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Bithal Das Khanna v. Shri Nath Das Khanna
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Bind Basni Prasad, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from an arbitration agreement executed on 12 June 1945 between two brothers, Bithal Das Khanna (plaintiff) and Shri Nath Das Khanna (defendant No. 1), to divide certain houses and zamindari property that had been allotted to them jointly by an earlier family partition decree (1936). Maqsudan Das (defendant No. 2) was appointed sole arbitrator with wide powers to divide houses and zamindari, including power to make two separate awards (one for houses and one for zamindari) and to divide the zamindari village-wise except in village Sarai Lakhan where plotwise division was directed.
The arbitrator made and registered an award on 22 November 1945 dividing the zamindari (with provisions about lots A and B and a one-week option to change allotment) and directing parties to file proposed plot allotments for Sarai Lakhan within one week. On 12 December 1945 the plaintiff applied to the Civil Judge at Azamgarh to have the arbitration agreement and award filed and a decree passed in his favour in terms of the award.
Defendant No. 1 responded by denying the existence of an agreement in fact, alleging collusion between the plaintiff and the arbitrator and misconduct by the arbitrator, and also by challenging the jurisdiction of the civil court to pass a decree in terms of the award.
The learned Civil Judge raised and decided a preliminary point as to jurisdiction, holding that a decree in terms of the award could be passed only by the revenue court (relying in part on section 31 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and unpublished Board of Revenue decisions). The Civil Judge ordered the plaint returned for presentation to the proper court and awarded costs to defendant No. 1. The plaintiff appealed that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Civil Court (specifically the Civil Judge, Azamgarh) had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's application to file the award and pass a decree in terms of the award made without the intervention of a court.
- Whether the expression "court" or "civil court" in the Arbitration Act, 1940 (notably section 2(c) and section 31) includes revenue courts, and if so, to what extent.
- Whether revenue courts can entertain and pass decrees in respect of awards made without the intervention of a court, or only where the reference to arbitration arose in proceedings pending before the revenue court.
- Whether section 233(k) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 (concerning partition or union of mahals) operated as a bar to the civil court's jurisdiction to deal with the partition of zamindari in this case.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant No. 1's Arguments
- Denied that an arbitration agreement existed in fact between the parties.
- Alleged collusion between the plaintiff and the arbitrator and misconduct on the part of the arbitrator.
- Challenged the jurisdiction of the civil court, contending that only the revenue court could pass a decree in terms of the award (relying on section 31 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and decisions of the Board of Revenue).
Appellant (Plaintiff) — Arguments Not Detailed
This opinion does not contain a detailed account of the plaintiff's specific legal arguments beyond the fact that the plaintiff applied for filing the award and a decree in his favour and appealed the order of the lower court returning the plaint on jurisdictional grounds.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Nilmoni Singh Deo v. Taranath Mukerjee (Privy Council) | Authority where a rent court was held to be a civil court under the specific provisions of the Bengal Rent Act and the relevant procedural codes. | The court held the facts and statutory context of that case distinguishable and therefore declined to treat the Privy Council's conclusion as controlling for the present dispute about whether "civil court" includes a revenue court under the Arbitration Act, 1940. |
| Bajrang Bahadur Singh v. Beni Madho Bakhsh Singh | Interpretation of the phrase "partition or union of mahals" as referring to a process regulated by chapter VII of the U.P. Land Revenue Act and the statutory result given effect thereby. | The court relied on the interpretation to conclude that because there had been no partition under chapter VII in the present case, the arbitration reference did not seek to modify any distribution effected under that chapter; hence section 233(k) did not bar the civil court's jurisdiction here. |
| Sukhdeo v. Basdeo | Principle that a suit founded on a cause of action for which adequate relief can only be granted by a civil court is cognizable by that court even if one relief prayed for relates to a matter (e.g., tenancy) falling under another jurisdictional regime. | The court applied this reasoning to hold that the civil court could entertain the reference to divide houses (by metes and bounds) notwithstanding other elements of the dispute concerning zamindari; this supported the Civil Judge's competence on part of the subject-matter. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds in a series of focused steps grounded in the textual provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901:
- Characterisation of the Arbitration Act, 1940 — The court treated the 1940 Act as an exhaustive consolidating statute on arbitration (subject to limited savings in sections 46 and 47). That statute governs arbitrations generally, and its definitions and rules control questions about filing awards and the jurisdiction of courts to entertain challenges or applications.
