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The King-Emperor v. Mofizel Peada

Calcutta High Court
May 1, 1925
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Case Summary — Sanderson, C.J. (Reference from Additional Sessions Judge, 24-Pergannahs)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a Reference made by the learned second Additional Sessions Judge of the 24-Pergannahs (the learned Judge) concerning the case of Mofizel Peada. The learned Judge recommended that Mofizel be convicted under section 302, Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.).

Thirteen persons were charged in relation to the incident. Except for Pazal Zamadar, all were convicted of an offence under section 147, I.P.C. The jury found Mofizel Peada not guilty under sections 302 and 342 read with section 109, but guilty under section 147 and also guilty of an offence under section 304(A). Dhanu Peada was found not guilty of sections 302 read with 109 and 342 read with 109, but was found guilty under section 147.

The factual core is that on 28th June 1924 there was a clash between two parties; Momtaz Molla (the deceased) belonged to one party and the accused's party to the other. At that incident Momtaz was struck by a bullet near the heart and died shortly thereafter. The opinion records that the fatal bullet was fired from a gun by Mofizel Peada according to the available evidence.

The trial concluded at the end of January (year not specified in the opinion) and the Reference was made by the learned Judge on 3rd February. Mofizel had been in jail for three months by the time of sentencing by this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Reference by the learned Additional Sessions Judge recommending conviction under section 302, I.P.C., should be accepted by this Court (i.e., whether the jury's verdict convicting or acquitting on various counts was perverse).
  2. Whether the jury's verdict convicting Mofizel Peada under section 147 and section 304(A), I.P.C., should be accepted by this Court.
  3. What sentence should be imposed on Mofizel Peada for the offences of which the jury convicted him (specifically section 304(A) and section 147), taking into account time already spent in custody and the nature of the act.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Case

  • The prosecution's primary narrative was that Mofizel Peada fired the gun deliberately from behind a wall adjoining the road, took deliberate aim at Momtaz Molla (who was standing in the field on a lower level across the road) and thereby killed him.
  • The prosecution alleged further that Dhanu Peada had incited Mofizel to shoot Momtaz; some witnesses said they heard Dhanu ask Mofizel to fetch Dhanu's gun and shoot Momtaz.

Defendant Mofizel Peada's Statement

  • Mofizel admitted he had fired the gun but stated he was standing on the west of the verandah of the house (not behind the wall adjoining the road) and that he fired the shot towards the field merely to threaten the opposite party.
  • He asserted the killing was an accident: he thought there was no one in the field and had no intention to kill Momtaz or anyone else.

Observations Regarding Dhanu Peada

  • Although several witnesses allegedly reported that Dhanu incited the shooting, the learned Judge expressed doubt that, given distance and noise, such words could have been heard reliably; the learned Judge also contrasted those statements with the police investigation (P.I.E.) which suggested the gun was taken by Mofizel from the house.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Abinash Chandra Bose A person who makes a map in a criminal case should note only what he personally sees; particulars derived from witnesses examined on the spot should not be put on the map itself but recorded separately (reference to amended Police Regulation r.173, 1920). The Court relied on this principle to criticise the Sub-Inspector's map prepared in the present trial. The map contained annotations (e.g., "From this place the accused Mofizel Peada fired his gun," and "The deceased Momtaz Molla was standing here when he was met with the gun-shot") which the map-maker could not personally have seen. The Court held that the map in its present state ought not to have been placed before the jury and that, if a map was necessary, a clean copy omitting such entries should have been used.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a careful review of the evidence and the learned Judge's Reference. The main strands of the Court's analysis are set out below in the order the opinion addresses them.

