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Jhanda Singh v. Wahid-Ud-Din
Case Summary — Appeal concerning Redemption of Alleged Mortgage (Deeds of 29 Aug & 5 Sep 1852)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit for redemption of an alleged mortgage. The court of first instance dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed; when the appeal came before a bench of this Court (the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Banerji) the learned Judges differed, giving rise to the present appeal under the Letter Patent.
Material facts recounted in the opinion (as summarised from the judgments) are:
- On 29 August 1852 the predecessors in title of the plaintiff executed a deed in favour of the predecessors in title of the defendants. On its face this document was an out-and-out transfer (sale) of the properties for which redemption is now sought.
- On 5 September 1852 a second deed was executed between the same parties. That instrument recited the 29 August sale-deed and stated (in substance) that if the vendors after 9 or 10 years paid the purchase money the executants would execute a fresh sale-deed and effect mutation in revenue papers; it further provided that in default of payment at the end of 10 years the grantors would have no further claim.
- The plaintiff's case was that the two documents should be read together as constituting a mortgage by conditional sale (relying on section 58, clause (e) of the Transfer of Property Act) and that the plaintiff therefore retained a right to redeem despite the lapse of time.
- The defendants maintained that the first deed was an absolute sale and the second an act of grace (or subsequent arrangement), and that any rights under the latter could only be exercised according to its terms and would in any event cease at the end of the ten-year period mentioned.
- Relevant surrounding facts noted by the Court included registration details (both deeds were registered in May 1853 on separate dates and by different presenting parties), the existence of another simple mortgage executed on 29 August 1852, a later (1863) mortgage by conditional sale executed as a single deed, the stamp denomination on the 1852 deeds (Rs. 32 each), and testimony of a witness named Narain concerning delivery and negotiations.
- The Court ultimately concluded that the parties intended an out-and-out sale on 29 August 1852 and that the 5 September instrument was a subsequent arrangement; the appeal was dismissed and the first-instance dismissal was thereby affirmed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the two deeds of 29 August 1852 and 5 September 1852 ought to be read together and thereby constitute a mortgage by conditional sale within the meaning of section 58, clause (e) of the Transfer of Property Act, giving the plaintiff a right to redeem.
- Whether, at the time of execution of the 29 August 1852 deed, the parties intended that the second deed (5 September 1852) would also be executed so as to render the transaction a mortgage rather than an absolute sale.
- Whether any rights created (if any) by the 5 September 1852 instrument survived the express ten-year period stipulated therein or were otherwise enforceable after that period.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The two documents must be read together; read together they constitute a mortgage by conditional sale under section 58, clause (e) of the Transfer of Property Act, and therefore the plaintiff retains a right to redeem despite the time elapsed.
- The form of mortgage by conditional sale is common (especially among Muhammadans), and although often effected by a single deed, it can be effected by two deeds — a practice reportedly not uncommon in 1852.
- It is improbable that the grantees, if absolute vendees, would forgo their vendor rights and become mortgagees in possession for a term of ten years; this improbability supports treating the transaction as a mortgage rather than a sale.
- The presentation of the ostensible sale-deed for registration by the vendors (in May 1853) was said to indicate the sale-deed had remained undelivered in the vendors' hands during the intervening period.
- Witness Narain's evidence was invoked to support aspects of the plaintiff's narrative (including delivery and alleged differences between grantors) and to explain timing differences.
Defendants' Arguments
- The deed of 29 August 1852 was, on its face, an out-and-out sale; the 5 September instrument was an act of grace or a subsequent arrangement and therefore to be construed strictly and independently.
- Any rights conferred by the 5 September deed could only be exercised according to its terms and, in particular, ceased at the expiration of the ten-year period specified.
- Circumstantial points supporting the defendants' position included: the unexplained seven-day interval between the two deeds; the fact that the two deeds were presented for registration by different parties (the sale-deed by the ostensible vendors and the 5 September deed by the ostensible vendees); the contemporaneous execution of a simple mortgage (bearing interest) on 29 August 1852 of another property (showing the vendees had no scruple in taking interest); the later use in 1863 of the single-deed form for a mortgage by conditional sale; and the stamp denominations on the 1852 deeds.
