- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Thathu Naick And Ors. v. Kondu Reddi And Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
The 1st plaintiff (decree-holder) obtained a mortgage decree for principal money (stated as Rs. 750 in one place and Rs. 1,682-7-0 in another part of the record) and was granted permission under the Civil Procedure Code to bid at a Court auction subject to conditions. After two unsuccessful sales, a third sale occurred in which property was purchased in the name of the 2nd plaintiff for Rs. 436 — a sum considerably less than the amounts referred to in the decree or the conditional permission. The sale was confirmed and symbolic possession delivered under Section 319, Civil Procedure Code. The 1st plaintiff now sues to recover the property from the 4th and 5th defendants (who are alleged purchasers from the judgment-debtors during the pendency of the mortgage suit and are bound by the decree), and the lower Courts dismissed the suit on the ground that the purchase was fraudulent: the 1st plaintiff had fraudulently purchased the property through the 2nd plaintiff (benami) for a smaller sum than he could have bid openly under the permission previously given.
Procedurally, the suit was tried in the subordinate Courts (Munsif and Lower Appellate Court). The present opinion records multiple judges' views: one judge (Abdur Rahim, J.) concluded that an issue should be framed and the case referred to a third Judge; another judge (whose judgment is reported here) concluded that the appeal should be allowed and the case remanded for trial of other issues; a third judge (Sankaran Nair, J.) concluded that the sale contravened Section 294, that secrecy prima facie implies fraud and confirmed dismissal of the second appeal. The opinions differ on whether the trial Court (as opposed to the executing Court) may refuse to enforce such a sale and on whether fraud must be specifically pleaded.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a decree-holder's purchase of the judgment-debtor's property in the name of another (benami), without the express permission required by Section 294, Civil Procedure Code, renders the sale void or voidable and on what grounds the sale may be set aside.
- Whether the Court trying an ejectment suit (or similar suit to recover possession) may refuse to enforce such a sale (i.e., set it aside or decline to give assistance) or whether only the executing Court that held the sale can exercise the power to set aside the sale under Section 294.
- Whether Section 244, Civil Procedure Code (and related procedural bars) prevents a defendant from raising, as a defence in the present suit, questions which otherwise might be the subject of separate proceedings to set aside an execution sale.
- Whether fraud must be specifically pleaded in the written statement (or plaint) in order for a Court to decide that the purchase was fraudulent and thus refuse assistance.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (as recorded)
- Under Section 294 the execution Court alone can exercise the power to set aside a sale; because the sale has not been set aside by that Court, the respondents (defendants) have no defence in the present ejectment suit.
- Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code bars the defence relied upon by the respondents (i.e., the question should be raised in separate proceedings under Section 244/Section 294).
- The decision to set aside or refuse enforcement of the sale on the ground of fraud is bad because fraud was not alleged in the written statement of the 4th and 5th defendants; fraud must be pleaded specifically.
Respondents / 4th and 5th Defendants' Arguments (as recorded)
- The sale to the 1st plaintiff (through the 2nd plaintiff) is void because the 1st plaintiff fraudulently purchased the property benami for a sum considerably less than the mortgage principal and/or less than the amount at which he was permitted to bid.
- The 4th and 5th defendants, being bound by the decree and having acquired title from the judgment-debtors during the pendency of the mortgage suit, are persons interested and entitled to challenge the sale.
