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Komath Ponnian Sooppi And Another v. Rayaroth Kanaran And Others

Madras High Court
Apr 3, 1956
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses two second appeals (S. A. No. 1794 of 1952 and S. A. No. 1448 of 1952) heard by a Bench because the question of law was regarded as important. The disputes concern claims for increased purappad (rent or dues under kanom/kuzhikanom relationships) and whether increases effected at renewal or by a later kanom are valid and enforceable under the Malabar Tenancy Act.

S. A. No. 1794 of 1952: The plaintiff (appellant) sued for arrears of rent for 1945–1950 based on a registered kanom marupat (Ex. A-1 dated 6-10-1945) fixing annual rent at Rs. 8 (plus sundries). The defendants relied on an earlier document (Ex. B-1 dated 7-1-1918), renewed by Ex. A-1, which purportedly fixed the rent at Rs. 4-12-0; they argued the increase was contrary to the Malabar Tenancy Act. The lower appellate court, following Puthukulangare Ukkali v. Sivarama Krishna, held that in a kanom renewal the purappad cannot be enhanced, and therefore disallowed the increase. The question before the Bench was whether an agreement by a kanomdar to pay higher rent at renewal is valid and enforceable.

S. A. No. 1448 of 1952: The dispute concerned an alleged increase of purappad where there was no formal "renewal" but a sequence of transactions: original kanom Ex. A-1 (22-11-1933), an apparent surrender Ex. B-2 (22-10-1945), and four days later a new kanom/kuzhikanom Ex. A-4 executed by the same tenant in favour of the same landlord. The lower appellate court found the surrender to be nominal and a device to evade S. 17(a) of the Malabar Tenancy Act. The appeal raised whether the surrender and regrant were genuine and whether an increased purappad could be enforced absent consideration.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an agreement by a kanom or kuzhikanomdar to pay a higher purappad (rent) at the time of renewal of a kanom is valid and enforceable under the Malabar Tenancy Act, S. 17(a), particularly in light of prior authorities holding that renewal should be on "the same terms."
  2. Whether a purported surrender of a holding followed shortly by a fresh kanom (i.e., surrender and regrant) can be treated as a genuine termination and fresh contract or is merely a device to evade the statutory protections of S. 17(a) of the Malabar Tenancy Act.
  3. Whether an increase in purappad can be upheld where the increase reflects enhanced Government revenue (e.g., due to settlement or improvements) and whether such increase constitutes adequate consideration to support a higher rent.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (S. A. No. 1794 of 1952 — Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon)

  • The Malabar Tenancy Act contains many provisions that begin with words such as "in the absence of a contract to the contrary," but S. 17(a) does not; therefore the parties should be able to contract out of S. 17(a) and agree different terms at renewal.
  • S. 17(a) provides a statutory method to compute a renewal fee and confers a right to compel renewal on the same terms, but it does not, by its language, forbid an agreement between landlord and kanomdar to adopt different terms at renewal if that agreement is supported by valid consideration and not vitiated by infirmities (fraud, undue influence) under the Indian Contract Act.
  • The particular increase from Rs. 4-12-0 to Rs. 8 in Ex. A-1 represented a legitimate adjustment because the original purappad had included Government revenue payable in 1918, whereas the Ex. A-1 rent included Government revenue as enhanced after the later settlement; the landlord had paid Government revenue and a reallocation of liability on account of an increased assessment furnished a valid consideration for increasing purappad.

