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M.B Ram Ran Bijoy Prasad Singh v. Ramagya Kuer And Others

Patna High Court
Jan 21, 1946
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Full Bench (Fazl Ali, C.J., Shearer, J., Sinha, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These are second appeals referred to a Full Bench on the following question (quoted in the opinion): “Whether where on the application of the tenant the rent of an occupancy holding has been reduced under S. 112A(1), cl. (d), the Rent Reduction Officer has jurisdiction again to reduce the rent under S. 112A(1), cl. (d) within the period specified in section 113 save on the grounds indicated therein.”

The specific facts before the Court concern two khatas, No. 415/1 and No. 416. On 8 November 1939, on the tenants' application under S. 112A, the Rent Reduction Officer reduced the rents to Rs. 14 (khata 415/1) and Rs. 17-11-0 (khata 416). On 20 November 1939 the tenants applied again for reduction under S. 112A cl. (d), and by order dated 29 November 1939 the Rent Reduction Officer further reduced the rents to Rs. 7-10-0 (khata 415/1) and Rs. 9-11-0 (khata 416).

The plaintiff landlord then brought two suits for recovery of rent for years 1344 to 1347 calculated at the rates fixed by the first order (Rs.14 and Rs.17). The tenants relied on the second order (29 November 1939) and the trial Court decreed the suits at the lower rates fixed by that second order. The plaintiff landlord then instituted the present suits seeking (a) a declaration that the second reduction (29 November 1939) was without jurisdiction, and (b) damages equal to the difference between the amounts recovered under the trial Court's decree (based on the second order) and the amounts which, according to the plaintiff, should have been allowed under the first order.

The lower Courts held that the second reduction was not ultra vires. These appeals were brought from those decisions and the Full Bench was asked to decide the referred question; however, the Court found that the referred question did not, in fact, arise on the facts of these appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. “Whether where on the application of the tenant the rent of an occupancy holding has been reduced under S. 112A(1), cl. (d), the Rent Reduction Officer has jurisdiction again to reduce the rent under S. 112A(1), cl. (d) within the period specified in section 113 save on the grounds indicated therein.”

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff landlord) — Principal contentions

  • The first reduction (order dated 8 November 1939) was binding on the parties and the Rent Reduction Officer had no jurisdiction to reduce the rent a second time within the period in question (the landlord argued effectively that a second reduction in the course of 15 years was impermissible).
  • It was further contended (by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad for the appellant) that the second application of the defendants (dated 20 November 1939) could not be treated as an application for re-hearing, because the second order does not purport to be an order passed upon an application for re-hearing.

Respondents (Tenants) — Principal contentions

  • The first order of 8 November 1939 was made ex parte on the basis of papers produced by the plaintiff; when the tenants learned of that ex parte order they filed an application for re-hearing.
  • Upon that application the Rent Reduction Officer re-heard the matters in the presence of both parties, considered the evidence produced, and passed the second order dated 29 November 1939. That second order was within his competence.
  • The tenants' evidence in the trial Court, accepted by the lower appellate Court, was to the effect that they had no notice of the first hearing, the case was decided ex parte, they were asked by the Deputy Collector to file a re-hearing petition, they did so, the case was re-heard in the presence of the plaintiff's servants, and the plaintiff did not prefer any appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench examined the factual findings of the lower appellate Court and the evidence given by the tenants in the trial Court (the tenants' evidence was accepted by the lower appellate Court). The Court proceeded step-by-step as follows:

