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(Chalikani) Venkatarayanim Garu v. (Raja Vatsavya) Venkatasubhadrayamma
Judgment Summary — Usufructuary Mortgage (Appeal)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit to enforce a usufructuary mortgage. The principal legal question argued on appeal was whether a valid tender of the amount due on the mortgage occurred on 17 January 1899 or, alternatively, whether the respondents' conduct dispensed with the necessity for such a tender. If either position were established, the appellants claimed that interest on the mortgage debt ceased to run from that date.
Relevant facts appearing in the opinion: on 17 January 1899 appellant 2 wrote to the mortgagee (Ex. 5a) asking for an account of the amount due and expressing willingness to pay. The mortgagee replied that, under the mortgage deed (Ex. A), he had acquired an absolute right to the property and refused to render an account, though he stated the amount he asserted to be due: Rs. 3,19,946. No sum was actually tendered or deposited in Court before the suit, and no payment has been made even after the decree. At first instance the Subordinate Judge found that appellant 1 did not have the necessary funds available on the date in question and disbelieved his testimony that he had Rs. 1,50,000 in his chest. Defendant 8 had later purchased the bulk of the mortgaged properties for Rs. 2,40,000 while the amount payable on 17 January 1899 exceeded Rs. 3,00,000.
The Subordinate Judge made a personal decree for costs against defendants 3, 8 and 12; allowed Rs. 3,000 per year for certain establishment/recurring charges (against an asserted Rs. 4,000 figure in the deed); and otherwise gave decree in favour of the mortgagee. Respondent 3's memorandum of objections was not pressed at hearing.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether there was a valid tender of the mortgage debt on 17 January 1899 within the meaning of Section 84 of the Transfer of Property Act.
- Whether the mortgagee's assertion that he had acquired an absolute right to the property amounted in law to a dispensation of the necessity for tender such that interest would cease to run from 17 January 1899.
- Whether the Subordinate Judge correctly made defendants 3, 8 and 12 personally liable for the entire costs, and whether any portion (specifically stamp duty) should be excluded from their personal liability.
- Whether the mortgagee was entitled, under the deed, to be allowed Rs. 4,000 per year for establishment, repairs, village charges, etc., or whether the Subordinate Judge's allowance of Rs. 3,000 per year was correct.
- Whether fees for two vakils should be allowed to the respondent under the Rule permitting such fees in cases of special difficulty or importance.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Appellants pointed to Ex. 5a: a letter in which appellant 2 requested an account and expressed willingness to pay, and argued that as the mortgagee alleged he had acquired an absolute right to the property and refused to render an account, that conduct should be treated as dispensing with the necessity of tender — with the consequence that interest would cease to run from 17 January 1899.
- It was conceded by appellants' counsel (Mr. Narayanamurthi) that the acts relied on could not be characterized as a valid legal tender within the meaning of Section 84, if measured strictly against the statutory requirements.
Respondents' Arguments
- The mortgagee contended that under the mortgage deed (Ex. A) he had acquired an absolute right to the property and therefore was not bound to render an account to the appellants; he did, however, indicate the amount he asserted to be due (Rs. 3,19,946).
- Respondents maintained that mere expression of willingness to pay does not constitute a statutory tender and that the Transfer of Property Act prescribes the conditions for valid tender/deposit — there is no rule that an allegation by the mortgagee of an absolute right to the property dispenses with the statutory requirements and causes interest to cease.
- On costs, respondents (and the Subordinate Judge) relied on the vexatious conduct of the defence as the basis for making defendants 3, 8 and 12 personally liable for costs.
- Respondent also sought the allowance of fees for two vakils under the Rule permitting two sets of fees in cases of special importance or difficulty (invoking the large amount involved — about seven lacs).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dayabhai Dipchand v. Dullabhram Dayaram | Principle that where reciprocal promises exist and one party dispenses with performance of the other's promise, that party cannot later rely on the other's non-performance to defend a claim for damages. | Cited as an example of the reciprocal-contracts principle; the court held this principle is not directly applicable to the statutory rules governing tender and cessation of interest under the Transfer of Property Act. |
| Owners of the “Norway” v. Ashburner | Similar principle relating to reciprocal contracts and waiver/dispensation of a reciprocal obligation. | Used along with Dayabhai Dipchand as authority for the reciprocal-contracts principle; court distinguished these authorities from the statutory context of tender and interest under the Transfer of Property Act. |
| Harendra Lal Rai Chowdhri v. Maharani Dasi (Privy Council) | In that case the mortgagee refused to appraise the property when a bona fide offer to purchase was brought to his notice; the Judicial Committee held that the mortgagee's conduct rendered a sale impossible and the matter stood "as if it was a case of tender" (used by way of analogy). | The court treated this decision as cited by appellants but rejected the argument that the phrase amounted to treating the situation as a legal tender under Section 84. The judgment concluded there was no warrant to interpret that Privy Council phrase as equivalent to statutory tender. |
| Gopeswar Saha v. Jadab Chandra | Another case placed on a similar footing to Harendra Lal Rai Chowdhri concerning impediment to sale and its consequences. | The court observed that this case likewise does not support the broad proposition that an assertion of absolute right by the mortgagee dispenses with statutory tender; it does not establish cessation of interest absent a valid tender or deposit under the Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court conducted a step-by-step analysis strictly tied to statutory requirements and the evidence:
- Statutory standard for tender: The court emphasized Section 84 of the Transfer of Property Act as establishing the conditions for a valid tender — money must be produced and kept ready for payment in Court or otherwise. A mere expression of willingness to pay is insufficient to constitute a tender.
