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Bansidhar v. Shiv Singh

Allahabad High Court
Aug 17, 1933
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Summary of the Court's Opinion (Plaintiffs' Appeal — Mortgages)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a plaintiffs' appeal arising out of a suit for sale based on multiple mortgage-deeds.

Key factual chronology (as stated in the opinion):

  • 20 March 1906: A mortgage-deed was executed by Bansidhar in favour of Lachhmi Narain and others, hypothecating shares in three villages (Nahil, Sambhalpur and Nawadia). A suit was subsequently instituted and a mortgage decree was obtained in 1916.
  • 6 May 1919: Mortgagors executed another mortgage in favour of Mange Lal and others for Rs. 7,000, hypothecating two villages (Nahil and Sambhalpur).
  • 1 March 1920: Another mortgage in favour of Lachhman Prasad was executed.
  • 12 March 1921: Mortgagors executed a further mortgage in favour of the plaintiffs (Mange Lal and others) for Rs. 22,000, again hypothecating Nahil and Sambhalpur and additionally Tukra Jungle. Money taken was partly left in the mortgagee's hands for payment of the prior (1916) mortgage decree, the 1 March 1920 mortgage, and other debts; some money was taken in cash for revenue and private expenses.
  • On the date of the 12 March 1921 mortgage, the mortgagors were not competent to hypothecate Nahil because a money decree against Nahil had been put in execution and execution had been transferred to the Collector under Schedule 3, Civil P.C.; the Collector had taken action under that rule.
  • 9 & 14 September 1921: Plaintiffs deposited Rs. 10,350-4-4 in Court to release Nahil from sale and set aside a prior auction sale.
  • Shortly before these deposits, on 8 December 1921 the mortgagors had mortgaged Nahil, Sambhalpur and Tukra Jungle to Ram Saran Lal (defendant 3) for Rs. 11,000. Ram Saran Lal obtained a decree and purchased the property in execution on 22 March 1927.

Procedurally, the plaintiffs sued to recover the sum they had paid to discharge the earlier mortgage-decree (the 1916 decree) and to enforce charges against the properties, leading to a decision by the Subordinate Judge which was appealed by the plaintiffs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the mortgage of the village Nahil dated 12 March 1921 was void and incapable of enforcement because execution had been transferred to the Collector under Schedule 3, Civil P.C., and in particular because of para. 11 of that rule as interpreted in Gauri Shanker Balmukund v. Chinnumiya (AIR 1918 PC 168).
  2. Whether the plaintiffs, having paid off the amount due under the prior mortgage decree (by depositing approximately Rs. 10,000 in September 1921), thereby acquired a fresh charge on the mortgaged properties enforceable within twelve years from the date of payment (i.e., whether payment created a new charge that restarts limitation).
  3. Whether the plaintiffs' claim to recover the amount paid to discharge the prior mortgage-decree is barred by the law of limitation.
  4. Whether, in the circumstances, the parties intended that the execution of the 12 March 1921 mortgage would keep alive earlier mortgages (i.e., whether earlier mortgages were extinguished or kept alive by the later transaction).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Plaintiffs)

  • The appellants (plaintiffs) contended that by paying approximately Rs. 10,000 in September 1921 to discharge the prior (1916) mortgage decree they acquired a charge on the properties originally mortgaged, which they were entitled to enforce within twelve years of the date of payment.
  • The appellants' counsel relied strongly on the decision in Shib Lal v. Munni Lal (AIR 1922 All 153) to support the contention that payment could create such an enforceable charge.

