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Ram Sunder Sahu v. Ram Narain Sahu And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This suit concerns a temporarily settled estate called Chak Jalal Charidar Diara (No. 11918 on the revenue roll of Muzzaffarpur District). The estate appears to have been under temporary Government settlement from about 1842. In 1896 the proprietors defaulted in revenue payment; the plaintiff, Ram Narain Sanu, alleges that he purchased the right, title and interest of the settlement-holders at the sale, doing so in the name of a servant (named in the record with some uncertainty).
Subsequent Government settlements were made with Kuldip Narain, the last being for three years from 1 April 1913 to 1 March 1916. The plaintiff contended those settlements were in reality made for him though recorded in Kuldip's name. In December 1913, when Kuldip was ill, the plaintiff caused a kobaia (a conveyance) to be executed in the names of Kuldip's brothers; registration was delayed and Kuldip died before registration. After Kuldip's death registration was resisted by his heirs. In February 1914 Kuldip's minor son (defendant 6) through his mother executed a kobaia in favour of Ram Sunder Sahu (defendant 5), who subsequently got his name registered and later, in April 1916, obtained a Government settlement for three years and possession under an order in a case brought under Section 144 CrPC (this possession occurred after institution of the present suit).
In his plaint Ram Narain sought a declaration that Chak Jalal was held by him in milkiat, that Kuldip Narain was his farzidar, that the defendants had no right in the mahal, and relief to be put back into possession after being dispossessed under the Section 144 proceeding. The defendants raised multiple pleas; the Subordinate Judge framed issues, found the first four issues for the plaintiff, but declined to decree possession on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide whether Government was justified in giving settlement to the defendant. The Subordinate Judge nevertheless declared that the plaintiff was the real auction-purchaser, a settlement-holder up to March 1916, and that Kuldip Narain was his farzidar, and held that defendants 1–4 were not necessary parties.
Ram Sunder appealed against that decree. There were cross-appeals (the plaintiff's cross-appeal was not pressed and dismissed). The appellate court considered two principal contentions pressed by Ram Sunder and ultimately set aside the Subordinate Judge's decree and decreed the appeal with costs. The court also directed that the plaintiff be called on to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for perjury.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Secretary of State for India in Council is a necessary party to the suit?
- Whether Section 36 of Act 11 of 1859 bars the suit, or whether the plaintiff is otherwise estopped from prosecuting the suit?
- Whether defendant 2 (Ram Sundar Sahu) is a bona fide purchaser for value and whether the plaintiff is estopped from disputing his title?
- Whether Kuldip Narain was a farzidar of the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff has any title to the mouza in suit?
- Whether defendant 1 (party) is entitled to confirmation of possession?
- To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Ram Sunder Sahu)
- Contended that Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act is a bar to the suit — i.e., that he is an ostensible transferee who took the estate for consideration and, having acted in good faith after reasonable inquiries, the transfer cannot be avoided on grounds that the transferor lacked authority.
- Contended that the declaratory decree of the Subordinate Judge was bad in view of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act (arguing that the decree did not properly fall within the scope of declarations permissible under that provision).
- Relied on the inquiries he made before purchase: consulting Register D, enquiries of the raiyats, and consultation with his mukhtear Badri Narain, and on documentary material he obtained or relied upon.
Plaintiff (Ram Narain Sanu)
- Sought declarations that he was the real auction-purchaser of Chak Jalal, that he was a settlement-holder up to March 1916, and that Kuldip Narain was his farzidar.
- Sought possession having been dispossessed under the Section 144 proceeding and suggested entitlement (or potential entitlement) to a renewal of settlement or to Malikana (compensation) under the terms of an earlier patta, relying on a 1910 clause in Kuldip Narain's patta.
- Alleged that settlements made in the name of Kuldip Narain were in truth for the plaintiff (i.e., that Kuldip was holding in his interest).
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded on two principal statutory points urged by the appellant: (1) whether the Subordinate Judge's declaratory decree could stand under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and (2) whether the appellant was protected by Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act as a bona fide transferee who had taken reasonable care and acted in good faith.
On Section 42, Specific Relief Act:
- The court explained the scope of Section 42: a person entitled to a legal character or to any right as to property may sue for a declaration of that entitlement and may do so without asking for further relief.
