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Ishan Chandra Bakshi v. Sefatulla Sikdar And Ors.

Calcutta High Court
Aug 18, 1921
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent arises from a judgment of Mr. Justice Newbould in an appeal from an Appellate Decree relating to a suit for recovery of possession and declaration of title. The plaintiff asserted that the disputed land formed part of an occupancy holding held by Biswambhur Bakshi at an annual rent of Rs. 6-4-0 under the Sinha Rays. That occupancy holding had been sold in 1900 in execution of a decree for arrears of rent and purchased by Prosanna Chandra Bhattacharjya; later, on 23 April 1913, the occupancy was again sold in execution for arrears and purchased by the landlords themselves. The plaintiff obtained a settlement from the landlords on 24 February 1915 but could not obtain possession, and instituted the suit on 10 January 1916.

The defendants contended that the disputed tract never formed part of the Rs. 6-4-0 occupancy under the Sinha Rays but was included in a separate tenancy held by Biswambhur Bakshi and Gobinda Bakshi at Rs. 9-4-0 payable directly to the Raja of Dighapatya. The Trial Court found for the plaintiff, holding the land was part of the Rs. 6-4-0 tenancy. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge did not decide that primary question; instead he assumed (for the sake of argument) that the land was part of the Rs. 6-4-0 tenancy and held that the defendants and their predecessors had acquired title by adverse possession, which constituted an "incumbrance" that the purchaser at the rent-sale could have but had not annulled under Section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act read with Section 159.