  1. Reliability of eyewitness and prosecution witnesses: The learned Judge had critiqued the prosecution witnesses, observing that, with the exception of the doctor (who was not an actual eye-witness), no witness could be described as truly disinterested and many had conflicts between their testimony before the jury and earlier statements to the committing Magistrate or the Sub-Inspector. The Court endorsed that such matters were open to the jury and could lead them to reject the prosecution evidence in whole or in part.
  2. Independent factual inferences relied on by the learned Judge: The learned Judge based a conclusion that Mofizel deliberately shot Momtaz in part on physical facts independent of direct eyewitness testimony—specifically the observed downward course of the bullet and the relative levels of the ground (ground behind the wall higher than the road, and the road higher than the field where the deceased stood). The Judge regarded this as corroboration of the prosecution case.
  3. Caution on the extent of reliance on ballistic/positional inference: The Court agreed that the direction of the bullet and the ground levels were material but cautioned that it would be dangerous to rely heavily on that inference in the absence of expert evidence as to exact ground levels and the angle the gun would have to be held to produce such a wound from the alleged positions.
  4. Possible jury conclusions: The Court noted plausible ways the jury might have reasoned: they might have rejected the prosecution witnesses as unreliable; they might have rejected the defendant's statement as wholly impossible (the Judge thought the defendant's account as to direction would have sent the bullet over the deceased's head); or they might have rejected parts of both accounts and convicted on the basis of those facts they accepted as proved—namely that Mofizel fired the shot and that death resulted, but without proof of the specific intent required for murder under section 302.
  5. Standard of appellate review on a Reference (sec. 307): The opinion emphasises that when a learned Judge makes a Reference under section 307, this Court must consider the entire evidence and give due weight to the opinions of the learned Judge and the jury. Applying that standard, the Court concluded it would not be right to find the jury's verdict perverse in the circumstances of this case.
  6. Map impropriety: The Court analysed the map prepared by the Sub-Inspector and found it defective for containing witness-derived annotations purporting to mark positions (e.g., where the accused fired and where the deceased was standing) which the map-maker himself had not seen. The map also failed to record the precise spot where the body was found. The Court considered the map prejudicial and stated that, if a map were necessary, a clean copy without such entries should have been provided to the jury.
  7. Nature of the offence and sentencing considerations: On sentencing, the Court accepted that Mofizel had caused death by a very rash and negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, and that firing a gun with a ball cartridge into a crowd or into a riotous situation was a grave practice the courts cannot view lightly. The Court also took into account that Mofizel had already been detained for about three months (time that, but for the Reference, would have been part of his sentence) and accordingly factored this into sentencing.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • The Reference under section 307 recommending conviction under section 302, I.P.C., was not accepted.
  • The jury's verdict convicting Mofizel Peada of offences under section 147 and section 304(A), I.P.C., was accepted by this Court.
  • Sentence imposed: Mofizel Peada was sentenced under section 304(A) to fifteen months' rigorous imprisonment to commence from the date of the Court's order; a similar sentence was imposed for the offence under section 147, the two sentences to run concurrently. The Court took account of approximately three months' prior detention when arriving at the sentence.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect: Mofizel Peada's conviction on section 304(A) and section 147 stands, and he was sentenced to concurrent terms of fifteen months' rigorous imprisonment (with credit for time already spent in custody).
  • Procedural admonition: The Court reiterated existing principles (citing Emperor v. Abinash Chandra Bose) concerning the proper preparation of maps in criminal trials and condemned the preparer's inclusion of witness-derived statements on the face of the map in this case; it held such a map should not have been before the jury and recommended that, if a map is needed, a clean copy without witness annotations should be used.
  • No new legal principle of broader scope was announced beyond the affirmation of established practice on maps and the application of appellate review standards on a Reference under section 307; the Court emphasised deference to the learned Judge and the jury in assessing whether a verdict is perverse.

Panton, J. concurred with the judgment.

Show all summary ...

Sanderson, C.J:— This is a Reference by the learned second Additional Sessions Judge of the 24-Pergannahs in the case of Mofizel Peada: and the learned Judge has recommended that he should be convicted under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

There were 13 persons involved in the charge, all of whom, with the exception of Pazal Zamadar, were convicted of an offence under sec. 147, I.P.C Mofizel Peada was found not guilty under secs. 302 and 342 read with sec. 109, but the jury found him guilty of an offence under sec. 147 and also of an offence under sec. 304(A).

Dhanu Peada was found not guilty of an offence under sec. 302 read with sec. 109 and also of an offence under sec. 342 read with sec. 109: but, as I have already said, he was found guilty under sec. 147, I.P.C

That there was a not on the 28th June 1924, there can be no doubt, between the party of the accused on the one hand and the party to which Momtaz Molla, the man who was killed, belonged. I do not think it necessary to deal in any detail with the allegations of enmity which existed between these two parties. There is evidence that enmity existed, at all events, between certain individuals of the one party with certain individuals of the other party. It is clear that on the 28th of June there was some incident which caused both parties to assemble—Momtaz's party near the bari of Dhanu Peada and the accused's party partly inside and partly outside the premises of Dhanu. There was undoubtedly abusive language: and I think the verdict of the jury involves the finding that there was throwing of bricks by the accused's party at Momtaz Molla and his companions.

