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Dr. Ajodhya Prasad v. Gangotri Prasad .
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff instituted a suit in the civil court seeking (a) a declaration that he was the sirdar of the land in dispute, (b) possession if found to be out of possession, (c) cancellation of a sale deed executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 in respect of the holding in dispute, and (d) an injunction. The defendants pleaded that the civil court had no jurisdiction and that the suit was cognizable by the revenue court. The trial court rejected that plea. An application for revision under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, who held that the suit was cognizable by the civil court. The defendants moved in revision to this Court. Because a learned single Judge had earlier decided in Ramdhari v. Jodhan (AIR 1973 All 81) that a suit claiming cancellation of a sale deed and injunction could be cognizable in the civil court, the revision was referred to a Bench. The Bench (Hari Swarup, J.) examined statutory provisions and precedents and allowed the revision: setting aside the orders of the courts below and directing the trial court to return the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation in the revenue court. Costs were imposed on the parties.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to try a suit which, although it claims relief for cancellation of a sale deed and injunction, principally arises from interference with sirdari rights and possession of agricultural land that is otherwise cognizable by the revenue court under Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.
- Whether, for the purpose of determining cognizance under Section 331, the relevant consideration is the cause of action or the relief claimed (with reference to the Explanation to Section 331).
- Whether a sale deed which is alleged to be void ab initio (e.g., transfer by a person who was not an heir under the statutory heirship rules) gives rise to a cause of action cognizable in the revenue court, or whether cancellation of the deed is a prerequisite for civil court jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
Argument that the civil court lacked jurisdiction
- The defence pleaded that the suit was cognizable by the revenue court and that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit (this is the jurisdictional stance taken in the defence as recorded in the opinion).
Argument that the civil court had jurisdiction
- It was urged by a learned counsel for the opposite party that because relief for cancellation of the sale deed and injunction was sought in the plaint, the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit even in respect of other reliefs.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramdhari v. Jodhan (AIR 1973 All 81) | The earlier single Judge's view that once relief of cancellation of a sale deed and injunction is claimed, the suit can be cognizable in the civil court. | The Bench concluded that the decision in Ramdhari overlooked the Explanation to Section 331 and "does not lay down the correct law." The Bench declined to follow it for the present matter. |
| Mewa v. Baldeo (AIR 1967 All 358; 1966 All LJ 1084) | Distinction between a document void ab initio (which need not be avoided and can be treated as ineffective) and a document which is merely voidable (which requires avoidance/cancellation before it ceases to be effective). | The Court expressed respectful agreement with Mewa's case and used its distinction to explain that if a document is void ab initio the revenue court can declare title/possessory relief; but where avoidance is necessary, the position is different. |
| Gorakh Nath Dube v. H.N. Singh ((1973) 2 SCC 535 : AIR 1973 SC 2451) | Distinction between documents wholly/partially invalid (which can be disregarded) and documents that must be set aside to lose legal effect; consolidation/revenue authorities' power to adjudicate rights and declare documents effective or ineffective, but lack of power to cancel a deed that must be set aside by a court. | The Court relied on this authority to show the proper analytical distinction and to support the view that where a document is void or inoperative the revenue/consolidation authorities can adjudicate the dispute; where cancellation is required, civil courts may be necessary. |
| Ram Nath… v. Smt. Munna…. (1976 Luck LJ 52, Full Bench) | Expressed a view similar to Gorakh Nath Dube regarding adjudication of rights and effect of documents in consolidation/revenue proceedings. | Used as supporting authority for the position that revenue authorities can adjudicate disputes about rights and the effectiveness of documents in certain circumstances. |
| Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Lal (1973 RD 365) | Consideration of Sections 209 and 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act showing that a civil court lacked jurisdiction where the suit was for permanent injunction and alternatively for possession. | The Court relied on this Supreme Court decision to hold that the civil court had no jurisdiction in analogous circumstances and that the suit in such cases should be dismissed or is otherwise not maintainable in civil court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by noting the general rule of jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure that civil courts have jurisdiction over suits of a civil nature unless expressly or impliedly barred. It then turned to Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of suits cognizable by the revenue court.