- Nature of Ex. 5a: The letter (Ex. 5a) from appellant 2 requested an account and expressed willingness to pay; the mortgagee's reply asserted an absolute right and refused to render an account but stated the amount claimed due. The court held these communications did not amount to a valid tender under Section 84.
- Dispensation argument rejected: The appellants’ argument that the mortgagee's assertion of absolute ownership dispensed with the requirement of tender was examined against precedent and statute. The court distinguished cases about reciprocal contracts (Dayabhai; Owners of the "Norway") as inapposite because those concern reciprocal promises and waiver in contract law, whereas the cessation of interest depends on the specific statutory regime in the Transfer of Property Act. The Privy Council decision (Harendra Lal Rai Chowdhri) was found to be only analogous and not authority for treating the mortgagee’s conduct in this case as a statutory tender.
- Evidence on the appellants' means and bona fides: The Subordinate Judge's factual findings — that appellant 1 did not have the amount required at his disposal on 17 January 1899 and that his testimony claiming cash in hand was disbelieved — were accepted. The court noted the lack of supporting account books, absence of negotiations or actual raising of funds, and the fact that defendant 8 later acquired properties for Rs. 2,40,000 while the debt due exceeded Rs. 3,00,000. These facts supported the conclusion that any offer (if Ex. Va were so construed) was not bona fide because the appellants lacked means then to pay.
- Consequent legal conclusion: Because there was no valid tender or deposit and because the Transfer of Property Act does not provide that interest ceases merely because a mortgagee asserts an absolute right, the court concluded interest did not cease to run from 17 January 1899.
- Costs and account items: The court agreed that defendants 3, 8 and 12 had conducted the defence in a vexatious manner and were properly made liable for costs, but held they should not be personally liable for stamp duty portion of the costs. On the dispute over establishment/recurring charges, the court accepted the Subordinate Judge's reasoning that the parties had fixed a lump sum figure for variable petty charges; the judge's allowance of Rs. 3,000 a year was sustained and the memorandum of objections (seeking adjustments) was allowed with costs to come out of the estate.
- Concurrence and emphasis on statutory tender: Oldfield, J. concurred, stressing the statutory foundation of Section 84 that a tender requires production and readiness to pay; appellants made neither a bona fide proposal nor any tender and therefore could not rely on Section 84.
- Fees for two vakils: The court considered the Rule permitting two vakils' fees in cases of special difficulty or importance. Although it did not regard the appeal as involving specially difficult legal questions, it accepted that the large amount in dispute (about seven lacs) justified allowing fees for two vakils; such fees would be taxed according to rules.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED.
Direct consequences and operative rulings:
- The court held that no valid tender was made on 17 January 1899 within the meaning of Section 84 of the Transfer of Property Act; therefore interest did not cease to run from that date.
- The appellants' argument that the mortgagee's assertion of an absolute right dispensed with the necessity of tender was rejected; earlier authorities relied upon do not support that broad proposition in the statutory context.
- The Subordinate Judge's finding that appellant 1 lacked the means to make a bona fide payment on the date in question was accepted.
- Defendants 3, 8 and 12 were correctly made liable for costs because of the vexatious conduct of the defence, but they should not be personally liable in respect of the stamp duty portion of the costs (that amount must be deducted from their personal liability).
- The memorandum of objections concerning establishment/recurring charges was allowed; the Subordinate Judge's allowance of Rs. 3,000 per year was upheld and costs relating to this memorandum are to come out of the estate.
- Respondent 3's memorandum of objections was dismissed because it was not pressed.
- Fees for two vakils were allowed for the respondent, to be taxed according to the rules, on the ground that the large amount in dispute justified engagement of two vakils.
Broader legal implication: The opinion confines itself to applying statutory requirements of the Transfer of Property Act and distinguishing contractual/reciprocal-waiver principles; it does not establish a new rule that an assertion of absolute ownership by a mortgagee dispenses with statutory tender. The decision's effect is limited to the parties and the circumstances presented.