- It is alleged (in written statements) that the sale is invalid because the real purchaser was the 1st plaintiff acting through the 2nd plaintiff and that he had no permission to bid; while specific allegation of insufficient price was not pleaded, the defendants relied on the circumstances (benami purchase, secrecy, and the low sale price) to assert fraud.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bhiram Ali Shaik Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha, 24 C. 355 (at p.357) | Authority that supports the view that questions regarding execution sales can be raised by a defendant in a suit (i.e., Section 244 does not bar the trial of an issue raised by a defendant), and that defendants in possession can resist ejectment on grounds that could set aside the sale. | Relied upon (by some members of the Court) to reject the argument that Section 244 bars the defence in the present suit and to support treating the plaint/written statement as an application to set aside the sale. |
| Second Appeal No. 616 of 1903 (Venkataramana v. Meenat) — referred to in this Court's decisions | Authority to the effect that Section 244 does not bar a defendant from raising, in the suit brought against him, issues that otherwise might be the subject of a separate application. | Used to support the proposition that the present Court may entertain the defence and that this avoids multiplicity of proceedings. |
| Mahomed Gazee Chowdhry v. Ram Loll Sen, 10 C. 757 | Instance where the Court refused to enforce a sale under similar circumstances (decree-holder having bought by means of fraud practised on the Court). | Referred to by those who held that the trial Court may refuse to enforce a sale procured by deceit; noted as a decision which refused to enforce a sale in similar circumstances, though some judges in the present opinion considered it not to be binding in the present context. |
| Mathura Das v. Nathuni Lall Mahta, 11 C. 731 | Principle that if the decree-holder paid the full value at the sale (even if benami), no one is the worse and the sale will be maintained; and authority cited to show such purchases are not void but create good legal title unless set aside under Section 294. | Invoked to show that buying in the name of another does not in itself constitute fraud and that such purchases create a good legal title unless set aside under Section 294. |
| Mahomed Mira Ravuthar v. Savvasi Vijaya Raghunadha Gopalar, 23 M. 227 | Emphatic statement that fraud must generally be pleaded in distinct terms so the accused party has notice; courts should construe charges of fraud strictly and narrowly. | Relied upon to underscore the usual requirement that fraud be pleaded; used by one judge to indicate caution in inferring fraud and that the plaintiffs might have had a defence such as ratification or agreement that would require opportunity to be pleaded and proved. |
| Javherbai v. Haribhai, 5 B. 575; Chintamanrav Natu v. Vithabai, 11 B. 588; Paramsiva v. Krishna, 14 M. 498; Martand v. Dhondo, 22 B. 624; and related authorities | Authorities showing that a decree-holder's purchase in contravention of statutory restrictions is not necessarily void but may create legal title, subject to being set aside under the relevant statutory provision (Section 294). | These cases were cited to support the view that such a purchase is not ipso facto void and that the statutory remedy (setting aside under Section 294) governs the consequences of contravention. |
| Srimati Sarat Kumari Debi v. Nimai Charn Dey Sircar, 5 C.W.N. 265 | Followed Mahomed Gazee Chowdhry in treating the conduct of the decree-holder as an abuse of process in similar facts. | Referred to as a case taking the view that the decree-holder's conduct could disentitle him from the assistance of the Court; noted by a judge but not accepted as controlling by other members of the Court in this opinion. |
| Coaks v. Boswell, 11 App. Cas. 232 | Authority cited for the proposition that conditional leave to bid may be treated as continuing (i.e., leave obtained earlier might be supposed to continue in force at a later sale). | Used to justify the supposition that the conditional leave granted earlier to the 1st plaintiff continued in force at the third sale, though the judge concluded that the leave was not a binding agreement to buy at a minimum price. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Reasoning of Abdur Rahim, J.
He assumed the 4th and 5th defendants and the executing Court were unaware of the true facts because the decree-holder purchaser had practised deceit. He held that confirmation of the sale did not cure the fraud where both the judgment-debtors and the Court were in ignorance caused by the decree-holder's deceit. Section 294 makes such a purchase voidable at the discretion of the Court on application by any person interested; he accepted that the 4th and 5th defendants were persons interested. He rejected the contention that Section 244 barred the defence, relying on authorities to the contrary and preferring the view that Section 244 bars separate suits but does not bar the trial of an issue when raised by a defendant in a suit against him. He considered the Mahomed Gazee Chowdhry decision (which refused to enforce a sale in similar circumstances) to be rightly decided: if fraud is established, the court should not aid in bringing the fraud to a successful issue by enforcing the sale. But he recognized fraud is more than trickery: if the purchaser paid full value, no one is harmed and the sale may be maintained. Given the admitted facts (benami purchase, low price relative to mortgage principal and prior conditional leave to bid at a much higher figure), he concluded that the issue of whether the 1st plaintiff by deceiving the Court and judgment-debtors became purchaser for less than true value should be framed and tried. He therefore asked that the Lower Appellate Court return a finding on the issue he formulated:
"Has the 1st plaintiff by deceiving the Court and the judgment-debtors become the purchaser of the land in question, for less than its true value at the date of the sale?"
