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Jasimuddin Sarkar And Others Accused v. Emperor Opposite Party.

Calcutta High Court
Aug 19, 1930
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants were committed for trial in the Sessions Court on charges under Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). In addition, appellants 1, 2 and 3 faced a charge framed under Section 304, IPC (later the jury returned verdicts under Section 325, IPC for these appellants), and appellants 4 to 8 were charged under Section 304 read with Section 149, IPC. A jury, by a majority of three to two, found all appellants guilty under Section 147, IPC; it also found appellants 1, 2 and 3 guilty under Section 325, IPC and appellants 4 to 8 not guilty under Section 304 read with Section 149, IPC. The Sessions Judge accepted the jury's verdicts, imposed various prison terms and fines, and the appellants appealed from that conviction and sentence.

The incident arose on 15 March 1928. Darogali and Maniruddin (holding the land in burga under a registered kabuliyat, Ex. 4) with six others went to plough a plot described as the chakran land of Purna Mali. After ploughing about a quarter of the land, a crowd of about 150–200 persons armed with lathis and halangas arrived and forbade them from ploughing. A fight ensued; members of Darogali and Maniruddin's party were injured (including Alamdi and Mahmudali). It is alleged that certain accused persons inflicted injuries on Mahmudali and that Mahmudali was subsequently detained by the accused. Darogali lodged the first information at Serajgunge Thana on the same day. The Sub-Inspector reached the scene around noon and observed huts being erected; about 50 men fled. The police investigated and submitted a charge sheet.

Before the magisterial enquiry, the accused Jasim instituted a cross case; the Deputy Magistrate S. C. Dutt convicted the complainant's party in the cross case and dismissed the complainant's case. Both matters then came before the Sessions Judge, who ordered a fresh enquiry on both matters. At the Sessions trial, there was also an appeal pending against the conviction in the cross case.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the evidence, the complainant's party (ploughing the land) had the requisite possession of the land at the time of the occurrence.
  2. Whether the Sessions Judge's charge to the jury on possession (including reference to statements made to the police) contained any misdirection prejudicial to the appellants.
  3. Whether statements made to the police (recorded during investigation) could be treated as substantive evidence or only for testing the witnesses' court testimony, and whether the Sessions Judge erred in how he instructed the jury about such statements.
  4. Whether the Sessions Judge erred in refusing to allow certain questions to be put to the investigating Sub-Inspector of Police—specifically questions aimed at showing that prosecution witnesses had not stated in investigation matters they later deposed to in Court—given the requirements of Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC).
  5. Whether the combination of the above alleged errors caused such prejudice as to warrant interference with the jury's verdict and the Sessions Judge's order dated 13 January 1930.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Talukdar)

  • Challenge to the complainant's possession of the land at the time of the occurrence: contention that the land's possession was disputed and that the appellants (or their predecessors) had rights or claims (e.g., pattani likhan) contesting the burga claim.
  • Attack on the clarity and probative force of Mahmudali's dying declaration—arguing it was not clear that Mahmudali was ploughing as a bargadar in respect of Purna Mali's land.
  • Complaint that the Sessions Judge improperly introduced or relied on statements made to the police in his charge to the jury and thereby prejudiced the accused.
  • Complaint that the learned Judge refused to permit cross-examination of the investigating Sub-Inspector on whether prosecution witnesses had given to him, during investigation, the same statements they later gave in Court; contended that this refusal caused great prejudice because the defence could not test inconsistencies between police-recorded statements and in-court testimony.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any arguments advanced by the prosecution beyond the prosecution's general case as reflected in the record and the Sessions Judge's acceptance of the jury verdicts.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court (C. C. Ghose, J.) reviewed the evidence and the Sessions Judge's treatment of the principal contested issues and reached the following conclusions based on the record:

