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Ramanand Lal v. Damodar Das
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges a judgment and decree dated 21 February 1935 dismissing the plaintiff's claim for possession of immovable property (taluqa Akhtha Mawaiya with appended villages and a pakka house in Benares city) and for mesne profits. The property originally formed part of the estate of Sheo Pragash Lal (d. 1869). His widow, Jasoda Kuer (d. 4 November 1929), executed a series of mortgages in 1881, 1884 and 1886, and subsequent decrees and executions led to auction sales in 1890 and 1895/1896. Purchasers and successors who acquired possession were made defendants in the suit.
The plaintiffs (Ramanand Lal and Shyamanand Lal), claiming as reversionary heirs of Sheo Pragash Lal, filed suit on 3 January 1934 in the Civil Judge's Court at Benares for recovery of possession and mesne profits accruing since the widow's death. The trial judge found legal necessity proved for the 1886 mortgage except to the extent of Rs. 1,230, but nonetheless treated the mortgage as binding on the reversioners and dismissed the plaintiffs' claim. The plaintiffs appealed. The present opinion affirms the dismissal of the appeal and orders that the parties bear their own costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether mortgages and consequent execution sales executed by a Hindu widow are binding on reversioners when the transfers were purportedly made for "legal necessity."
- What burden of proof rests on an alienee of a Hindu widow (and on a subsequent transferee) to justify a transfer on the ground of legal necessity?
- Whether the principle in Sri Krishan Das v. Nathu Ram (and cases following it) applies to mortgages as well as to sales, and whether it applies where only part of the consideration is shown to be for legal necessity (i.e., the scope of that rule with respect to partial necessity).
- What presumptions (if any) are permissible in very old transactions as regards the existence of necessity or representation of necessity, especially when the deed is silent or when recitals exist?
- Whether, on the facts of this case (including the lapse of time and the documentary and circumstantial evidence), the transfers and executions should be set aside in whole or part.
Arguments of the Parties
Arguments advanced on behalf of the purchasers (Sir Tej)
- In an old transaction it is sufficient for transferees of a Hindu widow to show that money was required for a purpose for which Hindu law permits transfers by a widow; it is not necessary to show the widow had no other means to meet that purpose.
- The burden on a transferee who is not the original alienee is not heavier than on the original alienee; in old transactions fact of necessity, representation of necessity, and bona fide inquiry may be presumed because evidence may have been obliterated by lapse of time.
- Where a mortgage by a widow is justified for a substantial portion of the consideration, a presumption should be drawn that any remaining small portion was also for legal necessity; reliance placed on Sri Krishan Das v. Nathu Ram and subsequent authorities.
- A mortgage made by a widow for legal necessity is binding on reversioners even if a portion of the consideration is not proved to be for legal necessity, and the same principle applies to an auction sale founded on such mortgage.
Arguments advanced for the plaintiffs (as summarized in the opinion; Mr. Banerji)
- The mortgage deed of 1881 contains no recital of necessity; therefore necessity should not be presumed and the borrowing was likely a personal loan by the widow, not a transaction justified by legal necessity.
- Recitals of necessity appear in other contemporaneous deeds (e.g., 1878, 1882, 1884) but their absence in the 1881 bond indicates the creditor expected repayment from the widow personally and did not intend to bind the estate; thus reversioners are not bound.
- The transferees failed to prove necessity for borrowing Rs. 2,300 (1884 mortgage) for revenue or Rs. 929-3-0 and Rs. 300 (components of the 1886 mortgage) for household expenditure; where part of a mortgage is not justified by legal necessity that portion is not binding on the reversioners and execution sale should be set aside accordingly.
- The trial judge erred in applying the Sri Krishan Das rule to the 1886 mortgage given his own findings that Rs. 1,229 of the Rs. 6,000 had not been shown to be for legal necessity.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sri Krishan Das v. Nathu Ram | The principle that where a sale or mortgage by a Hindu widow (or certain other transfers) is justified for legal necessity for the whole consideration (or where there is a representation of necessity for the whole consideration believed after bona fide inquiry), inability to prove a small remaining portion of application of consideration for necessity is not ground to set aside the alienation. | The court held that this rule is confined to cases of total necessity (or representation of total necessity) and does not apply to cases of partial necessity; thus it cannot be invoked to validate that part of a transfer which is not shown to be for legal necessity. |
| Niamat Rai v. Din Dayal | Listed as a case that followed/applied Sri Krishan Das (supporting the principle referenced above). | Referenced as part of the group of cases that illustrate the scope of the Sri Krishan Das rule, which the court subsequently limits to total necessity contexts. |
| Gauri Shankar v. Jiwan Singh | Listed as a case applying/affirming the Sri Krishan Das principle. | Cited among authorities; court used these authorities to examine the limits of the rule and to conclude it does not govern partial-necessity situations. |
| Ram Sunder Lal v. Lachhmi Narain | Listed as a subsequent case that applied or affirmed the Sri Krishan Das principle. | Included in the discussion of authorities; court relied on the collective understanding of these authorities to delineate the rule's limits. |
| Thakur Jai Indra Bahadur Singh v. Lola Khairati Lal | Authority referenced in the debate over whether the Sri Krishan Das rule applies to mortgages. | Cited by the court to show divergent judicial approaches; court noted some decisions did not apply Sri Krishan Das to mortgages. |
| Durga Prasad Singh v. Lachmi Narain | Another decision where Sri Krishan Das was not applied to mortgages. | Used to illustrate that the extension of Sri Krishan Das to mortgages has been controversial; court distinguished those authorities when limiting the rule to total necessity cases. |
| Hitendra Narayan Singh v. Sukhdeb Prasad Jha | Decision in which the Sri Krishan Das rule was applied to mortgages. | Cited to show conflicting authority on mortgages; court acknowledged divergent precedents but held the Sri Krishan Das type rule is not applicable to partial-necessity mortgages. |
