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Mukat Singh And Others Defts v. Misra Paras Ram And Another Plffs.

Allahabad High Court
Jul 30, 1923
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Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs-respondents brought a suit for recovery of possession of a house and a wall which they alleged to have purchased at an auction sale executed against Mukat Singh and other defendants. The plaintiffs alleged they purchased the house on 5 November 1914 and obtained possession through the court on 12 January 1917. After obtaining possession, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants took the house from them on an agreement to pay a rent of Re. 1 per mensem, with an understanding that the defendants would vacate the house whenever the plaintiffs demanded.

The defendants denied being tenants and said they had no knowledge of the auction sale; they contended that, even if they were tenants, they could not have been ejected without notice. They also pleaded that they were cultivators and that any sale was invalid.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim on the ground that no tenancy was proved. The lower appellate court reversed in part, finding that the plaintiffs had purchased at auction and obtained formal possession, and that the defendants had subsequently taken a lease on an agreement to pay Re. 1 per mensem. The appellate court further addressed the question of notice and relied on a precedent (Haidri Begam v. Nathu) to hold that a challenge based on lack of prior denial of title could not be sustained.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under the facts alleged (an agreement that the defendants would vacate on demand), Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act required prior notice before ejecting the defendants.
  2. Whether the omission of giving notice was fatal to the plaintiffs' suit for recovery of possession.
  3. Whether the house was legally saleable (i.e., whether objections under the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically Section 60 clause (c), could be raised after the sale had been carried out).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs-Respondents' Allegations

  • They purchased the house at auction on 5 November 1914 and obtained possession through the court on 12 January 1917.
  • After possession, the defendants occupied the house under an agreement to pay a rent of Re. 1 per mensem and agreed to vacate the house whenever the plaintiffs required it.

Defendants' Pleas and Contentions

  • They denied that they were tenants of the plaintiffs and said they had no knowledge of the auction sale.
  • Even if they were tenants, they contended they could not have been ejected without notice.
  • They also pleaded that they were cultivators (ex-zamindars) and that the sale, if any, was invalid and the property was not liable to sale under the Code of Civil Procedure.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Haidri Begam v. Nathu That a ground based on denial of title cannot be sustained where there is no proof that the title was denied prior to the suit. The court observed there was no proof that the defendants had denied the plaintiffs' title prior to the suit and applied Haidri Begam v. Nathu to reject that ground.
Umed v. Jas Ram That a judgment-debtor who refrained from raising objections to a sale in execution or from appealing has no right, after the sale, to object that the property sold was not legally saleable. The court applied this principle to hold the defendants could not, after participating in the sale proceedings, challenge the sale on the ground that the property was not legally saleable.
Pandurang Balaji v. Krishnaji Govind Same principle as in Umed v. Jas Ram regarding post-sale objections by a judgment-debtor. The court relied on this precedent together with Umed v. Jas Ram to bar the defendants from raising the objection to saleability at this stage.
Dwarka Nath Pal v. Tarini Sankar Ray Similar view to the foregoing authorities that objections to saleability cannot be raised after sale when they could have been raised earlier. Used as supporting authority for the proposition that the defendants cannot go behind the sale now.
Lala Ram v. Thakur Prasad Similar view to the foregoing authorities regarding post-sale objections. Again cited to support the court's application of the rule barring late objections to the sale.
Katwari v. Sita Ram Tewari An authority relied on by the defendants, but in that case an objection had been taken prior to the sale and no sale had occurred. The court distinguished this case on its facts and rejected the defendants' reliance on it because the objection there was prior to sale.
Malkarjan v. Narhari Lord Hobhouse's language to the effect that a court had done that which by the directions of the Code it ought to do, supporting the idea that strangers to the suit are justified in believing the court had authority to attach and sell the property. The court invoked this language to support the proposition that persons not parties to the original suit may reasonably rely upon the court's authority to attach and sell, and thus the defendants could not now undermine the sale.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed in sequence (a) whether notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was required in the circumstances alleged, and (b) whether the defendants could now challenge the sale on the ground that the property was not liable to sale under the Code of Civil Procedure.

On the notice issue the court reasoned as follows:

  • Section 106 does not require sending notice where there is a contract, local law or usage to the contrary.
  • The plaint alleged that the defendants had agreed to vacate the house on demand. That agreement was supported by the evidence of two witnesses (Lalta Prasad and Sirnam Singh), whom the lower appellate court believed. One witness said a lease was agreed to be written but none was actually reduced to writing. No term for the tenancy was alleged or proved.
  • Given the evidence that the defendants agreed to vacate when the plaintiffs so required, the court held that Section 106 could not be made applicable; consequently the omission to give notice did not render the plaintiffs' suit fatally defective.

