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Pran Mohan Das v. Hari Mohan Das

Calcutta High Court
Aug 7, 1924
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Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff sued for recovery of possession of a brick house. The learned Munsif dismissed the suit. On first appeal the learned Subordinate Judge reversed the Munsif and decreed for the Plaintiff. Defendants Nos. 1 and 3–5 pursued this second appeal. The house admittedly belonged to the Plaintiff and was in the possession of Defendant No. 2 (his daughter) and her husband until Defendant No. 2 sold it by a registered kobala in 1916 to Defendants Nos. 1 and 3–5. The Plaintiff alleged the daughter's possession was permissive and brought suit for recovery with mesne profits. Defendant No. 2 contended the Plaintiff had promised to give the house as her dower at marriage, that she obtained it as a gift (allegedly in 1907) and that an unregistered deed of gift was executed in 1909; she and her husband then sold the property in 1916. The Munsif found there was a gift and dismissed the suit despite the absence of a registered conveyance. The Subordinate Judge accepted the findings about the unregistered deed but nevertheless held for the Plaintiff (apparently on the ground that the gift was invalid under section 127 of the Transfer of Property Act). The present Court considered the validity of the antenuptial contract, the effect of possession and improvements by the purchasers, and the applicability of equitable doctrines preventing a party from relying on lack of registration.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the antenuptial promise/gift to Defendant No. 2 at the time of marriage constituted a valid and binding contract despite the absence of a registered conveyance.
  2. Whether Defendants who were put in possession (and purchasers from the donee) could resist the Plaintiff's claim on the principle of part performance/equitable relief despite lack of registration.
  3. Whether the transaction was invalid under section 127 of the Transfer of Property Act (as apparently held or regarded by the Subordinate Judge).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The deed was supported by good and valid consideration because it rested on an antenuptial contract (a promise inducing the marriage).
  • The donee having been put in possession and having held possession for many years could resist the Plaintiff’s claim under the doctrine of part performance/equity.
  • Reliance was placed on Syam Kishore Dey v. Umesh Chandra Bhuttacharya and the cases cited therein.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Reliance on Kalavagunta v. Kalavagunta and Gulabchand v. Fulbai to contend the contract set up by the Defendants was not valid.
  • Submission that the Subordinate Judge did not intend to find any consideration beyond natural love and affection.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Syam Kishore Dey v. Umesh Chandra Bhuttacharya Support for part performance/equitable relief where possession has been given in pursuance of a contract; reliance on equitable doctrine. Accepted as supporting the appellants' contention that equity may treat as done what ought to have been done, preventing reliance on absence of registration.
Kalavagunta v. Kalavagunta Authority relied on by respondent to challenge validity of the contract. Distinguished by the Court as involving marriage-brokerage contracts opposed to public policy, and thus not applicable.
Gulabchand v. Fulbai Authority relied on by respondent to challenge validity of the contract. Distinguished by the Court on the same basis as Kalavagunta (marriage-brokerage, public policy) and not applied.
Gobinda Rani v. Radha Ballabh Statement that antenuptial (marriage) promises may be valid and binding. Relied upon by the Court to affirm that antenuptial promises which induce marriage are valid contracts.
Md. Musa v. Aghore Kumar Affirmation by higher authority of earlier decisions concerning equitable principles referenced. Referred to as having affirmed earlier cases reviewed by Mookerjee, supporting the equitable approach adopted in Syam Kishore Dey.
Walsh v. Lonsdale Equitable doctrine that "equity regards that as done which ought to have been done." Applied via the reasoning in Syam Kishore Dey to justify treating the unregistered transfer as effective in equity under the circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court observed that the Subordinate Judge did not disturb the Munsif's factual findings, and accepted the recital of the unregistered deed; therefore there was a finding of an antenuptial promise that became a binding contract when the marriage took place. The Court held that such antenuptial contracts are well established as valid (citing Gobinda Rani v. Radha Ballabh). The Court distinguished the authorities relied on by the Respondent (Kalavagunta and Gulabchand) as involving marriage-brokerage contracts contrary to public policy and thus inapplicable. Applying the equitable doctrine (as expounded in Syam Kishore Dey and grounded in Walsh v. Lonsdale, and with reference to Md. Musa v. Aghore Kumar), the Court concluded that equity can treat the transfer as effective despite the absence of registration and that the Defendants were estopped from asserting invalidity for want of a registered deed. On this basis the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Subordinate Judge's decree and restored the Munsif's decree with costs.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed: the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge are set aside and the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif are restored with costs in all Courts.

Direct effect: The Plaintiff's claim for recovery was dismissed (restoration of the Munsif's dismissal), so the Defendants retain the benefit of the earlier dismissal and purchasers may rely on the equitable doctrines invoked. The opinion applies existing equitable principles (part performance/Walsh v. Lonsdale) to uphold antenuptial contracts; the Court did not state that it was creating a new precedent beyond applying these established authorities.