Because his learned brother differed and neither was prepared to dismiss the appeal, he proposed laying the case before the Chief Justice for reference to a third Judge.
Reasoning of the second Judge (reported at length, concluding appeal should be allowed)
This judge set out the factual background (including dates of sales, amount of decree, conditional leave to bid at Rs. 1,500 and actual sale at Rs. 436). He emphasized established rules: a purchase by a decree-holder through another in contravention of Section 294 does not in itself constitute fraud; the statute itself provides the remedy (the Court may set aside the sale) and one should not import consequences beyond that statutory penalty. He relied on authorities (including Mahomed Mira Ravuthar and a list of cases) showing that such purchases generally create good legal title unless and until the sale is set aside under Section 294. He held that the conditional leave to bid did not operate as a binding agreement obliging the 1st plaintiff to buy at Rs. 1,500 — it only afforded him liberty to avail himself of the leave or not. On the necessity of pleading fraud, he recognized the principle that fraud should be pleaded, and he said the admitted facts did not necessarily preclude defenses that the 1st plaintiff might have (e.g., agreement by judgment-debtors, later ratification). For these reasons he concluded the sale had not been set aside under Section 294 and therefore passed an effective title; accordingly, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover possession. He also addressed the argument founded on Bhiram Ali (24 C. 355) and Section 244, observing that if the sale conveyed no title, a defendant should not be compelled by reason of Section 244 to take steps to set it aside, but he found that the sale in this case did convey title subject to setting aside by the executing Court and that questions bearing upon the exercise of the executing Court's discretion could not properly be determined as a defence in this suit. He held the appeal should be allowed, subordinate Court judgments reversed, and the suit remanded to the Munsif for trial of other issues; costs would follow the result.
Reasoning of Sankaran Nair, J.
He emphasized the clear statutory command of Section 294: no decree-holder shall bid or purchase without the express permission of the Court. He treated the provision as protective of the judgment-debtor and others interested, and noted the defendants were unaware before confirmation that the 2nd plaintiff was not the real purchaser. He agreed that Section 244 was not a bar to determination of the question in the present suit and that the plaint or written statement could be treated as an application under Sections 244 and 294. Importantly, he stated that where a decree-holder purchases in contravention of Section 294 and the judgment-debtor seeks to set aside the sale, it is unnecessary for the judgment-debtor to allege fraud or insufficiency of sale price; the burden lies on the decree-holder to satisfy the Court that the sale should be confirmed. He noted particular facts here (purchase price less than amount lent on the land, less than the minimum bid under the earlier order, and purchase made benami with secrecy) and observed that secrecy prima facie implies fraud. On these grounds he concluded the burden was on the plaintiff to justify the sale, and he confirmed the decree of the subordinate Courts (i.e., dismissed the second appeal) with costs.
Holding and Implications
Core procedural posture: The opinions in this reported text are divided among the judges. One judge proposed framing a specific issue and referred the matter for consideration by a third Judge (i.e., the case was to be laid before the Chief Justice for reference). Another judge would allow the appeal, reverse the subordinate Courts' judgments and remand the suit for trial of other issues. A third judge would dismiss the second appeal and confirm the decree.
Immediate holdings recorded in the opinion:
- Abdur Rahim, J.: Proposed that the question whether the 1st plaintiff deceived the Court and judgment-debtors into becoming purchaser for less than true value be tried and recorded an intention to refer the case to the Chief Justice for the opinion of a third Judge.
- One Judge (reported at length between paragraphs 10–21): Held that the sale, not having been set aside under Section 294, passed an effective legal title; allowed the appeal, reversed subordinate Court judgments, remanded the suit to the Munsif for trial of remaining issues and directed costs to follow the result.
- Sankaran Nair, J.: Held that purchase in contravention of Section 294 is perilous for the decree-holder; where the purchase is benami and for a sum less than the mortgage/principal and less than any minimum order, the burden is on the decree-holder to justify the sale; concluded secrecy prima facie implies fraud and confirmed the decree (dismissed the second appeal) with costs.