- The defendants relied on the plain language of the 29 August sale-deed, subsequent conduct (mutation/possession and village revenue records), and the lack of contemporaneous conduct consistent with the parties treating the 29 August instrument as only a mortgage.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Balkishen Das v. W.H. Legge | Was decided on the language of the documents and the surrounding circumstances peculiar to that case. | The Court observed that that decision rested on its own documents and circumstances and, for that reason, concluded it could not be relied on to support the plaintiff's case in the present matter. |
| Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din | Considered a comparable case (similar factual circumstances regarding the nature of the transaction). | One judgment (Griffin, J.) regarded the present case as similar (indeed stronger) than Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din and used that similarity to support dismissal (i.e., to show the present transaction was not a mortgage by conditional sale). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis centered on discerning the true intention of the parties, drawn from the language of the documents themselves, the circumstances surrounding their execution, and the subsequent conduct of the parties. The principal analytical steps and factual findings expressly relied upon in the opinions are:
- Presumptive rules: The judges acknowledged that if two deeds were of the same date and obviously connected, a strong presumption would favour construing the transaction as a mortgage by conditional sale. Therefore whether the deeds were contemporaneous in intention was decisive.
- Documentary language and contemporaneous acts: The 29 August 1852 instrument, on its face, described an absolute sale. The Court placed significant weight on the clear and unambiguous terms of that deed.
- Registration and presentation: The sale-deed was registered on 18 May 1853 and was presented by the ostensible vendors; the 5 September deed was registered on 19 May 1853 and presented by the ostensible vendees. The Court rejected the plaintiff's inference that presentation by the vendors showed non-delivery to vendees; the Court observed that it was common for a deed to be presented by the party against whose interest it operated so as to make later repudiation more difficult.
- Delivery and witness testimony: Narain — a witness for the plaintiff — stated that the sale-deed was delivered to the ostensible vendees on execution. The Court accepted that evidence as undermining the plaintiff's theory of non-delivery.
- Contemporaneous mortgage and conduct: On the same date (29 August 1852) the parties executed another instrument that was a simple mortgage (bearing interest) of different property. That fact demonstrated that the vendees (who were Muhammadans) had no scruple in taking or documenting interest — undermining the plaintiff's cultural/religious rationale for using conditional sale form to disguise interest-taking.
- Subsequent pattern of transactions: A later mortgage by conditional sale executed in 1863 was in a single-deed form. The Court treated this as showing that where the parties actually intended a mortgage by conditional sale they used the single-deed form, not the two-deed arrangement used here.
- Stamp duty and documentary practice: Both 29 August and 5 September deeds bore stamps of Rs. 32. The Court considered what stamp duty would have been if the transaction had been a mortgage and noted the stamp denominations as one piece of surrounding circumstance.
- Unexplained interval of seven days: The Court placed particular emphasis on the unexplained seven-day gap between the two deeds (29 August to 5 September). The judges reasoned that if the deeds were always dependent on one another it was unlikely they would not have been executed on the same day; the lack of a persuasive explanation for the interval undermined the plaintiff's case that the two deeds were one continuous mortgage transaction.
- Conduct in revenue records and possession: Mutation (change of records) took place on 7 September 1853, and the vendees had been recorded as full owners in village settlements; the vendors had not asserted mortgagor status in such settlements. The Court regarded this continuing conduct as consistent with an absolute sale, not a mortgage.
- Weighing of factors and conclusion: Although the improbability-of-conversion argument (that vendees would not willingly change from vendees to mortgagees) was acknowledged, the Court concluded that the combined weight of documentary language, the seven-day interval, contemporaneous mortgage practice, registration and possession facts, and witness evidence led to the conclusion that the 29 August deed was an out-and-out sale and that the 5 September deed was a subsequent arrangement. On that basis the lower court's dismissal was correct.
