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Kikishru Chinoy v. Nadershaw Chinoy
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns an application by the respondent in a petition under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act III of 1936. The respondent seeks revocation of an order granting the petitioner leave to present her matrimonial proceedings in the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court in Madras. The respondent argues that the balance of convenience favors the proceedings being conducted in a court nearer to Punjab, where he resides. The petitioner had originally obtained leave under Section 29(3) of the Act on 6th February 1941. The respondent was served with the suit by the end of February 1941, was aware of the trial date fixed for 5th August 1941 by the end of March 1941, but did not apply to revoke the leave until 7th May 1941. The application for revocation was served only around 20th July 1941.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondent's application to revoke the leave granted to the petitioner to sue in the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court was maintainable under the procedural rules invoked.
- Whether the procedure adopted under Order 13, Rule 14(f) of the Original Side Rules of the High Court applies to the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court.
- Whether the statutory appellate remedy under Section 47(b) of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936 is the exclusive remedy for challenging the grant of leave to sue under Section 29(3).
- Whether the Original Side Rules of the High Court continue to apply to proceedings in the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court after repeal and re-enactment of earlier statutes.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent contends that the balance of convenience favors the proceedings being held in a court closer to his residence in Punjab.
- The respondent relies on Order 13, Rule 14(f) of the Original Side Rules of the High Court as the procedural basis for seeking revocation of leave to sue.
- The respondent's counsel argues that the Original Side Rules continue to apply to the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court by virtue of earlier statutory provisions and their continuance under the General Clauses Act.
- An application for extension of time to file the written statement was made, citing the pendency of the revocation application as a reason for delay.
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner objects on the ground that the wrong procedure has been adopted for revocation, relying on Section 47 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936.
- Section 47(b) provides an express appellate remedy to the High Court against the grant of leave by the Matrimonial Court, which must be instituted within three calendar months.
- The petitioner contends that the respondent should have appealed under Section 47(b) rather than applying under the Original Side Rules, making the current application procedurally improper and liable to fail.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first identifies the nature of the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court as constituted under Sections 18 and 19 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936. It notes that the application for revocation was made under a rule (Order 13, Rule 14(f)) applicable to the Original Side of the High Court, which the court finds inappropriate for the Matrimonial Court.
The court highlights that Section 47(b) of the 1936 Act expressly provides an appellate remedy to the High Court against the grant of leave to sue by the Matrimonial Court, to be exercised within three months. This statutory provision conflicts with the procedural rule relied upon by the respondent.
The court discusses the repeal of the earlier Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1865 and the consequent repeal of the High Court's power to make rules under that Act. It notes that the 1936 Act introduced new provisions, including the leave to sue and the appellate remedy, which did not exist previously.
Applying Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, the court explains that rules under repealed Acts continue only if consistent with the re-enacted provisions. Since the Original Side Rule invoked is inconsistent with the statutory appellate remedy, the statutory provision prevails.
The court concludes that the respondent's remedy was by appeal under Section 47(b), which was not pursued. Accordingly, the application under the Original Side Rules is improper and must be dismissed.
Regarding the extension of time sought for filing the written statement, the court finds no sufficient reason to grant it, noting the respondent's delay and failure to act promptly despite knowledge of the suit and trial date.
Holding and Implications
The application for revocation of the leave granted to the petitioner to present her matrimonial proceedings in the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court is dismissed with costs.
The court's decision directly affects the parties by affirming the procedural exclusivity of the statutory appellate remedy under Section 47(b) of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936 for challenging leave to sue. No new precedent is established beyond clarifying that the Original Side Rules of the High Court do not apply to such applications in the Matrimonial Court when inconsistent with statutory provisions.
This is an application by the respondent in a petition presented pursuant to the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act III of 1936. In the application the applicant seeks to obtain revocation of the order giving leave to the petitioner to present her proceedings in this Court, the grounds being that the balance of convenience will be met by the proceeding being presented in a Court nearer to the Punjab where the respondent says he is residing.
This Court is not the High Court sitting in its Original Jurisdiction. It is the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court which is constituted under the provisions of Ss. 18 and 19 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936. The application on the face of it purports to have been issued under O. 13, R. 14(f) of the rules of the Original Side of the High Court. This rule provides that the Judge sitting on the Original Side of the High Court shall deal with applications for revocation of orders granting leave to sue.