The Subordinate Judge made factual findings about earlier mortgage and purchases (including an 1896 mortgage-sale purchase by Abinash Chandra Bhattacharjya and transfer in 1898 to Harinath Mookerjee) and found that neither Prosanna Chandra Bhattacharjya nor his successors ever possessed the land as part of the Rs. 6-4-0 tenancy. He concluded the defendants had acquired title by adverse possession, and that such statutory title was an incumbrance within Section 159 which the purchaser at the rent-sale was bound to annul under Section 167. Mr. Justice Newbould approved that view, supported by a long line of earlier decisions in this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the disputed land formed part of the occupancy holding of Rs. 6-4-0 held by Biswambhur Bakshi under the Sinha Rays or formed part of the tenancy of Rs. 9-4-0 held by Biswambhur Bakshi and Gobinda Bakshi under the Raja of Dighapatya.
  2. Whether a statutory title or interest acquired by a trespasser by adverse possession of part of the lands of a defaulting tenure or holding constitutes an "incumbrance" within the meaning of Section 159 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and if so, whether that incumbrance can be annulled only by the procedure prescribed in Section 167.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff contended that the disputed land formed part of the occupancy holding of Biswambhur Bakshi at a rent of Rs. 6-4-0 under the Sinha Rays, and thus the plaintiff was entitled to possession following the purchase/settlement sequence described.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants contended that the disputed tract never formed part of the Rs. 6-4-0 occupancy under the Sinha Rays but was included in a separate tenancy of Rs. 9-4-0 held by Biswambhur Bakshi and Gobinda Bakshi payable to the Raja of Dighapatya; accordingly, on the facts set out (including purchases and possession following mortgage sale and transfer), they had acquired title by adverse possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gakul (Gokul) Bagdi v. Debendra Nath Sen (11 Ind. Cas. 453) Shows the term "incumbrance" had been repeatedly used by the Indian Legislature in a well-recognised sense in land- and revenue-law. Cited as authority for the established statutory meaning of "incumbrance".
Lukhmeer Khan v. Collector of Rajshahye (1851) (12 Ind. Dec. (O. S.) 641) Interpreted Section 27 of the Revenue Sale Law, 1841 to mean that interest acquired by an adverse possessor was an encumbrance. Relied on as early authority that adverse possessory interest amounts to an encumbrance on land sold for arrears.
Ramsunkur v. Bejoy Govind Boral (1852) Similar interpretation of revenue sale provisions to treat adverse possessory interest as an encumbrance. Used as supporting authority for the same principle.
Goluck Monee v. Huro Chunder (8 W. Rule 62) Construction of revenue sale provisions treating adverse possession interest as an encumbrance. Cited among cases construing similar statutory phrases.
Thakore Bass v. Nubeen Kishen (15 W. Rule 552) Same line of construction. Listed as part of the established authorities.
Narain Chunder v. Tayler (4 C. 103) Interpreting revenue-sale style phraseology in the same sense. Cited as additional supporting authority.
Karmi Khan v. Brojo Nath Das (22 C. 244) Holds that interest acquired by a trespasser by adverse possession is an incumbrance. Relied upon as authority both before and after the Bengal Tenancy Act to include adverse possession within "incumbrance".
Moisuddi (Moizudi) Biswas v. Ishan Chandra Das (7 Ind. Cas. 849) Rule that adverse possessory interest is an incumbrance. Cited as a directly relevant precedent supporting the Court's construction.
Khontomoni Dasi v. Bijoy Chand (19 C. 787) Interpreting Section 11 of the Patni Regulation, 1819, to hold that interest by a trespasser in adverse possession is an incumbrance. Used to show the concept existed in earlier regulations and was consistently applied.
Gopendro Chunder v. Mokaddam Hossein (21 C. 702) Similar holding under Patni Regulation interpretations. Included among authorities establishing the meaning of "incumbrance".
Nuffer Chandra Pal v. Rajendra Lal Goswami (25 C. 167) Same line of authority. Cited as supporting precedent.
Prodyote Kumar Tagore v. Rakhal Chandra Sarkar (5 Ind. Cas. 243) Similar construction under earlier revenue/land law provisions. Counted among decisions construing trespasser interests as incumbrances.
Kalikonanda Mukherjee v. Bipro Das Pal (26 Ind. Cas. 486) Authority for the same proposition (adverse possession interest as incumbrance). Cited as a significant precedent in the established line of cases.
Section 16, Sales of Under-Tenures Act, 1865 / Mahomed Askur v. Mahomed Wasuck (22 W. Rule 413) The Sales of Under-Tenures Act contains similar provisions interpreted to treat adverse possession interest as an encumbrance. Used to show the principle's application across related statutory contexts.
Womesh Chander Goopta v. Raj Narain Roy (10 W. Rule 15) (Section 105, Bengal Rent Law 1859) Application of the same principle in sales under rent law provisions. Cited as part of the consistent judicial approach.
Sections 70 and 71, Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 / Mahomed Nasim v. Kasi Nath Ghose (26 C. 194) Comparable statutory provisions construed in the same way. Provided additional support from a different regional regulation.
Aptar Ali v. Brojendra Kishore Roy (28 Ind. Cas. 119) Related authority cited alongside Assam Regulation cases. Included to bolster the generality of the principle across statutes.
Surja Kanta Acharjya Bahadur v. Sarat Chandra Roy (Judicial Committee) Ruled that the period of limitation for adverse possession against purchaser at sale for arrears commences from the date of the sale. Cited to support the revenue-law context and application of limitation principles relevant to sales for arrears.
Gokul/Gakul Bagdi v. Debendra Nath Sen (11 Ind. Cas. 453) (again) Post-Bengal Tenancy Act interpretative authority treating adverse possession as an encumbrance. Cited among post-enactment authorities confirming the construction.
Arsadulla v. Munseb Ali (14 Ind. Cas. 349) Authority interpreting the Bengal Tenancy Act to include adverse possession within "incumbrance". Listed as one of the series of decisions supporting the Court's view.
Satish Chandra v. Muniamali Debt (15 Ind. Cas. 869) Same interpretive line. Included as supporting precedent.
Bhutan Chandra Ghosh v. Srakanta Banerjee (33 Ind. Cas. 957) Same principle under Bengal Tenancy Act. Used to demonstrate continuity of the approach in later cases.
Monmotha Nath Mitter v. Anath Bunthu Pal (61 Ind. Cas. 469) Another decision treating adverse possession as an incumbrance under relevant statutes. Cited as part of the accumulated authority.
Kumar Kalanani Singh v. Syed Sarafat Hossein (12 C. W. N. 528) Represents a conflicting view: that an adverse possessor whose title ripens by prescription becomes essentially a co-owner and not merely the holder of an encumbrance. Not followed; cited to acknowledge contrary decisions but the Court declined to adopt that view.
Rahim-ud-Din v. Bhabagana Debya (1 Ind. Cas. 80) Part of the group of authorities challenging the view that adverse possession is an encumbrance. Not followed; mentioned as part of the contrary line of cases.
Baikuntha Nath Rai v. Basanta-Kumari Dasi (34 Ind. Cas. 946) Another decision suggesting the adverse possessor becomes co-owner in essence. Not adopted by the Court; acknowledged as an opposing view.
Aftar Ali v. Brojendra Kishore (37 Ind. Cas. 252) Also cited among cases taking the opposite view. Not followed; noted for completeness.
Jitendra Kumar Pal v. Mohendra Chandra Sarma (97 Ind. Cas. 239) Part of the contrary authorities. Referred to but not adopted.
Mohim Chandra Deb v. Piyare Lal Das (39 Ind. Cas. 213) Included in the list of cases that maintain the adverse possessor becomes co-owner. Not followed by the Court; acknowledged but rejected in favor of established line.
Bipradas Pal v. Kamini Kumar (Judicial Committee) Contains an observation by Lord Phillimore noted by the Court; related to affirmation of Kalikonanda Mukherjee v. Bipro Das Pal. Referred to when noting higher authority comments affirming earlier decisions.
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Cameron (1864) 11 H. L. Cas. 443 English authority for the presumption that when later statutes use the same words as earlier statutes which have received judicial construction, the legislature intended the same meaning. Applied to support inference that the Legislature, using terms in pari materia, intended the established judicial meaning of "incumbrance".
Ruckmaboye v. Lulloobhboy (5 M. I. A. 234) Similar authority (Sir John Jervis) supporting the presumption about legislative adoption of judicially construed terms. Cited to reinforce the presumption of continuity in legislative language interpretation.
Campbell, Ex parte, Cathcart, In re (1870) 5 Ch. App. 708 Also supports the principle regarding legislative use of previously judicially construed words. Used to buttress the interpretive presumption invoked by the Court.
Young v. Robertson (1862) 4 Macq. 314 Authority illustrating reluctance of courts to disturb long-established constructions of law. Cited as support for the Court's reluctance to depart from long-established decisions.
Owners of Steamship Mediana v. Owners, Master and Crew of Lightship "Comet" (1900) App. Cas. 113 Authority on not unsettling law where long-established decisions exist. Relied upon as part of the rationale to adhere to precedent.
Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Co. (1914) A. C. 25 Illustrates the court's caution in overruling long-standing authorities absent legislative action. Cited to justify maintaining the settled line of authority on "incumbrance".