Respondents' / Other Arguments

  • Mr. Achutan Nambiar for the respondents argued that there was no evidence establishing precisely how much the Government revenue had increased and that such proof should be called for.
  • In S. A. No. 1448 of 1952 the appellant (Mr. C. S. Swaminathan) argued that a registered surrender under S. 44 of the Malabar Tenancy Act may validly terminate the prior relationship and that the parties can lawfully enter into a fresh kanom (citing authorities on surrender/regrant and karnavan competence).
  • The lower Courts, however, found in S. A. No. 1448 that the surrender and subsequent kanom were a make-believe device to circumvent S. 17(a); the respondents (as successful parties below) relied on those findings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Puthukulangare Ukkali v. Sivarama Krishna, 1941-1 Mad LJ 113; AIR 1941 Mad 468 Held that in the case of a kanom demise there can be no enhancement of the purappad payable at the time of renewal; renewal should be on the "same" terms as the previous kanom. The lower appellate court relied on this decision to deny the increase; the Bench accepted the principle but held it does not exclude an agreed increase supported by consideration.
Kunchu Menon v. Narayana Ezhutessan, 16 Mad LJ 317; AIR 1915 Mad 100 Authority to the effect that where Government enhances revenue during the pendency of a usufructuary mortgage/kanom, the mortgagee (or person enjoying the usufruct) may be liable to pay the enhanced revenue. Used to support the proposition that increased Government revenue may justify an increased purappad and thus supply consideration for a higher rent at renewal.
Nanu Nair v. Ashta Moorthi Nambudripad, 2 Mad LW 509; AIR 1916 Mad 127 Similar authority concerning liability for enhanced Government revenue during the relationship of kanom/usufructuary mortgage. Cited with other cases to show established practice that enhanced revenue may be borne by the person responsible for improvements or enjoying the benefits.
Nathuwath Pappu v. Kolli Valappil Kalathile Vittil, (1911) 2 Mad WN 236 Authority addressing allocation of increased Government revenue in the context of kanom/usufructuary relationships. Grouped with other authorities to support the Court's view that increased Government revenue can justify an increased purappad payable by the tenant.
Mallikharjuna Rao v. Tripura Sundari, 1953-2 Mad LJ 313; AIR 1953 Mad 975 Held that a stipulation to pay a higher rate of interest than provided by statute is not supported by consideration and is unenforceable. Applied analogically to show that without specific consideration a stipulation to pay higher rent at renewal cannot be enforced; but conversely, if there is valid consideration, an increase may be enforceable.
Dhanakojia Pillai v. Narayana Iyer, 1955-2 Mad LJ 569 Followed Mallikharjuna Rao on the consideration principle concerning higher contractual obligations contrary to statutory limits. Cited as part of the line of authority establishing the principle about consideration and enforceability of higher contractual obligations.
Sreenivasa Rao v. Abdul Rahim, C.R.P. No. 232 of 1954; AIR 1956 Mad 618 Another authority following the principle that stipulations contrary to statutory limits are unenforceable unless supported by consideration. Used to reinforce the Court's reliance on the consideration principle in deciding when an increase may be valid.
Kunhukuttan v. Imbichikuttan, 71 Mad LJ 727; AIR 1937 Mad 35 Authority recognizing the competence of a karnavan to renew or grant melcharth before expiry, subject to assent, and the validity of surrender/regrant in appropriate circumstances. Relied on in S. A. No. 1448 to show that surrender and regrant, if genuine and above board, are competent transactions.
Lakshmi Amma v. Kunhi Raman, 1932 Mad WN 543 Authority on competence of karnavan and validity of certain transactions affecting tarwad rights. Cited among cases supporting the proposition that surrenders and regrants can be valid if bona fide.
Koppassa Menon v. Kalliani Ammal, 45 Mad LJ 258; AIR 1923 Mad 700 Authority on surrender/regrant and the competence of tarwad or karnavan actors to effect such transactions. Used to show antecedent case law accepting surrender/regrant where properly executed.
Trivikrama Konuraya v. Sankaranarayana, ILR 56 Mad 92; AIR 1932 Mad 771 (Full Bench) Full Bench held that even a melcharth granted before expiry by a karnavan, if assented to subsequently, can be valid. Applied for the proposition that surrender and subsequent fresh kanom could be valid if not a device to evade statutory protections.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by identifying the established legal position and then testing whether that position precluded the result sought by the plaintiff.