The opinion does not contain a detailed, separate account of the respondents' legal arguments in the same explicit manner as the appellants' contentions; the court records findings and factual circumstances adverse to the plaintiffs (as set out in the Subordinate Judge's conclusions) rather than an itemised respondent pleading reproduced in the text.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gauri Shanker Balmukund v. Chinnumiya, AIR 1918 PC 168 Interpretation of para. 11, Schedule 3, Civil P.C.: where execution has been transferred to the Collector and he has taken action, a mortgage made in contravention of para. 11 is absolutely void. The Court applied this principle to hold that the mortgage of Nahil dated 12 March 1921 was absolutely void and the charge on Nahil incapable of enforcement.
Shib Lal v. Munni Lal, AIR 1922 All 153 Supports the proposition that payment of a prior charge may create a charge the enforcement of which may be brought within twelve years from payment (i.e., supports appellants' contention). The Court acknowledged that this case supports the appellants' contention but noted conflicting authority and subsequent judicial treatment; it did not accept Shib Lal as determinative in this matter.
Kotappa v. Raghavayya, AIR 1927 Mad 631 Dissenting view from Shib Lal's principle (as to whether payment creates a fresh charge for limitation purposes). The Court noted that the Madras High Court dissented from Shib Lal, indicating conflicting authority on the point relied on by appellants.
Ram Sanehi Lal v. Janki Prasad, AIR 1981 All 466 (Full Bench) Discussed the underlying principle: majority view that a purchaser in execution of a prior decree who is not in possession can enforce his remedy if limitation on the prior mortgage has not run out, but cannot recover mortgage money if limitation has run out; if in possession, discharge may operate as a shield in defence only. The Court observed that this Full Bench did not directly decide the precise point in issue and therefore was not conclusive authority for the present question; nevertheless, its majority view was noted and discussed.
Annupurna Kunwar v. Ram Padarath, AIR 1927 All 417 Held that the period of limitation prescribed for a suit against a puisne mortgagee was not extended by execution of an intermediate usufructuary village by the mortgagee (i.e., limitation not extended by such acts). The Court treated this ruling as contrary to the principle asserted in Shib Lal and relied upon the reasoning and authorities supporting Annupurna Kunwar in rejecting the appellants' claims.
Mohammad Ibrahim Hossain Khan v. Ambika Prasad Singh, (1912) 39 Cal 527 (Privy Council) Authority that a prior charge (zaripeshgi lease) kept alive by payment may nevertheless be unenforceable where the claim in respect of that charge is time-barred under Article 132 (Limitation Act); payment does not necessarily entitle recovery if limitation has expired. The Court found this Privy Council decision "very much in point" and relied on it as a principal authority to hold that the plaintiffs' claim to recover the amount paid to discharge the prior mortgage was barred by limitation (Article 132).
Sibanand Misra v. Jagmohan Lal, AIR 1922 Pat 499 Patna High Court's interpretation aligning with the Privy Council's decision in Mohammad Ibrahim Hossain Khan's case (i.e., that a prior charge may be unenforceable if the claim is time-barred). The Court cited this decision as consistent with the Privy Council authority and as supporting the conclusion that the plaintiffs' claim was too late.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of factual and legal determinations as follows:

  1. Validity of the Nahil Mortgage: Applying the Privy Council decision in Gauri Shanker Balmukund v. Chinnumiya (AIR 1918 PC 168) and para. 11, Schedule 3, Civil P.C., the Court found that the mortgagors were not competent to hypothecate Nahil on 12 March 1921 because a money decree against Nahil had been put in execution and execution had been transferred to the Collector; therefore the mortgage of Nahil was absolutely void and the charge on it incapable of enforcement.
  2. Effect of Plaintiffs' Payment to Discharge Prior Decree: The plaintiffs had paid (deposited) the amount due under the prior (1916) decree in September 1921 to release Nahil from sale. They claimed reimbursement and contended that this payment created a charge enforceable within twelve years.
  3. Intention of the Parties Regarding Earlier Mortgages: The Subordinate Judge found (and the Court recorded) circumstances indicating that the parties did not intend to keep alive the earlier mortgages when executing the mortgage of 12 March 1921 — e.g., higher interest in the later mortgage, omission of Nawadia from the later mortgage, no express mention of keeping alive earlier mortgage in the deed or prior proceedings, and money left in mortgagee's hands being understood to extinguish earlier mortgages. The Court was prepared, however, to assume arguendo in favour of the plaintiffs that the parties intended to keep the previous mortgages alive; it stated that it was not necessary to decide that question finally for the disposition of the appeal.
  4. Limitation as the Decisive Obstacle: The Court identified limitation as the chief difficulty for the plaintiffs. Even assuming an intention to keep earlier mortgages alive, the plaintiffs' claim to recover the amount paid to discharge the prior mortgage was held to be time-barred.
  5. Assessment of Conflicting Authorities: The Court considered the appellants' reliance on Shib Lal v. Munni Lal (which supported the appellants' position) but noted that other authorities dissented (Kotappa v. Raghavayya) or reached contrary conclusions (Annupurna Kunwar). The Court found the Privy Council decision in Mohammad Ibrahim Hossain Khan (1912) 39 Cal 527 to be "very much in point" — there the Privy Council held that a prior charge, though kept alive for the benefit of a later payer, could not be enforced where the claim had become barred by Article 132 of the Limitation Act. The Court also noted Patna High Court's decision in Sibanand Misra v. Jagmohan Lal as reaching the same conclusion.
  6. Characterisation of Plaintiffs' Rights: The Court recognised that by paying off the prior decree the plaintiffs acquired a personal right to reimbursement (a right enforceable under Section 69, Contract Act). That right carries a shorter period of limitation which would start from the date of payment. However, the Court rejected the contention that the plaintiffs' payment created a new charge on the immovable property (in particular on Nahil) giving the plaintiffs a fresh start of limitation against all concerned.
  7. Limited Relief: The Court noted that the plaintiffs did hold a valid mortgage (12 March 1921) on the villages other than Nahil (Nahil's mortgage being void) and were entitled to enforce that charge; the plaintiffs had already obtained a decree from the Court below with respect to those villages. But enforcement against Nahil was precluded because the mortgage on Nahil was void and cannot be revived for limitation purposes by the payment.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED — The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Direct consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The plaintiffs cannot recover from Ram Saran Lal (or enforce against Nahil) the amount they paid to discharge the prior 1916 mortgage-decree because the claim to recover that amount is barred by limitation; the mortgage of Nahil dated 12 March 1921 was void in law and the payment by plaintiffs does not create a fresh, enforceable charge on Nahil that restarts limitation.
  • The plaintiffs retain a personal right to reimbursement for the sum paid (a right under Section 69, Contract Act), subject to its own, shorter period of limitation which runs from the date of payment; the Court did not provide judgment on the enforceability of that personal claim beyond noting its existence and applicable limitation implications.
  • The plaintiffs are entitled to enforce the mortgage of 12 March 1921 as against the other villages (those mortgages being valid for those properties); the Court observed that the plaintiffs had already obtained a decree from the Court below in respect of those properties.
  • No new legal principle was laid down by this decision; the Court resolved the dispute by applying existing authorities (notably the Privy Council decision in Mohammad Ibrahim Hossain Khan and related High Court decisions) to hold the plaintiffs' claim barred by limitation.

This summary is limited strictly to the facts, analyses and holdings contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal conclusions beyond those expressly set out in that opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a plaintiffs' appeal arising out of a suit for sale on the basis of two mortgage-deeds.

2. It appears that on 20th March 1906 a mortgage-deed was exeeuted by Bansidhar in favour of Lachhmi Narain and others hypothecating shares in 3 villages: (1) Nahil, (2) Sambhalpur and (3) Nawadia. This was a simple mortgage on the basis of which a suit was instituted subsequently and a mortgage decree obtained in 1916. On 6th May 1919 the mortgagors executed another mortgage in favour of plaintiff Mange Lal and others for Rs. 7,000 carrying interest at Re. 1-4-0 per cent per mensem compoundable annually under which shares in 2 out of the 3 villages, namely, Nahil and Sambhal-pur, only were mortgaged. There was another mortgage of 1st March 1920 in favour of another person, Lachhman Prasad. On 12th March 1921 the mortgagors executed a second mortgage-deed in favour of the plaintiffs Mange Lal and others for Rs. 22,000 carrying interest at 14 annas per cent per mensem compoundable yearly. In this also the same 2 out of the 3 villages, namely, Nahil and Sambhalpur were hypothecated and there was a 4th village, Tukra Jungle, also mortgaged. Money was left in the hands of the mortgagee for payment of the prior motgage decree of 1916 as also for the payment of the mortgage of 1st March 1920 and some other debts and some money was taken in cash for purposes of payment of revenue and private expenses.

3. But for one difficulty the plaintiffs. would have had a plain-sailing case inasmuch as the previous mortgages were both incorporated in the third mortgage, a suit on which was well within time.

4. It however happened that on the date of the mortgage dated 12th March 1921 the mortgagors were not competent to hypothecate village Nahil because there had been a money decree against this village put in execution, of which the execution had been transferred to the Collector under Schedule 3, Civil P. C., and he had taken action thereunder. In view of para. 11 of that rule as interpreted by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Gauri Shanker Balmukund v. Chinnumiya AIR 1918 PC 168 the mortgage of Nahil made in contravention of para. 11, Schedule 3, Civil P. C., was absolutely void and the charge is incapable of being enforced. The whole trouble has arisen because the plaintiffs took a mortgage of this village, and now consider that the total amount is probably insufficient to be realised out of the remaining property.