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by tracing the historical and statutory use of the word "incumbrance" in Indian land- and revenue-law and in decisions interpreting earlier revenue sale and tenancy statutes. It observed that numerous earlier authorities had construed similar statutory phrases (in various Revenue Sale Laws, the Patni Regulation, the Sales of Under-Tenures Act and related regulations) to include an interest acquired by an adverse possessor as an encumbrance.

The Court applied a textual and precedential methodology: because the same term had been judicially construed in earlier statutes in pari materia, there is a presumption that the Legislature, in using the same words in the Bengal Tenancy Act (Sections 159 and 161), intended the same meaning. The Court relied on English authorities (e.g., Mersey Docks) explaining and supporting this presumption of legislative intent when identical words are used across statutes.

The Court acknowledged that a body of decisions existed which took a contrary view — namely that an adverse possessor whose title has ripened by prescription effectively becomes a co-owner and that his interest cannot logically be deemed an encumbrance. The Court admitted that, if the matter were wholly open (res integra), that contrary view might invite serious argument. Nonetheless, the Court emphasized the importance of legal stability, the security of property and title, and the weight of long-established judicial construction. It therefore declined to depart from the long line of decisions holding that an adverse possessory interest constitutes an incumbrance.

On that basis, the Court held that the word "incumbrance" in Sections 159 and 161 of the Bengal Tenancy Act includes statutory title and interest acquired by a trespasser by adverse possession of part of the lands of the defaulting tenure or holding, and that such an encumbrance cannot be annulled except by the procedure expressly provided in Section 167.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court affirmed Mr. Justice Newbould's decree and held that the word incumbrance, as used in Sections 159 and 161 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, includes statutory title and interest acquired by a trespasser by adverse possession of part of the lands of the defaulting tenure or holding, and that such encumbrance can only be annulled in the manner prescribed by Section 167.

Disposition: The appeal is dismissed and the decree of Mr. Justice Newbould is affirmed; costs were awarded against the appellant.