  1. Possession and related documentary history:
    • The land in dispute was described as chakran land of Purna Mali and had been the subject of earlier proceedings before the settlement officer. The land had previously been let in burga; at one point the landlord had purportedly settled the land with certain prodhans including Jumon (father of accused Jasim).
    • After inquiry, the settlement officer recorded the plot as let out in burga to the party opposed to Jasim; Jasim's evidence consisted principally of a pattani likhan which the settlement officer found unconvincing.
    • There was a registered kabuliyat executed in favour of Purna Mali (Ex. 4) in respect of the burga holding by Darogali and Maniruddin.
    The court found that the Sessions Judge had examined the evidence on possession at length, had properly identified the material question for the jury, and had given a fair and impartial summary of the evidence on possession. The court did not find any misdirection in the charge on this point.
  2. Dying declaration:
    • The judge (and the present court on reading the original dying declaration) found it not clearly established from Mahmudali's dying declaration whether he was ploughing as a bargadar in his own right the land known as that of Purna Mali. This uncertainty did not show misdirection by the Sessions Judge in his charge.
  3. Use of statements made to police and the Sessions Judge's directions:
    • The Sessions Judge referred to statements made to the police, but when the paragraph is read as a whole he cautioned the jury that such statements were not to be treated as substantive evidence; rather, since the statements had been placed on the record (apparently at the instance of the defence), the jury could use them to test the evidence adduced by prosecution witnesses.
    • The court concluded that the Judge's direction was properly framed: it did not convert the police statements into substantive evidence and appropriately told the jury how to treat them. The court regarded the defence as having brought those statements into the record and therefore could not later complain of their presence.
  4. Refusal to permit cross-examination of the investigating officer and application of Section 162 CrPC:
    • A petition was presented to the Sessions Judge asking that the investigating Sub-Inspector be asked whether prosecution witnesses had made to him the statements they later gave in Court. The petition was described as vague—no specific witness or specific alleged omission was identified and the case diary had not been put on the record.
    • The court explained the correct legal approach under Section 162 CrPC: prosecution cannot invoke it; defence may use statements made to police to contradict witnesses, but to decisively prove that witnesses contradicted themselves it is ordinarily necessary to place on the record the true copy of the case diary and to prove it through the investigating officer by appropriate means. There are established methods for proving and getting the case diary on the record.
    • In the present instance the defence sought to ask the Sub-Inspector about what the witnesses were supposed to have stated to him without following the proper procedure of producing and proving the case diary and specifying the alleged contradictions. The court held that the Sessions Judge was justified in refusing the proposed line of questioning because the petition was vague and did not afford the court or prosecution a way to test whether there was a substantial grievance deserving of remedial action.
    • The court observed that while exceptional circumstances might justify allowing an investigating officer to be cross-examined on such matters, ordinarily the established procedure (producing and proving the case diary and adducing specific contradictions) should be followed. On the facts of this case there was no genuine grievance shown.
  5. Overall appraisal and conclusion on prejudice:
    • Considering the conduct of the trial, the content of the Sessions Judge's charge, and the nature of the defence petition regarding the investigating officer, the court found no serious complaint and no prejudice sufficient to warrant interference with the jury's verdict or the Sessions Judge's order dated 13 January 1930.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Consequences for the parties:

  • The court held that all points taken by Mr. Talukdar failed. The appeal was dismissed.
  • Specifically, appellants Mafizuddin Sarkar (No. 4), Kanta Sheikh (No. 5), Misiluddin Sarkar (No. 6), Abedali Sarkar (No. 7), and Moyezuddin Sheikh (No. 8), who were on bail, were ordered to surrender their bail-bonds immediately and serve out the remainder of the sentences imposed on them.

Broader implications: The opinion does not discuss broader legal implications or purport to lay down any new precedent; the decision operates directly to affirm the conviction and sentence as recorded by the Sessions Court and to dismiss the present appeal.

Order accordingly. (Rankin, C.J., agreed.)

Show all summary ...

C.C Ghose, J.:— The appellants before us were committed to take their trial in the Sessions Court on a charge under S. 147, I.P.C There was a further charge under S. 304, I.P.C against appellants 1, 2 and 3 and a charge under S. 304 read with S. 149, I.P.C, against the rest, i.e, appellants 4 to 8. The jury by a majority of three to two returned a verdict of guilty against all the appellants under S. 147, I.P.C They also by a majority in the same proportion found appellants 1, 2 and 3 guilty under S. 325, I.P.C, and appellants 4 to 8 not guilty under S. 304 read with S. 149, I.P.C The learned Sessions Judge accepted the verdict of the majority of the jury and sentenced the appellants to various terms of imprisonment and in addition thereto he also imposed fines of various amounts. Against this conviction and sentence, the present appeal has been preferred.