Central to the Court's analysis was the Explanation to Section 331: "If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may not be identical to that which the revenue court would have granted." The Court interpreted this to mean that for purposes of determining cognizance the relevant factor is the cause of action and not the relief claimed.
Applying that standard to the facts, the Court identified the cause of action as the alleged interference or threatened invasion of the plaintiff's rights over an agricultural holding — a cause of action that the revenue court could adjudicate by declaration and, if necessary, possession. Consequently, the mere inclusion of a prayer for cancellation of a sale deed and for an injunction in the plaint did not, by itself, transform the suit into one cognizable by the civil court.
The Court examined the contention that the sale deed itself initiated the cause of action. It explained the legal distinction — following Mewa v. Baldeo and Gorakh Nath Dube — between a document that is void ab initio (which creates no title and can be treated as ineffectual for all purposes) and a document that is voidable (which remains effective unless and until set aside). If a document is void ab initio, the revenue court can treat it as ineffective and grant declaratory or possessory relief without cancellation by a civil court. If the document is voidable and requires avoidance, then a civil court decree of cancellation may be necessary to render it ineffective.
On the specific facts alleged in the plaint, the plaintiff claimed to be the son of the deceased landholder and averred that the transfer deed had been executed by the widow. Relying on Section 171 (as stated in the opinion), the Court observed that a son was the preferential heir and the widow was not an heir in his presence; therefore any transfer by the widow would be void ab initio and would not require cancellation through a civil court decree. Determination of that factual question — whether the plaintiff was indeed the son and thereby excluded others from title — fell within the competence of the revenue court.
The Court also referred to Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Lal and the effect of Sections 209 and 331 to underscore that civil courts lacked jurisdiction where revenue authorities could provide effective relief in respect of the cause of action. The Court concluded that the learned single Judge's decision in Ramdhari v. Jodhan did not correctly apply the Explanation to Section 331 and therefore did not state the correct law for such cases.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court's final resolution was to allow the revision and hold that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in the present case because the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court under Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.
Immediate implications for the parties:
- The orders passed by the trial court and the Additional District Judge were set aside.
- The trial court was directed to return the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation in the revenue court.
- Costs were imposed on the parties.
Broader legal implications (as stated in the opinion): The Court expressly disagreed with the decision in Ramdhari v. Jodhan to the extent it suggested that claiming cancellation of a sale deed and injunction would automatically render a suit cognizable in the civil court; the present opinion emphasizes that the cause of action, not the relief claimed, determines whether the revenue court has cognizance under Section 331. The Court relied upon Supreme Court authority and a Full Bench decision to support this conclusion.
Hari Swarup, J.:— This revision has been referred to us by a learned single Judge as he felt some difficulty in view of the judgment of a learned single Judge in Ramdhari v. Jodhan (AIR 1973 All 81).
2. The plaintiff instituted a suit in the civil court for a relief of declaration that he was the sirdar of the land in dispute and for possession in case he was found to be out of possession. The plaintiff had also claimed relief for cancellation of a sale deed executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 in respect of the holding in dispute and for an injunction. A defence was taken to the effect that the civil court had no jurisdiction and the suit was cognizable by the revenue court. The trial court rejected the plea taken in defence and the revision filed under Section 115, C.P.C was dismissed by the Additional District Judge holding that the suit was cognizable by the civil court. The defendants have come up in revision to this Court and have urged that the civil court had no jurisdiction. As in Ramdhari's case (AIR 1973 All 81) (supra) a learned single Judge had taken the view that once the relief of cancellation of sale deed is claimed and injunction is prayed for, the suit can be cognizable in the civil court, this revision has been referred to us.
3. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:—
“The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.”
4. Section 331 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of suits cognizable by the Revenue Court. A suit for declaration of sirdari rights and for possession is maintainable in the Revenue Court. There is, however, no express bar in respect of suits for cancellation of sale deeds and injunctions. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the opposite party that because in the suit relief for injunction and cancellation of the sale deed was also sought, the civil court had the jurisdiction to try the suit even in respect of other reliefs. In this connection Explanation to Section 331 is relevant which runs as under:
“If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may not be indentical to that which the revenue court would have, granted.”