Implications: As a direct effect, the appellant's challenge fails and the decree below stands. More broadly, the decision confirms and reaffirms a long-established line of authorities interpreting "incumbrance" to include statutory title acquired by adverse possession and underscores that such encumbrances are remediable only by the statutory procedure in Section 167. The Court signalled that it would be reluctant to unsettle that established construction in the absence of legislative change.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal under clause lo of the Letters Patent from the judgment of Mr. Justice Newbould in an Appeal from Appellate Decree in a suit for recovery of possession of land on declaration of title. The plaintiff claimed the disputed land as included in an occupancy holding held by one Biswambhur Bakshi at an annual rent of Rs. 6-4-0 under the Sinha Rays who were tenure holders under the Raja of Dighapatya. The occupancy holding was sold in 1900 in execution of a decree for arrears of rent, when it was purchased by one Prosanna Chandra Bhattacharjya. His representatives made default in the payment of rent, and the occupancy holding was again sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent on the 23rd April 1913 when it was purchased by the landlords themselves. The plaintiff took settlement from the landlords on the 24th February 1915, but was unable to obtain possession of the disputed area. The result was the institution of this suit on the 10th January 1916. The defendants resisted the claim on the ground that the tract in suit never formed part of the occupancy holding held by Biswambhur Bakshi under the Sinha Rays and was in reality included in a tenancy held by Biswambhur Bakshi and Gobinda Bakshi at an annual rant of Rs. 9-4-0 payable directly to the Raja of Dighapatya. The question consequently arose, whether the disputed land was included in the tenancy of Rs. 6-4-0 hell by Biswambhur Bakshi under the Sinha Rays or in the tenancy of Rs. 9-4-0 held by Biswambhur Bakshi and Gobinda Bakshi under the Raj of Dighapatya. The Trial Court answered this question in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. On appeal the Subordinate Judge did not determine this question, but held that, on the assumption that the land was included in the tenancy of Rs. 6-4-0 held by Biswambhur Bakshi under the Sinha Rays, the defendants and their predecessors had acquired a title by adverse possession which constituted an incumbarance and could have been, but had not beer, annulled by the grantor of the plaintiff under Section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, read with Section 159. The Subordinate Judge found upon the evidence that, on the 21st May 18 6 one Abinash Chandra Bhattacharjya, in execution of a mortgage decree held by him against Biswambhur Bakshi and Gobinda Bakshi, purchased their tenancy of Rs. 9-4-0 under the Raja of Dighapatya, that on the 29th November 1898 the purchaser transferred the tenancy to Harinath Mookerjee (one of the defendants in this suit), and that, same the mortgage sale of 1896, Abinash and thereafter Harinath had been in possession of the disputed land as included in the tenancy of Rs. 9-4-0. The Subordinate Judge further found that neither Prosanna Chandra Bhattacharjya nor his successors-in-interest ever possessed the land cis included in the tenancy of Rs. 6-4-0 held by Biswambhur Bakshi under the Sinha Rays, On these findings, the Subordinate Judge held that the defendants had acquired a good title by adverse possession from 1900 it when Prosanna Chandra Bhattacharjya became the purchaser at a rent-sale-tin the 23rd April, 19(sic)3, when the grantors of the plaintiff purchased at another rent-sale. The question thus emerged for consideration, whether the statutory title by adverse possession acquired by the defendants against the tenant for whose fault the holding of Rs. 6-1-0 was brought to sale, was an incumbrance within the meaning of Section 159 of the Bengal Tenancy Act which the purchaser at the rent-sale was competent and bound to annul in the prescribed method, namely, in the manner directed in Section 167. The Subordinate Judge answered this question in the affirmative, and his view has been approved by Mr. Justice Newbould, as supported by a long line of decisions in this Court.