- The court examined the Subordinate Judge's declaration (that the plaintiff was the real auction-purchaser, a settlement-holder up to March 1916, and that Kuldip Narain was his farzidar) and held that it was not a declaration that the plaintiff had any present legal character or present right to the property.
- The Subordinate Judge himself had observed that the declaration might appear to be of no practical use but might help the plaintiff in approaching Government for future settlement; the appellate court held that such a declaration would amount at best to a recommendation to Government and not to a present legal right within Section 42.
- Regarding Malikana (compensation) the Subordinate Judge relied on a clause in a 1910 patta; the appellate court noted that the operative patta at Kuldip's death was a 1913 patta which had not been produced. Ram Sunder's 1916 patta (Exhibit T) contained no provision for resettlement or Malikana. As the onus lay on the plaintiff to produce relevant patta(s), the absence of the 1913 patta undermined any claim that the Subordinate Judge's declaration established entitlement to Malikana or a renewal.
- Consequently the court concluded the Subordinate Judge's declaration was outside the scope of Section 42 because it did not declare any present legal right or character enforceable against the defendants or Government.
On Section 41, Transfer of Property Act (proviso):
- Section 41 protects a transferee who, with reasonable care to ascertain the transferor's authority, acts in good faith when the transferor is an ostensible owner. The key inquiry was whether Ram Sunder took reasonable care and acted in good faith before purchasing.
- Ram Sunder's enquiries included consulting Register D, asking the raiyats of Chak Jalal, and relying on his mukhtear Badri Narain. He also obtained copies of several documents relating to suits and proceedings touching the estate.
- The court reviewed the documentary material on record: depositions by Ram Narain (in which he denied present interest in Chak Jalal and said Kuldip was in possession as auction-purchaser), plaint Exhibit N (a suit between Kuldip and Ramdhari compromised without suggestion that Kuldip was merely farzidar of Ram Narain), and a judgment in an action where Kuldip was found not to be a benamidar of Ram Narain.
- On this evidence the appellate court found that a reasonable person would have concluded that Kuldip Narain was the real settlement-holder and that Ram Sunder had done as much as reasonably required to verify the transferor's authority. The court rejected the Subordinate Judge's view that Ram Sunder should have insisted on production of original sale-certificate, observing that for a temporarily settled estate the sale-certificate only transferred the remainder of a temporary settlement and that Ram Sunder was justified in relying upon the existing settlement records showing Kuldip's name.
- Accordingly the court found that Ram Sunder satisfied the proviso in Section 41: he had taken reasonable care and had acted in good faith.
Other conclusions and procedural directions:
- The appellate court found that Ram Narain had made contradictory sworn statements in prior proceedings and in the present suit; the court labelled these as gross perjury and directed that he be called upon to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for perjury (Section 476 CrPC was invoked as the basis for directing notice to show cause).
- Justice Roe concurred with the primary conclusions: that the plaintiff had no present title under the Specific Relief Act and that prosecution for perjury should be directed; a date was fixed for hearing the show-cause application.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DECREED.
Holding (core rulings):
- The appellate court set aside the declaratory decree of the Subordinate Judge insofar as it purported to declare any present legal character or present right of the plaintiff under Section 42, Specific Relief Act.
- The court held that Ram Sunder Sahu satisfied the proviso to Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act — he made reasonable enquiries and acted in good faith — and therefore the challenge to his title could not succeed on that ground. For these reasons the appeal by Ram Sunder was decreed with costs.
- The plaintiff (Ram Narain) was directed to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for perjury in light of inconsistent sworn statements; the court proposed a direction for prosecution under Section 476 CrPC and fixed a hearing date for the show-cause matter.
- The plaintiff's cross-appeal was not pressed and was dismissed without costs (as noted by the court).
Implications (direct effects on the parties):
- The Subordinate Judge's declaratory decree in favour of the plaintiff (as to present legal title or character) is set aside — the plaintiff has no declared present title under the Specific Relief Act arising from that decree.
- The appellant Ram Sunder's purchase is protected by his having acted in good faith after reasonable inquiries; the appeal was decreed in his favour with costs.
- The plaintiff faces a show-cause direction for possible prosecution for perjury arising from inconsistent sworn statements; the court fixed a date for that procedural hearing.