| Dwarka Ram v. Bakshi Parnaw Prasad Singh | Decision confining Sri Krishan Das to sales and not extending it to mortgages. | Referenced to demonstrate judicial disagreement; court relied on the overall body of authority to limit the Sri Krishan Das rule. |
| Durga Prasad Barhai v. Jewdhari Singh | Case leaving undecided whether Sri Krishan Das applies to both sales and mortgages but requiring both bona fide inquiry and evidence that the sale/mortgage was justified to apply the rule. | Cited for the proposition that bona fide inquiry and evidence of necessity must co-exist to attract the rule; the court adopted that cautious approach when analyzing the instant case. |
| Shanti Kumar Pal v. Mukandalal Mandal | Illustrates that where part of the consideration is not binding on reversioners, the execution sale based on that mortgage can be set aside and reversioners may recover property on payment of the binding portion. | Cited to support the legal proposition that partial invalidity of a mortgage leads to partial non-binding effect of decrees and sales; court adopted this principle in articulating the rule for partial necessity. |
| Deputy Commissioner of Kheri v. Khanjan Singh | Similar authority about the consequences where part of a mortgage consideration is not binding on reversioners. | Used together with Shanti Kumar Pal to establish the consequence for partial-necessity mortgages and execution sales. |
| Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Acharjya Chowdhuri | Addressed weight to be given to recitals in deeds in old transactions; recitals may assume greater importance as original evidence disappears with time. | Cited by the court to support the proposition that recitals in old deeds may properly carry weight and that presumptions can be allowed to fill gaps, depending on circumstances. |
| Venkata Reddi v. Rani Saheba of Wadhwan | Held that, given great lapse of time, it may not be reasonable to expect full detailed evidence and that presumptions may fill gaps where appropriate. | Invoked to support the permissibility of making reasonable presumptions in very old transactions when evidence has perished. |
| Ravaneshwar Prasad Singh v. Chandi Prasad Singh | Stated that lapse of time does not remove the appellant's duty to establish legal necessity or bona fide belief thereof, except insofar as lapse may affect available evidence or give rise to presumptions of acquiescence. | Referred to in distinguishing where presumptions are permissible and where they are not; the court relied on a balanced approach rather than automatic presumptions. |
| Bhojraj v. Sita Ram | Observed that lapse of time does not automatically justify presuming necessity; presumptions may fill gaps but must not contradict the evidence. | Used to temper the scope of permissible presumptions; the court adopted a fact-sensitive approach in this case. |
| Kumarasami Mudaliar v. Narayanasami and Thimmanna Bhatta v. Rama Bhatta | Held that presumptions to fill gaps may be made even where the deed is silent, on the basis of probabilities and other evidence. | Cited to support the view that silence in a deed does not preclude the court from raising a presumption of necessity or representation of necessity in a proper case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by first setting out the governing legal principles from authoritative texts (Mulla's Hindu Law and Mayne's Hindu Law) and from prior case law, and then applying them to the facts.
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The court summarized settled principles:
- A Hindu widow may alienate property for certain legitimate purposes (e.g., payment of Government revenue or maintenance) but only when such purposes cannot be met out of the estate's income or available funds; mere existence of income does not justify borrowing to pay revenue if that income could have been used.
- The alienee (and a transferee from the alienee) bears the burden of proving either: (a) legal necessity in fact, or (b) that he made proper and bona fide inquiry and believed a representation of necessity which justified advancing money.
-
On the Sri Krishan Das rule, the court carefully limited its scope. It held explicitly that:
- The rule applies where legal necessity is proved for the entire consideration, or where there was a representation of necessity as to the entire consideration which a transferee believed after bona fide inquiry.
- The rule does not extend to cases of "partial necessity": if a part of the consideration is not justified by legal necessity, that portion is not binding on reversioners; related decrees and execution sales are consequently vulnerable to being set aside to the extent of the non-binding portion.
-
On burdens and presumptions in old transactions, the court held:
- Alienee and a subsequent transferee stand in the same position regarding burden of proof; both must discharge the same burden against reversioners, although lapse of time may give rise to permissible presumptions where evidence has been obliterated.
- There is no rigid rule about presumptions in old transfers; instead each case must be decided on its facts and probabilities. Recitals in a deed gain weight as contemporaneous evidence disappears, but they are not conclusive where they contradict evidence or probabilities.
- When a deed is silent as to necessity, the court may, in a proper case and having regard to surrounding circumstances and probabilities, raise a presumption either as to the factum of necessity or as to representation of necessity believed by the transferee.
-
Application to facts:
- The court reviewed the family and estate history: Sheo Pragash Lal died in 1869, wife Jasoda Kuer was young; estate was substantial (assessed revenue ~ Rs. 15,735), famines occurred (1868, 1878), and early debts existed (e.g., Rs. 3,000 left by the husband). Several earlier borrowings and mortgages recited necessity for revenue at times.
- The court noted the absence of evidence of extravagance, overreaching, inadequate consideration, or bad faith by purchasers or managers; it recorded that the widow was assisted by her father and brother and that a reputable lawyer attested the 1886 deed.
- Given the lapse of time and these circumstances, the court concluded it was sufficient to presume that representations of necessity were made to the successive lenders and that those lenders, after reasonable inquiry and in good faith, relied upon those representations and advanced funds.
- The court acknowledged risk in making presumptions for old transactions but found the balance of probabilities, lack of adverse indicia (e.g., fraud or undervaluation), and improvements made by purchasers supported upholding the transfers.
- On the trial judge's specific finding that Rs. 1,229 of the Rs. 6,000 mortgage was not proved to be for necessity, the court nevertheless concluded that, on the totality of circumstances and permissible presumptions, the transfers need not be disturbed. (The court thereby affirmed the result of the trial court but did so on grounds different from those used by the trial judge.)
