Kamlesh Sharma, J.:— This appeal under Section 100 C.P.C is directed against the decree and judgment dated 30th September, 1991 passed by the Additional District Judge, Kullu, District Kullu whereby the decree and judgment dated 22nd August, 1989 of the trial Court was affirmed, dismissing the suit of the appellant-plaintiff filed against the respondents defendants for possession of the suit property detailed in Para 2 of the plaint and, for brevity, referred to as “the suit property”

2. The brief facts, which are not in dispute, are that one Hirday Ram was the last male holder of the suit property. He had three wives, namely, Smt. Kubja, Smt. Pari and Smt. Uttamdassi. Smt. Kubja predeceased Hirday Ram leaving behind one daughter, namely, Smt. Tikami. The plaintiff Shakuntala Devi is the daughter of said Smt. Tikami. Hirday Ram had executed a Will dated 1.10.1938 whereby he had bequeathed certain lands and a house to his daughter Smt. Tikami and the suit property was given to his widows, namely, Smt. Pari and Smt. Uttamdassi, for the purposes of maintenance provided they lived in his house and remained chaste and did not squander away the property. It was further provided in the Will that after the death of the widows, the suit property would also go to his daughter Smt. Tikami, who would be its complete owner. A further wish was expressed by Hirday Ram in the Will that if the widows felt any difficulty in maintaining themselves from the suit property, it would be the obligation of his daughter Smt. Tikami to look after them. One of the widows, namely, Smt. Pari, had died in the year 1939 and her estate came to Smt. Uttamdassi who held it as limited owner. By sale deed dated 28.11.1958, Smt. Uttamdassi sold a part of the suit property, as mentioned in the plaint, to one Sandup son of Tashi Todar, the predecessor-in-interest of defendants No. 1 and 2. Vendor Sandup further mortgaged it to Smt. Uttamdassi. On 2.12.1958 Smt. Uttamdassi further gifted another part of the suit property, as mentioned in the plaint, to defendant No. 3 who further sold it to defendant No. 4. This gave cause of action to the plaintiff to file a suit in the Court of Senior Sub Judge, Kullu., which was decreed vide decree and judgment dated 12.7.1961, Ex. P-12 and Ex.P-13 by Sub Judge, Kullu, for a declaration that the alienations of part of the suit property made by Smt. Uttamdassi in favour of Sandup and defendant No. 3 will not affect her vested interest in the suit property after the death of Smt. Uttamdassi. The said decree and judgment was affirmed by the District Judge by his decree and judgment dated 25.1.1963, Ex.P-14 and Ex.P-15. Despite this, Smt. Uttamdassi again gifted another part of the suit property to defendant No. 5 on 24.5.1975 as detailed in the plaint. The plaintiff again filed suit No. 40 of 1976 challenging the said alienation but failed and her suit was dismissed by the Senior Sub Judge, Kullu vide decree dated 11.9.1978, Ex.P-17. In appeal, the District Judge, Mandi camp at Kullu, vide his decree and judgment dated 25.9.1979 Ex. P-18 and Ex.P-19, set aside the decree and judgment dated 11.9.1978 of the Senior Sub Judge, Kullu, and decreed the suit of the plaintiff against the defendants, Smt. Uttamdassi and Sandup, declaring the gift dated 24.5.1975 in favour of defendant No. 5 Sandup void ab-initio and not binding on the reversionary rights of the plaintiff. Thereafter;, Smt. Uttamdassi had died on 11.1.1987 and the plaintiff filed Civil Suit No. 147 of 1987 for possession of the suit property out of which the present appeal has arisen.

3. Defendants No. 1 and 2 resisted the suit by filing separate written statements and raised number of preliminary objections regarding limitation, there being no cause of action, estoppel etc. etc. On merits, they denied that Hirday Ram had three wives and one daughter Smt. Tikami and that he had executed Will dated 1.10.1938 in their favour. It was specifically averred that only Smt. Uttamdassi was his wife who had inherited the suit property of Hirday Ram as he had died issueless, as such, the alienation by Smt. Uttamdassi in their favour was perfectly legal. It was specifically denied that Smt. Tikami was the daughter of Hirday Ram. However, since the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 136 of 1959 was not executed by the plaintiff it had become infructuous and void.

4. Defendants No. 3 to 7 filed their separate written statement and challenged the competence of the plaintiff to file the suit it was specifically alleged that defendant No. 3 was the daughter of Smt. Lambi who was the daughter of Smt. Kubja, the predeceased wife of Hirday Ram. Therefore, in case the suit was decreed it would enure for the benefit of defendant No. 3 besides other reversioners. It was also averred that the plaintiff was bound by the tenancy created by Smt. Uttamdassi in favour of defendant No. 7, as such, the suit against him was not competent. It was further contended that Smt. Uttamdassi had rightly alienated a part of the suit property in favour of defendants No. 3 and 5, as such, further alienation by them is also valid. They have also pointed out that Smt. Uttamdassi had executed a valid Will dated 27.12.1986 in favour of defendant No. 5.

5. The plaintiff had filed replication reiterating the averments made in the plaint and denied the preliminary objections and the contrary allegations made in the written statements.

6. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:

1. Whether the suit is within limitation? OPP

2. Whether the plaintiff has no enforceable cause of action and right to sue? OPD

3. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by her act and conduct from filing this suit? OPD

4. Whether the suit is not maintainable without filing the proper site plan as alleged? OPD

5. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction? If so, what is its valuation for this purpose? Op Parties.

