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Kalimaddin Mea v. Eahutennesa Bibi

Calcutta High Court
Feb 1, 1940
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Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arises out of Touzi No. 302 of the Tippera Collectorate, a revenue-paying estate comprising a two-annas and 8½ gds. share in certain zemindary properties belonging originally to Krishna Kishore and Surendra Narain Rai Choudhuri. Krishna Kishore held a 15 gds. share (partly inherited from his adoptive father Sambhu) and, on 18th Magh 1289 B.S., granted a putni in respect of certain lands (including the lands in suit) to Rajjab, a predecessor of the defendants first party.

In 1293 B.S., Saroda threatened a suit challenging Krishna Kishore's adoption and claimed the estate as legal heir of Sambhu. The parties compromised by an ekrarnama (Ex. B) under which Saroda obtained a 5/16th share out of Krishna Kishore's 15 gds., leaving Krishna Kishore with the balance; subsequent transactions resulted in Krishna Kishore holding 12 annas and Saroda holding 4 annas in the Hissya. The present plaintiff claims to have acquired roughly 1 gonda and odd share within Saroda's four-anna share.

Prior to 1924 a proceeding under the Estates Partition Act allotted the lands in suit (which were comprised in the putni of the first party defendants) to the present plaintiff in his saham. The second party defendants were raiyats (tenants) holding lands under the putnidars (putni-holders).

After obtaining possession on 23 May 1924, the plaintiffs sued the tenants (second party defendants) for rents for various years and on occasions obtained decrees; tenants also deposited rents under Section 149 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and served notice on the plaintiffs under that section. The plaintiffs commenced the present suit seeking an injunction restraining the putnidar defendants (first party) from withdrawing rent deposited by the tenants and that such deposited amounts be paid to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' asserted legal theory was that the putni granted by Krishna Kishore alone would attach to lands allotted to Krishna Kishore under Section 99 of the Estates Partition Act, and that plaintiffs deriving title from Saroda would take their saham free of the intermediate tenancy.

At trial the Munsif held the putni binding on Saroda and on purchasers from Krishna Kishore but found that plaintiffs had acquired a title to the rents by adverse possession (twelve years' enjoyment) and decreed the suit in plaintiffs' favour permitting them to withdraw the deposited rent. On appeal by the first party defendants the lower Appellate Court reversed that decree and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. The present matter is a further (second) appeal from that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the putni granted by Krishna Kishore was binding on Saroda and consequently on the plaintiffs who derived title from Saroda.
  2. Whether the first party defendants' plea that the plaintiffs' claim is barred by res judicata (because the same issue had been raised in a prior rent suit) succeeds.
  3. Whether the plaintiffs acquired a good title to the rent by adverse possession (interception of rents payable to the putnidar for at least twelve years prior to the suit).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Choudhury in support of the appeal)

  • The putni was not binding on Saroda or on the present plaintiffs because Saroda did not derive his title from Krishna Kishore.
  • The defence of the first party defendants is barred by res judicata since the same point was raised and negatived in a previous rent suit between the parties.
  • In any event, the plaintiffs have acquired a good title by adverse possession (by realizing rents for a sufficient period).

First Party Defendants' Arguments (as reflected in the record)

  • The putni granted by Krishna Kishore was binding on Saroda and therefore on the plaintiffs (who took under Saroda's interest), preventing the plaintiffs from realizing rents directly from the cultivating tenants to the exclusion of the putnidars.
  • In a prior rent suit the identical question was raised and decided in their favour at trial (though appellate decisions later differed), which the defendants relied upon as a bar.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
13 MIA 160 Principle noted by the Judicial Committee that once a Court dismisses a suit, it is not within the Court's power to avoid the legal consequences of dismissal by making an observation allowing another suit on the same cause of action; such latitude must be exercised within Code of Civil Procedure mechanisms rather than by dismissal with a saving observation. The Court relied on the principle to consider whether an observation in a prior dismissal could prevent the plea of res judicata; it distinguished the prior dismissal as not deciding title and treated the observation as intentionally leaving title open, so res judicata did not apply.
52 IA 100 Same line of Judicial Committee authority cited for the limits on a court's power to effectively preserve rights by mere observation in a dismissal order. Used as background authority invoked by Mr. Choudhury; the Court analysed the earlier order in light of these authorities and concluded the earlier dismissal had not finally determined title between plaintiffs and pro forma defendants.
42 CWN 560 (decision of Khundkar, J.) Cited as a later decision that followed the Judicial Committee authorities mentioned above. The Court noted this later decision had followed the same authorities, but the opinion does not record any distinct rule drawn from it beyond confirming the line of authority cited.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the three principal contentions sequentially.