On the objection that the house was not liable to sale (under Section 60, clause (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure), the court noted:

  • No issue was framed on that point at trial nor was a finding recorded.
  • There was some evidence the defendants were agriculturists or ex-zamindars, but they were parties to the sale proceedings and had opportunities to raise objections or to appeal at the time of sale or judgment for sale.
  • Relying on authorities (Umed v. Jas Ram; Pandurang Balaji v. Krishnaji Govind; Dwarka Nath Pal v. Tarini Sankar Ray; Lala Ram v. Thakur Prasad), the court applied the settled principle that a judgment-debtor who refrained from raising objections to a sale or appealing cannot, after the sale, object that the property sold was not legally saleable.
  • The court distinguished Katwari v. Sita Ram Tewari because in that case the objection had been raised prior to sale and no sale had occurred; thus Katwari was inapposite on the facts.
  • The court further observed, invoking language from Malkarjan v. Narhari, that parties and persons dealing with sale and execution proceedings are justified in believing that the court had authority to attach and sell and had followed the directions of the Code.

On the basis of the foregoing analysis the court concluded the defendants could not successfully resurrect objections to the sale or the omission of notice, and accordingly dismissed the appeal with costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED

Implications and consequences:

  • The judgment affirms that where occupants have agreed to vacate a property on demand, Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not require prior notice and omission of such notice is not necessarily fatal to recovery of possession (given the testimonial evidence accepted by the court).
  • The defendants, as parties to the execution and sale proceedings who did not raise timely objections or appeal, are precluded from raising after-the-sale objections that the property was not legally saleable.
  • The direct effect is to dismiss the appeal and uphold the plaintiffs' entitlement to recover possession; the court applied existing authorities rather than announcing any new precedent.
Show all summary ...

1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiffs-respondents for the recovery of possession of a certain house and a wall which they allege to have purchased at an auction sale held in execution of a decree against Mukat Singh and the other defendants. The allegation of the plaintiffs was that they purchased the house on the 5th of November, 1914 and got possession through court on the 12th of January, 1917 and that after such possession had been obtained the defendants, took the house from them on an agreement to pay a rent of Re. 1 per mensem. It was further stated that it was settled at the time that the plaintiffs would, when they would like, be entitled to have the house vacate. The defendants denied the tenancy and pleaded that they had no knowledge of the auction sale and that even if the defendants were proved to be the tenants of the plaintiffs, they could not have been ejected without notice. There was a further plea that they were cultivators and that the sale, if any, was invalid.

2. The court of first instance dismissed the claim, holding that no tenancy was proved.

3. The lower appellate court, however, held that the plaintiffs had purchased the house at auction on the 5th of November, 1914 and got formal possession in 1917 and that the defendants had subsequently taken a lease of the house from the plaintiffs on an agreement to pay a rent of Re. 1 per mensem. On the question of notice, the latter court observed that inasmuch as the defendants had denied the title of the plaintiffs no notice was necessary. There was no proof, however, that the title of the plaintiffs had been denied prior to the suit; and as held in Haidri Begam v. Nathu (1) that ground cannot be sustained.

4. But it still remains to consider whether a notice was in the circumstances alleged in the plaint at all necessary. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (No. IV of 1882) does not require the sending of such a notice where there is a contract or local law or usage to the contrary. The allegation in the plaint was that the defendants had agreed to vacate the house on demand. That agreement was sought to be proved by the evidence of two witnesses, Lalta Prasad and Sirnam Singh, whom the lower appellate court believed. Those witnesses said that the defendants had agreed to vacate the house whenever the plaintiffs wanted them to do so. One witness also said that a lease was agreed to be written out, but it is admitted that none was actually reduced to writing. There is no allegation that any term was fixed for the tenancy; and in view of the evidence, which goes to show that the defendants had agreed to vacate the house when the plaintiffs wanted, Section 106 cannot be made applicable and the omission to give the notice cannot be regarded as fatal to the present suit.

5. It remains also to consider the other objection taken by the defendants in the trial court, namely that the house in question was not liable to ??? Section 60, Clause (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. No issue was framed on that point by the trial court or finding recorded. There is some evidence to show that the defendants are agriculturists or ex-zamindars; but it is not open to them at this stage to go behind the sale proceeding to which they were parties and set up a plea which they had omitted to raise at the time of the judgment or prior to the safe. As held in Umed v. Jas Ram (2) and Pandurang Balaji v. Krishnaji Govind (3), a judgment-debtor, who might have raised objections to a sale in execution of a decree against him but who has refrained from doing so or who might have appealed against the order for sale, has no right after the sale has been carried out to prefer an objection that the property sold was not legally saleable. In Dwarka Nath Pal v. Tarini Sankar Ray (4) and Lala Ram v. Thakur Prasad (5) a similar view was taken.

6. On behalf of the defendants reliance is placed on a decision in Katwari v. Sita Ram Tewari (6) but in that case an objection was taken prior to the sale and no sale had, in fact, taken place. So far as the parties to the sale and execution proceedings are concerned, a person who is a stranger to the suit is justified in believing that the court had authority to attach and sell the property or to use the language of Lord Hobhouse in Malkarjan v. Narhari (7) that the court had done that which by the directions of the Code it ought to do. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.

7. Appeal dismissed.