Holding and Implications
Holding: By unanimous decision of the Court the appeal was dismissed. The core ruling is:
APPEAL DISMISSED
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The dismissal of the appeal affirms the first-instance judgment that the 29 August 1852 deed operated as an out-and-out sale and not as a mortgage by conditional sale; thus the plaintiff does not have a right to redeem on the basis asserted.
- No broader precedent announced: The Court treated earlier cases (notably Balkishen Das v. W.H. Legge and Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din) as having relevance only to the extent their facts and documents resembled the present case; the opinion does not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond applying established principles (intention determined from documents, surrounding circumstances and conduct). The Court explicitly stated that Balkishen Das v. W.H. Legge could not be relied on for the plaintiff's case because it was decided on its own documentary circumstances.
Richards, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit for redemption of an alleged mortgage. The court of first instance dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed and the appeal coming before a bench of this Court, consisting of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Banerji, the learned Judges differed, hence the present appeal under the Letter Patent.
The facts appear very fully from the judgements of our learned brothers, and it is only necessary very shortly to refer to them.
On the 29th of August, 1852, the predecessors in title of the plaintiff executed a deed in favour of the predecessors in title of the defendants. The document on the face of it was an out and out transfer by way of sale of the properties now sought to be redeemed.
On the 5th of September, 1852, another deed was entered into between the same parties. This document recites the sale-deed of the 29th August and proceeds as follows:—
“As we, the executants, are now willing to help and treat with kindness the vendors, we, the executants, with our own free will, do hereby covenant and give it in writing that if the aforesaid vendors after the lapse of 9 or 10 years from the date of the aforesaid sale-deed do pay to us the purchase money, & c., we shall forthwith execute a fresh sale-deed on receipt of the sale-consideration entered in this document and get mutation of names effected in the revenue papers.”
The deed goes on to provide that in default of payment at the end of 10 years the grantors shall have no further claim to the property.
The plaintiff contends that those documents must be read together, and if they are read together they constitute a mortgage by conditional sale within the meaning of section 58 of the Transfer of Properly Act, clause (e); that the plaintiff notwithstanding the time that has elapsed has still a right to redeem, and that therefore his suit ought not to have been dismissed.
The Transfer of Property Act was not, of course, in force when the document of the 29th August, 1850, was executed, but it is not contended that the Act introduced any change in the law as to what constituted a mortgage by conditional sale. The defendants contend that the deed of the 29th of August was what, on the face of it, it purports to be, namely, an out and out sale, and the subsequent document of the 5th of September was also what it purports to be, namely, an act of grace, and that assuming it conferred on the plaintiff or his predecessors in title any rights at all, such rights could only be exercised according to the actual terms of the deed and ceased and determined on the expiration of the period of ten years mentioned in the latter deed.
The plaintiff argues that the form of mortgage by conditional sale is very common, particularly where the mortgagees are Muhammadans, that although a mortgage by conditional sale is more frequently carried out by a single deed, nevertheless such a mortgage carried out by two deeds is not uncommon and was still less uncommon in the year 1852. He lays great stress on the improbability of the grantees in the deed of 29th August, 1852, if in fact they were absolute vendees, foregoing their rights as such and becoming mortgagees in possession for a term of ten years.
The defendants rely on the unexplained, as they contend, interval of seven days between the execution of the two deeds, the express language of the latter deed and certain other facts and circumstances to which I shall refer hereafter, as demonstrating that the two deeds were quite independent and ought to be given effect to accordingly.
It seems to me that if we held that at the time of the execution of the first deed the parties intended that the second deed also should be executed, we ought to hold that the two deeds constituted a mortgage by conditional sale and that the plaintiff has a right to redeem. On the other hand if, at the time of the execution of the sale-deed, there was no intention of executing the second deed, the defendants are entitled to have the latter construed strictly and quite independent of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the law of mortgages.
There can, in my opinion, be no doubt that if the two deeds were of even date, an almost irresistible presumption would arise in favour of the transaction being a mortgage. I shall now very shortly refer to a few facts and circumstances relied upon by the parties.
The sale-deed was not registered until the 18th of May, 1853, and it appears from the registration certificate to have been presented for registration by the ostensible vendors.