- Types of arbitration — The court distinguished three kinds: (i) arbitration without court intervention (chapter II), (ii) arbitration with court intervention where no suit is pending (chapter III), and (iii) arbitration in pending suits (chapter IV). The present case was an arbitration without court intervention.
- Meaning of "court" in section 2(c) — The court examined the definition: "Court means a civil court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the reference if the same had been the subject matter of a suit." It rejected the lower court's view that revenue courts were included in this definition, emphasising the ordinary distinction between "civil court" and "revenue court" in other statutes and codes. The court concluded that "civil court" does not include revenue courts for purposes of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
- Jurisdictional test — The court stressed that jurisdiction to file an award and entertain related applications under section 31 is determined by the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration reference (i.e., what would be the subject-matter of a suit), not simply by the terms of the award. Thus the proper test is the nature of the subject-matter referred to arbitration.
- Application to the present facts — The reference before the arbitrator expressly covered division of houses and zamindari. The Civil Judge plainly had territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction, and the court found that the Civil Judge also had jurisdiction to deal with the division of the houses (i.e., to divide by metes and bounds and to grant adequate relief as a civil court). As regards the zamindari, the court examined whether section 233(k) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act barred civil court jurisdiction: it relied on Bajrang Bahadur Singh to conclude that the phrase "partition or union of mahals" refers to the statutory partition process under chapter VII and that no such statutory partition had occurred here.
- Role of revenue courts — The court noted that the U.P. Land Revenue Act contains provisions about arbitration only in the context of references arising in pending revenue proceedings; it provides no mechanism for filing awards made without court intervention in revenue courts. Therefore revenue courts cannot, by general competence, entertain awards made without their intervention. Revenue courts may, however, act upon family-settlement-type awards (e.g., by noting transfers in registers under sections such as section 34 and section 40) after a decree is passed in civil court or by their own process where a reference arose in pending revenue proceedings.
- Conclusion on lower court error — Because the Arbitration Act vests exclusive jurisdiction to decide questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of the award in the court where the award may be filed (and because the civil court was competent with respect to part of the subject-matter and to relevant relief), the lower court erred in returning the plaint for presentation to a revenue court. The Civil Judge had exclusive jurisdiction under subsections 2 and 3 of section 31 to entertain the application.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT SET ASIDE; CASE REMANDED
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The appellate court allowed the plaintiff's appeal, set aside the Civil Judge's order that returned the plaint to be presented to the revenue court, and remanded the matter to the learned Civil Judge to proceed in accordance with law.
- Costs were awarded to the appellant (the appeal was allowed with costs in the court's order).
Broader legal implications articulated by the court (as stated in the opinion):
- The Arbitration Act, 1940 is essentially exhaustive on arbitration matters subject to the savings contained in sections 46 and 47; its definitions and scheme determine where awards may be filed and which courts have jurisdiction.
- For purposes of the Arbitration Act, the expression "civil court" (in section 2(c)) does not include revenue courts; revenue courts have jurisdiction in arbitration matters only where the reference arises in proceedings pending before them under the relevant revenue enactments.
- Jurisdiction to file or challenge an award under section 31 depends on the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference (i.e., what would be the subject of a suit), not merely on the terms of the award itself.
- A family-settlement style award (such as the award in this case) may be given effect in the revenue records (for example under sections 34 and 40 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act) after a decree has been passed in its terms, but the initial jurisdiction to pass a decree in terms of an award made without court intervention lies with the appropriate civil court when the subject-matter falls within civil jurisdiction.
The opinion did not purport to create novel doctrine beyond its statutory interpretation and application to the facts; it clarified how the Arbitration Act interplays with the revenue law in the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, and resolved the jurisdictional dispute accordingly.