1. On the binding effect of the putni: the court found that the ekrarnama (Ex. B) effected a transfer by Krishna Kishore to Saroda (a transfer of a five-sixteenths share in the Hissya). The ekrarnama expressly allocated rents and dues up to 1292 B.S. to Krishna Kishore and thereby operated as a transfer of interest. The court was not persuaded that Saroda's rights existed independently of the ekrarnama; rather, Saroda must be deemed to have derived title from Krishna Kishore. The settlement records and findings of both courts below showed that Saroda and his heirs recognized the putni of the first party defendants since 1293 B.S. For these reasons the court overruled the first contention (that Saroda did not derive title from Krishna Kishore).

2. On res judicata: the court examined the history of an earlier rent suit in which the first party defendants had been made pro forma defendants and had raised the same point (that the putni was binding on Saroda and therefore on the plaintiffs). The trial court had upheld that contention; the appellate court had negated it; this Court (Mullick, J.) dismissed the second appeal but appended an observation expressly stating that the decision would not operate as res judicata on any question of title in future litigation between the parties. The court analysed authorities cited by counsel (Judicial Committee decisions) which state that a dismissal cannot be undone by saving observations. The court distinguished those authorities on the basis that the earlier rent suit did not require the court to decide title between the plaintiffs and the pro forma defendants in order to give relief against the tenants. Consequently, the appended observation was properly understood as leaving the title question open; the rent decree operated between plaintiffs and tenants for the periods in suit but did not finally determine title as between plaintiffs and the putnidars. On that basis the plea of res judicata failed.

3. On adverse possession: the court agreed with the lower Appellate Court that plaintiffs had not established the requisite period of adverse possession in respect of rents payable to the putnidar. Because the land was in the tenants' possession, adverse possession against rival landlords required proof that the plaintiffs had intercepted rents payable by the tenants to the putnidar for a continuous period of twelve years immediately prior to the suit. The court observed that the plaintiffs' first clearly hostile act (a rent suit) was in 1928 (claiming rents for 1331–1334 B.S.); even if limitation were to run from 1928, the present suit fell well within twelve years of that date. The court therefore concluded that adverse possession was not established.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSITION: The appeal is dismissed.

Consequences and immediate effect:

  • The judgment of the lower Appellate Court (which had reversed the Munsif and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit) stands.
  • The plaintiffs' attempt to restrain the first party defendants from withdrawing rent deposited by the tenants and to have the deposit paid over to them is unsuccessful on this appeal.
  • No order as to costs was made by the court in this appeal.

Broader implications:

The court's decision is narrowly reasoned on the facts presented: it resolves disputes about the provenance of title (derivation from Krishna Kishore via the ekrarnama), the proper scope of res judicata where an earlier rent decree did not decide title between parties, and the requirements for establishing adverse possession of rents where tenants occupy the land. The opinion does not purport to set a new general precedent beyond these fact-specific applications and expressly treats the earlier Court's observation as leaving title open; no broader legal principle beyond the court's analysis is announced.

G.N/R.K
Show all summary ...

1. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be shortly stated as follows. There was a revenue paying estate bearing touzi No. 302 of the Tippera Collectorate consisting of a two-annas and 8½ gds. share of certain zemindary properties which belonged to two persons Krishna Kishore and Surendra Narain Rai Choudhuri. Krishna Kishore had a 15 gds. share in it which he inherited from his adoptive father Sambhu and the balance amounting to one-anna 13½ gds. share belonged to Surendra. On 18th Magh 1289 B.S, Krishna Kishore granted a patni in respect of certain lands which included the lands in suit to one Rajjab predecessor of the defendants first party. In 1293, a suit was threatened against Krishna Kishore by one Saroda who challenged the validity of the adoption of the former and claimed the entire estate as legal heir of Sambhu. To purchase peace the parties entered into a compromise and by an ekrarnama which is Ex. B in this case it was agreed by and between the parties that Saroda would get a 5/16th share out of the 15 gds. belonging to Krishna Kishore and the remaining 11/16ths share would remain vested in the latter. Subsequently there was a re-transfer of one anna share by Saroda to Krishna Kishore and the result was that Krishna Kishore had 12 annas share in the Hissya while the remaining four annas belonged to Saroda. The present plaintiff purports to have acquired 1 gd. and odd share within the four annas share of Saroda. Sometime before 1924 there was a proceeding under the Estates Partition Act with regard to this Touzi and the lands in suit which were comprised in the putni of the first party defendants were allotted to the present plaintiff in his Sahara by the partition authorities. The second party defendants were raiyats holding these lands under the putnidars.

2. The plaintiffs' case is that, after they got possession of their allotted share on 23rd May 1924, they sued the second party defendants for rents for the years 1331 to 1334 and recovered a decree. They also allege to have realized rents amicably from the tenants for the years 1335 to 1337 and; again got a decree for rents for the years 1338 to 1341. In 1343 B.S the first party defendants instituted a suit for rent against the defendants second party claiming rent for the year 1342 and a portion of 1343 and the tenants deposited the rent under Section 149 of the Ben. Ten. Act, and got notice served upon the plaintiffs under that Section. Upon that the plaintiffs have commenced the present suit and have prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants first party from withdrawing the rent deposited by the tenants defendants. They also prayed that the amount deposited might be paid over to them. Their case was that the putni having been granted by Krishna Kishore alone to which Saroda was not party it would attach to the lands which were allotted to Krishna Kishore in the partition proceedings under Section 99 of the Estates Partition Act. The plaintiffs who derive their title from Saroda would take their Saham free and clear of this intermediate tenancy.

3. The Munsif who tried the suit was of opinion that the putni was binding on Saroda as he derived his interests from Krishna Eishore after the latter had granted the putni and the plaintiffs who were purchasers from Krishna Kishore were also bound to recognize the same. He held, however, that the plaintiffs were realizing rents payable by the tenant defendant to the exclusion of the putnidars for a period of more than 12 years from the time when they got possession of the suit lands in the year 1924 and thus acquired a good title to the rent payable by the defendants second party on the ground of adverse possession. In this view of the case the plaintiffs' suit was decreed and they were held entitled to withdraw the amount that was deposited as rent by the defendants second party. On appeal by the first party defendants this decision was reversed and the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed. It is against this decree that the present second appeal has been preferred.

4. Three points have been taken by Mr. Choudhury who appears in support of this appeal. He has argued, in the first place, that the putni was not binding on Saroda or on the present plaintiffs as Saroda did not derive his title from Krishna Kishore. The second point taken is that the defence of defendants first party is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the same point having been raised and negatived in a previous rent suit between the parties. The third ground made is that, at any rate, the plaintiffs must be deemed to have acquired a good title by adverse possession. The first point raised by Mr. Choudhury does not appear to me to be of much substance. The ekrarnama, Ex. B, was executed between the parties to settle all disputes and the consideration was that Krishna Kishore would give up his five annas share in the Hissya in favour of Saroda. It was stated clearly in the ekrarnama that all rents and dues payable in respect of the entire Hissya up to the year 1292 B.S would belong to Krishna Kishore. The solenamah, therefore, amounted really to a transfer of a five-sixteenths share in the Hissya by Krishna Kishore to Saroda and Saroda took that interest in the state as it existed in the year 1293 B.S I am not satisfied that the rights of Saroda were not created by this ekrarnama but had their existence independently of it which the ekrarnama merely recognized. Saroda, in my opinion, must be deemed to be a person who derived his title from Krishna Kishore and as the plaintiffs are the purchasers from Saroda they are also in no better position. It has been found by both the Courts below, and this appears also from the settlement records that both Saroda and his heirs recognized the putni of the defendants first party ever since 1293 B.S The first contention of Mr. Ohoudhury must, therefore, be over-ruled.