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED; the transfers and execution sales challenged by the plaintiffs are upheld and the parties are ordered to bear their own costs.
Direct consequences for the parties
- Plaintiffs' claim for recovery of possession and mesne profits is unsuccessful; purchasers (defendants) who acquired title through the decrees and execution sales retain their acquisitions and continued possession as a result of the court's decision.
- Costs are directed to be borne by each party (parties to bear their own costs) because defendants had falsely denied the plaintiffs' pedigree/reversionary title, although the court affirmed the decree on other grounds.
Broader legal implications articulated by the court (as stated in the opinion)
- The rule in Sri Krishan Das v. Nathu Ram is confined to transactions where legal necessity (or representation of necessity believed after bona fide inquiry) covers the entire consideration; it cannot be generalized to validate parts of a transfer that lack necessity.
- Where a mortgage by a Hindu widow is partly for non-necessity, the portion not justified by necessity is not binding on reversioners; consequentially, a decree and any sale in execution of the entire decree may be set aside to the extent of the non-binding portion (subject to special equities in particular cases).
- In very old transactions, courts may permissibly draw inferences and raise presumptions to fill evidentiary gaps, but such presumptions must be consistent with probabilities and circumstances and cannot be used to contradict direct evidence.
- The burden of proof to justify the transfer rests equally on the alienee and on subsequent transferees claiming under the alienee; lapse of time may affect the evidence available but does not automatically relieve that burden except insofar as reasonable presumptions may be drawn where justified.
Note: This summary is strictly based on the content of the provided opinion. Sections are limited to information explicitly contained in the opinion and do not introduce material beyond the text.
Bajpai and Dar, JJ.:— This is an appeal against a judgment and decree dated 21st February, 1935, by which the plaintiff's claim for possession of immovable property with mesne profits was dismissed. A zamindari share in taluqa Akhtha Mawaiya and the appended villages of Mawaiya, Benipura and Nawapura in the Benares district and a pakka built house situated in Part Kalan, Benares city, which is the property in suit, at one time formed part of the estate of a Hindu named Sheo Pragash Lal, who died in the year 1869. On the death of Sheo Pragash Lal his estate, which included the above property, devolved by right of inheritance upon his widow, Jasoda Kuer, who died on 4th November, 1929. On 26th June, 1881, she executed a simple mortgage of the said house in favour of Kamta Nath for Rs. 1,000. The purpose for which the money was borrowed is not recited in the deed. On 25th August, 1884, she borrowed another sum of Rs. 2,500 from Govind Das by mortgaging another, house; not in dispute in this case. It is recited in the deed that Rs. 2,330 was raised for the payment of Government revenue and the rest was brought by the lady to her own use. In 1884 Kamta Nath raised an action in the court of the Civil Judge of Benares (No. 76 of 1884) for recovery of money due on the bond of 1881 and on 18th December, 1884, Kamta Nath obtained a decree for a sum of Rs. 1,464-11-0. In 1885 Govind Das raised an action (No. 82 of 1885) in the court of the Civil Judge of Benares against Mst. Jasoda Kuer for recovery of money due on the, bond of 1884, and on 10th September, 1885, Govind Das obtained a decree for a sum of Rs. 3,163-14-6.
On 7th January, 1886, Mst. Jasoda Kuer executed a mortgage deed in favour of Gobardhan Das for a sum of Rs. 6,000. It is recited in the bond that the money was raised for payment of the two decrees mentioned above and for other necessary expenses of the lady. The property mortgaged was the house in the city of Benares which had been previously mortgaged to Kamta Nath and taluqa Akhtha Mawaiya, the property which is now in suit, and one other village Kundhai. In 1888 Gobardhan Das raised an action (suit No. 85 of 1888) against Mst. Jasoda Kuer for recovery of money due on the bond of 1886 and on 2nd August 1888, a decree was passed for Rs. 10,521-6-0. In execution of Gobardhan Das's decree taluqa Akhtha Mawaiya was sold on 20th May, 1890, by a court auction and was purchased by Gobardhan himself for Rs. 8,000. In further execution of Gobardhan Das's decree the house at Piari Kalan in the city of Benares was sold by public auction on 23rd August, 1895, and was purchased by Ishwar Sahai for Rs. 1,600. Gobardhan Das, after his purchase, entered into possession of taluqa Akhtha Mawaiya, and on his death his two sons and three grandsons succeeded to the property and they are in possession of it at present and have been made defendants Nos. 1 to 5 in the present action. Ishwar Sahai, the purchaser of the house, by a conveyance dated 12th August 1915, sold the house to Ganga Prasad for Rs. 1,900; and Ganga Prasad, by virtue of that purchase, entered into possession of the house, and on his death the house came into possession of Ganga Prasad's son and grandson, who are defendants Nos. 12 and 13 in the action; and Ishwar Sahai, the purchaser of the house in the year 1896, being dead, his sons are joined in this action as defendants Nos. 6 to 10. Mst. Jasoda Kuer had a brother, Mathura Prasad, who died leaving a son Shyam Bahadur Lal, and he has been made defendant No. 11 in the action.