Bind Basni Prasad, J.:— This is an appeal arising out of an arbitration proceeding. Bithal Das Khanna, the plaintiff, and Shri Nath Das Khanna, defendant No. 1, are brothers. On the 12th June, 1945, they executed an arbitration agreement. As the decision of this appeal will depend greatly upon the interpretation of this agreement, it is necessary that its terms may be set forth in detail. It appears that in 1936 there was a partition suit between other members of the family on the one side and these two brothers on the other, and according to a decree passed therein certain houses and zamindari property were allotted to these two brothers jointly. In 1945, these two brothers desired to divide these properties as between themselves. With this object they executed a deed of agreement and appointed Maqsudan Das, defendant No. 2, as the sole arbitrator. He was empowered to make inquiries publicly or confidentially, to decide the dispute with without taking evidence as he pleased and to divide the houses and the zamindari half and half between the two brothers. If the arbitrator found that there would be a delay in making the partition of the houses, he was authorised to divide the zamindari first. It was provided in the agreement that the parties would have no objection if there were two separate awards, one for the division of houses and the other for the zamindari. The zamindari was situated in several villages. A request was made to the arbitrator in the agreement that he should so divide the villages that except in the village Sarai Lakhan both the brothers should not have their shares in the same village. In other words, the allotment was to be made in such a manner that each was to have the complete zamindari of the family in one or more villages. In village Sarai Lakhan, however, the arbitrator was to divide the land half and half between the parties plotwise.
In pursuance of this agreement the arbitrator gave the award on the 22nd. November, 1945, and it was registered the same day. By the award only the zamindari was divided. According to it, lot B mentioned in it was given to the plaintiff and lot A to defendant No. 1 with the proviso that if defendant No. 1 so desired he could within a week of the award take lot B by notifying his intention to the arbitrator. It was further provided that after the expiry of one week the award would become final and then no party would have any concern with the village allotted to the other. As regards Sarai Lakhan, the arbitrator by his award allotted to each party equal areas and called upon them to file before him within a week two lots allotting to each party specific plots, otherwise he himself would allot the plots.
On the 12th December, 1945, the plaintiff applied to the Civil Judge at Azamgarh that the arbitrator be required to file the arbitration agreement and the award and a decree be passed in his favour as against defendant No. 1 in terms of the award.
Defendant No. 1 took a number of pleas. He denied that there was any agreement in fact and alleged collusion between the plaintiff and the arbitrator and misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. He questioned also the jurisdiction of the court to deal with the case.
The learned Civil Judge took up the preliminary point of jurisdiction and held that a decree in terms of the award could be passed in the present case only by the revenue court. In this, view of the case, he passed the following order:
“Let the plaint be returned for presentation to the proper court. The defendant No. 1 will get his costs incurred in this court from the plaintiff.”
As against this order the plaintiff comes up in appeal.
The reasoning adopted by the learned Civil Judge is that the arbitration agreement in the present case really consists of two separate agreements, one in respect of the zamindari and the other in respect of the houses. The award is in respect of the zamindari only. He goes on to say that “If the houses had also been the subject-matter of the award, it would have been different.” He was of opinion that as the award is in respect of the zamindari only, so having regard to the provisions of section 31 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the case is not cognizable by the civil court and it is the revenue court only which can pass the suitable order on it. There is an inconsistency in the line of reasoning of the lower court. At one place it appreciates that the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference to arbitration and not the subject-matter of the award, but at another place it holds that its jurisdiction was barred because the award dealt only with the zamindari. It may be said at once that having regard to the definition of the word “court” as defined in clause (c) of section 2 and the terms of section 31 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the jurisdiction of a court for passing a decree in terms of the award now depends upon the questions which form the subject-matter of reference to the arbitration and not on the terms of the award.
For the determination of the question whether or not the learned Civil Judge had the jurisdiction to deal with this award it is necessary to carefully examine the scheme of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The first significant point to note is that it is an “Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to arbitration”. This will be apparent from the preamble and also from the provisions of sections 46, 47 and 49 of the Act which provide as follows:
“46. The provisions of this Act, except sub-section.(1) of section 6 and sections 7, 12 and 37, shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force, as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement, except in so far as this Act is inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder.