Show all summary ...

Chakravarti, J.:— This second appeal by the Defendants Nos. 1 and 3 to 5 arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiff for the recovery of possession of a brick-built house. The suit was dismissed by the learned Munsif but has been decreed on appeal by the learned Subordinate Judge. The facts are shortly these:— The house in question admittedly belonged to the Plaintiff and was also admittedly in possession of the Defendant No. 2 and her husband, until it was sold by Defendant No. 2 to the Defendants Nos. 1 and 3 to 5 by a registered kobala in 1916. The Plaintiff's case is that he permitted Defendant No. 2, his daughter, and her husband to occupy the house as a matter of favour and their possession was permissive and as they have sold the house to the Defendants Nos. 1, 3 to 5, he has brought this suit for recovery of possession of the house with mesne profits. The defence of the Defendant No. 2 was that the Plaintiff promised to make a gift of the house to the Defendant No. 2 as her dower at the time of her marriage and the husband of Defendant No. 2 agreed to marry her on such a promise having been made by her father; that she obtained the house as a gift from her father in 1907, and she and her husband possessed the same in that right, until they sold the house to Defendants Nos. 1 and 3, 4 and 5 for Rs. 431 by a registered kobala in the year 1916 executed by Defendant No. 2 and that since then the purchasers are in possession of the house. The defence of the other Defendants is the same and they further pleaded that since then purchase they have made considerable improvements in the house.

It appears that although Defendant No. 2 was put in possession of the house after her father made a gift of it to her, no registered conveyance was executed by the Plaintiff who, it is alleged, executed an unregistered deed of gift in favour of Defendant No. 2 in 1909.

The learned Munsif found that “the Plaintiff agreed to give the house to Charubala (Defendant No. 2) and that this induced the bridegroom's party to agree to this marriage “and, overruling the objection of the Plaintiff that the transfer was invalid as there was no registered deed, gave effect to the transfer and dismissed the suit.

On appeal by the Plaintiff the learned Subordinate Judge did not set aside any of the findings arrived at by the learned Munsif and on the contrary he found from the recital of the unregistered deed of 1909, “that the house was given to the Defendant No. 2 according to a promise made at the time of marriage and also on account of natural love and affection.” Inspite of these findings, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the Plaintiff was entitled to recover the house from the Defendants. It is difficult to understand the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge as to what the real ground of his decision is. It seems that he held that the gift was invalid under the provisions of sec. 127 of the Transfer of Property Act.

The learned vakil for the Appellants contended that there was good and valid consideration for the deed, because the transfer was made on the basis of an antenuptial contract and that the donee having been put in possession and having held such possession for a number of years was justified in resisting the claim of the Plaintiff on the principle of the doctrine of part performance of a contract and relied upon the case of Syam Kishore Dey v. Umesh Chandra Bhuttacharya(1) and the cases cited in that decision.

The learned vakil for the Respondent relied on the cases of Kalavagunta v. Kalavagunta(2) and Gulabchand v. Fulbai(3) in support of the proposition that the contract set up by the Defendants was not valid and he further contended that the learned Subordinate Judge did not intend to find that there was any consideration except that of natural love and affection.

We are of opinion that there is do doubt that the learned Subordinate Judge did not disturb the findings of the Munsif which have been already set out and the learned Subordinate Judge has accepted the passage which he quotes from the unregistered deed as correct. There is therefore a finding by the Courts below that there was antenuptial promise by the Plaintiff which became a binding contract when the marriage followed. The validity of such contracts are well-established. In the case of Gobinda Rani v. Radha Ballabh(4), Mr. Justice Mookerjee held that such contracts are valid and binding.

The cases cited from Kalavagunta v. Kalavagunta and Gulabchand v. Fulbai are clearly distinguishable on the ground that they are what may be called marriage brokerage contracts for procurement of marriages and are opposed to public policy.

We are therefore of opinion that the contentions of the learned vakil for the Appellants are well-founded and that the contract is valid in law. That being so, the Defendants are entitled to rely on the cases which estop the Plaintiff from urging that the Defendants could not resist Plaintiff's claim as the transfer was not evidenced by a registered deed.

Mr. Justice Mookerjee, after reviewing a number of the earlier cases of this Court, which have been affirmed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Md. Musa v. Aghore Kumar(5), observed in the course of his judgment in the case of Syam Kishore Dey v. Umesh Chandra Bhuttacharya referred to above that “the decisions are based on the well-known doctrine of equity enunciated in Walsh v. Lonsdale(6) that under certain circumstances equity regards that as done which should have been done.” The rule thus laid down clearly applies to the present case.

On the whole, we think that this appeal should succeed and the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge are set aside and those of the Munsif are restored with costs in all Courts.

Greaves, J.:— I agree.

S.C.M