2. The term "encumbrance" was not introduced for the first time in the bengal tenancy act, but, as was (jointed out in Gakul Bagdi v. Debendra Nath Sen 11 Ind. Cas. 453 : 14 C. L. J. 186., had been repeatedly used by the Indian Legislature in a well-recognised sense in the statutory provisions of our land-law and. revenue-law. In Lukhmeer Khan v. Collector of Rajshahye (1851) Beng. Section D. A. 824 : 12 Ind. Dec. (O. S.) 641. Section 27 of the Revenue Sale Law, 1841, which provided that a purchaser of an estate sold for the recovery of arrears of revenue due thereon would acquire the estate free from all incumbrances imposed thereupon after the time of settlement, was interpreted to signify that the interest acquired by an adverse possessor was an encumbrance. The same phraseology was reproduced in Section 26 of the Revenue Sale Law, 1845, and was similarly interpreted in Ramsunkur v. Bejoy Govind Boral (1852) Beng. Section D. A. 824 : 12 Ind. Dec. (O. S.) 641. Section 37 of the Revenue Sale Law, 1859, reproduces the same phraseology and has been repeatedly construed in the same sense: Goluck Monee v. Huro Chunder 8 W. Rule 62; Thakore Bass v. Nubeen Kishen 15 W. Rule 552; Narain Chunder v. Tayler 4 C. 103 : 3 C. L. Rule 151 : 2 Shome L. Rule 78 : 2 Ind. Dec. (N. S.) 67; Karmi Khan v. Brojo Nath Das 22 C. 244 : 11 Ind. Dec. (N. S.) 164; Moizudi Biswas v. Ishan Chandra Das 7 Ind. Cas. 849 : 15 C. W. N. 706 : 18 C. L. J. 298., A similar question has arisen upon the construction of section 11 of the patni regulation, 1819, and it has been frequently held that the interest acquired by a trespasser, who has been in adverse possession of part of the lands of the taluk for the statutory period is an incumbrance that has accrued upon it by the act of the defaulting putnidar: Khontomoni Dasi v. Bijoy Chand 19 C. 787 : 9 Ind. Dec. (N. S.) 968; Gopendro Chunder v. Mokaddam Hossein 21 C. 702 : 10 Ind. Dec. (N. S.) 1099; Nuffer Chandra Pal v. Rajendra Lal Goswami 25 C. 167 : 13 Ind. Dec. (N. S.) 113; Prodyote Kumar Tagore v. Rakhal, Chandra Sarkar 5 Ind. Cas. 243 : 11 C. L. J. 209 : 37 C. 322 : 14 C. W. N. 487; Kalikonanda Mukherjee v. Bipro Das Pal 26 Ind. Cas. 486 : 21 C. L. J. 285 : 19 C. W. N. 18 at p. 20. When we turn to Section 16 of the Sales of Under-Tenures Act, 1865, we meet with a similar provision which has been construed in a like manner; Mahomed Askur v. Mahomed Wasuck 22 W. Rule 413. The same principle was applied by Sir Barnes Peacock, C. J., in the case of sales under Section 105 of the Bengal Rent Law, 1859 : Womesh Chander Goopta v. Raj Narain Roy 10 W. Rule 15. A similar view has been adopted with reference to Sections 70 and 71 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886, Mahomed Nasim v. Kasi Nath Ghose 26 C. 194 : 3 C. W. N. 108 : 13 Ind. Dec. (N. S.) 729; Aptar Ali v. Brojendra Kishore Roy 28 Ind. Cas. 119 : 20 C. L. J. 210. This is supported by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Surja Kanta Acharjya Bahadur v. Sarat Chandra Roy ., where it was ruled that the period of limitation for adverse possession against the purchaser at a sale for arrears under the Revenue Sale Law, 1859, only commences to run from the date of the sale, It is thus undeniable that, at the time when the bengal tenancy act was passed, the term "incumbrance" had a well-recognised meaning in connection with provisions in Statutes in pari materia. It is equally incontestable that, since the bengal tenancy act came into operation, the word "incumbrance" as used in Sections 159 and 161 has been interpreted to include a statutory title and interest acquired by a trespasser by adverse possession of a part of the lands of the defaulting tenure or holding: Karmi Khan v. Brojo Nath Das 22 C. 244 : 11 Ind. Dec. (N. S.) 164; Moisuddi Biswas v. Ishan Chandra Das 7 Ind. Cas. 849 : 15 C. W. N. 706 : 18 C. L. J. 298. Gokul Bagdi v. Debendra Nath Sen 11 Ind. Cas. 453 : 14 C. L. J. 186. Arsadulla v. Munseb Ali 14 Ind. Cas. 349 : 16 C. L. J. 539 : 16 C. W. N. 831; Satish Chandra v. Muniamali Debt 15 Ind. Cas. 869 : 17 c. W. N. 840. Bhutan Chandra Ghosh v. Srakanta