Momtaz Molla was killed by a bullet entering his body in the neighbourhood of the heart and penetrating his lungs and coming out at the back at the tenth intercostal space about an inch in the left of the spine: he must have died very shortly after he had received that wound. There is no doubt that the bullet which killed him was fired from a gun by Mofizel Peada.

The prosecution story, in short, is that the gun was fired by Mofizel Peada, that he was standing behind the wall which adjoins the road which passes the premises of Dhanu Peada, that Momtaz was in the field on the opposite side of the road on a father lower level and that Mofizel took a deliberate aim at Momtaz and killed him.

The written statement made by the Defendant Mofizel Peada was to the effect that it was true that he had fired the gun but that he was standing on the west of the verandah—the verandah of the house and not behind the wall adjoining the road—that he fired the shot towards the field with a view to threaten the opposite party and that it was a pure accident that the bullet struck Momtaz, that he fired the shot towards the field thinking that there was no one there and that he had no intention to kill Momtaz or any one else.

It was part of the prosecution case that Dhanu had incited Mofizel to shoot Momtaz. Some of the witnesses said that they had heard Dhanu ask Mofizel to fetch Dhanu's gun and shoot Momtaz.

It seems to me that the learned Judge made a very significant observation with regard to that part of the case when he said: “The gun and license were in his name, but if there were such a shooting and hullabaloo, who would hear him give an order in the terms that we have given here? Besides that does not agree with the P.I.E statement that the gun was taken by Mofizel from the house. The evidence now given looks like an inference drawn by angry and prejudiced men.”

It seems to ma that it would be difficult, having regard to the distance which separated some of the witnesses and Dhanu Peada and the noise and shouts which apparently were going on, for those witnesses to have heard what is alleged to have been said, namely, that Dhanu had asked Mofizel to fetch his gun and shoot Momtaz.

With regard to the witnesses who were called on behalf of the prosecution, the learned Judge summarised his criticisms in the following manner:—” Thus it may be said generally that none of the ??? can really be said to be disinterested except the Doctor who is not an actual eye-witness, and there is no eye-witness who has not apparently made statements which conflict with his evidence before the committing Magistrate or the statements recorded by the Sub-Inspector.”

There are other matters to which the learned Judge referred which the jury were entitled to take into consideration: but it is not necessary for me to deal with them in detail. It is sufficient for me to say that this was a case in which the jury might come to the conclusion that they could not accept the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as being reliable in nil respects.

If I understand the learned Judge's summing up and his Reference, it seems to me that he has based his conclusion that the accused deliberately shot Momtaz on certain facts and inferences which are to a certain extent independent of the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution who are alleged to have been present at the time of the occurrence.

He pointed out that the course of the bullet was in a downward direction and that it went through the body of the man. He was of opinion that there was an important corroboration of the case which was put forward by the prosecution, because it was alleged—and apparently it was a fact—that the ground behind the wall over which the accused is alleged to have fired the gun was on a higher level than the road and that the road again was on a higher level than the field on which the deceased man was standing and the learned Judge came to the conclusion that if the gun had been fired by the accused from that position and the deceased man was standing in the position which I have stated, the course of the bullet would be downward from the front to the back.

I agree with the learned Judge that is a matter which is material for consideration. At the same time I feel that it would be dangerous for us to rely to any large extent upon that, especially in the absence of any expert evidence as to the exact level of the ground and the angle in which the gun would have had to be held in order to inflict such a wound upon the deceased man if he had been standing in the position which I have stated.

It is, therefore, possible, in my opinion, that the jury may have come to the conclusion that it would not be safe to accept the case for the prosecution.

The jury then had to consider the statement which had been made by the accused person. The learned Judge seems to have formed the opinion that statement could not possibly be true, for, amongst other reasons, that if the shot had been fired in the direction and in the manner described by the accused, the bullet must have gone over the head of the deceased person. I am inclined to agree with the learned Judge that the statement made by the accused person as it stands cannot be accepted and the jury may have been of the same opinion.

The jury, however, may have come to a further opinion, viz., that the case for the prosecution was not in every respect accurate, and that the statement of the accused in every respect was not accurate, but that he may have fired the gun with a view to threaten the deceased man or some of his companions, although he did not fire it from the place in which he said he did and in the direction in which he said he did.