The petitioner applied to the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court under S. 29, Sub-S. (3) of the Act for leave to present her proceedings in the Matrimonial Court in Madras and on the 6th February, 1941, this Court granted the leave which the petitioner sought. Learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent, the applicant in the application before me, has with great frankness, conceded that his client was served with the proceedings in the suit brought against him by his wife by the end of February 1941. Early in the month of March this Court fixed the date to hear the suit between the petitioner and the respondent to take place on the 5th August 1941 and again learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent has conceded that his client was aware of the date of trial by the end of March 1941. No step was taken by him until the 7th May 1941 when the present application was issued to revoke the leave granted to the petitioning wife to bring her proceedings in Madras. This application was not served until on or about the 20th July.
Learned Counsel on behalf of the wife takes the preliminary objection that the wrong procedure has been adopted and he relies upon the provisions of S. 47 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act which, so far as is material, provides as follows:
“An appeal shall lie to the High Court from…………(b) the granting of leave by any such Court under Sub-S. (3) of S. 29 provided that such appeal shall be instituted within three calendar months after the decision appealed from shall have been pronounced.”
The words above “such Court” clearly refer to the Chief Parsi Matrimonial Court within the jurisdiction of the High Court. It is contended that the husband should have presented an appeal to the High Court from the decision of the Matrimonial Court granting leave to sue and the machinery which has been adopted pursuant to the provisions of the Original Side Rules of the High Court is wrong and consequently, this application must fail.
Prior to 1936 the statutory enactment in force was the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act of 1865 which contains some similar provisions to the Act of 1936 but by S. 51 of the earlier Act the High Court of the area in which the Parsi Matrimonial Court is established was empowered to make such rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in the Matrimonial Court as it might consider expedient. Under the provisions of the section, to which I just referred, the High Court provided in O. 35, R. 18 of its Original Side Rules that the rules of the High Court should apply to all suits under the Matrimonial Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act of 1865. Counsel on behalf of the husband thereupon contends that the Original Side Rules are still applicable to the Parsi Matrimonial Court and he is entitled to present this application.
Section 53 of the Act of 1936 repealed the whole of the Act of 1865. It has therefore repealed S. 51 to which I have referred. By the Repealing and Amending Act of 1937, S. 53 of the 1936 Act was itself repealed. S. 24 of the General Clauses Act provides that
“Where any Act…………is…………repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, made or issued under the repealed Act………shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been issued under the provisions so re-enacted.”
The important words to emphasize are “so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted”. Under the Act of 1865 there was no provision by which the potential petitioner in a Matrimonial suit in a Parsi Court could obtain leave to present the proceedings and there was no comparable provision in the earlier Act to that contained in S. 29(3) of the 1936 Act. The appellate provision in S. 47(b) of the 1936 Act is also a new provision which expressly gives a remedy by appeal in regard to the grant by the Court of leave to present proceeding under S. 29(3). This provision is in conflict with the provisions in O. 13, R. 14(a) of the Original Side Rules of the High Court which provides a remedy for revocation of leave to sue by means of an application to the Judge and which is therefore inconsistent with the statutory provision in S. 47(b) of the Act of 1936.
It is not necessary for me to decide whether or not all Original Side Rules of the High Court still have application to the Matrimonial Court for this reason. Assuming that they do, then, the provision by which an application can be made to the Judge to revoke the leave to sue is inconsistent with the statutory provision and in consequence the statutory provision must prevail.
It is quite clear that the remedy open to the respondent husband in the proceedings was to have availed himself of the appellate provisions of S. 47(b) of the Act of 1936. He has not done so but has taken proceedings under a rule of the Original Side of the High Court which, in my view, has no application to the Matrimonial Court. The consequence is that the present application cannot be entertained and must be dismissed with costs.
Learned Counsel on behalf of the husband (respondent) applied for an extension of time to be given to his client for filing the written statement and he stated that the reason why it had not already been filed or prepared was because of the pendency of the present application. The respondent took no steps at all until more than two months had elapsed after he was informed of the filing of the suit in this Court and not until about six weeks following his being apprised of the date of trial and although the application was issued on the 7th May 1941, service was not effected on the wife's learned Advocate until about the 20th July. True it is that the vacation of this Court was then taking place, but I see nothing to have prevented initiation of the proceedings long before the present application was filed. I see no ground to extend the time. I refuse to do so.
N.R.R
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