Banerjee 33 Ind. Cas. 957 : 23 C. L. J. 485 : 21 C. W. N. 155 : 46 C. 756; Monmotha Nath Mitter v. Anath Bunthu Pal 61 Ind. Cas. 469 : 25 C. W. N. 106., We have bean pressed to hold, however, that the view which hag obtained in this Court far well-nigh seventy years as to the meaning of the term "incumbrance" is erroneous and is not logically reconcileable with the position maintained in Kumar Kalanani Singh v. Syed Sarafat Hossein 12 C. W. N. 528; Rahim-ud-Din v. Bhabagana Debya 1 Ind. Cas. 80 : 18 C. W. N. 407; Baikuntha Nath Rai V. Basanta-Kumari Dasi 34 Ind. Cas. 946 : 23 C. L. J. 164; Aftar All v. Brojendra Kishore 37 Ind. Cas. 252 : 24 C. L. J. 60; Jitendra Kumar Pal v. Mohendra Chandra Sarma 97 Ind. Cas. 239 : 24 C. L. J. 62. and Mohim Chandra Deb v. Piyare Lal Das 39 Ind. Cas. 213 : 25 C. L. J. 99 : 21 C. W. N. 537 : 44 C. 412; namely, that the adverse possessor, when his title has ripened by prescription, becomes in essence a co-owner of the estate, tenure or holding, as the case may be, and his interest cannot logically be deemed an incumbrance on the ownership. It need not be disputed that the matter, were it res integra, would be open to serious argument, as, indeed, is indicated by the observation of Lord Phillimore in Bipradas Pal v. Kamini Kumar 66 Ind. Cas. 674 : 41 M. L. J. 638 : 15 L. W. 180 : 30 M. L. T. 133 : 26 C. W. N. 465 : 49 C. 27 : 4 U. P. L. Rule (P. C.) 58. where the Judicial Committee affirmed the decision in Kalihonanda Mukherjee v. Bipro Das Pal 26 Ind. Cas. 486 : 21 C. L. J. 285 : 19 C. W. N. 18 at p. 20. But in the well-known words of Mr. Justice Holmes (Common Law P. 1), the life of the law is not logis but experience. As pointed out by Blackburn, J., in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Cameran (1864) 11 H. L. Cas. 443 at p. 480 : 20 C. B. (N. S.) 56 : 35 L. J. M. C. 1 : 11 Jur. (N. S.) 756 : 13 W. Rule 1069 : 11 E. Rule 1405 : 12 L. T. (N. S.) 648 : 145 Rule R. 256 : 144 E. Rule 1021. where an Act of Parliament had received a judicial construction, putting a certain meaning on its words, and the Legislature in a subsequent Act in pan materia uses the same words, there is a presumption that the Legislature used those words intending to express the meaning which it knew had been put upon the same words before, and, unless there is something to rebut that presumption, the Act should be so construed even if they were such that they might originally have been construed otherwise. To the same effect are the observations of Sir John Jervis, C. J., in Ruckmaboye v. Lulloobhboy 5 M. I. A. 234 : 8 Moo. P. C. 4 : 1 Sar. P. C. J. 423 : 18 E. Rule 884 : 14 E. Rule 2 : 97 Rule R. 1. and of James, L, J. in Campbell, Ex parte, Cathcart, In re (1870) 5 Ch. App. 708 : 23 L. T. 289 : 18 W. Rule 1056. We are further of opinion that the case before ns belongs to that class where the Court should be reluctant to dissent from the view expressed in long established decided cases and thereby not only to unsettle the law but' also to endanger the security of property and title,---dangers whish are not associated with changes brought about by legislative intervention: Young v. Robertson (1862) 4 Macq. 314 at p. 345 : 8 Jur : (N. S.) 825 : 181 Rule R. 788., Owners of Steamship Mediana v. Owners Master and Crew of Lightship "Comet" (1900) App. Cas. 113 : 69 L. J. P. C. 35 : 82 L. T. 95 : 48 W. Rule 398 : 9 Asp. M. C. 41 : 16 T. L. Rule 194; Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat & Gold Storage Co. (1914) A. C. 25 : 83 L. J. Ch. 79 : 109 L. T. 802 : 58 Section J. 97 : 30 T. L. Rule 114. We hold accordingly, in concurrence with Mr. Justice Newbould, that the word incumbrance, as used in Sections 159 and 161 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, includes statutory title and interest acquired by a trespasser by adverse possession of a part of the lands of the defaulting tenure or holding and that such encumbrance cannot be annulled in any manner other than what is provided in Section 167.

3. The result is that the decree made by Mr. Justice Newbould is affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.