5. The plaintiffs did not at first pay off the amount due under the previous mortgage decree but when one of the properties, namely, Nahil was put up for sale they deposited Rs. 10,350-4-4, the total amount due under the decree, in Court on the 9th and the 14th September 1921 and thereby got that property released from sale and the previous auction sale set aside. The plaintiffs now claimed that they are entitled to recover this sum paid by them as against a subsequent mortgagee who came on the scene in the following way. Just before the date when Mange Lal made the deposit in Court the mortgagors had already mortgaged their property in Nahil, Sambhalpur and Tukra Jungle to Ram Saran Lal, defendant 3, for Rs. 11,000. This was on 8th December 1921. Ram Saran Lal brought a suit to enforce this mortgage and obtained a decree and himself purchased it again on 22nd March 1927.

6. In the present suit the plaintiffs are claiming to recover the sum of Rupees 10,000 odd on account of the mortgage decree of 1916 against Ram Saran Lal's property, although the second mortgage in his favour of Nahil was void.

7. The learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the circumstances of this case were such that the parties could not have intended to keep alive the previous mortgage of 1906 on the date when the mortgage of 12th March 1921 was executed. He has pointed out that the rate of interest under the second mortgage was much higher and it was in the interest of the mortgagee to claim this higher rate rather than fall back on the original mortgage decree which was carrying interest at 6 per cent per annum. He has also pointed out that one village, Nawadia, which had been included in the previous mortgage, was not mortgaged again in the second mortgage and has suggested that if the parties had intended to keep alive the mortgage that property also would have been included. He has also commented on the circumstances that neither in the mortgage-deed nor in the previous suit for sale, which was brought and withdrawn by the plaintiffs, was there any mention of the keeping alive of this earlier mortgage. He has also emphasised that by the mortgage of 12th March 1921 the mortgagors had intended to extinguish the rights under the earlier mortgage of 6th May 1919 and when money had been left in the hands of the mortgagee for the discharge of the previous mortgages it was understood that those mortgages should stand extinguished.

8. There is however the fact that there was an intermediate mortgage of 1st March 1920 and it might have been in the interest of the mortgagee to keep alive the earlier mortgage which he was paying off in order to use it against that intermediate mortgagee. We think that it is not necessary to decide this question finally and we are prepared to assume in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants that when they Intended to take the mortgage on 12th March 1921 it was intended that the previous mortgages would not be extinguished when the amounts left in their hands were paid. But the chief difficulty in the way of the plaintiffs is, as has been found by the Court below, that the claim for the recovery of the amount due under the previous mortgage is now barred by time.

9. The learned advocate for the appellants strongly argued before us that by paying Rs. 10,000 odd in September 1921 the plaintiffs acquired a charge on the properties originally mortgaged which they are entitled to enforce within 12 years of the date of the payment. He has relied very strongly on the case of Shib Lal v. Munni Lal AIR 1922 All 153. That case no doubt supports his contention. It has however been dissented from by the Madras High Court in Kotappa v. Raghavayya AIR 1927 Mad 631.