The plaintiffs, Ramanand Lal and Shyamanand Lal, are two brothers, sons of Rameshwar Dial, who died in 1895. The plaintiffs, alleging that they as reversionary heirs of Sheo Pragash Lal are entitled to Sheo Pragash Lal's estate on the death of his widow Jasoda Kuer, which took place on 4th November, 1929, raised an action on 3rd January, 1934, in the court of the Civil Judge, Benares, for recovery of possession of taluqa Akhtha Mawaiya and the house in the city of Benares against defendants Nos. 1 to 13 and for mesne profits which accrued due since the death of the lady, and their case, shortly stated, is that Sheo Pragash Lal had died leaving a considerable estate which came into possession of his widow Jasoda Kuer, that Jasoda Kuer without any legal necessity, created the mortgages of 1881, 1884 and 1886, and in enforcement of the said mortgages allowed the property to be sold in execution sales and that the house was purchased benami by her brother Mathura Prasad in the name of Ishwar Sahai and the village was purchased by Gobardhan Das, the decree-holder, but the mortgage being without legal necessity, the execution sales which followed were not binding upon the plaintiffs, the reversionary heirs, and they were entitled to recover possession of the estate with mesne profits from the purchasers. The suit was contested by the purchasers. They denied the plaintiffs' relation with Sheo Pragash Lal and the plaintiffs' reversionary title. They pleaded that the mortgages were made for legal necessity and the auction sales which followed the mortgages were binding upon the plaintiffs as reversionary heirs, and they further pleaded that they had made additions and improvements to the property in their respective possession and they were not liable to be evicted without receiving proper compensation for them.
The trial Judge found, regarding the mortgage of 1886 in favour of Gobardhan Das for Rs. 6,000, that legal necessity was proved except for a sum of Rs. 1,230, and the learned Judge held that the failure of proof of necessity with regard to the sum of Rs. 1,230 might be disregarded and the mortgage was binding upon the reversioners. The trial Judge further found that the purchasers had made certain additions and improvements to the property subsequent to their purchases and these would have to be compensated for; but on the finding that the mortgages and the auction sales were justified by legal necessity the learned Judge has dismissed the claim, and against that dismissal the plaintiffs have made this appeal.
This is an action by Hindu reversioners for recovery of possession of immovable property transferred by a Hindu female, on the death of the said female. The transfers which require consideration were made in 1881, 1884 and 1886, and the auction sales took place in 1890 and 1896, and the action was raised in 1934, 51 years after the first transaction in dispute and 48 years after the third transaction in dispute. In the mortgage of 1881 there is no recital as to the purpose for which money was borrowed. In the mortgage of 1884 it is recited that the money was borrowed for payment of Government revenue which could not be paid from the collections and income of the property; and in the mortgage of 1886 it is recited that the money was being raised in order to pay off the decrees which had been passed on two previous mortgages and for a further sum of money for household expenses.
There has been a great deal of discussion at the bar as to the law which applies to this case Sir Tej, on behalf of the purchasers, has contended that it is sufficient in an old transaction for the transferees of a Hindu widow to show that money was required for a purpose for which Hindu law allows widows to make a transfer of the property and that it is not necessary for the transferees to show that the widow had no other means of meeting that purpose except by borrowing. Sir Tej has further contended that, whatever may be the burden upon the original alienee of a Hindu widow, the burden is not the same upon the transferee of an alienee who was no party to the original transaction. And in an old transaction the factum of necessity as well as representation of necessity and bona fide inquiry on the part of the transferee may both be presumed, even when recitals of legal necessity in the deed of transfer are absent or silent, by reason of obliteration of evidence which may have taken place in account of lapse of time. And that a mortgage made by a widow for legal necessity is binding on the reversioner, even when a portion of the consideration was not proved to be for legal necessity, and that the same consideration applies to an auction sale which is based on the mortgage.
We think that up to a certain stage the law which is applicable to this case is well settled. Payment of Government revenue and borrowing money for maintenance are legitimate purposes for which a Hindu widow is entitled to alienate the husband's estate, provided the maintenance and the revenue could not be met out of the income of the estate or out of the available funds of the estate; but it is not the law that, while keeping the income to herself where income exists and keeping the husband's funds to herself where the husband's funds exist, which might enable her to pay off the Government revenue, it is open to a Hindu widow to pay Government revenue by borrowing. In Mulla's Hindu Law, ninth edition, at page 181, the law in this matter is stated as follows: “The following purposes have, been held to amount to legal necessity for which an alienation may be made … (ii) Payment of arrears of Government revenue and of decrees for rent accrued due after the death of the deceased owner, provided she had no funds when she mortgaged or sold the property to pay the revenue or the decrees and the mortgage or sale was absolutely necessary in order to discharge the debt, which if not discharged would have resulted in a forcible sale of the property. If there is an actual existing necessity, the circumstance that the necessity was brought about by the mismanagement of the widow does not vitiate the mortgage or sale, unless it is shown that the mortgagee or purchaser himself contributed to the mismanagement.”
In Mayne's Hindu Law and Usage, tenth edition, at page 787, the law is stated as follows: “One very common case of necessity is that of a loan of money, or a mortgage or sale of part of the property, to pay off arrears of Government revenue provided there is no other available source.”
This, in our opinion, is a correct statement of the law and is amply supported by authority.
With regard to the burden of proof which rests upon the alienee of a Hindu widow, there also cannot be much dispute. The alienee, in order to justify a transaction by a Hindu, widow, has to prove legal necessity in fact for the transaction, or a representation of legal necessity which the transferee after bona fide inquiry believed and he advanced money on its basis. Here again in Mulla's Hindu Law, ninth edition, the law is correctly stated at page 184 as follows: “If the sale or mortgage is impeached, the burden lies on him to prove (a) either that there was legal necessity in fact; or (b) that he made proper and bona fide inquiry as to the existence of the necessity and did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity. If he proves that there was a necessity in fact, the alienation will be upheld, even though the necessity was brought about by the mismanagement of the limited heir, unless it be shown that he himself contributed to the mismanagement. Even if he fails to prove that there was a necessity in fact, the alienation will be upheld, if he proves that he made such inquiry as aforesaid, and that the facts represented to him were such as, if true, would have justified the transaction. In no case, however, is he bound to see that the money paid by him is applied to meet the necessity. The reason is that he can rarely have the means of controlling the actual application, unless he himself enters on the management. The same rule applies to a transferee from an alienee.”