47. Subject to the provisions of section 46, and save in so far as is otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings thereunder;
Provided that an arbitration award otherwise obtained may with the consent of all the parties interested be taken into consideration as a compromise or adjustment of a suit by any court before which the suit is pending.
49. (1) The enactments specified in the Third Schedule are hereby repealed to the extent mentioned; in the fourth column thereof.
(2) The enactments specified in the fourth schedule are hereby amended to the extent and in the manner mentioned in the fourth column thereof.”
There are a large number of Acts in which there are provisions relating to arbitration, e.g, sections 260 to 265, Cantonments Act, 1924, section 152 of the Companies Act, 1918, section 52 of the Electricity Act, 1910, sections 11, 12, 18 and 26 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, section 52(h) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, sections 46, 46A and 46B and 48 of the Railways Act, 1890 section 43(c) of the Trusts Act, 1882, and sections 113, 130 and 203 to 209 of the U.P Land Revenue Act, 1901. The provisions of these Acts and similar provisions in other Acts were intended to be affected by section 46 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Section 47 is also somewhat to the same effect. Section 49 provides for the repeals and the amendments.
It is clear from the above that with certain saving provisions as regards matters relating to arbitration in other enactments the Arbitration Act, 1940, contains the whole of the law on the question of arbitration and is exhaustive on the subjects.
The second point to be noted is that the Act deals with three kinds of arbitration—
(1) Arbitration without the intervention of a court (chapter II).
(2) Arbitration with the intervention of a court, where there is no suit pending (chapter IIT).
(3) Arbitration in pending suits (chapter IV).
It will be seen that in the present case the arbitration was without the intervention of a court.
The third point to be noted is the definition of the word “court” in clause (c) of section 2 of the Act which provides as follows:
“‘Court’ means a civil court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the reference if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under section 21, include a Small Cause Court.”
The learned Civil Judge has held that as the revenue courts also deal with matters of civil nature they must be held to be civil courts as contemplated in the above definition. He has relied upon two unpublished decisions of the Board of Revenue.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to examine the provisions relating to arbitration in the U.P Land Revenue Act, 1901, and the rules made thereunder. Firstly, there is the provision in section 113 of that Act which provides that when it has been decided to make a partition, the Collector may allow the parties to make the partition themselves, or appoint arbitrators for the purpose. Then there is section 130 which provides that in all cases, whether partition has been made by arbitrators or otherwise, the revenue of the mahal shall be distributed by the Collector over the several portions into which the mahal has been divided. Section 203 authorises the revenue courts of various grades to refer any dispute pending before them to arbitration with the consents of the parties. Section 204 applies the provisions of sections 50V, to 521 of the old Code of Civil Procedure to arbitrations under the Land Revenue Act in so far as they are not inconsistent with anything in that Act. Section 205 provides for the setting aside of the award and section 206 lays down that if there is no reason to remit the award or to set it aside the dispute shall be decided in accordance with the award.
Paragraph 26 of the Partition Manual provides that the partition officer shall after deciding objections, if any, inquire from the parties whether they wish to make the partition themselves or to appoint arbitrators for the purpose or whether they wish it to be made by the court. Sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 26 provides that where the matter is referred to arbitration the partition proceeding drawn up by the partition officer will not be binding on the arbitrators. Paragraph 28(1) provides the principles to be observed by the arbitrators in making the partition. Sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 28 applies all the provisions of the second schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure (now repealed) to the arbitration proceedings. According to section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the reference to the repeated second schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure shall be construed as reference to the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
The important point to note is that nowhere in the U.P Land Revenue Act, 1901, or in the Partition Manual is there any provision for arbitration without the intervention of a court or arbitration with the intervention of a court where there is no pending proceeding. The provisions, such as they are, in the Land Revenue Act, 1901, as regards arbitration relate only to references in cases pending before the revenue courts. That being the position, how can the revenue court entertain in a case like the one before us the, plaintiff's application for the passing of a decree in terms of the award?