  1. The Court noted that the referred question did not necessarily arise on the facts because the lower appellate Court had found that the second order dated 29 November 1939 was passed upon an application for re-hearing by the tenants (i.e., the second order resulted from a rehearing after an ex parte order).
  2. The Bench referred to R. 114 (a rule framed under the Bihar Tenancy Act) and observed that Rules 82, 83 and other rules made for S. 104 proceedings were adopted for proceedings under S. 112A. The opinion reproduces Rule 82 which provides, in substance, that when a landlord or tenant applies for settlement of a fair rent he shall be considered as plaintiff and the opposite party as defendant, and that proceedings shall be dealt with as suits and, subject to certain directions, the Revenue Officers shall adopt, as far as applicable, the procedure in the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) for trial of suits.
  3. Applying Rule 82, the Court concluded that proceedings under S. 112A are in the nature of suits and governed, so far as applicable, by the CPC. Thus, the tenants (who were defendants in the present rent-recovery suits) were plaintiffs in the reduction proceedings.
  4. If the accepted evidence is correct — that the first hearing was ex parte and that the tenants filed a re-hearing petition which resulted in a rehearing and a fresh order on 29 November 1939 — then, by analogy with the CPC, the Rent Reduction Officer had jurisdiction to re-hear the matter and decide it afresh. Consequently the second order would not be ultra vires and could not be challenged by the landlord in these suits.
  5. The Court rejected the appellant's formalistic argument (that the second application could not be treated as a re-hearing because the order did not purport to be one) on the short ground that the appellant, who bore the onus of showing ultra vires action, did not produce the re-hearing application filed by the tenants. The Court emphasized substance over form: the substance of the proceedings, as found by the lower appellate Court, was that the second order was the result of a re-hearing petition.
  6. The Court also addressed an alternative hypothesis: if the second application of 20 November 1939 were treated as a fresh (new) application rather than a re-hearing application, then the proceedings started on that basis would themselves be suits under the CPC. In that event the appellant (as defendant) could have raised a plea of res judicata — that the matters had already been decided in the earlier proceeding. The appellant did not raise such a defence before the Rent Reduction Officer and therefore, in that scenario, Explanations 4 and 5 to Section 11 of the CPC would operate against him.
  7. The opinion reproduces the texts of the Explanations relied upon:
    Explanation 4:— Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.
    Explanation 5:— Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused.
    The Court reasoned that because the appellant did not assert the point (that the rent could not be reduced further) in the second proceedings, he could not raise it afresh in a separate suit; res judicata principles would bar such a collateral attack.
  8. Given the lower appellate Court's factual finding that the second order was made after a re-hearing, the Full Bench concluded the referred question (about the Rent Reduction Officer's power to reduce rent again under S.112A(1)(d) within the period specified in s.113) did not arise on these appeals. Any answer the Bench might give would be academic and amount to obiter dicta.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS DISMISSED.

Holding (core ruling): The Full Bench dismissed the appeals, upholding the result that the second reduction order of 29 November 1939 could not be challenged on the grounds advanced by the appellant. The Court concluded that, on the findings of the lower appellate Court, the second order was made following a re-hearing application and was within the Rent Reduction Officer's competence; alternatively, had the second application been a fresh suit, the appellant's failure to raise res judicata before the Rent Reduction Officer would have barred his later attack.

Direct consequences for the parties: the second reduction order (29 November 1939) stands; the landlord's attempt to treat that order as ultra vires and recover the difference in rent was rejected. The Full Bench awarded costs against the appellant and ordered one set of hearing fees.

Broader implications: the Court expressly refrained from answering the referred abstract question on jurisdiction under S. 112A(1)(d) within the period mentioned in section 113, finding that the question was not raised on the facts and that any ruling on it would be obiter. The opinion therefore does not lay down a binding new precedent on that abstract point.

Disposition and Concurrence

The appeals were dismissed. Chief Justice Fazl Ali delivered the reasoning above. Justices Shearer and Sinha concurred.

Show all summary ...

Fazl Ali, C.J:— These second appeals have been referred to a Full Bench for the decision of the following question:

“Whether where on the application of the tenant the rent of an occupancy holding has been reduced under S. 112A(1), cl. (d), the Rent Reduction Officer has jurisdiction again to reduce the rent under S. 112A(1), cl. (d) within the period specified in section 113 save on the grounds indicated therein.”