2. On behalf of the appellants, Mr. Talukdar has taken several points before us. One of the main points which Mr. Talukdar has argued relates to the question of possession of the land, in respect of which the occurrence took place on the day of the occurrence. The land in dispute is said to be chakran land of one Purna Mali held in burga by two persons named Darogali and Maniruddin. These latter are alleged to have held the land under a registered kabuliyat which is Ex. 4 in the case. It appears that, early on the morning of 15th March 1928, these two persons Darogali and Maniruddin along with six other men went to plough the land in question. After they had ploughed about a quarter of the land, a crowd of about 150 to 200 persons came on with lathis and halangas from the west side. The leader of the crowd forbade the complainant and his men from ploughing the land. The complainant's party refused to comply with the demand of the crowd with the result that the complainant's party were attacked by several of the crowd and in course of the fight which ensued a person named Alamdi who belonged to the complainant's party was injured and another person named Mahmudali was also injured on the head. It is alleged that the injuries inflicted on Mahmudali were caused by the accused Jasim, Poyez and Tomij and two other accused Atab and Moyez. The complainant's party then ran away but Mahmudali—the man who had been grievously wounded—was detained by the party of the accused. The first information was lodged at the Serajgunge Thana by the complainant Darogali on the same day, namely 15th March 1928.

3. The Sub-Inspector recorded the first information and reached the place of occurrence at about 12 noon and it is said that, when he appeared on the scene, he saw some ghars or huts being erected on the land and at the sight of him soma 50 men ran away. The matter was further investigated by the police and ultimately a charge sheet was submitted. Before the magisterial enquiry was taken up, a cross casa was instituted by Jasim. Both the cases were heard by the same Deputy Magistrate, Mr. S.C Dutt. He convicted the complainant's party in the cross casa and dismissed the complainant's case. Both the cases were then taken before the Sessions Judge and the latter ordered a fresh enquiry to be made into both the cases. It appears that in the cross case the complainant's party had been convicted and, at the time when the present Sessions trial was going on, there was an appeal pending against the order of conviction. As regards the case against the present accused, as indicated above, it was committed to the Sessions Court.

4. Mr. Talukdar's first point relates to the question of possession of the land in question on the day of occurrence. It does appear from the evidence on the record that, sometime before the date of the occurrence, there had been certain proceedings in connexion with the possession of the land before the settlement officer. The land used to belong to the father of Purna Mali. It was let out in burga. It appears that the landlord without reference to Purna Mali's father settled the land in question with certain prodhans of the villages including Jumon, the father of the accused Jasim. Thereafter there were certain proceedings in the criminal Court and in the end, Purna Mali got settlement of the lands in question from the zamindars. Then there was a registered kabuliyat executed by Darogali and Maniruddin which is Bx. 4 in the case in favour of Purna Mali and the land was given in burga to these people. Now the party of Jasim while the settlement operations were pending raised several questions before the settlement officer as to whether or not they were entitled to be in possession. They produced what is called a pattani likhan whereas the other side produced a document which according to the settlement officer showed that the landlord had agreed to let out the chakran land in question in burga to the party opposed to Jasim. The settlement officer after a detailed inquiry came to the conclusion that the plot in question which was Purna Mali's chakran land should be recorded in the khatian as let out to the party opposed to Jasim by the landlord because Jasim could not produce any convincing evidence other than what he has done before the kanungo, namely the pattani likhan. In this state of affairs the occurrence in question took place, as is stated above, on 15th March 1928.

5. The learned Sessions Judge has gone through the evidence relating to the question of possession at considerable length, and he has pointed out to the jury what the material question was that had to be decided by them and on what evidence that question had to be decided. Mr. Talukdar raises the question as to whether it is clear from Mahmud's dying declaration that the land in question was in the possession of Purna Mali—being the land which he was cultivating in burga. I have read in original the dying declaration of Mahmudali. It is by no means clear, as far as I can make out, whether Mahmudali was on the date of the occurrence ploughing as bargadar in his own right the land which was known as the land of Purna Mali. In this state of the record I am of opinion that the learned Judge has not introduced into his charge anything which is not borne out by the evidence on the record. He has given a fair and impartial summary of the evidence on the question of possession and, in my opinion, there is absolutely no misdirection whatsoever so far as this portion of the charge is concerned.

