 5,500. In his objection of the 16th September Kishun Gopal did urge that the decree-holder was not entitled to take out execution for the entire amount as he had contracted to take Rs. 5,500 in full satisfaction of the decree, but even then he did not say anything about the readiness of the judgment-debtors to pay and the unwillness of the decree-holder to receive that amount. The point was only mentioned for the first time in the judgment-debtors' objection of the 21st September, five days after the date fixed for the sale and nearly three months after the expiry of the stipulated period of two months from 29th April. There is no reference to this point in the judgment of the lower Court, nor is it clearly stated in the grounds of appeal that the Subordinate Judge omitted to deal in his judgment with this or any other point that was actually argued before him. It seems to me from all this that the point was not really taken—argued—below. The judgment-debtors had evidently been filing one objection after another without meaning, it, and the compromise petition, after empowering the decree-holder to proceed with the execution in case he was not paid Rs. 5,500 within the stipulated time, went on to say:

In regard to the same (that is to say execution for the decretal amount of Rs. 19,700) the judgment-debtors will not be competent to raise any objection. The judgment-debtors withdraw the objections they have raised regarding valuation, ate, in the execution, and they will not be competent to raise those objections in future.

4. The decree-holder, it is plain, agreed to take the Rs. 5,500 within a limited time. In order to avoid the delay to be apprehended from what looked like the habit of the judgment-debtors of raising objections from time to time. The objections actually urged before the learned Subordinate Judge and dealt with by him relate to the death of Gigla as affecting what is claimed to be a joint decree, and the decree being against a firm and not against the individuals constituting the firm. What I have already stated about the details of the decree is sufficient to show how palpably untenable the objections actually urged were. Although it is urged in appeal that the lower Court should have investigated the judgment-debtors' allegation that though they had been ready to pay, the decree-holder was unwilling to receive Rs. 5,500, it does not appear that the Subordinate Judge was asked—moved—to do so, or that any evidence was offered or any adjournment asked for to enable them to produce it. The mere allegation was no proof, and this was probably one of the reasons why the point was not actually urged before the learned Subordinate Judge. I am not prepared in these circumstances to hold that an investigation should have been made by the lower Court. As regards the power of the Court to relieve against forfeiture, it is to be remembered that equity only interferes to do complete justice between the parties:

No doubt, if forfeiture is occasioned by accident, fraud, surprise, or ignorance, a Court of Equity will interpose and relieve against forfeiture so caused; but it is equally clear that a Court of Equity will refuse to aid a defaulter if the forfeiture is wilful or is the result of gross negligence: as Mookerjee, J. observed in 6 CLJ 176.1

5. Nor does this appear to be a case of forfeiture of the kind that equity would have relieved against, even if the judgment-debtors had made a serious attempt to pay according to the compromise into which they have entered and the attempt had failed for no fault of theirs. Where the creditor agrees to accept part of the debt in full satisfaction if paid within a stated time, equity will not relieve against the provision as to time—19 Beav 428,2 cited and distinguished by Lord Kings-down in 8 MIA 239.3 In such a case there is no scope for the application of the doctrine of penalties (16 Ch D 6754) or forfeitures. The contention of the appellants that time was not of the essence of the contract is also plainly untenable on the facts of this case. The judgment-debtors had been repeatedly filing objections to the execution, when the decree-holder agreed to accept in full satisfaction Rs. 5,500 if paid in two months, the agreement further being that if not paid within time, he was to proceed with the execution without the judgment-debtors being “competent to raise any objection”. This provision in the circumstances makes it clear that the parties intended time to be of the essence of the contract; for it cannot be reasonably supposed that the decree-holder who had a decree for over Rs. 19,700 would agree to be satisfied with a much smaller sum not within the time stipulated, but within such period as the Court may on evidence find to be reasonable.