- The opinion does not announce any broader legal precedent beyond application of Sections 41 (Transfer of Property Act) and 42 (Specific Relief Act) to the facts, and does not purport to bind Government decision-making as to settlements — the court characterized any declaration to Government as merely a recommendation and not a binding declaration of entitlement.
This summary is confined to the matters expressly stated in the provided opinion and does not infer facts or holdings beyond that text.
Coutts, J.:— This was a suit in respect of a certain temporarily settled estate called Chak jalal Cnauuar Diari, bearing No. 11918 on me revenue roll of the District of Muzatiarpur. We do not know much about the history of this estate, but it appears to have been settled by Government for snore terms of years from about the year 1842. In the years 1896 default was made in payment of revenue by the proprietors and according to the case of Ram Narain Sanu, the plaintiff, who was one of the defaulting proprietors, he purchased at the sale in the name or a servant of his, named ??? Narain. What was purchased at the sale was the right, title and interest of the settlement Holders who were holding for a term of years. After the expiry of this term there were further settlements by Government with Kuldip Narain, the last settlement being for 3 years from 1st April 1913 to the 1st march 1916, and the plaintiff's case is that all these settlements were really made with him in the name of Kuldip Narain. In December 1913 Kulaip was very ill and as, he appeared to be dying the plaintiff alleges that in order to protect the property from the heirs of Kuldip, he got the latter to execute a Kobaia in the names of his brothers. There was delay in registration of the Kobaia and Kuldip died before it was registered.
2. After his death registration was applied for but execution was denied by Kuldip's heirs and registration was refused. Subsequently in February 1914. Kuldip's minor son Harendar Prosad, defendant 6, through his mother executed a Kobaia in favour of Ram Sunder Sahu, defendant 5. Ram Sunder got his name registered and appeals to the Collector and Commissioner by Ram Narain were in fructuous. Ram Sunder did not at once get possession, but in April 1916 he got settlement from Government for 3 years and in a case under Section 144 of the Cr PC, he got possession. This case was after the institution of the present suit. In his plaint Ram Narain asked that it might be declared that Chak Jalal was held in Milkiat by him, that Kuldin Narain was his, Farzidar, and that the defendants had got no right in the Mahal, Further having been dispossessed in the case under S. 144 the plaintiff asked that he thight be put back into possession. The defendants raised various pleas which under sufficiently from the issues framed in the case, which were as follows:
1. Whether the Secretary of State for India in Council is a necessary party to the suit? 2. Whether S. 36 of Act 11 of 1859 bars this suit? Is the plaintiff otherwise estopped from prosecuting the suit? 3. Whether defendant 2. Party Ram Sundar Sahu is a bona fide purchaser for value and is the plaintiff estopped from disputing his title? 4 Whether Kuldip Narain was a Farzidar of the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff has got any title to the Mouza in suit? 5. Whether defendant 1 party entitled to confirmation of possession? 7. To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled?.
3. The learned Subordinate Judge found the first four issues in favour of the plaintiff. But in view of the fact that it was outside the jurisdiction of the Court to decide whether Government was justified in giving settlement to the defendant, he declined to give a decree for possession. He has however passed a decree declaring that the plaintiff was the real auction-purchaser of the temporarily settled Mahal, Chak Jalal Charidar Diara; that he was a settlement holder up to March 1916, and that Kuldip Narain was his Farzidar. He however held that the defendants 1 to 4 were not necessary parties. Against this decree the defendant Ram Sunder has appealed and there is a cross-appeal against the decision of issue 5 declaring that defendants 1 to 4 had no interest in the property. The plaintiff's cross-appeal has not been pressed and I would dismiss it without costs.