At the same time they may have concluded that he had no intention to hit anybody. In other words, the jury may have rejected both the prosecution story and the story told by the accused and may have come to a conclusion relying only upon those facts which they thought had been proved.

When a learned Judge makes a Deference to this Court under sec. 307, it is the duty of this Court not only to consider the entire evidence, but also to give due weight to the opinion of the learned Judge and the jury and in the circumstances of this case, in my judgment, it would not be right for this Court to hold that the verdict of the jury was perverse.

The result is that, in my opinion, this Reference ought not to be accepted.

It was open, in my opinion, to the jury to convict Mofizel Peada under sec. 304(A) having regard to the fact that there was a charge against him under sec. 302. Therefore the verdict of the jury as regards this accused, namely, that he was guilty under sec. 147 and also of one offence under sec. 304(A) ought to be accepted.

Before leaving this case, I regret to say that I find it necessary once more to refer to the way in which the map in this case was prepared.

It is many years since this Court drew attention to the way in which plans were prepared: and the matter was expressly dealt with in the case of Emperor v. Abinash Chandra Bose(1) the head-note of which runs as follows:—

“A person who makes a map in a criminal case ought not to put upon it anything more than what he sees himself. Particulars derived from witnesses examined on the spot should not be noted on the body of the map but on a separate sheet of paper annexed to the map as an index thereto:” and this Court drew attention to the fact that the Police Regulation dealing with the preparation of maps had been amended so long ago as 1920 in consequence of a representation which had been made by this Court. The Police Regulation as amended in this respect (r. 173) is set out in the report.

I should have thought that a sufficient time has elapsed to enable those who have the conduct of criminal cases in subordinate Courts to see that the directions of this Court and of the Government of Bengal are carried out.

In this case the map which, we were informed by the learned Counsel who appeared for the Crown, was placed before the jury, is a glaring instance of what ought not to be done. In this case there was a dispute between the prosecution and the defence as to the exact position in which the accused was standing, when he fired the gun. The prosecution said that he was standing behind the wall near the road. The accused said that he was standing on the verandah of the house at some distance away. In spite of this I find on the map, a place marked near the wall with the following note: “From this place the accused Mofizel Peada fired his gun.”

This is the place alleged by the prosecution. Anything more improper it is difficult to imagine. This I find in another part of the map, “The deceased Momtaz Molla was standing here when he was met with the gun-shot.” These are two things which the Sub-Inspector of Police who, we were told, prepared the map, could not possibly have seen, because he was not there at the time and he must have made those insertions in the map relying upon information which he received from the witnesses.

There is one thing which it was most important for the person who made the map to note but which he did not mark on the map: that is, the place where he found the body of the deceased man. The Sub-Inspector said that he found the body lying in the field. He ought to have taken careful measurements so as to identify the exact spot. That is a thing which he saw but which he did not note on the map.

I do not think it necessary for me to say anything more upon this point, as the matter has already been dealt with so frequently by this Court. In my judgment, the map in its present state ought not to have been allowed to be placed before the jury. If it was necessary for the map to be placed before the jury, the proper thing to be done was to have a clean copy made with these entries omitted, so that the jury would have a map before them which would not have prejudiced their minds in any way.

We now have to consider what sentence should be passed upon the accused Mofizel Peada. He was convicted by the jury under sec. 304(A). There is no doubt that Mofizel Peada caused the death of Momtaz Molla by doing a very rash and negligent act, which did not amount to culpable homicide. In my opinion, there was no justification for the accused person taking out the gun and firing it specially with a ball cartridge in view of the situation which existed. A person who goes into a not with a gun loaded with a ball cartridge is act to cause serious injuries to some one person or persons; and it is a practice which cannot be looked upon lightly by a Court of justice. In this case, the unfortunate result was that the accused caused the death of Momtaz Molla.

The trial in this case concluded at the end of January this year and the Reference was made by the learned Judge on the 3rd of February, so that Mofizel Peada has been in jail for three months already expired which, but for the Reference, would have been served as part of his sentence. The result therefore is that we take that into consideration and pass a sentence on Mofizel Peada under sec. 304(A), of fifteen months' rigorous imprisonment to commence from to-day and we pass a similar sentence for the offence under sec. 147—the two sentences to run concurrently.

Panton, J.:— I agree.

S.C.M