In our opinion the alienee from a Hindu widow and a transferee from the alienee both stand in the same position in the matter of burden of proof and both have to discharge the same burden as against a reversioner, though presumptions of facts may arise in either case when by lapse of time evidence has disappeared.
When a Hindu widow transfers immovable property of her husband, and part of the consideration of the transfer is for necessity and part of it is not, is the transaction binding upon the reversioner? Sir Tej's contention is that if a substantial portion of the consideration is for legal necessity, then the transfer is binding and a presumption should be made that the remaining portion also was for legal necessity, and in support of this contention Sir Tej relies upon the well known pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Sri Krishan Das v. Nathu Ram(1) which has subsequently been applied and affirmed by their Lordships, in Niamat Rai v. Din Dayal(2), Gauri Shankar v. Jiwan Singh(3) and Ram Sunder Lal v. Lachhmi Narain, and on the headnote of Sri Krishan Das v. Nathu Ram which is as follows:
“Where it is established that the sale or a mortgage by a Hindu widow or a Hindu father or manager of a joint Hindu family was one justified for legal necessity, the fact that the vendee or the mortgagee is unable to prove that a small portion of the consideration was applied for the purposes of legal necessity, is no ground for setting aside the alienation, nor can the vendee or the mortgagee be held liable to pay to those challenging the alienation that portion of the consideration for which legal necessity is not positively established.”
A great deal of controversy exists as to whether the rule laid down in Sri Krishan Das v. Nathu Ram applies to cases of sales or whether it applies to mortgages also and further whether it applies to a case of partial necessity or whether it applies only to a case of total necessity. In Thakur Jai Indra Bahadur Singh v. Lola Khairati Lal and in Durga Prasad Singh v. Lachmi Narain(4) the rule laid down in Sri Krishan Das v. Nathu Ram was not applied to mortgages. In Hitendra Narayan Singh v. Sukhdeb Prasad Jha(5) the rule was applied to mortgages also; while in Dwarka Ram v. Bakshi Parnaw Prasad Singh(6) the rule was confined to sales and was not extended to mortgages. In Durga prasad Barhai v. Jewdhari Singh(7) the question whether the rule applies to sales and mortgages was left undecided, but it was held that the Privy Council decision referred to above was a case in which a representation of necessity was made to the transferee which on bona fide inquiry was believed by him and “two conditions, viz., the existence of a bona fide inquiry and the existence of evidence to show that the sale itself was justified by legal necessity must co-exist in order to attract the application of this rule to a particular case.”
We do not think that the rule enunciated in Sri Krishan Das v. Nathu Ram and in other cases which follow it applies to a case of partial necessity. They were all cases in which either legal necessity was proved in fact for the transfer and for the entire consideration of transfer or there was a representation of the legal necessity for transfer and for the entire consideration and the transferee after bona fide inquiry believed and acted upon it; and the Privy Council only emphasised that in such cases the transferee was not bound to account for the application of the money. The Privy Council did not hold—and the paint did not arise in those cases—that where a part of the transfer or a part of the consideration of the transfer is not justified by legal necessity or by a representation of necessity which the transferee had believed, the unjustified consideration or transfer in such a case would be binding upon the reversioner.
In Mulla's Hindu Law, ninth edition, at page 196, the law on this part of the subject is stated as follows:
“Cases frequently arise in which property inherited by a widow from her husband is sold by her for legal necessity but the whole of the price is not proved to have been applied to purposes of necessity, and the sale is challenged by the reversioners on that ground. In such cases, if the: sale itself is justified by legal necessity and the purchaser pays a fair price for the property sold and acts in good faith and after due inquiry as to the necessity for the sale, the mere fact that part of the price is not proved to have been applied for purposes of necessity would not invalidate the sale, the purchaser not being bound to see to the application of the price. If the above conditions are satisfied, the sale must be upheld unconditionally, whether the part not proved to have been applied to purposes of legal necessity is considerable or small.”
This., in our opinion, is a correct statement of law, and Sri Krishan Das v. Nathu Ram and that type of cases only apply when it is proved that there was legal necessity in fact for the entire consideration of transfer or there was a representation of necessity for the entire consideration which on bona fide inquiry was believed and found correct and in case of sales there was also legal necessity for sale of property and an adequate price was paid for the same, but the transferee is not able to prove that a small portion of sale consideration was applied for purposes of legal necessity. Those cases do not apply when these elements wholly or in part are wanting, or, in other words, where the transfer is for partial necessity either with regard to its consideration or with regard to the property transferred.
It follows from this that if a mortgage is made by a Hindu widow for a consideration, part, of which is not justified by legal necessity, that portion of the mortgage is not binding upon the reversioner; and if a decree has been passed on such a mortgage, a part of the decree will be binding upon the reversioner and a part will not be binding on the reversioner, and if in execution of such a decree property is sold, the sale is liable to be set aside at the instance of the reversioner on payment of the consideration which was binding on the reversioner, as was done in Shanti Kumar Pal v. Mukandalal Mandal and in Deputy Commissioner of Kheri v. Khanjan Singh. Cases may, however, arise where the portion of the consideration not binding on the reversioner is negligible or unsubstantial in a mortgage which has resulted in an execution sale and such cases may have to be considered on their own special equities. But, as a general rule, if a part of a mortgage made by a widow is not binding on the reversioners, the decree made upon such a mortgage is also not binding upon them and an auction sale made in execution of the decree is also not binding upon the reversioners and they are entitled to recover the property on payment of the consideration which is binding upon the estate.