5. It makes clear that for purposes of cognizance of suit in the revenue court it is the cause of action and not the relief that is relevant. In Ramdhari's case (AIR 1973 All 81) (supra) learned single Judge had obviously overlooked the Explanation in Section 331 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. As the cause of action in the present case was the interference or threatened invasion to the rights of the plaintiff over an agricultural holding, the relief could be claimed against that cause of action in the revenue court and the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred? It was urged by the learned counsel for the opposite party that because the sale deed had to be cancelled, it must be deemed to have initiated the cause of action for the suit. In this respect it has to be remembered that an instrument can create a cause of action only if by itself creates a right and so long as that instrument is not avoided the title continues to be effective. This would be a case where the instrument is a voidable instrument. But in case the instrument referred to in the plaint is a void document, that is it creates no title ab initio it cannot give rise to a cause of action for claiming the relief of possession.
6. In Mewa v. Baldeo (AIR 1967 All 358) : (1966 All LJ 1084) it was held:
“It may be noted here that position would have been very different if the document which was sought to be cancelled was a document void ab initio, for instance, if it had been executed by the plaintiff while he was minor, then the document being completely void it would not have been necessary to avoid it and in that case he could, merely by proving that it was a void document, get a declaration of his title to the property or even possession without cancellation of the sale deed. It was possible for the revenue court in those circumstances to look into the sale deed was completely void and ineffectual to pass title to the transferee could have given a declaration or could have also decreed possession in favour of the plaintiff. But in case where avoidance of a document is necessary the position is different”.
7. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in Mewa's case.
8. In Gorakh Nath Dube v. H.N Singh ((1973) 2 SCC 535 : AIR 1973 SC 2451) it was held:
“We think that a distinction can be made between cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. An alienation made in excess of power to transfer would be to the extent of the excess of power, invalid. An adjudication on the effect of such a purported alienation would be necessarily implied in the decision of a dispute involving conflicting claims to rights or interests in land which are the subject matter of consolidation proceedings. The existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be declared by the consolidation authorities which would be deemed to be invested with jurisdiction, by the necessary implication of their statutory powers to adjudicate upon such rights and interests in land, to declare such documents effective or ineffective, but where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed, and, therefore it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it. In the case before us, the plaintiff's claim is that the sale of his half share by his uncle was invalid, inoperative, and void, such a claim could be adjudicated upon by consolidation courts.”
9. A similar view was expressed by Full Bench of this Court in Ram Nath… v. Smt. Munna…. (1976 Luck LJ 52).
10. In the present case the allegation of the plaintiff was that he was the son of the deceased landholder. The transfer deed had been executed by the widow of the landholder. Under Section 171 son was the preferential heir and in his presence widow was not an heir. Hence any transfer made by her would be void ab initio would not require cancellation through a decree by the civil court. What is to be decided in this case is the question of fact whether the plaintiff was the son of the landholder and excluded the defendants from getting title in the property.
11. In view of the Explanation to Section 331 even, if the relief for injunction was included in the plaint the suit would be cognizable by the revenue court because the revenue court could give an effective relief by way of declaration and, if necessary, by possession over the land in suit. In Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Lal (1973 RD 365) the suit had been filed for the relief of permanent injunction and in the alternative for possession. The suit was instituted in the civil court and decree was passed. Considering the effect of Sections 209 and 331 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the Supreme Court held that the civil court had no jurisdiction and the suit was liable to be dismissed. We, accordingly, hold that the case decided by the learned single Judge in Ramdhari v. Jodhan (AIR 1973 All 81) does not lay down the correct law.
12. In view of the law declared by the Supreme Court and the provisions we have considered, the civil court in the present case will have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In the result, the revision is allowed. The orders passed by the courts below are set aside and the trial court is directed to return the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation in the revenue court. Costs on the parties.
13. Revision allowed.
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