Disposition: Appeal dismissed.
Abdur Rahim, J.:— This appeal is in a suit to enforce a usufructuary mortgage, and the question that is argued before us is as to whether there was a valid tender of the amount due on the mortgage on 17th January 1899 or whether the respondents dispensed with the necessity for such a tender. On either ground the claim is that interest ceased to run from the date mentioned. Mr. Narayanamurthi who has argued the case for the appellants before us conceded, and we think rightly, that what happened could not be stated to amount to a valid tender within the meaning of Section 84 of the Transfer of Property Act. The so called tender really depends on what appellant 2 wrote to the respondent on the date in question. That letter is Ex. 5a, and there he asked the mortgagee to give him an account of what was due to him and expressed his willingness to pay what was due to the mortgagee. In his reply the mortgagee stated that under the terms of Ex. A, the deed of mortgage, he had acquired an absolute right to the property and therefore he was not bound to render any account to the appellants and refused to do so. He did however mention what was the amount that had become due on his mortgage. That amount was Rs. 3,19,946. It is argued that would be the correct amount upon the terms of the mortgage, that is, calculating interest at the rates specified therein. This or any amount was never actually tendered by the appellants, nor was it sought to be deposited in Court. In fact, before the institution of the suit, no deposit or tender was made, and even now after decree, no portion of the amount due to the respondents has been paid. The mere expression of willingness on the part of a debtor to pay a debt cannot possibly amount to a tender within the meaning of the law. In fact, as we have said, Mr. Narayanamurthi did not contend so far. But he has strongly urged upon as that inasmuch as the respondent put forward the allegation that he had acquired an absolute right to the property and therefore the appellants were not entitled to redeem him, it must be taken in law to amount to a dispensation of tender.
2. On this point we have been referred to a number of Indian and English cases dealing with contracts for sale or other cases of reciprocal contracts; for instance, Dayabhai Dipchand v. Dullabhram Dayaram(1), Owners of the “Norway” v. Ashburner(2). But the principle laid down in those cases is that where there are reciprocal promises and one of the promises waives or dispenses with the performance of the promise made to him, he cannot afterwards put forward the non-performance of that promise as an answer to a suit for damages.
3. But as regards the question whether the interest on a debt ceases from the date of tender or deposit, that class of cases depends upon the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and upon a different principle. That Act lays down the conditions relating to a valid tender and valid deposit. It nowhere says that even if a valid tender has not been made, interest will cease to run if the mortgagee happens to set up a right to the property in himself. If the argument of the appellants were well founded, the position would be this:
In every case where the mortgagee in good faith, as in this case asserts that he has acquired an absolute right to the property, the mortgagor or the person who has purchased the equity of redemption, by reason of that fact alone, would be exempted from payment of interest, provided he has expressed his willingness to pay the debt. No authority whatever has been cited in support of such a proposition which, in our opinion, is altogether untenable. We have been referred to a Privy Council decision in Harendra Lal Rai Chowdhri v. Maharani Dasi(3). There what happened was that under the contract between the parties the mortgagee engaged to appraise the mortgaged property if there was any proper negotiation for the sale of that property and it was brought to his notice. There was in fact a bona fide offer to purchase the property which was brought to the notice of the mortgagee in that case and he was asked to say whether he would appraise the property and fix the value. He refused to do so and in consequence the mortgagor was unable to find a purchaser for the property and re-pay the mortgage amount. Their Lordships held that the mortgagee having rendered impossible the sale of the property by the mortgagor by which the latter would have been in the position to re-pay the debt the matter stood ‘as if it was a case of tender.’ Mr. Narayanamurthi has attempted to build an argument upon this phrase to the effect that their Lordships treated the case as one of a tender. But we do not think that there is any warrant for such an interpretation.
4. There was no case of tender there and the Judicial Committee merely cited the case of a tender only by way of analogy. The other case referred to Gopeswar Saha v. Jadab Chandra(4), stood apparently on the same footing and none of those cases support the broad proposition which has been contended for before us on behalf of the appellants. We therefore hold that what happened between the appellants and the respondents in 1899 did not have in law the effect of making interest cease to run from that date. The Subordinate Judge also finds upon the evidence that in fact appellant 1 had not the necessary amount at his disposal on the date of Ex. Va. He is no doubt a large landlord with an income of about Rs. 40,000 a year. But the evidence does not show that he had on the date in question, the amount which would be required to discharge the mortgage debt at his disposal. He was obliged to borrow even small sums of money and sometime after 1899 he got considerably involved in debt. He swore in the witness box that he had Rs. 1,50,000 in his chest. The Subordinate Judge has disbelieved that evidence and we think rightly. If he had anything like that amount with him at the time, his account books would have been the best evidence to show it. He must have kept accounts which he has withheld from Court, and it was not the case of defendant 8 the principal appellant before us that he had been negotiating to raise money, still less that he had actually raised money in that way. We therefore accept the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge that if Ex. Va would be construed as an offer to pay, it was not a bona fide offer in the sense that the appellants had the means of making the payment at the time. It may be pointed out that defendant 8 bought the bulk of the mortgaged properties for Rs. 2,40,000, while on 17th January 1899 the amount payable to the mortgagees was over Rs. 3,00,000. That also supports the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the so-called offer in Ex. Va, if offer it can be called at all, was really not bona fide for we are not prepared to hold that defendant 8 was able and willing to pay that amount on the date in question.