5. As regards the question of res judicata, it appears that in a previous rent suit which was instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendants second party the defendants first party were made pro forma defendants. It appears also that they raised the identical question which they are now raising namely that the putni was binding on Saroda and also upon the plaintiffs, and consequently, they were not entitled to realize rents directly from the cultivating tenants. This contention was upheld by the trial Judge but negatived by the lower Appellate Court. Then there was a second appeal to this Court which was dismissed. Mullick, J. who decided the appeal observed in the end of his judgment as follows:

In view, however, of the fact that there are some Indications to show that there may he some evidence available to the appellant on the point, I would dismiss the appeal with costs with this observation that this decision will not operate as res judicata on any question of title in any future litigation between the parties.

6. Mr. Choudhury contends that as this Court dismissed the appeal preferred by one of the putnidar defendants, the observation made by the learned Judge at the end of the judgment would not preclude the plaintiffs from raising or the Court from considering any plea of res judicata if that is available to the plaintiffs and in support of his argument he has relied upon certain decisions of the Judicial Committee: viz. 13 MIA 160,1 52 IA 100,2 which were followed by Khundkar, J. in a later decision which is to be found reported in 42 CWN 560.3 In the first of these two cases the Judicial Committee pointed out that after a Court has dismissed the suit it was no longer within its power to pass an order allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to institute another suit upon the same cause of action. This power could be exercised, if at all, only under the circumstances mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure, and without dismissing the suit. It means therefore that if the suit is actually dismissed, the legal consequences that follow from the order of dismissal cannot be avoided or curtailed in any way by any observation which the Court might make in the order of dismissal.

7. In the present case, the order of dismissal which was passed by Mullick, J. had the effect of confirming the rent decree obtained by the plaintiffs against the tenants defendants. These rights, undoubtedly, could not be cut down or prejudiced in any way by any observation contained in the judgment, but as this was a rent suit it was not absolutely necessary to decide the question of title as between the plaintiffs on the one hand and the pro forma defendants on the other in order to give the plaintiffs any relief against the tenants. The observation mentioned above, in my opinion, therefore indicates clearly that this Court did not intend to decide the question of title anally. In other words, the rent decree was made operative between the plaintiffs and the tenant defendants with regard to the period in suit leaving the question of title between the plaintiffs and the pro forma defendants open. In this view of the case the plea of res judicata which has been raised by the plaintiffs must fail.

8. The only other point that requires determination is the question of adverse possession and here I do not think that the decision of the lower Appellate Court was wrong. It may be that the plaintiffs have realized rents amicably for the period 1335 to 1337 B.S and I am not inclined to place much reliance upon the rent decree which the defendant first party got against the defendants second party subsequently.

9. But I think however that as in this case the land was in possession of the tenants, in order that there may be adverse possession against the rival landlords, the plaintiffs must show that they have intercepted rents payable by the tenants to the defendants first party for a period of 12 years prior to the institution of the suit. The first hostile act, if I may say so, was not commenced earlier than the year 1928 when the plaintiffs instituted a rent suit claiming rents for the years 1331 to 1334 B.S Even if limitation runs in favour of the plaintiffs from the year 1928, the present suit would be well within 12 years from that date. The result is therefore that all the points raised by Mr. Choudhury fail and this appeal is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.

G.N/R.K

10. Appeal dismissed.