  1. The Court accepted that precedent (Puthukulangare Ukkali) establishes the principle that a kanom renewal, when compelled under S. 17(a), should be on the "same" terms as the previous kanom, and that where the landlord refuses to grant renewal on identical terms the tenant may seek compulsory renewal from the Court.
  2. However, the Court analyzed the language of S. 17(a) and compared it with other sections (S. 10, S. 22, S. 32) that expressly say "Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary." From that textual contrast the appellant argued that S. 17(a) does not expressly forbid contracting out; the Court accepted the appellant's submission to the limited extent that nothing in S. 17(a) positively prevents parties from agreeing a different rent at renewal provided that agreement is supported by valid consideration and not vitiated by contract defects.
  3. The Court emphasized the necessity of consideration for such an agreement: an increase without consideration would amount to a contract contrary to the statute and unenforceable (drawing analogy from authorities on higher interest stipulations). Thus, an agreed increase at renewal is enforceable only if fully supported by consideration or justification.
  4. Applying these principles to the facts of S. A. No. 1794, the Court found that the original purappad of Rs. 4-12-0 (fixed in 1918) included Government revenue then payable, whereas Ex. A-1's Rs. 8 included enhanced Government revenue after a later settlement. The Court accepted that the increase in rent was arrived at because of enhanced Government revenue and treated that enhancement as valid consideration for the higher purappad. The Court further noted authorities holding that where Government revenue increases during such relationships, the enhanced burden may fall on the person responsible for the improvement or enjoying the benefit.
  5. Respondents' contention that there was insufficient evidence to quantify the Government revenue increase was rejected by the Court as unnecessary to require strict proof of details in the circumstances: the original rent included Government revenue then payable and the later rent included enhanced revenue, so it was reasonable to conclude the difference was due to enhanced Government revenue.
  6. On the second appeal (S. A. No. 1448), the Court recognized that surrender and regrant can be valid (citing authorities) but upheld the lower courts' factual finding that Ex. B-2 and Ex. A-4 were a sham device to evade S. 17(a). Because the lower courts found no additional consideration supporting the increased purappad in that transaction, the appeals in respect of S. A. No. 1448 had to be dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • S. A. No. 1794 of 1952 — Modified in favour of the appellant: The Court held that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the purappad in accordance with the terms of Ex. A-1 (i.e., the higher rent of Rs. 8). The Court modified the decisions of the lower Courts and awarded costs to the appellant in this second appeal and costs in both lower Courts.
  • S. A. No. 1448 of 1952 — Appeal dismissed: On the lower Courts' finding that the purported surrender and fresh kanom (Ex. B-2 and Ex. A-4) were a device to evade S. 17(a) and that there was no consideration supporting the increase, the Court affirmed the lower Courts' decisions and dismissed this second appeal with costs.

Implications:

  • The Court reaffirmed the established principle that a compulsory renewal under S. 17(a) should be on the "same" terms as the previous kanom, but clarified that S. 17(a) does not, by its language, make it impossible for the parties to agree to different terms at renewal provided such agreement is supported by valid consideration and is not vitiated by defects recognized by the law of contract.
  • Practically, where an increase in purappad at renewal reflects an objectively ascertainable increase in Government revenue (or other valid consideration), that increase may constitute adequate consideration and be enforceable; conversely, sham surrenders and regrants intended to circumvent statutory protections will be scrutinized and may be declared invalid.
  • Direct effects on the parties: in S. A. No. 1794 the plaintiff recovers the higher rent as per Ex. A-1 and costs; in S. A. No. 1448 the appeal is dismissed and the lower-court outcome stands, with costs awarded to the successful party. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new rule that contradicts established precedent but refines the application of S. 17(a) to transactions supported by consideration.
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P. Govinda Menon, J.

1. As the question of law involved in these second appeals was considered an important one by Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., they have come up for decision before a Bench.