10. In a case which came up before a Full Bench of this Court in Ram Sanehi Lal v. Janki Prasad AIR 1981 All 466 this question did not directly arise though the principle underlying the contention urged on behalf of the appellants arose in that case. Four out of five Judges (p.747) considered that the authorities seem to establish that if the purchaser in execution of a prior mortgagee's decree is not in possession and is suing as plaintiff against the purchaser in execution of a subsequent mortgagee's decree then he can enforce his remedy if limitation on the prior mortgage has not yet run out; but he cannot re cover the mortgage money if limitation has run out. The majority of the judges were clearly of opinion that when a person is suing as plaintiff to enforce a simple mortgage he cannot get a decree for money if the period of limitation prescribed for a suit on the mortgage has already expired. They however thought that if he were found in possession he might be entitled to use the discharge of the previous mortgage as a shield for purposes of defence only and not as a weapon of attack. We are prepared to concede in favour of the appellants that as the point did not directly arise in that case it is not of binding authority in the same way as it is as regards the point which directly arose in that case. Even if we were to assume that the ruling in Shib Lal's case AIR 1922 All 153 was not by implication overruled by this Full Bench, we must point out that the principle laid down therein is contrary to another ruling of this Court, namely, Annupurna Kunwar v. Ram Padarath AIR 1927 All 417, where another Bench held that the period of limitation prescribed for a suit brought against a puisne mortgagee was not extended either by execution of an intermediate usufructuary village by the mortgagee. The latter view was based on the facts of that case. The Bench relied for authority on Mohammad Ibrahim Hossain Khan v. Ambika Prasad Singh (1912) 39 Cal 527. This last-mentioned Privy Council case was not brought to the notice of the Divisional Bench in Shib Lal's case AIR 1922 All 153. We agree that the decision of their Lordships in Muhammad Ibrahim Hosain Khan's case (1912) 39 Cal 527 is very much in point. There, in the first place, there was a zaripeshgi lease of 1874 in favour of Girwar Singh for Rs. 12,000 under which possession was delivered. This was followed by mortgages of 1879, 1880 and 1888 January. Lastly there was a mortgage of 17th February 1888 in favour of Mt. Alfan, which was for the express purpose of paying off the zaripeshgi debt which Mt. Alfan discharged (p. 550). The representatives of Mt. Allan brought a suit in 1900 to enforce not only the mortgage of 17th February 1888 but also to recover the sum of Rs. 12,000 due on the zaripeshgi lease on the ground that they had paid that amount, and thereby acquired priority as against the intermediate mortgagees of 1879, 1880 and January 1888. There were pleas of res judicata and limitation and also a plea that the charge created by the zaripeshgi lease had not been kept alive. On p. 555 their Lordships came to the conclusion that the charge created by the zaripeshgi lease was kept alive for the benefit of Mt. Alfan. On p. 558 their Lordships held that as Mt. Alfan had not been made a defendant in a previous suit brought by an intermediate mortgagee, although she was a necessary party, her rights were not affected by the decree and. there was no bar of res judicata. Having recorded these findings their Lordships went on to observe at p. 558:

But as the Rs 12,000 were, under the zaripeshgi deed of 20th November 1874, repayable in jeth 1294 Fasli (September 1887) and this suit was not brought until 22nd September 1900, the claim of the plaintiffs to priority is barred by Article 132, Schedule 2, Lim. Act, 1877.

11. Mt. Alfan's representatives were therefore not allowed to claim priority on account of their having paid off the amount due under the zaripeshgi lease although that lease was prior in point of time to the mortgages of the contesting defendants; and the ground on which the claim was disallowed was that the period of limitation prescribed for the enforcement of the charge under the zaripeshgi had expired. The mere fact that Mt. Alfan paid off the lease in July 1888 did not entitle her representatives to recover the amount.

12. It is possible that even 12 years had expired from the, date of payment when the suit was brought as it is stated on p. 550 that possession was delivered on 15th July 1888. But their Lordships did not base the dismissal on this ground but based it on the ground that the claim on the zaripeshgi deed itself had become time-barred under Article 132, Limitation Act. The authority of this case is therefore in point.

13. We find that the Patna High Court in the case of Sibanand Misra v. Jagmohan Lal AIR 1922 Pat 499 has come to the same conclusion and put the same interpretation on the decision of their Lordships in Muhammad Ibrahim Hossain Khan's case (1912) 39 Cal 527. We are accordingly of opinion that it is too late now for the plaintiffs to recover the amount paid by them to discharge the previous mortgage of 1906.

14. By paying it off they acquired a right for reimbursement but that did not given them any charge on any immovable property capable of being enforced within 12 years. They might have enforced their personal right of re-imbursement under Section 69, Contract Act, for which there is a shorter period of limitation though it would start from the date of payment. But they cannot claim that the payment made by them created a fresh charge in their favour which gave them a fresh start of limitation as against everybody concerned. We may note that this view has been expressed in Sir D.F. Mulla's new treatise on the Transfer of Property Act at p. 486.

15. The plaintiffs are undoubtedly entitled to claim this amount as a charge against the villages other than Nahil, inasmuch as they hold a mortgage of 12th March 1921 on those properties. They have already got a decree for this from the Court below. But we are clearly of opinion that they are not entitled to enforce this charge against Nahil of which the mortgage was void in law and cannot take the case of the law of limitation by pleading that a fresh charge was created in their favour. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.