6. Mr. Talukdar complains that while discussing the question of possession of the land in question, the learned Sessions Judge has brought to the notice of the jury certain statements alleged to have been made by the prosecution witnesses to the police when the police were investigating into the occurrence. It is quite clear that there is a reference to the statements made to the police; but the paragraph in which this reference occurs has got to be taken as a whole and it is abundantly clear from a perusal of the paragraph taken as a whole that the learned Judge has cautioned the jury that they were not to take the statements made to the police as substantive evidence but that, inasmuch as they had been introduced into the record, they were free to look at them for the purpose of testing the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses. This is how I read, because otherwise there is no sense or meaning in what was stated in the paragraph in question. Now these statements could not have been put on the record at the instance of the prosecution. If they did at all get on the record that must have been done at the instance of the defence; and if that was so, then, although it is now clear from the record whether they were marked as exhibits, the defence must take the consequence of getting things on the record from which they now at the appellate stage desire to run away. Therefore so far as that portion of the learned Judge's charge to the jury is concerned, I do not think that any serious complaint can be made or that there has been caused any prejudice whatsoever to the accused which would entitle this Court to interfere with the verdict of the jury.

7. Mr. Talukdar's third point is that very great prejudice to the accused has been caused because of the learned Judge's refusal to allow certain questions to be put to the investigating police officer. The matter stands thus: It appears that a petition was put in before the learned Sessions Judge in which it was stated that the greater portion of the statements made by the prosecution witnesses in the Sessions Court had not been mentioned to the police during the stage-of investigation and that being so, it was desirable that the Sub-Inspector of Police who was at the moment giving evidence in the Sessions Court should be asked whether or not the prosecution witnesses who had already deposed in the Sessions Court had stated to him the matters which they had already deposed to. The case diary had not been made a part of the record. Now, this is my translation of the Bengali petition which was put in before the Sessions Judge. As may be seen from the petition itself, the petition was couched in the vaguest language possible. No definite allegation was made with reference to any particular witness nor was the Court afforded any assistance whatsoever for the purpose of testing whether the defence had any grievance of a substantial character which required to be redressed. Upon this petition being put in, the learned Judge refused to allow the investigation police officer to be cross-examined for the purpose of finding out whether the statements made by the prosecution witnesses in Court had also been made to him during the investigation. Now Section 162 of the Cr PC which is attracted to this question, is clear in its language. To put it in very simple words, the prosecution cannot invoke in their aid S. 162. The defence however can use the statements made to the police during the stage of investigation for the purpose of contradicting the witnesses who come and give evidence in the Sessions Court and for the purpose of showing that the witnesses have made divergent statements at different times. If however it is desired to clinch the matter before the Sessions Judge and the jury and to show in an affirmative manner that the witnesses for the prosecution cannot be relied upon, it is obviously the duty of the defence to prove through the investigating police officer when he is in the witness box the record of the statements made to the police by the witnesses for the prosecution during the stage of investigation and for that purpose, it is necessary to get on the record a true copy of what is known as the case diary and there are well-known ways of proving the document and of getting the document on the record. But instead of that course being followed the Sub-Inspector of Police who was in charge of the investigation was apparently to be asked various questions—not with reference to what was recorded by him during the stage of investigation but with reference to what was supposed to have been stated to him by the prosecution witnesses during such investigation.

8. I have attempted to indicate what ought to be the procedure to be followed when it is desired by the defence to invoke in aid the provisions of Section 162 of the Cr PC and when it is desired by the defence to show that the prosecution witnesses cannot be relied upon. It is sufficient to observe that each case must depend upon its own facts; and while it may be necessary in very special circumstances to allow the investigating officer to be cross-examined ordinarily the procedure which I have attempted to sketch is the one which should be adopted. Bearing in mind what has been stated above, I do not think that there could be a genuine and real grievance in the matter of what happened in this case in the Sessions Court during the trial. As I have shown in an earlier portion of this judgment, the objection was not to any specific question which had been ruled out by the Court. The objection was taken on vague and general grounds to which no Sessions Judge in course of the trial can be expected to pay any attention.

9. In this view of the matter, I am of opinion that there is really nothing in the order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 13th January 1930, to which any reasonable objection can be taken.

10. These are all the points taken by Mr. Talukdar; and, in my opinion, every one of these points fails and this appeal must stand dismissed. The appellants Mafizuddin Sarkar (No. 4), Kanta Sheikh (No. 5), Misiluddin Sarkar (No. 6), Abedali Sarkar (No. 7), and Moyezuddin Sheikh (No. 8), who are on bail must forthwith surrender to their bail-bonds and serve out the remainder of the sentences imposed on them.

Rankin, C.J:— I agree.

V.B/R.K

11. Order accordingly.