The deed of the 5th of September was registered on the 19th of May, 1853, and was presented for registration by the ostensible vendees.
The plaintiff contends that the presentation of the ostensible sale-deed for registration shows that the so-called sale-deed must in the interval have remained undelivered in the hands of the vendors. I do not think that this inference can be drawn. It is a very common practice for the deed to be presented by the party against whose interest it is, so as to make repudiation thereafter more difficult.
If we can believe the plaintiff's own witness, Narain, the sale-deed was given over to the ostensible vendees on execution.
The parties entered into another transaction on the 29th August, 1852. This was a simple mortgage. It recites the sale of mauza Murlipur Phul, as a sale, not as a mortgage, nor as a mortgage by conditional sale. The interest is at a low rate, but it shows that the grantees in the first mentioned deed of 29th of August, 1852, though Muhammadans, had no scruple in lending money on a mortgage which expressly provided for the payment of interest. On the 17th July, 1863, the parties entered into another transaction which was on the face of it a clear mortgage by way of conditional sale. This deed, no doubt, was executed some ten years after the first transactions, but it cannot be left altogether out of consideration. It shows that in the year 1863 the parties when they wanted to have a mortgage by conditional sale, adopted the more usual form of one single deed instead of two.
The deeds of the 29th of August, 1852 (ostensible sale-deed) and 5th September, 1852, each bears a stamp of Rs. 32. If the transaction had been a mortgage, a stamp of Rs. 32 (or if carried out by two deeds Rs. 38) would have been sufficient. Lastly, it seems to me that no explanation has been given of the interval of 7 days between the execution of the two deeds. If the two deeds were all along dependent one on the other and constituted a mortgage by conditional sale, why were both deeds not ready and executed the same day? As already mentioned, there was a simple mortgage executed on the 29th August. The plaintiff's advocate referred us to the evidence of Narain, where the witness states that there were differences between the grantors, and suggests that this explains why the two deeds were not executed on the same day. I cannot accept this explanation. It perhaps might explain the delay in registration, but it does not explain the interval of 7 days. Furthermore, I have already pointed out that another deed of simple mortgage was executed on the 29th of August. Differences between the grantors ought, it seems to me, just as much to have delayed the execution of this deed as the execution of the deed of the 5th of September. As to the argument based on the improbability of the vendees converting themselves into mortgagees, it may have been that the predecessors in title of the defendants considered that it was unlikely that the plaintiffs would ever be able to redeem, and that the grantees would in any event gain the advantage of getting possession with the good will of the grantors. However this may be, I do not think that this matter can outweigh the other circumstances of the case. After careful consideration I have come to the conclusion that we ought to hold that at the time of the execution of the deed of the 29th of August, 1852, the parties to it intended that there should be an out and out sale of mauza Murlipur Phul and that the deed of the 5th of September following was the result of a subsequent arrangement between the parties, and that therefore the suit was rightly dismissed by the court of first instance. In my opinion the language of the deeds themselves, and the surrounding circumstances, so far from showing that it was the intention of the parties on the 29th of August, 1851, merely to make the property security for money lent, on the contrary show that the intention was that there should be an out and out sale. The case of Balkishen Das v. W.H Legge was decided on the language of the documents and surrounding circumstances peculiar to that case, and for this reason cannot, I think, be relied on in the present case.
I would dismiss the appeal.
Griffin, J.:— The intention of the parties has to be gathered from the documents themselves, the circumstances attending their execution and also from the conduct of the parties. The reason usually assigned for the execution of deeds of conditional sale instead of ordinary mortgages is that Muhammadans who abide strictly by the tenets of their religion object to receiving interest on money lent. The vendees in the present case, who are Muhammadans, have no such scruples, for on the same date, i.e, 29th of August, 1852, the plaintiff or his predecessors in title executed a deed of mortgage bearing interest in favour of the vendees in respect of another property. The sale was complete or absolute on 29th of August, 1852. The document in; clear and unmistakeable terms indicates that it was a sale out and out. Mutation of names took place in respect of the property on 7th September, 1853, and ever since that date the vendees have remained as owners of the village. If it had been the intention of the plaintiff or his predecessors in title to execute only a mortgage-deed on the 29th August, 1852, it is difficult to imagine why they should have consented to execute an out and out sale-deed. That the agreement of the 5th September, 1852, was the result of an afterthought is, in my opinion, indicated first, by the lapse of seven days since the date of the execution of the sale-deed, and further by the fact that in order to execute the agreement the plaintiff had to incur the further expense of purchasing a fresh stamp-paper for Rs. 32.