This brings us to the consideration of the question whether in the expression “civil court” the revenue courts are also included or not. I have no hesitation to say that the term “civil court” does not include revenue court. The Arbitration Act, 1940, itself does not provide that the revenue courts are also included in the expression “civil court”. When a term is not defined in an Act, it must be given its plain natural meaning. Every one knows that the term “civil court” has a definite meaning in contradistinction with the term “revenue court”. The various Civil Courts Acts, e.g Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Acts, 1887, deal only with the civil courts as they are understood in the ordinary-sense, viz., the Munsifs, the Civil Judges and the District Judges. In the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the term “revenue court” has been defined in sub-section (2) of section 5. It means “a court having jurisdiction under any local law to entertain suits or other proceedings relating to the rent, revenue or profits of land used for agricultural purposes, but does not include a civil court having original jurisdiction under this Code to try such suits or proceedings as being suits or proceedings of a civil nature” It is true that the revenue courts also decide suits of a civil nature, but when they have been given a separate name as opposed to civil courts they cannot be regarded as civil courts. In section 111(1)(b) of the U.P Land Revenue Act, 1901, the words “civil court” have been used with a definite meaning in contradistinction with revenue courts. Similarly, in sections 287 and 288 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939, the expression “civil court” has been used as distinct from the revenue court. Learned counsel for the respondents relies upon the Privy Council ruling in Nilmoni Singh Deo v. Taranath Mukerjee in support of his contention that the expression “civil court” includes the revenue court also. The facts of that case are distinguishable from the present one. There the Deputy Commissioner of Manbhum had made decrees in rent suits under the Bengal Rent Act No. X of 1859 and transferred those decrees for execution into another district. On a consideration of the provisions of the Bengal Rent Act No. X of 1859 and the Code of Civil Procedure then in force and also the provisions of the earlier Code, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee arrived at the conclusion that a rent court is also a civil court. The views expressed in regard to the provisions of other Acts and in relation to a case of quite distinct nature cannot be applied to the present case. I have no hesitation to say that the expression “civil court” as used in section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, does not include the revenue court.
The position thus is that the revenue courts cannot deal with awards made without the intervention of the court or arbitrations with the intervention of a court as regards matters not before them in any pending case. By virtue of the saving provisions contained in sections 46 and 47 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, they can, however, deal with awards made through their intervention in cases pending before them. There are provisions in the U.P Land Revenue Act, 1901, which indicate that where an award has been made without the intervention of the court, revenue courts will act upon it, although they may not go through the procedure of passing a decree in terms of it. Thus, sub-section (1) of section 34 provides that every “person obtaining possession by succession or Transfer, of any proprietary or other right in a mahal, or part of a mahal, or the profits thereof, or in any specific area therein, which is required to be recorded in the registers prescribed by clauses (a) to (d) of section 32, shall report such succession or transfer to the Tahsildar of the tahsil in which the mahal or any part thereof is situated.” The Explanation to this section provides that the word “transfer” includes a family settlement by which the proprietary share or part of the proprietary share recorded in the register of proprietors in the name of one or more members of that family is declared to belong to another or other members. An award like the one before us is nothing but a family settlement. A family settlement in strict legal phraseology is a settlement between the several members of a family of their dispute, each one relinquishing all claims in respect of property in dispute other than that falling to his share and recognizing the rights of the others to the portions allotted to them respectively. Section 40 of the Land Revenue Act provides that all disputes regarding, entries in the annual registers shall be decided on the basis of possession. Any person aggrieved from the order passed by the revenue court under section 40 has his remedies open to him in the civil court.
This brings us to the question whether or not the learned Civil Judge had jurisdiction to pass a decree in terms of the award. The decision of this question rests upon the provisions of section 31 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which provides as follows:
“31. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, an award may be filed in any court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement or persons claiming under them shall be decided by the court in which the award under the agreement has been, or may be, filed, and by no other court.