2. A brief statement of the facts of the case will show that the question which has been referred to us does not arise in these appeals. The question is said to arise in respect of two khatas, namely, khata no. 415/1 and khata No. 416. It appears that on 8th November 1939 on the application of the tenants under S. 112A the Rent Reduction Officer reduced the rent of khata No. 415/1 to Rupees 14 and that of khata No. 416 to Rs. 17-11-O. On 20th November 1939, that is to say, only 12 days after this order, the tenants concerned applied again for the reduction of rent under S. 112A cl. (d) and by his order dated 29th November 1939 the Rent Reduction Officer reduced the rent of khata No. 415/1 to Rupees 7-10-0 and that of khata No. 416 to Rs. 9-11-0. In spite of this last order the plaintiff landlord brought two suits for recovery of rent for the years 1344 to 1347 at the rates allowed by the first order of the Rent Reduction Officer, that is to say, at the rate of Rs. 14 for khata No. 415/1 and Rs. 17 for khata No. 416. The tenants in defending the suits relied upon the order dated 29th November 1939 and the suits were decreed only at the rates allowed by that order, that is to say, at the rate of Rs. 7-10-0 for khata No. 415/1 and at the rate of Rs. 9-11-0 for khata No. 416. The plaintiff landlord thereupon brought the present suits for a declaration that the reduction of rent allowed by the second order of the Rent Reduction Officer, that is to say, the order passed by him on 29th November 1939 was without jurisdiction and for recovery as damages of the difference between the amount of rent which was allowed by the Court in the rent suit on the basis of the second order of the Rent Reduction Officer and the amount which according to the plaintiff ought to have been allowed on the basis of his first order.

3. In other words, the plaintiff's case was that the first reduction was binding upon him, but the second reduction was liable to be ignored as the Rent Reduction Officer had no jurisdiction to reduce the rent of an occupancy holding for a second time in the course of 15 years.

4. These suits were contested by the defendants who are the tenants of the two khatas and it was alleged by them in their defence that the first order of the Rent Reduction Officer dated 8th November 1939 was made ex parte on the basis of the papers produced by the plaintiff and that when the defendants came to know of the ex parte order they filed an application for re-hearing upon which the Rent Reduction Officer again heard the cases in the presence of both the parties and after considering the evidence produced by them passed the second order dated 29th November 1939, this order being one which the Rent Reduction Officer was fully competent to pass.

5. Both the Courts below have held that the second reduction was not ultra vires and the lower appellate Court seems to have accepted the evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants which was to the effect that the second order was passed upon their application for re-hearing the two cases. As the evidence which was given by the defendants in the trial Court on the point has not been reproduced in the judgment, it will be useful to state what the defendant who gave evidence actually deposed to in the trial Court. What he said was this:

“I had applied for reduction of rent. Of the first date of hearing had no knowledge and the case was decided ex parte. I later asked the Deputy Collector about my case and he said that it had been decided ex parte. I showed him my receipt. Thereupon he asked me to file a re-hearing petition. I filed a petition and my case was re-heard in the presence of the plaintiff's servants. The plaintiff did not prefer any appeal.”

6. According to my reading of the judgment of the lower appellate Court this evidence was accepted in its entirety and the question is what is the effect of the finding of the lower appellate Court on this point. A reference to R. 114 which is one of the rules framed under the Bihar Tenancy Act in regard to proceedings relating to the settlement of rent under S. 112A shows that Rr. 82, 83 and certain other rules which were framed by the Provincial Government to govern the proceedings under S. 104 were adopted for the purpose of proceedings under S. 112A also. Rule 82 is to the following effect:

“When the landlord or tenant applies for the settlement of a fair rent he shall be considered as plaintiff and the opposite party as defendant. The proceedings shall be dealt with as suit, and subject to the directions contained in rules 84 to 87 of this Chapter, the Revenue Officers shall adopt, as far as it is applicable, the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the trial of suits.”