2. S. A. No. 1794 of 1952: The plaintiff is the appellant and he filed a suit for arrears of rent from 1945 to 1950 on foot of a registered kanom marupat, Ex. A-1, dated 6-10-1945, under which defendants were to pay an annual rent of Rs. 8 along with certain sundries. The defence to the suit was that under an earlier document, Ex. B-1, dated 7-1-1918, which had been renewed by Ex. A-1, the rent payable was only Rs. 4-12-0, and the increase of rent by the renewed demise was opposed to the provisions of the Malabar Tenancy Act and as such the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the difference. The lower appellate Court found following the decision in Puthukulangare Ukkali v. Sivarama Krishna, 1941-1 Mad LJ 113: (AIR 1941 Mad 468) (A), that, in the case of a kanom demise, there can be no enhancement of the purappad payable at the time of renewal and therefore the increase under Ex. A-1 was not justified. The question is whether the agreement to pay a higher rent by a kanom or kuzhikanamdar at the time of renewal is valid and enforceable.

3. Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon for the appellant relies upon certain provisions of the Malabar Tenancy Act, Madras Act, XIV of 1930, where certain statutory provisions are enacted 'in the absence of a contract to the contrary', whereas in S. 17(a) of the Act which relates to renewals there is no such distinguishing feature. Under these circumstances it is contended that it is open to the landlord despite the previsions of S. 17 (a)to enter into an agreement with the kanomdar with regard to fixing of michavaram, renewal fee and the like. What is contemplated by S. 17 (a) is that a kanomdar shall on the expiry of the kanom under which he holds, be entitled to claim and his immediate landlord shall be bound to grant a renewal ensuring for a period of 12 years of the same on payment as renewal fee, of two and one fourth times the balance of the annual fair rent of the lands covered by the kanom after deducting the annual revenue payable on the kanom property to the Government it payable by the kanomdar under the kanom deed, (2) the annual interest on the kanartham and (3) the annual nuchavaram payable under the previous kanom. It is clear from this provision that on the expiry of the kanom there is a statutory right conferred on the kanemdar which he could enforce by means of an application to the Court by S. 22 onwards to obtain a renewal after he pays to his immediate landlord the amount of renewal fee as calculated under this provision. In so computing the renewal fee, the annual michavaram payable under the provisions of the kanom deed alone has to be taken and the terms should be the same as in the previous kanom which is sought to be renewed. As the section does not begin by enumerating that the provisions are in the absence of a contract to the contrary, comparing certain other sections which state specifically 'contract to the contrary', the learned counsel contends that whatever might be the statutory provision under S. 17 it is open to a kanomdar and his landlord to contract out of it, if such a contract is not vitiated by any of the infirmities contemplated by the Indian Contract Act such as fraud, undue influence or the like. Our attention is invited to S. 10 which speaks of the cultivating verumpattadar's right to fixity: "Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary entered into whether before or alter the coming into force of the Act, every cultivating verumpattadar shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding " Similarly S. 22 begins by saying ''Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary (whether made before or after the commencement of this Act), a customary verumpattadar, kanomdar or kuzhikanomdar shall be entitled to apply to the Court, in the form prescribed for the execution of a renewal deed '' Section 32 also says "Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary express or implied whether entered into before or after the coming into force of this Act no cultivating verumpattadar shall be liable to pay to his landlord anything more or anything else than the fair rent and no tenant who is entitled to claim a renewal under this Act shall for the purpose of obtaining the renewal be liable to pay as renewal fee anything more or anything else than the renewal fee provided by this Act.'' The fact that the Legislature had thought fit to make it impossible for the tenants to contract out" of the Act in the three instances refer red to above is relied on by the learned counsel to show that it is possible for the landlord while renewing a kanom to impose his own terms apart from what the section provides if the kanomdar, tenant, is willing and agreeable to act upon such terms. In ( 1941-1 Mad LJ 113: AIR 1941 Mad 408) (A), this Court has held that the word 'same' in S. 17 of the Malabar Tenancy Act connotes renewal of the kanom on the same terms as the previous kanom. If the landlord declines to grant a renewal on payment of the proper renewal fee, the tenant can seek the aid of the Court and the Court should grant the renewal of the kanom only on the same terms as the previous kanom. The principle underlying this decision is that if the landlord is unwilling or refuses to grant a renewal