6. In this view of the matter it is unnecessary to consider the larger question of the power of the executing Court in such circumstances to extend the time of payment without the consent of the decree-holder. A similar question, we were informed, had arisen in a Full Bench reference which was pending. That reference has since been decided, 17 PLT 940,5 without pronouncing on the general question. It may be added that the view seems to have been taken in at least two cases in this Court, 2 PLJ 1646 and 9 Pat 332,7 that time fixed for payment by consent of the parties in execution proceedings cannot be extended by the Court without their consent. These were cases where payment was to be made in order to get an execution sale set aside or nullified. The same view was taken in 13 Pat 18 which was a case where the decree-holder was to proceed to realize the entire decree without any remission in case he was not paid certain instalments punctually. In 2 Pat 9069 however, Mullick, J. referred to 1891 WN 17010 and the exhaustive discussion of the question in 33 CLJ 244,11 and took it as settled that where the agreement is for the payment of money on a prescribed date and that on default of payment on that date money is to be forfeited, time is not of the essence of the contract, and that in every case the Court must determine upon the facts of that case whether relief against forfeiture is to be given or not. This would imply that the Court has power to extend time if it should hold that there was a forfeiture involved in the agreement. In formulating his general rule about the forfeiture of money—the rule which was adopted by Mullick, J.—Mookerjee, J. in Kandarpa's case proceeded on 8 MIA 239 as a case where relief against forfeiture was given to a defendant who was indebted to the plaintiff in a certain sum which the defendant agreed to pay, upon a remission by the plaintiff of part of his claim, in two instalments on specified dates. But, as pointed out by Lord Kingsdown, that was not the case of a creditor engaging to remit to his debtor a portion of his demand in consideration of his making payment of smaller sums punctually at fixed periods, in which case the punctuality of the payment is the only consideration which the creditor receives for his indulgence: Ford v. Chesterfield; but a case in which a third person, being under no liability consents to incur that liability and binds himself in a penalty for the due performance of his engagement.

7. The general rule about forfeiture of money laid down by Mookerjee, J. in Kandarpa Nag v. Banwari Lal on which Mr. Manohar Lal has laid so much stress, and which was applied by Mulliok, J. in 2 Pat 906 to a case where no debt was established apart from the compromise which terminated the suit, is thus of no help to the appellants, because, as I have already shown, the present case falls within the principle of Ford v. Chesterfield. In cases of this kind there is hardly any question of penalty or forfeiture or the analogous principle on which equity relieves against mere lapse of time where it is consistent with the substance of justice to do so, if from the contract or from the nature of the case time is not shown to be of the essence of the contract. It is true that if the judgment-debtor does not pay in time, he becomes liable for the entire decretal amount. But the liability arises from the decretal debt and default in the punctual payment of the smaller sum which the decree-holder had agreed to accept in full satisfaction, subject to payment within a fixed period, merely operates to remove an essentially temporary bar to execution. In the analogous case of an agreement under which an execution sale is to be set aside if the judgment-debtor pays a certain amount within a certain time, but is to stand confirmed if he does not, Mookerjee, J. himself held in 9 CLJ 25112 that the executing Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time “except by the assent of each and every one” of the parties to the agreement, not merely because time is of the essence of the contract in such cases but also because any modification of the agreement required the concurrence of all the consenting parties. In that case there was no question of any forfeiture: see 6 PLT 51113; but in 23 CWN 43914 Teunon and Newbould, JJ. only extended the time fixed for payment by a compromise decree in a mortgage suit because the mortgagee did not seriously press his objection as regards the jurisdiction of the Court to extend time.

8. Assuming however in favour of the appellants that the Court may in some cases have jurisdiction to vary a consent order as regards time without the concurrence of all the parties, it is clear that in the present case the contention that time was not of the essence of the contract and that the judgment-debtors were entitled to have the decree satisfied by paying Rs. 5,500 within a reasonable time, is untenable and must be overruled. It follows that the decree-holder was entitled to proceed with the execution. It was also urged incidentally that the compromise only entitled the decree-holder, in case the judgment-debtors did not pay the Rs. 5,500 within the stipulated time, to levy execution for Rs. 5,500 only. This contention is raised on the words of the compromise:

“Tabe decreedar tahar decree babat prapya arthat 19700 tahar jarite sampatti nilam bikray mate aday karia leite paribe.”

9. The translation of this clause in the paper book is entirely against the appellants' contention. The learned Subordinate Judge was a Bengali, and the contention was not raised before him.

10. It is also not raised in the grounds of appeal. Nor is it easy to see any meaning in the interpretation suggested before us, namely that the decree-holder was to realise Rs. 5,500 by levying execution for Rs. 19,700. It was also similarly urged that according to the compromise the decree-holder was entitled to levy execution for Rs. 19,700 only. The decree was for Rs. 19,767-7-3. We do not know for what amount execution was actually levied after the failure of the appellant to pay, nor is the point really raised in the grounds of appeal. It was not raised below. I would therefore decline to enter, tain it. In my opinion the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Rowland, J.:— I agree. The observation of Khaja Mohammad Noor, J. in 17 PLT 940 that

The wording of the contract dearly shows that the parties meant that the benefit which was to accrue to the judgment-debtors would be lost to them if the payment was not made within the specified time, or in other words time was of the essence of the contract, applies in its entirety to this case. The question what a Court can or should do, if it thinks time not to be of the essence, hardly seems to arise. The appeal was in my view nothing better than a frivolous device to delay the execution proceedings.

K.B/A.L

11. Appeal dismissed.