(3) All applications regarding the conduct of arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings shall be made to the court where the award has been, or may be, filed, and to no other court.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where in any reference any application under this Act has been made in a court competent to entertain it, that court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that reference and the arbitration proceedings shall be made in that court and in no other court.”
The definition of the word “court” has already been given above and it has been held that it does not include the revenue court. It will be seen that the jurisdiction is to be determined with reference to “the questions forming the subject matter of the reference if the same had been the subject matter of the suit”. It is wrong to determine the jurisdiction with reference to the terms of the award. Jurisdiction is of three kinds (1) territorial, (2) pecuniary and (3) the nature of the subject matter. It is not disputed that the learned Civil Judge of Azamgarh had the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction in the case. The only question is whether having regard to the subject matter of the questions which were referred the arbitration, he was competent to deal with the case or not. The reference was for the division of houses and zamindari. Clearly the Civil Judge had the jurisdiction to divide the house. It is urged, however, that in view of section 233 (k) of the U.P Land Revenue Act, 1901, he had no jurisdiction for the partition of the zamindari. The expression or the phrase “partition or union of mahals” in section 233(k) has been the subject of interpretation by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Bajrang Bahadur Singh v. Beni Madho Bakhsh Singh It was held in that case that the expression refers to a process regulated by chapter VII of the Act and the result thereof which is given statutory effect. In the present case there was no partition between these two brothers under chapter VII of the U.P Land Revenue Act, 1901, and so there was no question of the arbitration reference seeking to modify any distribution which by partition had been affected under the Act. I am unable to agree with the lower court that the arbitration agreement in the present case should be taken as two distinct agreements, one relating to the houses and the other to the zamindari property. The whole immovable property of the joint family was brought into the hotchpotch and the arbitrator was appointed to divide it. Even if it be assumed that the learned Civil Judge had no jurisdiction as regards the partition of the zamindari property by virtue of section 233(k) of the U.P Revenue Act, 1901, it cannot be denied that he had jurisdiction as regards the houses. In Sukhdeo v. Basdeo it was held that a sail, that is based on a cause of action with respect to which adequate relief can only be granted by the civil court is cognizable by that court notwithstanding the fact that one of the rebel's prayed for by the plaintiff is for the declaration of his right to a tenancy holding. In the present case the learned Civil Judge had the jurisdiction to divide the houses by metes and bounds. As regards the zamindari property, he had certainly the jurisdiction to declare the title of the parties. Excepting the case of Sarai Lakhan, there was no question of the partition of any mahal. In the present case by the award in tenms of which the decree is prayed for Sarai Lakhan has not been divided between the parties plotwise.
My conclusions, therefore, are as follows. The Arbitration Act, 1940; is an exhaustive Act on the subject, except as provided therein by sections 46 and 47. Inasmuch as the U.P Land Revenue Act, 1901, makes no provision for the riling of the awards made without the intervention of the court or with its intervention but not in a pending suit. The award before us cannot be filed in the revenue court and the order of the lower court directing the plaint to be returned for proper presentation was erroneous. The term “civil court” occurring in section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, does not include revenue courts and the revenue courts can deal only with the references for arbitration made through their intervention in pending cases. By sub-sections 2 and 3 of section 31 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, learned Civil Judge had the exclusive jurisdiction in the case. The award like the one before us is a family settlement and when a decree has been passed in its terms, it can be given effect to by the revenue court under sections 34 and 40 of the U.P Land Revenue Act, 1901. As part of the subject matter of the reference, viz., the division of houses, was within the jurisdiction of the civil court and as regards the reference about the division of zamindari, the arbitrator was only required to make the partition, except Sarai Lakhan, villagewise between the parties, the learned Civil Judge was competent to entertain the case. Section 233(k) of the Land Revenue Act is no bar to the proceeding's which have given rise to this appeal.
For the reasons given above the appeal should in my opinion be allowed with costs, the order of the lower court should be set aside and the case should be remanded to the learned Civil Judge to proceed with it according to the law.
Malik, J.:— I agree and have nothing to add.
By the Court— The appeal is allowed with costs. The order of the lower court is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court to proceed according to law.
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