It was contended at the bar that in the case of an old transaction which is challenged fifty years after it took place, if there was a recital in the deed to the effect that the transfer was being made for payment of Government revenue, a presumption should be made in fact that there were no other means of paying revenue and that it could not be paid out of the income and borrowing was necessary. On the other side, it was contended that, if the deed by which transfer is made is silent as to its necessity, no presumption can be made about necessity and presumptions are only permissible in cases where there is a recital in the deed about the necessity. It was further contended that, if there were recitals in the deed to show that money was required for a necessary purpose, presumptions may be made that a representation of necessity was made to the transferee and the latter on bona fide inquiry found it to be true, but no presumption can be made as to the existence of necessity in fact. In Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Acharjya Chowdhuri the Lord Chancellor observed as follows:
“But in such a case as the present their Lordships do not think that these recitals can be disregarded, nor, on the other hand, can any fixed and inflexible rule be laid down as to the proper weight which they are entitled to receive. If the deeds were challenged at the time or near the date of their execution, so that independent evidence would be available, the recitals would deserve but slight consideration, and certainly should not be accepted as proof of the facts. But, as time goes by, and all the original parties to the transaction and all those who could have given evidence on the relevant points have grown old or passed away, a recital consistent with the probability and circumstances of the case assumes greater importance, and cannot lightly be set aside; for it should be remembered that the actual proof of the necessity which justified the deed is not essential to establish its validity. It is only necessary that a representation should have been made to the purchaser that such necessity existed, and that he should have acted honestly and made proper inquiry to satisfy himself of its truth. The recital is clear evidence of the representation, and if the circumstances are such as to justify a reasonable belief that an inquiry would have confirmed its truth, then when proof of actual inquiry has become impossible, the recital, coupled with such circumstances, would be sufficient evidence to support the deed. To hold otherwise would result in deciding that a title becomes weaker as it grows older, so that a transaction—perfectly honest and legitimate when it took place—would ultimately be incapable of justification merely owing to the passage of time.”
In Venkata Reddi v. Rani Saheba of Wadhwan, which was a case in which a transfer by a widow was challenged 82 years after it took place, Lord Shaw approved and adopted the statement of law on the subject by Madras High Court which was to the following effect: “It is not disputed that the onus lay upon the defendant to prove the necessity for the sale, but having regard to the great lapse of time since the transaction took place, that is, about 82 years, perhaps the highest on record, it will not be reasonable to expect such full and detailed evidence as to the state of things which gave rise to the sale in question as in the case of alienations made at more or less recent dates. In such circumstances, presumptions are permissible to fill in the details which have been obliterated by time.”
On the other hand, in Ravaneshwar Prasad Singh v. Chandi Prasad Singh the Calcutta High Court had remarked as follows: “It is for the appellant to establish cither that there was legal necessity in fact for these large borrowings or that from sufficient inquiries made he honestly believed that there was such necessity. It has been argued that the onus upon the appellant is lightened by reason of the lapse of time. But lapse of time does not affect such a matter except in so far as it might give, rise to a presumption of acquiescence or save the appellant from adverse inferences arising from the scanty proof offered. In the present case there was admittedly no acquiescence …. Then it is said that the expenses were incurred in the course of the litigations which took place between Durga Kumari and Durga Prasad. That there were such litigations is a fact, and expenses must have been incurred. But it is not sufficient to establish these two facts. It must be shown that the expenses could not have been made from the income of the estate, that they were reasonable, and what they were.” And this decision was upheld by the Judicial Committee in Ravaneshwar Prasad Singh v. Chandi Prasad Singh
In Bhojraj v. Sita Ram Lord Roche, in delivering the judgment of the Board, observed as follows: “It was contended on behalf of the defendants that owing; to the lapse of time, as a matter of law, necessity should be presumed and in support of the contention the case of Venkata Reddi v. Rani Saheba of Wadhwan was relied upon. The judgment in that case does not in the opinion of their Lordships support the contention of the respondents. Here, as in the case cited, regard must be had to the amount of evidence likely to be available after the lapse of a long time and presumptions should be allowed to fill in gaps disclosed in the evidence, but in this case there is nothing justifying the conclusions of the courts below. Presumptions not to supplement but to contradict the evidence would be out of place.”
We think that in transfers made by a Hindu widow which are being challenged after a long delay, there is no hard and fast rule about presumptions which are to be made either with regard to recitals in the deed of transfer or with regard to the question whether necessity existed in fact or whether a representation of necessity was made and on bona fide inquiry was believed. Each case will have to be considered on its merits and presumptions may be made which are consistent with the evidence, the probabilities and the surrounding circumstances in the case. If the evidence, the probabilities and the circumstances warrant, the court may find that necessity for the transfer existed in fact or the court may find that a representation of necessity was made and it was believed and, for that reason, the transferee is protected, though the factum of necessity is not proved.
A more difficult question then arises. When a deed is silent as to necessity in an old transaction, can a presumption be made that representation of necessity was made and was believed by the transferee on an inquiry? In Kumarasami Mudaliar v. Narayanasami and Thimmanna Bhatta v. Rama Bhatta it has been held that the rule that presumptions may be made to fill in the gaps is not confined only to a case where the alienee can point to recitals in the deed under which he claims, but the court can presume on probabilities and evidence, even when the deed is silent, that there was necessity in fact. In our opinion, when the recital in the deed is silent as to the necessity, in a proper case, having regard to probabilities, circumstances and evidence in the case, a presumption may be raised either with regard to the factum of the necessity or with regard to representation of the necessity which the circumstances of the case warrant.