Practical consequences for the parties (as discussed in the opinion):
- If a decree-holder purchases in contravention of Section 294, the sale is voidable at the discretion of the Court and interested persons (including those bound by the decree) may apply to set it aside.
- A trial Court may (depending on the view adopted) either refuse to enforce a sale tainted by deceit or consider the sale to have passed a legal title subject to being set aside by the executing Court; the judges in this opinion differ on that procedural question.
- Where the sale has not been set aside, some judges consider that the purchaser holds an effective legal title unless and until the executing Court sets it aside; other judges consider that secrecy and benami purchase, especially at an undervalue, may amount to fraud and disentitle the purchaser to the Court's assistance.
- Pleading: One judge emphasized the traditional rule that fraud should be specifically pleaded so the accused party has notice; another judge considered that where facts clearly show secrecy and undervalue, the burden lies on the decree-holder to justify the sale without the judgment-debtor needing to plead fraud expressly.
- Remedial/Procedural step: If the defendants (or other interested persons) learn of the true facts of a benami purchase by the decree-holder, the preferred course (under some views expressed) is to apply to the executing Court under Section 294 to set aside the sale; under other views, the defendants can raise the issue as a defence in a suit for recovery of possession.
- Costs: Where appeal outcomes are addressed, the judge who would have allowed the appeal directed that costs follow the result; Sankaran Nair ordered dismissal of the appeal with costs.
Precedential effect: The judges in this opinion differ in their conclusions; there is no single unanimous ruling reflected across the recorded opinions. The decision records conflicting approaches to (a) whether the trial Court or only the executing Court should set aside an execution sale, and (b) the need to plead fraud versus placing the burden on the decree-holder to justify a benami/secret purchase at undervalue. Accordingly, the opinion does not present a single, unqualified new precedent but records the positions taken by the several judges and the cases they relied upon.
1. The 1st plaintiff sues for the recovery of property purchased by him at a Court-sale in execution of a mortgage decree obtained by himself. The principal money due being Rs. 750 he obtained permission to bid at the sale to an amount not less than Rs. 1,500. The sale was held but neither he nor any one else made any bid: a month or two later another sale was held but again the property was not sold: at the third sale without asking for permission to bid he purchased in the name of the 2nd plaintiff for a sum considerably less than the principal money due on the mortgage. The sale was confirmed and possession delivered to the 2nd plaintiff under Section 319, Civil Procedure Code. The plaint alleges that delivery was under Section 318, and the delivery order and receipt are not on the record, but I take it for the purposes of this judgment, paragraph 12 of the plaint being ambiguous, that the 4th and 5th defendants are purchasers from the judgment-debtors pending the plaintiff's suit on his mortgage and have retained actual possession of the land ever since their purchase. The 1st plaintiff now sues to recover the land from them, and they resist him on several grounds of which one only has been dealt with by the Courts below. They have dismissed the suit, holding that the sale to the 1st plaintiff is void by reason of his having fraudulently purchased the property through the 2nd plaintiff for a smaller sum than he must have paid had he, acting on the permission given him by the Court, bid at the auction in his own name or openly by an agent.
2. I must assume that the 4th and 5th defendants did not know the truth before the institution of the present suit, and that the Court executing the decree was equally in the dark.
3. These being the facts I may clear the ground by stating that I do not think the fact that the sale has been confirmed affects the case. At the time of confirmation neither the judgment-debtors nor the Court had notice of any fact which would have caused the latter to refuse confirmation, and their ignorance was due to deceit practised by the decree-holder purchaser.
4. The purchase being effected in contravention of the provisions of section 294, the sale is voidable, in the discretion of the Court, on the application of any person interested in it, and I have no doubt that the 4th and 5th defendants, who are, ex-hypothasi, bound by the decree, are persons interested in the sale.
5. The appellants contend that under Section 294 the execution Court alone can exercise the powers conferred by the section and as the sale has not been set aside by that Court the respondents have no defence. It is also contended that section 244 of the code bars the defence; and that the decision on the ground of fraud is bad in the absence of an allegation of fraud in the written statement of the 4th and 5th defendants.