4. Two points have been argued in the appeal by Ram Sunder Sahu: (1) that Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, is a bar to the suit, and (2) that the decree is bad in view of the provisions of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. I will deal with the latter point first. The first clause of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, runs as follows: “Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief.” The question, in the present case, is whether the plaintiff is entitled to any legal character or to any right as to any property which would entitle him to a declaration such as has been given. With regard to this point the portion of the decree with which we are concerned, runs as follows: “It may be declared that the plaintiff is the real auction-purchaser of the temporarily settled Mahal, Chak Jalal Charidar Diara, and that he is the settlement holder up to March 1916, and Kuldip Narain Singh was his Farzidar.” On the face of it this is not a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to any present legal character or that he has any present right to the property in dispute. The learned Subordinate Judge realised this, for he says in his judgment: “It may at first appear that it (the declaration) can be of no practical use to the plaintiff,” but he continues as follows: “as Chak Jalal is a temporarily settled estate, the property of a private individual, and as some right is reserved to the last settlement holder as is indicated by Kuldip Narain's Patta, Ex. 16, Cl. 4, namely, the right to receive some Malikana in case of refusal to take fresh settlement, and as it further indicates that settlement would be offered in the first instance to the last settlement holders, I think the declaration will be of great use to the plaintiff in approaching the Government and asking for a temporary settlement with him after the expiry of the term of the present settlement, even if it is conceded that he cannot do so now.” Now it is not and it cannot be contended that Government would either with or without this declaration be bound to give the plaintiff a settlement and it is in fact almost certain that Government, when they knew the facts, would not give a settlement. They would certainly not give a settlement if Kuldip Narain is not his Farzidar and even assuming, as the learned Subordinate Judge has found, that Kuldip Narain was his Farzidar, he is a co-proprietor who has gone behind the backs of his co-sharers and has got a settlement by means of a Farzi transaction. This would certainly not find favour with Government and in fact it would appear that it has not done so, for settlement has, as I have already said, been made with the defendant Ram Sunder in 1916, who has also got his name registered in the Collectorate. The decree therefore in so far as any settlement is concerned, could be nothing more than a recommendation to Government. It was no declaration to Government. It was no declaration of a present legal character or a legal right, and it is not within the scope of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.
5. The learned Subordinate Judge however seems to think that by reason of a certain clause in Kuldip Narain Patta of/1910 the declaration which he has given will assist the plaintiff in getting Malikana. The clause runs as follows: “That at the end of the aforesaid period of settlement you shall have the right to a renewal of the settlement on the revenue that may be fixed. If you do not take the settlement on the revenue that be then fixed, you shall be entitled to receive Malikana at the usual rates.” The plaintiff however never asked for a declaration that he was entitled to receive Malikana nor has any such declaration been made. All that the Subordinate Judge intends by;he declaration is that it shall help the plaintiff in the event of his making a claim for Malikana and apparently conveying a pious hope that he may jet it. The declaration then in regard to this also is nothing more than a recommendation to Government from he Subordinate Judge and is not within he scope of S. 42. Apart from this here is, in my opinion, no ground for lie, finding of the Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff can have any right to settlement Malikana. He relies on he Patta of 1910, but the Patta under which Kuldip was holding when he died was a Patta of 1913, which has not jeen produced. Ram Sunder's Patta of 1916, Exhibit T however has been produced and it contains no provisions or either re-settlement or payment of Malikana and there is nothing to show whether the Patta of 1913 was similar to the Patta of 1910 or to that of 1916. In fact as the onus was on the plaintiff and as he has not produced the Patta of 1913, there is a suspicion that if re did produce it, it would be against him. In any case in the absence of the Patta, I am not prepared to accept the view of the learned Subordinate Judge that there is any provision in it for wither Malikana or for settlement.
6. I now come to the question whether Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act a bar to the suit. This section runs as follows:— “Where, with the consent, express or implied, of the person interested in immoveable property, a person is the ostensible owner of such property and transfers the same for consideration, the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorized to make it, provided that the transferee, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that he transferor had power to make the transfer, has acted in good faith.” of far as the first part of the section ??? concerned, it is not even suggested at the plaintiff has any case. The ??? is whether, as required by the proviso, Ram Sunder took reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer and acted in good faith. On this point, it seems to me, there can be no doubt. Ram Sunder says that at the time he made the purchase he made inquiries about, the title of Kuldip Narain and what he did was to consult Register D, to make inquiries from the raiyats of Chak Jalal and to consult his Mukhtear named Badri Narain. The register showed the name of Kuldip and Jiadri Narain got for him copies of documents relating to Chak Jalal. These copies, he says, related to a suit between Kuldip Narain and Ramdhari, to a dakhil kharij case between Ram Charitar and Ram Narain and to a Kat-band case between Kuldip and the tenants of Chak Jalal. There was also a copy of a deposition and a copy of judgment in a Balabandi case between Kuldip Narain and Lalji Babu. Now we have on the record most of these documents. The first of them to which I shall refer is the deposition of Ram Narain in the dakhil kharij case with Ram Charitar and related to a village called Daudpur, which the applicant said was owned by him and was in his possession. In the course of that deposition, which was made before the Sub-Deputy Collector on 1st October 1910, Ram Narain stated:—“Village Chak Adam is in the name of Gobind Shah. No other milkiat excepting the village in dispute stands in others name as benami.” This clearly indicates that the plaintiff had no Malikana right in the lands in the present suit Chak Jalal. Again on 16th March, 1911 deposing to another suit the plaintiff stated:—“Mouza Chak Jalal Diara formerly belonged to me. It was sold for arrears of Government revenue. Kuldip Narain is in possession of the Mouza as auction-purchaser since it was sold for arrears of Government revenue. I can swear I have no concern with the present settlement of the Mouza.”
