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Ganu Chandra Kashid (Original Accused Nos. 1 To 9 And 12) v. Emperor

Bombay High Court
Nov 17, 1931
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Opinion Summary — Beaumont, C.J. (concurring with Broomfield, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by ten accused persons against their convictions for dacoity under sections 396 and 402 of the Indian Penal Code, handed down by the Sessions Judge of Sholapur. The dacoity occurred on 18 January 1931. The property stolen consisted mostly of cash (approximately Rs. 1,700), the bulk being one-rupee coins; some other property was also taken. The owner of the house, Darayappa, was seriously injured during the dacoity and died ten days later.

The prosecution case was founded principally on (a) the testimony of an approver and (b) the confessions of three accused (Nos. 1, 8 and 9), which, together, implicated all ten accused. The appellate court was required to examine whether the approver's story and the confessions were corroborated as to each accused. A central procedural issue raised at trial — and addressed on appeal — concerned the admissibility under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act of statements made by the accused when they produced or offered to produce the stolen property.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether statements made by accused in police custody that they "would point out the place where [their] share of the property ... was buried" (and related compound statements) are admissible in evidence under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, and if so, whether the whole compound statement or only the portion directly leading to discovery may be admitted.
  2. What is the evidential value of the production (or accounting) of stolen property by the accused as corroboration of an approver's story and co-accused confessions, and whether such production suffices to identify each accused with the offence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as represented in the opinion)

  • Mr. Abhyankar, for the accused, argued that the whole of the statements alleged to have been made by the accused in police custody should have been excluded from evidence. He relied on authorities concerning the proper scope of section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • He referred specifically to Reg. v. Jora Hasji and Emperor v. Shivputraya in support of excluding those statements.

Respondent's / Trial Court's Position (as recorded)

  • The learned Sessions Judge admitted the whole of the panch's account of the accused' statements (Exhibit 19) under section 27, reasoning that the information notified the police that the property was stolen and led to the production of the property.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Reg. v. Jora Hasji That the fact discovered must be itself relevant to the case, and the connection must be such that the statement constituted the information through which the discovery was made (as stated by Mr. Justice West). The court noted the correctness of the principle but observed difficulty in its application to compound statements like "I will produce my share of the property"; the decision did not compel exclusion of statements of the kind made in this case, but the court treated it as an instructive authority on section 27.
Emperor v. Shivputraya Consideration of section 27 (case law addressing the proper scope of the provision). Referenced by the defence (per the opinion) as authority on section 27; the judges discussed it in the context of the admissibility issue but did not extract a distinct new rule from it in this report.
Queen-Empress v. Nana (Full Bench) Held that where an accused said, inter alia, "I have kept it" and "I will point it out" and "I buried it in the fields," only the part that distinctly set the police in motion and led to the discovery (the burial in the fields / pointing out) was admissible under section 27; admissions that he "had kept" the property were inadmissible. The court treated this Full Bench decision as authoritative and followed its reasoning: only the part of a compound statement that distinctly relates to the discovery of the hidden property is admissible under section 27; other incriminating parts must be excluded under section 25.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis focused primarily on the interplay between sections 25 and 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and on the nature of what constitutes a "fact discovered" under section 27.

Beaumont, C.J., set out the statutory scheme: section 25 bars proof of confessions made to police officers; section 26 permits confessions made before a Magistrate; section 27 provides an exception permitting proof of so much of information received from an accused in custody as "relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered."

The Judges treated the "fact discovered" as a concrete fact (in this case, the location and production of hidden stolen property). Where an accused gives a compound statement containing several components (for example: an admission that a dacoity was committed; an admission of participation; a statement that he received property; and a statement as to where that property is hidden), the court held that only the component that directly led to the discovery of the hidden property is admissible under section 27. The other components — admissions of the offence, participation, or that it was "their share" — are inculpatory and fall within the prohibition of section 25 and therefore are not admissible as confessions made to police.

The court observed that while a police officer testifying cannot "dissect" a recorded compound statement for admission purposes, it is the judicial function (the Judge receiving the evidence) to identify and admit only that part of the information that distinctly relates to the discovered fact. Beaumont explicitly held that the learned Sessions Judge erred in admitting the entire compound statement attributed to the accused; only that part indicating the location of hidden property should have been admitted.

Broomfield, J., agreed and amplified the point by reference to the authorities relied on. He acknowledged the instructive dicta in Reg. v. Jora Hasji but regarded the Full Bench decision in Queen-Empress v. Nana as dispositive: only the statement that set the police in motion to discover the property (e.g., a statement that property was buried at a place and the accused would point it out) is admissible under section 27. Accordingly, Broomfield held that the phrases "their share of the property" and "stolen in the Dahiwadi dacoity" are not necessarily connected with the discovery and must be excluded under section 27.