6. The second contention is I think unsound. Bhiram Ali Shaik Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha 24 C. 355 at page 357., and Second Appeal No. 616 of 1903 in this Court are authorities to the contrary, and I am unable to accept the view pressed upon us in the able argument addressed to us on behalf of the appellants that the words, 'by a separate suit' in Section 244 are equivalent to in a separate suit whether the question is raised by the plaintiff or the defendant." I prefer the view taken by the Calcutta High Court that the section "bars a suit brought for the determination of certain questions, but does not bar the trial of an issue involved in those questions, if the issue is raised at the instance of a defendant in a suit brought against him." As was pointed out in Second Appeal No. 616 of 1903 this view tends to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, and it also avoids the necessity of compelling a defendant to raise in the execution Court questions which it may be entirely unnecessary to agitate so long as he is left in peaceable possession of his property. In the present case it is obviously more convenient to try the question in the present suit, than to stay proceedings and refer the 4th and 5th defendants to an application to the execution Court, the execution of the decree having been, so far as they are concerned, closed long ago with the delivery of possession to 2nd plaintiff.
3. The first contention amounts to this: though the execution Court could, if it thought fit, set aside the sale, the Court trying this suit cannot do so, and cannot, therefore, refuse to enforce it. In Mahomed Gazee Chowdhry v. Ram Loll Sen 10 C, 757., the Court did refuse to enforce a sale in similar circumstances but, it is argued that decision ought not to be followed.
4. It seems to me, however, that that decision is right: assuming fraud on the part of the 1st plaintiff what he in effect asks the Court to do is to aid him in bringing his fraud to a successful issue. By deceiving the execution Court and the judgment-debtors he has obtained for himself an advantage over the latter which he would not have obtained had the Court known the truth: and because he has been able ever since to keep the truth from the knowledge of the judgment-debtors and the 4th and 5th defendants, the Court must, he claims, give him a decree now. I cannot believe that it is the duty of the Court knowingly to accept the position of an instrument of fraud, and that too when the fraud has been practised upon itself or upon another Court which is practically the same thing. We might no doubt stay proceedings and give the judgment-debtors an opportunity of applying to the execution Court, but that would be, I think, an unnecessarily circuitous method of procedure.
5. But it has to be remembered that fraud means more than mere trickery. The 1st plaintiff has deceived the execution Court: knowing that that Court would not give him permission to buy the land for Rs. 436, he has set up the 2nd plaintiff to buy it for him: he has thus by his deceit obtained an advantage for himself, but at whose expense? If he has paid its full value for the land no one is the loser by his trick and the sale will be maintained. Mathura Das v. Nathuni Lall Mahta 11 C. 731. It matters not to the judgment-debtors who buy the land provided it fetches its full value at the sale.
6. This brings me to the third contention that no fraud was alleged or proved. In the written statement of the 4th and 5th defendants, and in the additional written statement of the 4th defendant all that is said is that the sale is invalid because the 1st plaintiff was the real purchaser through the 2nd plaintiff, and had no permission to bid. It is nowhere alleged that the price realised was insufficient.
7. Nevertheless the District Munsif taking into consideration the fact that the purchase price was less than the amount lent on mortgage on the land has held that the 1st plaintiff has defrauded the judgment-debtors by purchasing at an undervalue benami. No other injury to the judgment-debtors is suggested. The 8th issue, the only one decided, does not raise this question, but having regard to the undoubted facts, the fact that the 4th and 5th defendants are not the actual debtors (though it may be that they are bound by the decree) and may possibly not have been aware of the amount realized at the sale, the fact that the 1st plaintiff must have known that except by a trick he could not have obtained leave to bid for so little as Rs. 436, and the fact that that sum is but little more than half the principal mortgage money--having regard to all these facts I have come to the conclusion that we ought to allow the issue to be tried now.
8. I would frame it thus and ask the Lower Appellate Court to return a finding on it:
"Has the 1st plaintiff by deceiving the Court and the judgment-debtors become the purchaser of the land in question, for less than its true value at the date of the sale?"If he has, it seems to me, he has been guilty of a fraud upon the Court and the judgment-debtors and the Court will not lend him its assistance.
9. As my learned brother differs, and neither of us is prepared to dismiss the appeal, we will lay the case before the learned Chief Justice for reference to a third Judge.
Abdur Rahim, J.