If it had been the intention of the parties on the 5th of September, 1852, that the sale-deed of the 29th August of the same year should not operate as a sale-deed, but that the defendants were to remain in possession merely as mortgagees, the simplest and most direct methods for the plaintiff to adopt would have been on 5th September, 1852, to tear up the sale-deed and execute another document setting out the intention plainly and distinctly.
I would therefore agree with the view taken by the learned Chief Justice.
I would dismiss the appeal.
Tudball, J.:— I am fully in agreement with my learned colleagues in the view they have taken of the case.
It is clearly a question of intention. On the 29th of August, 1852, two documents were executed, one an out and out sale of the property in question and another a simple mortgage-deed (bearing interest) of other property. The Muhammadan vendees, therefore, clearly had no scruple in taking interest and in openly declaring this in writing.
If, therefore, the parties intended a mortgage in both cases, there was no reason why they should in the one case have executed what on the face of it is an out and out sale deed.
The agreement to resell on payment of the purchase money was executed seven days after (5th September, 1852). There is no explanation of this delay.
The witness, Narain, is one of the original vendors. He admits that Ilahi Bakhsh wished to purchase the property, but says that he was only willing to mortgage and that the two deeds were executed because Ilahi Bakhsh stated that as a Muhammadan he could not openly take interest. This statement is disproved by the simple mortgage deed of the 29th of August, 1852.
It is suggested at the bar that the Muhammadans wished to evade the usury laws which were then in force and forbade the taking of more than 12 per cent, interest. There is no material on record to indicate the profits of this village in 1852, and the resultant interest on the amount paid by the vendees.
In regard to registration it has first to be noted that under the law, as it then stood, registration was not compulsory, and the sale was complete on the 29th of August, 1852. Moreover, though the registration was delayed until May, 1853, even then the two documents were not registered together but on separate dates.
On the evidence of Narain himself the sale-deed up to the time of registration remained with the vendees and not with the vendors. It does not follow from the bare fact that the vendors handed it to the sub-registrar in May, 1853, that it had till that date remained in their (the vendor's) hands.
It is contended that the language used in the deed of agreement, where it sets forth the action which the vendors might take to enforce the agreement in case the vendees failed to carry out their promise, is a reference to the procedure which was then in force under Regulation I of 1708 for the redemption of a mortgage, and clearly indicates the intention of the parties. In the first place I think the document has not been properly translated. The word ‘and’ has no place in the original. In the next place the language would apply in a certain degree to a suit for specific performance of contract. But in any case we have to look to the intention of the parties at the time when the sale-deed of the 29th of August, 1852, was executed, and it is not possible to say from this language in the deed of the 5th of September, 1852, that on the 29th of August, 1852, the parties intended a mortgage and not a sale. I would further point out that, though the vendors live in this very village and two settlements have taken place since the year 1852, they have never put forward at such settlements a claim to be recorded as mortgagors. The vendees have all along been recorded as full owners. The parties clearly understood what a mortgage was, including a mortgage by conditional sale, as is shown by the subsequent litigation (and its results) on the simple mortgage deed of the 29th of August, 1852. In my opinion there are not sufficient grounds for holding that the transaction entered into by the parties on the 29th of August, 1852, was other than what it purported to be on the face of the sale-deed of that date. The case is clearly distinguishable from the case of Balkishen Das v. Legge and is similar to that of Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din; in fact, is a far stronger case than the latter in that there was an interval of seven days between the two documents. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal.
By the Court.— The appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
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