On corroboration, Beaumont noted that the approver's and confessors' accounts allocated approximately Rs. 88–93 (about Rs. 90) to each dacoit, and that many accused produced or accounted for about that amount — mainly in rupee coins — which lends cumulative weight to the prosecution case. However, he emphasized that corroboration must identify each accused with the offence; the general truth of an approver's narrative is not sufficient if there is no specific corroborative evidence linking a particular accused to the offence.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that only that portion of a statement made by an accused in custody which "relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered" — namely the statement that the accused would point out the place where hidden property was buried (i.e., the part that set the police in motion and led to discovery) — is admissible under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Other elements of a compound statement (admissions of dacoity, participation, or that the property was "their share" or "stolen in the Dahiwadi dacoity") are inadmissible as confessions under section 25 and must be excluded.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the trial record: the learned Sessions Judge erred in admitting the entire compound statements attributed to the accused; only the discrete portion enabling discovery should have been admitted. The evidence that the produced property formed part of the stolen property must be established by material other than the excluded portions of those statements.
  • Corroboration requirement: while the production by accused of sums approximating their alleged shares and in the same form as the stolen money has cumulative evidential force, the court emphasized that corroboration must be sufficient to identify each accused with the offence. The approver's general narrative, even if substantially true, cannot alone suffice against each accused without specific corroborating evidence.
  • The opinion applies and follows existing authorities (notably Queen-Empress v. Nana) on the proper scope of section 27 rather than purporting to establish a novel, broader rule.

Order: "Order accordingly." (The report notes that the remainder of the judgment is not material for this report.)

Show all summary ...

Beaumont, C.J:—

This is an appeal by ten accused persons against their convictions for dacoity under sections 396 and 402 of the Indian Penal Code by the Sessions Judge of Sholapur. The dacoity took place on January 18, 1931, and the property stolen consisted mostly of cash.

The prosecution evidence is that about Rs. 1,700 were lost in the dacoity of which the great bulk consisted of one rupee coins though there were a certain number of coins of smaller denomination. A certain amount of other property was also lost, but most of the property was cash. The owner of the house where the dacoity took place, Darayappa, was so injured by the dacoits that he died ten days later.

The evidence consists in the first place of the story of an approver and the confessions of three accused, viz., Nos. 1, 8 and 9, which story and confessions inculpate all the accused, and we have to look at the evidence against the several accused in order to see whether the story of the approver is corroborated, and, in the case of those accused who did not confess, whether the story of the approver and the confessions of the co-accused are corroborated.

Now the principal evidence of corroboration is the production of stolen property by the several accused. I will deal with the particular property produced by the different accused later, but there is a preliminary point which is raised, and which has to be disposed of, as to the admissibility of statements made by the accused when the property was produced. According to the evidence of the panch witness, Exhibit 19, each of the accused, except accused No. 9, first gave information that he would point out the place where his share of the property stolen in the Dahiwadi dacoity case was buried and offered to produce the same. Now the learned Judge has admitted the whole of that statement under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, because he says that the information first gave the police notice that all the property was stolen, and led up to the production of the property. The construction of section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act may in a good many cases I think involve difficulty. The section is, both in form and in substance, a proviso on the preceding sections. Section 25 provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. Then section 26 makes an exception in respect of a confession recorded before a Magistrate, and then section 27 introduces another exception and provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. The fact discovered within the meaning of that section must, I think, be some concrete fact to which the information directly relates, and in this case such fact is the production of certain property which had been concealed. Now if an accused gives information to the police in a form which divides such information under several heads, the case is simple. Supposing he says: “There was a dacoity committed at such and such a place on such and such a date; I took part in it; I received certain property as my share; and my share of the property is buried at a place which I will show you.” It is, I think, quite clear that of such information it is only the last sentence, dealing with the place where the property is buried, which is admissible under section 27, and the other statements are not admissible as confessions, having regard to section 25. But supposing the accused, as the accused would appear to have done in this case, gives his information in the form of a compound statement, the position is not so clear. Suppose he says: “I will produce the share which I received in such and such a dacoity.” The police officer to whom that statement is made is not at liberty himself to dissect it, and give evidence of part of it only. He can only state the fact of what information was given to him. But it seems to me that when the Judge gets the evidence of that information, he must, before he records it as evidence or leaves it to the jury, divide the sentence into what are really its component parts, and only admit that part which has led to the discovery of the particular fact, viz., the hidden property. I think the Judge must have regard to the fact, that the information, expressed as it is in a single sentence, really involves first an admission that there was a dacoity, secondly an admission that the accused took part in it, thirdly an admission that he got part of the property, and fourthly a statement as to where the property is. The first three parts of the dissected sentence are not admissible in evidence, but the fourth part is. That seems to me to be the effect of sections 25 and 27 read together, and I think that such a construction is justified by the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Queen-Empress v. Nana. I think, therefore, that the learned Judge was not correct in treating the whole of the statement, which the panch attributes to the accused, as being relevant evidence, and that he ought only to have treated that part as relevant which shows that the accused had hidden property which they were willing to produce. The evidence that the property formed part of the stolen property must be looked for elsewhere than in the statements of the accused. I propose, therefore, to deal with the evidence on this basis.