10. The first plaintiff in the suit in which this second appeal has arisen bought at a Court auction sale held on the 8th March 1901 the property which he now seeks to recover from the defendants, in the name of the 2nd plaintiff but for his own benefit. The sale which was effected in execution of a mortgage decree for Rs. 1,682-7-0 obtained by the 1st plaintiff in Original Suit No. 368 of 1899 on the file of the District Munsif's Court of Satur against the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 was confirmed on the 12th April 1901 and the 2nd plaintiff the apparent purchaser also obtained symbolical delivery of possession but did not succeed in obtaining actual possession of the property. Before the sale of the 8th March 1901, there had been two infructuous attempts at sale one on the 12th October 1900 and the other on the 18th January 1901, on both of which occasions there was no bidder. At the third sale the 2nd plaintiff was the only bidder and the property was knocked down to him for Rs. 436. On the 1st September 1900 that is before the first infructuous sale the 1st plaintiff had applied under Section 294, Civil Procedure Code, for leave to bid and obtained it on condition that he was to commence his bids at Rs. 1,500, namely twice the principal amount secured by his mortgage. So far as it appears this limit was fixed without any reference to the value of the property. The defendants Nos. 4 and 5 bought the property from the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 during the pendency of the mortgage suit, Original Suit No. 368 of 1899, and are, therefore, bound by the decree in that suit and would have the same right to impeach the sale as defendants Nos. 1 and 2.
11. Both the lower Courts dismissed the plaintiff's suit holding on the authority of Mahomed Gazee Chowdhry v. Ram Loll Sen 10 C.757. that the plaintiff purchased the property by means of fraud practised on the Court and, therefore, his purchase was void and of no effect in law. The learned pleader for the plaintiffs, who are the appellants in, this Court, argues that in the first place the lower Courts were not entitled to find a case of fraud as no fraud was at all alleged in the written statements, nor was any issue framed raising the question. There can be no doubt, it seems to me, that the rule is well established that a party relying upon fraud either as the basis of his action or as defence to a suit must plead it in distinct terms so that the party whose act is impeached as fraudulent may have full notice of the charge he has to meet. This proposition is emphatically enunciated in Mahomed Mira Ravuthar v. Savvasi Vijaya Raghunadha Gopalar 23 M. 227 where their Lordships of the Privy Council strongly protest against the propriety of the Appellate Court entertaining a case of fraud other than the one specifically alleged in the pleadings. Here though the question of fraud is discussed in the judgment of the Munsif it does not appear that the plaintiffs were invited to go to trial on that question and in their grounds of appeal to the Lower Appellate Court they protested against the Munsif considering any case of fraud. But it is said that the facts which are found in this case to constitute fraud are all admitted and as fraud has been inferred from those facts merely as a conclusion of law the plaintiffs can have nothing to complain of. But I am not sure that this is so. In my opinion the admitted facts of this case such as they are did not preclude the necessity of pleading fraud in express terms because the 1st plaintiff might for instance be able to show if a proper opportunity were given to him that the judgment-debtors agreed to his bidding for the property in the name of the 2nd plaintiff for Rs. 436 or that the judgment-debtors subsequently to the sale and with full knowledge of the facts ratified or acquiesced in the purchase made by the 1st plaintiff. All that was, in fact, pleaded was that the purchase was made without permission of the Court and, therefore, could not be enforced.