on the identical terms as the existing kanom there is a right for the kanomdar to resort to a Court of law and get a compulsory renewal on the same terms if he pays the renewal fee as contemplated in S. 17, cl. (a), of the Act. That being the case, it is not open to the landlord to stipulate a higher rate of michavaram as opposed to the provisions of the Act. In our opinion, the principle of law enunciated, cannot be questioned but there is nothing in S. 17 (a) which prevents a landlord from increasing the rent at the time of renewal if there is specific consideration for such a renewal. Otherwise such an increase would be a contract entered into without consideration because any increase of rent is against the provisions of the statute. In the present case the original purappad of Rs. 4-12-0 fixed in 1918 was inclusive of Government revenue. The landlord had the obligation to pay Government revenue and if the kanomdar paid Rs. 4-12-0 there is no obligation cast on him to pay the annual Government revenue but under the renewal, Ex. A-1, the rent of Rs. 8 included in itself not only the Government revenues as it stood in 1918 but also the revenue enhanced alter the settlement in the early thirties. Such being the case, there is a valid consideration for the increase of purappad and it cannot be said that such an increase for reasons beyond the control of the landlord is opposed to the provisions of the Act. If the purappad is not increased the original purappad might be less than the increased revenue at the time of the settlement. In the present case Ex. A-1 clearly lays down that the amount of Rs. 8 was arrived at because there was an increase in the Government revenue as a result of the settlement in respect of the lands covered by the kanom. It has been laid down in a number of cases that where there is a usufructuary mortgage or kanom and the Government enhances the revenue payable during the pendency of such relationship then it is the mortgagee and not the mortgagor who is liable to pay the enhanced Government revenue. Vide Kunchu Menon v. Narayana Ezhutessan, 16 Mad LJ 317: (AIR. 1915 Mad 100) (B); Nanu Nair v. Ashta Moorthi Nambudripad, ( 2 Mad LW 509: AIR 1916 Mad 127) (C) Nathuwath Pappu v. Kolli Valappil Kalathile Vittil, (1911) 2 Mad WN 236 (D). Apart from the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, in Malabar, where in many cases the increase of Government revenue at the time of periodical settlements has been due to improvements effected on the property by the tenant the burden of such increase should be on the tenant. Usually in regard to lands on which fruit bearing trees such as coconut trees, arecanut trees and jack trees are planted the assessment per acre is computed with reference to the yield of the trees and if the trees are planted by the tenant as a result of which the Government revenue on the land gets enhanced the obligation to pay such enhanced revenue on the land is on the tenant and not on the landlord. In cases where the landlord has demised an extent of land which could be converted into a garden by planting fruit bearing and other kinds of trees and on which at the time of the demise there were no trees, if the kanomdar or the tenant plants such trees as a result of which the land gets improved and consequently the tax is also enhanced it stands to reason that the tax must be paid not by the landlord but by the person responsible for the increase in taxation. In the present case it can fairly be presumed that the increase in Government revenue was due to the planting of trees by the defendants. Mr. Achutan Nambiar for the respondents contends that there is no evidence as to what exactly is the increase in Government revenue and as such a finding should be called for to ascertain that, We do not think that any such necessity arises because the original rent of Rs. 4-12-0 included Government revenue then payable, and the enhanced rent of Rs. 8 also included enhanced Government revenue payable at the time of Ex. A-1. Such being the case, it is easy to conclude that the difference of Rs. 3-4-0 was due to enhanced Government revenue. It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled to get the purappad in accordance with the terms contained in Ex. A-1. But it is not open to the landlord to raise the michavaram at his will and pleasure. There must be some circumstance justifying the enhancement and the contract must be fully supported by consideration. To take an analogous instance, as in the case of rate of interest provided for under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, if a debtor agrees to pay a higher rate of interest than what is provided for by the Act it has been held in Mallikharjuna Rao v. Tripura Sundari, ( 1953-2 Mad LJ 313: AIR 1953 Mad 975) (E), which has been followed int Dhanakojia Pillai v. Narayana Iyer, 1955-2 Mad LJ 569 (F) and also in Sreenivasa Rao v. Abdul Rahim, C. R. P. No. 232 of 1954: ( AIR 1956 Mad 618) (G), that a stipulation to pay a higher rate of interest is not supported by consideration and as such cannot be enforced. Following that principle it seems to us that without a specific consideration or justification there can be no increase of rent or purappad in the case of renewals under S. 17 of the Malabar Tenancy Act.