There is one other general observation which I will make about the evidence. According to the approver and all the three confessing accused the share of each of the dacoits came to approximately Rs. 90. The stories do not agree as to the exact amount but they vary only between Rs. 88 and Rs. 93, so that according to the stories each accused got Rs. 90 or thereabouts. The evidence is that practically all the accused either produced or accounted for about Rs. 90, and that the money was produced mainly in rupee coins and the cumulative effect of all the accused producing just about the amount of their alleged respective shares in the dacoity, and producing it in the form in which the money was stolen, must, I think, have weight with us in deciding whether the story of the approver and the three confessions are true or not. But one has to remember that in the case of each accused the corroboratory evidence must be such as serves to identify the accused with the offence. It is very easy for an approver who took part in an offence to give a substantially correct statement of how the offence was carried out, and the statement may be perfectly correct as to the names of (say) ten persons who are said to have taken part in the offence; but it may be that there are incorporated into the statement the names of one or two persons who really did not take part in the offence, but against whom the approver has feelings of enmity. Therefore it is not enough to say that we think that the general truth of the approver's story is established. We must be satisfied that as against each accused there is some corroboratory evidence which shows that accused took part in the dacoity. [The rest of the judgment is not material for the purposes of this report.]

Broomfield, J.:—I agree….

I only desire to add a few remarks as to the admissibility of certain statements alleged to have been made by the accused while in police custody, and as to the value which ought to be attached under the circumstances of the case to the production of certain sums of money by the accused as corroboration of the evidence given by the approver. The statements which the accused are alleged to have made have been deposed to by the panch witness as follows:—

“Every accused, except accused No. 9, first gave us information that he would point out the place where his share of the property stolen in the Dahiwadi dacoity case was buried and offered to produce the same.”

Mr. Abhyankar for the accused has argued, as I understand him, that the whole of these statements should have been excluded. He referred us to two authorities, Reg. v. Jora Hasji and Emperor v. Shivputraya. These were both cases in which the provisions of section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act were considered. In the former case Mr. Justice West said (p. 244):—

“Whatever be the nature of the fact discovered, that fact must, in all cases, be itself relevant to the case, and the connection between it and the statement made must have been such that statement constituted the information through which the discovery was made, in order to render the statement admissible.”

These propositions are doubtless perfectly correct. The difficulty is in their application to concrete cases, and the particular statements of which Mr. Justice West gave examples were not such as to cause the same difficulty that we have found in this case. In such a statement as “You will find a stick at such and such a place; I killed Rama with it”, it is very easy to separate the part of the statement which is incriminating from the part of the statement which led to the discovery of the fact and say that the former part must be excluded and the latter only admitted. I do not, however, find anything in this case or in the case of Emperor v. Shivputraya which necessarily implies that a statement such as the one we have to deal with here (“I will produce my share of the property stolen in the dacoity”) is barred by section 27.

A much more important case in that connection is the Full Bench decision in Queen-Empress v. Nana. The statements which the Court considered in that case were these:— The accused was asked where the property was. He said in reply: “Yes, I have kept it. I will point it out. I have buried it in the fields.” He also made a second statement at the time of pointing out the property to the effect that he had buried it there. Of all these statements the only one which the Court held to be admissible was the first statement that he had buried the property in the fields. That was admitted on the ground that it set the police in motion and led to the discovery of the property. Even the accused's statement that he had kept the property was held to be inadmissible on the ground that it was not necessarily connected with the fact discovered. With respect, I agree with the reasoning in this judgment, and I think on the authority of it we ought to hold that the only part of the statements of the accused in this case which can be admitted under section 27 is the statement that they would point out the places where the property was buried. The words “their share of the property” and the words “stolen in the Dahiwadi dacoity” must be excluded on the ground that they are not necessarily connected with, and do not distinctly relate to, the discovery of the property. [The rest of the judgment is not material for the purposes of this report.]

Order accordingly.
J.G.R