7. The next document is Exhibit N, a plaint in a suit between Kuldip Narain and Ramdhari. The suit was in respect of a piece of land in Chak Jalal. The suit was compromised and nowhere was there any suggestion made that Kuldip Narain was a Farzidar of Ram Narain or that Ram Narain had anything to do with the Mouza.
8. The next document to which I will refer is a judgment in a suit brought by Kuldip against one Bindeswari Prosad, who was the proprietor of a neighbouring Mouza, for a certain piece of land which Kuldip Narain claimed as a part of Chak Jaial. In that suit one of the issues was whether the plaintiff was a benamidar of Ram Narain Sahu and alter going into the evidence very fully the Subordinate judge, who heard the suit, found that Kuldip Narain was not the beriamidar of Ram Narain.
9. This then was the evidence on which Ram Sunder relied, and on these documents it is difficult to understand what other conclusion he could have arrived at than that Kuldip Narain was the real settlement holder. I fail also to understand what more he could have done to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer. The learned Subordinate Judge has said that as Badri Narain has not been examined, he has no materials to decide whether the papers which were read over to Ram Sunder were sufficient to lead a reasonable man to be satisfied with what they embodied. But, as I have already pointed out, these documents are on the record and they are, in my opinion, more than sufficient to satisfy any reasonable man that Ram Narain had nothing to do with the Chak Jalal estate. The learned Subordinate Judge seems to think that Ram Sunder Sahu should have insisted on the production of the original sale-certificate by which Kuldip Narain purchased. But there was very little object in this, because this was a temporarily settled estate. The sale-certificate merely transferred the right, title and interest of the remainder of the temporary settlement and Ram Sunder was perfectly justified in relying on the terms of the settlement which was running at the time when he made the purchase, and this lie knew was in the name of Kuldip Narain. It appears then that up till the time when Ram Sunder applied for registration of his name, Ram Narain had never suggested that he was the real owner and in fact had on oath specifically denied his connection with the Mouza. Under these circumstances, I am satisfied that whether Kuldip Narain was the Farzidar of Ram Narain or not, Ram Sunder made all reasonable enquiries and acted in good faith. For the above reasons, therefore, I would set aside the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge and would decree this appeal with costs.
10. In conclusion I would note that Ram Narain has committed gross perjury. In his examination on oath before the Sub-Deputy Collector Babu Suresh Chander Deb on 1st October 1910 he stated that Village Chak Adam is in the name of Gobind Shah. No other milkiat excepting the village in dispute stands in other's name as benami.” Again in his statement before the Munsif of liajipur on 16th March, 1911 he stated: “Mouza Chak Jaial Diara for merely belonged to me. It was sold for arrears of Government revenue. Kuldip Narain is in possession of the Mouza as auction-purchaser, since it was sold for arrears of Government revenue. I can swear that I have no concern with the present settlement of the Mouza,” In the present suit Ram Narain has stated on oath before the Subordinate Judge on 22nd January, 1917: “Chak Jalal was sold for arrears of revenue in 1896. It was I who purchased it.
11. It was in the name of my servant Kuldip Narain that I purchased.” It is impossible to reconcile these statements and I would direct that he be called on to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for pert jury.
12. Roe, J.:— I entirely agree that the plaintiff has no present title in this estate and that therefore he is not entitled to a decree under the Specific Relief Act. I also agree that the plaintiff should be prosecuted for perjury Let notice be issued to him to show cause why a direction for his prosecution should not be made under Section 476 of the Cr PC. The 6th of January next may be fixed for hearing.
V.S/R.K
13. Appeal decreed.
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