4. The decisions of the lower Courts are, therefore, modified and the plaintiff will get a decree for higher rent on foot of the claim made in his plaint as stipulated in Ex. A-1. The appellant will be entitled to his costs in this second appeal and the costs in both the lower Courts.

5. S. A. No. 1448 of 1952: Here also the question is as regards the payment of increased purappad. Unlike the previous second appeal, there was no renewal as such, which has now become the subject of consideration. The original kanom Ex. A-1 dated 22-11-1933 was under Ex. B-2 dated 22-10-1945 as ostensibly surrendered; but four days there after under Ex. A-4 there was a kanom, kuzhikanom deed executed by the same tenant to the same landlord. The lower appellate Court has found that the surrender under Ex. B-2 was only a nominal transaction got executed by the plaintiffs for the purpose of getting over the provisions of S. 17 (a) of the Malabar Tenancy Act. The learned Subordinate Judge has given ample reasons for holding that the surrender was never intended to be Acted upon. He has also found that there was in fact no surrender of possession but only a make believe. Mr. C. S. Swaminathan, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that this finding cannot be accepted. He urges that it is open to a landlord to obtain a surrender of the holding from the tenant if he is willing to do so under S. 44 of the Malabar Tenancy Act, which is A kanomdar or kuzhikanomdar or customary verumpattadar may at the end of any agricultural year surrender his holding to his immediate landlord, by a registered document.

That being the case, the privilege of surrendering the holding at the expiry of the demise is one granted by the Act and when between the parties there is an agreement that the previous relationship is to be put an end to by a registered document, there is nothing according to the learned counsel, to prevent the erstwhile landlord and the quandom kanomdar enter into a fresh kanom or kuzhikanom on new stipulations and terms. It is urged by the learned counsel that in the present case what has been done is the giving up of rights conferred under Ex. A-1 by Ex. B-2 and the creation of fresh relationship by Ex. A-4. Analogous cases have arisen where a karnavan on behalf of his tarwad has renewed a kanom or granted melcharth of the same before the expiry of the original demise. Questions have arisen whether such transaction is binding on his successor. In a number of cases it has been held that a surrender and regrant are within the competence of the karnavan: see Kunhukuttan v. Imbichikuttan, 71 Mad LJ 727: (AIR 1937 Mad 35) (H); Lakshmi Amma v. Kunhi Raman, 1932 Mad WN 543 (I); Koppassa Menon v. Kalliani Ammal, ( 45 Mad LJ 258: AIR 1923 Mad 700) (J); S. A. No. 3 of 1931: (68 Mad LJ 23 (SN) (K); C. M. A. No. 406 of 1928: (59, Mad LJ 63 (SN) (L); S. A. No. 40 of 1927: (58 Mad LJ 55) (SN) (M). It is, therefore, clear that if the transaction had been above board and in the usual course of circumstances there can be no objection to that. The Full Bench in Trivikrama Konuraya v. Sankaranarayana, ILR 56 Mad 92: ( AIR 1932 Mad 771) (N), has held that even a melcharth granted before the expiry of the term by a karnavan if assented to by the same karnavan when the original term had expired would be valid. Applying that principle if the kanomdar surrenders his rights under an existing kanom and then takes a fresh document there is nothing to be said against such a transaction. But the difficulty in this case arises from the fact that the lower Courts have found that Ex. A-4 was a device to get over S. 17 (a) of the Malabar Tenancy Act, by which it is not possible to enhance the michavaram. As we have stated, in the judgment in S. A. No. 1794 of 1952 if there had been any additional consideration for enhancing the michavaram, then the renewal cannot be discountenanced on that score.

6. On the finding of the lower Courts that there is no such consideration, the decisions have to be affirmed and this second appeal dismissed with costs.