5. The 3rd point which has been raised before us relates to costs. The Subordinate Judge has given a personal decree against defendants 3, 8 and 12 for the entire costs. As regards the conduct of the suit we think that the Subordinate Judge was right in saying that the way in which the defence was conducted was vexatious. Defendants 3, 8 and 12 have been rightly made liable to pay the costs finally. But we do not think that they ought to be made personally liable for the costs relating to the stamp duty. So that amount must be deducted from the amount of costs for which defendants 3, 8 and 12 have been made personally liable. In other respects, the decree of the Subordinate Judge is confirmed. Respondent 1's memorandum of objections relates to the expenses of the establishment charges, repairs to canals, etc., expenses for the village headman, service Inams to village headman, and village duties and other similar expenses. The Subordinate Judge has allowed Rs. 3,000 a year for all these charges, which are amounts actually spent by the mortgagee. But the contention is that Rs. 4,000 is provided: for in a lump sum in the deed of mortgage, that being the amount which was settled with the mortgagee as payable on account of these charges. The clause in question says that it is agreed that after deducting for Government taxes so much and Rs. 4,000 on account of establishment charges, etc., and other payments mentioned therein, the mortgagors should take an account of the balance of the net income from the mortgagee's officials on 1st February of each year. The agreement is only to account for the balance and not with regard to any of the items mentioned in that clause. This view is suggested also by the clause at p. 7 of the document which says that, if in addition to the usual earthwork which may have to be executed, any extensive repairs have to be done in respect of river bunds, etc., in respect of these unusual expenses, the mortgagee is entitled to charge the actual amount paid in excess of the Rs. 4,000. There is no mention here as to the other items comprised in the Rs. 4,000, that is to say, it is not provided that, if for establishment, charges, the mortgagee has actually spent more than what was taken into account, he would be entitled to the excess. Nor is it anywhere provided that if anything less then Rs. 4,000 is spent the mortgages must account for the rest. It seems to us that with respect to these petty and recurring items of expenditure, which were of a variable character, both the parties agreed that they should be fixed at a certain figure. If all that they intended was that the actual expenses-incurred under these heads should alone be allowed to the mortgagee, there would have been no necessity to fix this figure at all. We must allow the memorandum of objections with costs to come out of the estate.
6. The respondent 3's memorandum of objections is not pressed and is dismissed.
Oldfield, J.:— I agree with my learned brother's judgment; but I prefer not to base my conclusion on any implication from the particular reason which plaintiff 1 gave in his letter, Ex. 5, for refusing to receive money from the defendant. The foundation of Section 84 of the Transfer of Property Act is that liability for interest on the amount due on the mortgage shall cease from the date of the tender, inasmuch as the person who has made the tender not merely has to produce money in order to make it, but must also keep it ready for payment in Court or otherwise. It is clear that no money could have been produced in this case and that none was kept ready for payment. There is, no doubt, a distinction to be drawn between the proposal to make a tender, such as we have in this case, and an actual tender; but there is no reason why a person who makes the former should be treated any better, than a person who makes the latter. In these circumstances, it seems to me that the appellants, who made no bona fide proposals and who, it is admitted, made no tender of any sort, cannot benefit by the principle of S. 84. On the other points, I entirely agree with my learned brother's judgment.
7. (This case coming on for hearing for orders this day, the Court made the following.)
8. In this appeal Mr. K. Srinivasa Ayyangar for the respondent has applied to us for fees for two vakils under the new R. 41 framed under the Legal Practitioners Act. This Rule empowers the Court in cases of special difficulty or importance to allow two sets of fees to a party who has engaged more than one Vakil. This case involved about seven lacs of rupees, but it did not strike, us that there was any specially difficult question involved in the appeal and in fact we did not call upon the learned vakil for the respondent to reply. It is, however, urged that the case is of special importance having regard to the amount involved. We are inclined to agree with that contention; for the respondent, in view of the fact that no less than seven lacs were concerned in the litigation, was justified in engaging two Vakils. We therefore, allow fees for two Vakils, which will be taxed according to the rules.
S.N/R.K
9. Appeal dismissed.
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