7. It is unnecessary to refer to rules 84 to 37 because they do not affect the point which arises in these appeals. In substance what rule 82, when applied to proceedings under S. 112A, provides is that these proceedings will be in the nature of suits and they will be governed as far as possible by the Code of Civil Procedure. According to this rule the tenants who are defendants in the present suits were plaintiffs and the landlord who is the appellant before us was the defendant in the proceedings under S. 112A. If the evidence given by the defendants is correct (and it must be accepted to be correct because it has been accepted by the lower appellate court) what happened in the rent reduction proceedings was that the defendants had made an application for reduction of rent, but it was taken up on a date of which they had no notice and it was disposed of ex parte. Thereupon a re-hearing application was filed and the matter was re-heard and a final order was passed on 29th November 1939. The whole question therefore resolves itself into whether the Rent Reduction Officer had jurisdiction to re-hear the application for the reduction of rent in the circumstances stated in the evidence of the defendant. In my opinion the answer to this question must be in the affirmative if the Code of Civil Procedure is held to apply to the proceedings under S. 112A. In other words, the Rent Reduction Officer was fully competent to re-hear the matter and to decide it afresh. That is what he has done and therefore his order cannot be challenged by the appellant landlord. If the order made by the Rent Reduction Officer was substantially an order upon a re-hearing petition, then the question which has been referred to us does not arise and need not be answered. Any answer which we may give to the question will be academic and will be treated only as obiter dicta. It was contended by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, who argued these appeals very fully and in the course of his argument urged all that could be urged on behalf of his client, that the second application of the defendants cannot be treated as an application for re-hearing because the order which was passed upon it does not purport to be an order passed upon an application for re-hearing a case; but in my opinion this argument can be disposed of on the short ground that the appellant upon whom lay the onus of showing that the order of the Rent Reduction Officer was ultra vires ought to have produced the application filed by the tenants, but they have not done so. We have to look to the substance of the proceedings which resulted in the order which is attacked in these appeals and not to the mere form. In my judgment upon the finding of the lower appellate Court there can be no doubt that the order which is attacked as being without jurisdiction was passed upon an application made by the tenants for re-hearing the matter. But assuming for the sake of argument that the second application of the tenants, that is to say, the application made by them on 20th November 1939 was a fresh application and was not an application for re-hearing, the appellant will have to face a further difficulty, that is to say, there will be a bar of res judicata involved in the decision of the question which he asks this Court to decide. If the second application was a fresh application, then the proceedings which were started on the basis of that application were suits and the appellant must be regarded as defendant in those suits. If the suits were brought in regard to matters which had already been the subject-matter of a previous suit, it was open to the appellant to show as defendant that those matters could not be re-agitated as they had already been decided in the previous suits. The appellant, however, did not raise any such defence and therefore Explns. 4 and 5 to Section 11 of the CPC, will be an impediment in his way. Explanations 4 and 5 run as follows:

Explanation 4:— Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.

8. Explanation 5:— Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused.

9. Section 11, however, lays down that no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. The appellant did not contend in the second proceedings before the Kent Reduction Officer that the rent could not be reduced further because it had already been reduced by a previous order. If this point had been raised and decided against him, it would have been open to him to appeal against the decision of the Rent Reduction Officer under S. 112A. He did not, however, raise the point before the Rent Reduction Officer and now he wants to raise it in a separate suit. In my opinion the principle of res judicata clearly applies to such a situation and the appellant cannot be allowed to raise the point in these suits. I have considered this alternative situation merely upon the hypothesis that the second application for reduction was not an application for re-hearing; tut as I have already said, the correct view upon the findings of the lower appellate Court is that those applications were applications for re-hearing. As these appeals fail on the grounds stated in my judgment the question which has been referred to us does not arise and without answering this question I would dismiss these appeals with costs. There will be one set of hearing fee.

Shearer, J.:— I agree.

Sinha, J.:— I agree.

K.S

10. Appeals dismissed.