12. Now do the facts which I have stated make out that there was fraud vitiating the sale? The fact that the 1st plaintiff bought the property through the 2nd plaintiff does not in itself constitute fraud even although he did so without disclosing it to the Court holding the sale and with the object of evading the necessity of obtaining the Court's leave under Section 294, Civil Procedure Code. What he did no doubt amounted to a violation of the Statutory rule as enacted in Section 294, Civil Procedure Code, and that section itself lays down the penalty for his so buying the property, namely, that the Court may, if it so chooses, set aside the sale on an application being made to that effect by the judgment-debtor. The restriction imposed on a decree-holder buying the property of the Judgment-debtor in execution of his decree is the creation of a Statute and when we find that the same Statute has provided a penalty for the violation of such restriction, I think, it is according to a sound canon of construction that the penalty should be regarded as co-extensive with the disobedience of the restriction. What I mean is, that the Court cannot attach to the disregard of a rule like this consequences other than that contemplated by the Legislature by converting such a disregard into fraud. In Mahomed Mira Ravuthar v. Savvasi Vijaya Raghunadha Gopalar 23 M. 227, at page 237, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council point out that in this country, where the responsibility for conducting the sale devolves entirely on the Court, the necessity for obtaining its permission to bid cannot be said to impose the same obligations on the decree-holder, wanting to buy the property, as in England where the decree-holder has generally the conduct of the sale. The cases referred to, namely Javherbai v. Haribhai 5 B. 575., Chintamanrav Natu v. Vithabai 11 B. 588, Paramsiva v. Krishna 14 M. 498, Martand v. Dhondo 22 B. 624, at p. 628 and Mathura Das v. Nathuni Loll Mahta 11 C. 731, are clear authorities, if any such were needed, showing that such a purchase, as is under consideration, is not void but creates a good legal title in the buyer unless and until the sale is set aside according to the provisions of Section 294, Civil Procedure Code.
13. The next question is, does the fact that the first plaintiff had applied, before the first infructuous sale, for leave to bid and obtained it on condition that he was not to bid less than Rs. 1,500--make any difference? In my opinion it does not. In this connection I would suppose that the conditional leave continued in force at the time of the third sale (See Coaks v. Boswell, 11 App. Cas. 232, at P. 242) at which he actually bought the property for Rs. 436--a sum considerably less than Rs. 1,500. But the leave which was granted to the 1st plaintiff cannot be said to have the effect of a binding agreement on his part to buy the property for at least Rs. 1,500. If he was then at liberty to avail himself or not of the leave, as granted, his buying the property for Rs. 436--would only show that he bought it without availing himself of such leave. I fail to see, therefore, why the 1st plaintiff buying the property at the third sale for a sum less than Rs. 1,500--should be in a worse legal position than he would be if he had obtained no leave at all.
14. I may again refer to Mahomed Mira Ravuthar v. Savvasi Vijaya Raghunadha Gopalar 23 M. 227, pages 232, 234--as showing that the Court should not be hasty in inferring fraud but should, on the other hand, construe strictly and narrowly all charges of fraud. Here the Court holding the sale was quite willing to conclude the bargain for Rs. 436--with the 2nd plaintiff and the fact that the latter bought really for the 1st plaintiff, who had not obtained leave of the Court to buy for that amount, cannot be said to vitiate the contract itself. In Mahomed Gazee Chowdhry v. Ram Loll Sen 10 C. 757., however, a different view prevailed and that case was subsequently followed in Srimati Sarat Kumari Debi v. Nimai Charn Dey Sircar 5 C.W.N. 265. In both these cases, the circumstances of which were similar, the learned Judges were of opinion that the conduct of the decree-holder who bought the judgment-debtor's property amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court and, therefore, disentitled him to the assistance of the Court in enforcing that purchase. But with the greatest deference to the learned Judges who decided those cases I do not see how, if the Court sale passed a legal title subject to its being defeated by an order of the executing Court setting aside the sale, the Court can refuse to recognize his legal title. It is not the case of a plaintiff seeking an equitable relief so that the Court may refuse to grant it in the exercise of its discretion upon one of the well-known principles which guide the exercise of equity jurisdiction. I may also remark that, so far as I am aware, the phrase abuse of the process of the Court' is generally used in connection with actions for using some process of the Court, such, as for instance, a writ of attachment taken out maliciously to the injury of another person and I do not think that the employment of that phraseology helps in any way to indicate the legal effect of a purchase, such as this, or the legal force of the judgment-debtor's plea in resisting a suit for ejectment.