It is now necessary to consider the facts of this case. Sheo Pragash Lal died in the year 1869. At the time of his death, according to the evidence, he was about 40 years old. His wife, Jasoda Kuer, was about 15 years old. He left no child and he left real estate, most of it permanently settled, which was assessed to a Government revenue of Rs. 15,735-4-8. A chart was supplied to us at the hearing by Mr. Banerji, which was prepared from khewats and other exhibits on the record, which shows the quantum of the estate as it was between the years 1880–1886, when the disputed transactions took place; and according to this chart, the estate consisted of 45 villages, whole or in part, and it was assessed for revenue at the figure which we have given above. Sheo Pragash Lal left no child, and there is no evidence that the widow had any dependants to support. Mst. Jasoda Kuer was the daughter of a man named Mahesh Prasad, and she had a brother by the name of Mathura Prasad. After the death of Sheo Pragash Lal the lady's father and brother acted as her attorneys and managers. There is no evidence to show what was the actual income of the estate, but from the fact that he estate was assessed to a revenue of over fifteen thousand rupees and was permanently settled a presumption arises that the income of the estate should be considerable. In the year 1868 there was a famine in the Benares district, where the estate mainly lies, and in 1869, when Sheo Pragash Lal died, he left a debt of Rs. 3,000. For what purpose this money was borrowed does not appear from the record, but it is not improbable that the money might have been borrowed for payment of Government revenue on account of famine, and, if so, it shows that there was some demand upon the income of the estate which left the proprietor in this difficulty that when he was faced with the demand of revenue in a famine year, he had no funds to fall back upon and he had to raise money by borrowing. It also appears that at the time of his death a sum of Rs. 6,000 was due to Sheo Pragash Lal from other people for which a succession certificate was taken by his widow; but there is no evidence to show what the nature of these dues was, for which succession certificate was taken, and whether any money was in fact realised or not with regard to them.
Soon after her husband's death, on 15th June, 1871, Jasoda Kuer raised a sum of Rs. 3,000 by making a mortgage in favour of Thakur Singh. The whole of this money was borrowed for payment of debts left by her husband, Sheo Pragash Lal. Six years later, on 30th August, 1877, Jasoda Kuer made a usufructuary mortgage of a portion of her property in favour of Jalal Uddin for Rs. 2,200 and on 1st February, 1878, she made a simple mortgage of her property in favour of Thakur Singh for Rs. 1,240. As a result of this usufructuary mortgage and simple mortgage, the first mortgage of 1871 which was for payment of her husband's debt, was paid off. It will thus appear that, for some reason or other, the husband died leaving a debt of Rs. 3,000 and the widow could not manage to pay that amount by the income of the property or by her husband's funds and she borrowed the money for its payment, and that her inability to discharge this liability continued up to 1878, when she executed the usufructuary mortgage and the simple mortgage mentioned above. In 1878 there was another famine in the district of Benares. She again borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,500 in August, 1878, from a lady named Rani Makundi Kuer by mortgaging her property. In this mortgage deed it was recited that the money was borrowed for payment of Government revenue.
This is the previous history of the family before the transactions in dispute took place. On 22nd June, 1881, Jasoda Kuer borrowed Rs. 1,000 from Kamta Nath by mortgaging the house and, as we have said before, it is not recited in the deed for what necessity this money was borrowed; but there is evidence to show that proceedings for realisation of revenue were pending against her at that time and those proceedings terminated on 19th July, 1881, when she paid a sum of Rs. 1,003-8-0 as arrears of revenue. On 20th June, 1882, Jasoda Kuer executed a simple mortgage in favour of Bhola Singh for Rs. 10,000, out of which a sum of Rs. 1,100 was for payment of the instalment of Government revenue of May, 1882. The rest of the consideration was for payment of some of the earlier debts mentioned above and some other debts. On 25th August, 1884, Jasoda Kuer made a simple mortgage in favour of Gobind Das for Rs. 2,500. Out of this consideration a sum of Rs. 2,300 was for payment of Government revenue of May, 1884. And lastly, on 7th January, 1886, Jasoda Kuer made a mortgage in favour of Gobardhan Das for a sum of Rs. 6,000, the consideration of which was as follows:
Rs. a. p. (1) For payment of Gobind Das's decree … …… 3,194 5 0 (2) For payment of Kamta Nath's decree … … … 1,536 8 0 (3) Set off against the prior debt of Gobardhan Das … … … 300 0 0 (4) Taken for stamp and registration costs … … … 40 0 0 (5) Taken for household expenditure … … … 929 3 0 Total … 6,000 0 0
As the auction sales which are challenged in this case took place in execution of a decree which was passed on the mortgage of 1886, in order to make the auction sales binding it is necessary for the transferees to establish that the mortgage of 1886 was binding upon the reversioners; and as out of the consideration of the mortgage of 1886 a portion was for the satisfaction of the two mortgages of 1881 and 1884 in favour of Kamta Nath and Gobind Das, respectively, on which decrees had been obtained, it becomes necessary for the transferees to establish necessity for these two mortgages of 1881 and 1884.
Mr. Banerji's contention is that in the mortgage of 1881 there is no recital of any necessity and therefore it cannot be presumed that the mortgage was for the payment of Government revenue and from the mere fact that near about that time Rs. 1,000 odd was paid for Government revenue or that proceedings with regard to realisation of Government revenue were pending against Jasoda Kuer an inference cannot be drawn that money was borrowed in fact for payment of Government revenue or on a representation made to Kamta Nath that money was required for the payment of Government revenue. Mr. Banerji contends that in 1878, three years earlier, when money was borrowed for payment of Government revenue, that necessity was recited in the bond of Thakur Singh. Again, a year later, in 1882, when money was borrowed for payment of Government revenue, in the bond of Bhola Singh that necessity was recited, and again, in 1884, when money was borrowed from Gobind Das for payment of Government revenue, that necessity was recited. The fact that the necessity for payment of Government revenue was not recited in the bond of Kamta Nath and that the bond was silent as to all necessity shows that the money was not required for that purpose and that the transaction with Kamta Nath was without reference to a legal necessity and on the footing of a personal borrowing by the widow on her own personal credit and the creditor looked to payment from Jasoda Kuer and not from reversioners. The creditor was advancing a small sum of Rs. 1,000 on a short term credit and he expected to realise it from the usufruct of the estate, in the hands of Jasoda Kuer and he did not care to bind the estate. Mr. Banerji further contends that the lady had an estate which was assessed to revenue of about Rs. 15,000, and it must be presumed that her income from the permanently settled estate might well be taken to be about Rs. 32,000 a year. She had no children and no dependants to support. There is no evidence as to what she did with the income, and the transferees have failed to prove that there was any necessity for her to borrow Rs. 2,300 for payment of Government revenue from Gobind Das or to borrow a sum of Rs. 929-3-0 for household expenditure from Gobardhan Das and a further sum of Rs. 300 of which no particulars are given in the deed. Mr. Banerji further contends that the trial Judge has disbelieved the evidence led by the defence to prove legal necessity for Rs. 929 and Rs. 300, in other words, for Rs. 1,229 out of the total consideration of Rs. 6,000 in the bond of Gobardhan Das, and has held that the legal necessity to the extent of Rs. 1,229 out of the consideration of Rs. 6,000 in the bond of Gobardhan Das has not been proved, but the learned Judge has wrongly applied the rule laid down in Sri Krishan Das v. Nathu Ram to the mortgage of Gobardhan Das on the findings which he has arrived at. If the consideration of the mortgage of Gobardhan Das for Rs. 6,000 was justified by legal necessity to the extent of Rs. 4,771 and was not justified to the extent of Rs. 1,229, then, Mr. Banerji contends, to the extent to which the mortgage was not justified it is not binding upon the reversioners and consequently the decree which has been passed on the basis of that mortgage and the sale which took place in execution of the decree are also not binding to upon the reversioners and they are entitled to get possession of the property on payment of that portion of the consideration which is binding upon them.
These are serious contentions and we have given them our anxious consideration. The transactions which are being challenged took place about 50 years ago. The scribes, the attesting witnesses and the parties who took part in the transactions are all dead. The reversioners to the estate lived at Benares, close by, and they never challenged these transactions soon after they took place or at a time when they were fresh and when evidence justifying, them could be available. This is not a case in which it is proved that the Hindu widow was extravagant or wasteful or improvident or was surrounded by imscrupulous persons. It is not shown to us that the transferees in any way acted unfairly or unscrupulously or did not pay full consideration. There is no evidence that the property was not sold for full price. Very different considerations would have arisen if all or any of these things had been established or if there had been any reason to suspect the bona fides of the transferees or to suspect that the widow was overreached or was a tool in the hands of unscrupulous persons. It appears that the lady was being assisted by her father and brother, and nothing has been proved to show that the father and the brother were out to serve their own interests and were not serving the interests of, the lady. In the transaction of Gobardhan Das a leading lawyer of Benares, who is now dead, took part in attesting the deed. This lawyer belonged to the same community as the lady and there is every reason to think that he would know all the affairs of the lady and would not Vouch for recitals which were incorrect or false or would take part in a transaction which was not justified.
It is true that there is no direct evidence to show as to what happened to the income which the lady had from the estate, but it is clear that the husband of the lady himself left a debt of Rs. 3,000 and that the year before he died there was a famine. It is also a fact that in 1878 there was another famine and he lady borrowed the money, from Rani Makundi Kuer to pay Government revenue. The after effects of a famine continue for sometime and difficulties continue in making collections from tenants. In 1884 money was borrowed from Gobind Das. It was recited in the bond that “on account of the arrears due by the tenants and other expenses it is not possible to pay the revenue without taking a loan, and this would mean a great loss to me, the executant”. In the bond of 1881 in favour of Kamta Nath it is true that there is no recital, but it is a fact that money was due for Government revenue at that time and the sum of Rs. 1,003 was actually paid in Government revenue soon after the sum of Rs. 1,000 was borrowed from Kamta Nath. It is also a fact that in 1882 a sum of Rs. 1,100 was borrowed from Bhola Singh for payment of revenue for the instalment of May, 1882. It is not necessary for the purposes of:this case to find as a fact that legal necessity existed, or in other words that the lady was not in a position to pay Government revenue or to maintain herself without borrowing money. It is sufficient if it can be found that representation was made to the transferee that money was required for payment of Government revenue and for her maintenance, which the transferee, after reasonable inquiry, in good faith believed and he advanced money on that basis. We think that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, a presumption might well be raised that, when Rs. 1,000 was borrowed from Kamta Nath, a representation was made that the money was required for payment of revenue and that there was no other way for its payment except by borrowing and Kamta Nath believed in good faith all this and after reasonable inquiry that necessity existed he advanced money on that basis. We may also presume that when representation was made to Gobind Das that Rs. 2,330 was required for payment of revenue, which could not be paid in any other way except by borrowing, Gobind Das, after due inquiry, believed in that representation and advanced the money; and we may further presume that a representation was made to Gobardhan Das that money was due to Kamta Nath and to Gobind Das on their decrees, which could not be paid in any other way except by borrowing, and the lady required a further sum of Rs. 900 odd and Rs. 300 for maintenance and other necessary expenses and Gobardhan, after due inquiry and in good faith, acted on the representation and found it justified.
The case is not free from difficulty, and in all transactions of Hindu widows which are challenged by reversioners after a great lapse of time and in which presumptions are raised to fill in the gaps of evidence, there is some risk of speculation; but in the absence of evidence of waste and extravagance on the part of the widow and unfairness on the part of the transferees and inadequacy of the price of sale consideration and, having regard to the fact that the reversioners have allowed transactions to stand so long and the transferees have made improvements upon property transferred in good faith, we have come to the conclusion that the transfers need not be disturbed.
The result is that the appeal is dismissed, but as the defendants falsely denied the plaintiffs' pedigree and reversionary title and the decree of the trial court is being affirmed upon other grounds than those adopted by the trial court, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.
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