15. I am thus of opinion, that the sale not having been set aside under Section 294, Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the property from the defendants. But it has been argued on the authority of the case of Bhiram Ali Shaik Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha 24 C. 355 at page 357., that, if on an application to the executing Court, the sale could be set aside, the defendants are entitled, if in possession, to resist a suit for ejectment on the same grounds. This it is urged would save a multiplicity of proceedings. I can quite understand that in cases where the sale conveyed no title the defendant should not be compelled by reason of Section 244, Civil Procedure Code, to take any step to set it aside. But if I am right in the view that the sale in this case passed an effective title, subject to its being defeated at the discretion of the executing Court, the decision in Bhiram Ali Shaik Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha 24 C. 355 at page 357., cannot be said to be in point. And if my appreciation of the legal position of the parties in this suit be correct the argument based on convenience has no force, Nor do I see how questions bearing upon the exercise of the discretion vested in the executing Court under Section 294, Civil Procedure Code, can be properly determined as a matter of defence to a suit like this. The only course open to the defendants was, when the facts of the purchase by the 1st plaintiff in the name of the 2nd plaintiff came to their knowledge, to apply to the Court, which held the sale, to set it saide under Section 294, Civil Procedure Code.
16. In the view I take the appeal should be allowed and the judgments of the Subordinate Courts reversed, but as there are other issues raised which have not been tried the suit must be remanded to the Munsif for the trial of those issues. Costs will follow the result.
Sankaran Nair, J.
17. It is unnecessary for me to recapitulate the facts as they are fully stated in the judgments of my learned colleagues. Section 294 of the Civil Procedure Code is quite clear. It says distinctly that no decree-holder shall bid for or purchase the property "without the express permission of the Court." This provision precluded the 1st plaintiff from purchasing the property in the name of the 2nd plaintiff. It is enacted in the interests of the judgment-debtor and other persons interested in the property. They need not, therefore, impeach the sale. But it is open to them to apply to the Court to set it aside and the Court may "if it thinks fit" set it aside.
18. As the defendants Nos. 4 and 5 were not aware, before the confirmation of the sale, that the second plaintiff was not the real purchaser and that it was the first plaintiff decree-holder who purchased the property in the name of the 2nd plaintiff, the confirmation of the sale obviously cannot be a bar to enforcing their right to set aside the sale. My learned colleagues also take the same view. The only question then is, whether the defendants may apply to set it aside in this suit in answer to the plaintiff's claim. On this point my learned colleagues differ, Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim taking the view that the executing Court alone can set aside the sale and that the proper course which should have been adopted by the respondents when the fact of the purchase by the first plaintiff came to their knowledge was to apply to the Court which held the sale to set it aside under Section 294, while Mr. Justice Miller held following the decisions, referred to in his judgment, that it was open to the Court which tried this suit to set it aside.
19. It does not appear to have been brought to the notice of my learned colleagues, at any rate they have not noticed the fact, that the Court which executed the decree is also the Court which tried this suit.
20. It has been held, and in my opinion rightly, that in such cases Section 244 is not a bar to the determination of the questions, therein referred to, by separate suit. The plaint in the suit is, or will be treated as, the application under Section 244, Civil Procedure Code. Nor is there anything to prevent the Court, for the fame reasons, from treating a written statement containing a prayer to set aside a sale, as an application to set it aside under Sections 244 and 294. If a defendant would, in a suit brought or application made by him, be entitled to a relief, which would be a complete answer to a plaintiff's claim, then as a defendant he is entitled to put forward his claim, unless he is estopped or otherwise barred by any rule of law. I can find no such bar in this case. I agree with the decision in S.A. 616 of 1903, (Venkataramana v. Meenat 1 I.C. 193 (ante); 19 M.L.T.R.I.), which follows the case of Bhiram Ali Shaik Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha 24 C. 355 at page 357.
21. The next question is whether the sale should now be upheld. Where a decree-holder purchases property in contravention of the provisions of section 294 and the judgment-debtor seeks to set aside the sale, I am of opinion that it is unnecessary for the latter to allege fraud or that the property has not been sold for its proper value; it is for the decree-holder to satisfy the Court that the sale should be confirmed. The decree-holder is in a more advantageous position than any other intending purchaser. However that may be, in this case, the burden of proving that the sale should be upheld is clearly on the plaintiff, as the purchase price was less than the amount lent on the land, less than the amount below which he was not to bid for the property under the order obtained by him and also as the purchase was made benami for the purpose of concealing the matter from the Court or the defendants. Secrecy prima facie implies fraud. I do not think it necessary, therefore, to call for any finding. I confirm the decree and dismiss the second appeal with costs.
Alert