6. Whether the suit is bad for its multifariousness as alleged? OPD

7. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder and nonjoinder of the necessary parties? OPD

8. Whether the suit is not competent, as alleged in preliminary objection No. 1 of the written statement of the defendants No. 3 to 7? OPD

9. Whether the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants No. 6 and 7 was tenant of the portion of the suit land and have now become owners of the suit land? OPD (6 & 7)

10. Whether the plaintiff is owner of the suit land as alleged? OPP

11. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the suit land? OPP

12. Relief.

7. After the trial issues No. 9 to 11 were answered in the negative, Issues No. 2 and 8 in the affirmative and Issues No. 3 to 7 were not pressed. Resultantly, the suit was dismissed. It is held by the trial Court that by decrees and judgments, Exs. P-12, P-13, P-14 and P-15 as well as P-18 and P-19 finality has been attached to the interpretation of the Will dated 1.10.1938 of Hirday Ram that his wives, including Smt. Uttamdassi, were given the suit property as limited owners and after their death, the plaintiff was to succeed to the suit property as full owner. But applying the ratio of the judgment in Vaddeboyina Tulasmma v. Vaddeboyina Shesha Reddi (dead) by L.Rs, (1977) 3 SCC 99 : AIR 1977 S.C 1944, it was concluded that Smt. Uttamdassi who was in possession of the property in the year 1957 became its absolute owner under Sec. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter called “the Act”) and had every right to alienate the suit property by way of sale or gift or Will to defendants No. 1 to 5 with the result that the plaintiff had no enforceable cause of action and right to sue for possession as owner of the suit property, These findings have been affirmed by the District Judge in the impugned judgment. The District Judge has further held that decrees and judgments Ex. P-12 to P-15 and P-18 & P-19 did not operate as resjudicata inter se the parties as these were passed in earlier suits filed by the plaintiff as a presumptive reversioner and the present suit is for possession as owner.

8. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The interpretation of Will dated 1.10.1938 as given in the judgments Ex.P-12, Ex.P-14 and Ex.P-19 is not in dispute that the widows of Hirday Ram including Smt. Uttamdassi, were in possession of the suit property as limited owners in lieu of their pre-existing right of maintenance. The real dispute is that the said judgments and decrees had become final and conclusive between the parties whereby Smt. Uttamdassi was held as limited owner and alienations made by her by way of sale or Will or gift were declared not binding on the reversionary rights of the plaintiff. In other words, after the death of Smt. Uttamdassi, the plaintiff had a right to get back the possession of the suit property in exercise of her reversionary rights. But if in the meantime by declaration of law by the Supreme Court on Section 14(1) of the Act before her death, Smt. Uttamdassi became full owner, the plaintiff lost her reversionary rights to get the possession of the suit property despite the decrees and judgments Exs.P-12 to P-15 and P-18 and P-19 and these cannot operate as res judicata between the parties.

9. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs has also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mst. Karmi v. Amru, (1972) 4 SCC 86 : AIR 1971 Supreme Court 745,: which, according to him still holds the filed and has not been set aside in the later judgments of the Supreme Court. No doubt, in this case it is held by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court that a widow who succeeds to the properties of her deceased husband on the strength of a Will executed by the husband in her favour cannot claim any rights in the property other than those conferred by the Will as the life estate given to her under the Will cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of Sec. 14(1) of the Act and she is governed by Section 14(2) of the Act, yet, in a catena latter judgments, it has been consistently held that if a widow got the, property by virtue of her pre-existing right, including the right of maintenance, and was possessed of such property on the date of the commencement of the Act, she becomes full owner thereof by virtue of Sec. 14(1) of the Act and Sec. 14(2) of the Act is confined to cases where property was acquired by a Hindu woman without any pre-existing right for the first time under a gift, Will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe restricted estate in the property. It is correct that the judgment in Mst. Karmi's case (supra) has not specifically declared not to be good law but is is clear that it no longer holds the filed in view of the latter consistent view on Section 14 of the Act.

10. The leading judgment on Section 14 of the Act is in the case of Vaddeboyina Tulsamma (supra) wherein it has been held that Section 14(1) of the Act is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed by her at the date of the commencement of the Act or was subsequently acquired or possessed, she would become the full owner. It was held in para 4 that Section 14(2) was in the nature of a proviso and was an exception to Section 14(1) of the Act. Further observations of the learned Judges are:—

“…It excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of sub-section (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu Society, it must be construed strictly so as to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in sub-section (1). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob sub-section (1) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by sub-section (1). The language of sub-section (2) is apparently wide to include acquisition of property by a Hindu female under an instrument or a decree of order or award where the instrument, decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate for her in the property and this would apparently cover a case where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance and the instrument, decree, order of award, giving such property prescribes limited interest for her in the property. But that would virtually emasculate sub-section (1), for in that event, a large number of cases where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance under an instrument, order or award would be excluded from the operation of the beneficent provision enacted in sub-section (1), since in most of such cases, where property is allotted to the Hindu female prior to the enactment of the Act, there would be a provision in consonance with the old Sastric law then prevailing, prescribing limited interest in the property and where property is given to the Hindu female subsequent to the enactment of the Act it would be the easiest thing for the dominant male to provide that the Hindu female shall have only a restricted interest in the property and thus make a mockery of sub-section (1). The explanation to sub-section (1) which inlcudes within the scope of that sub-section property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would also be rendered meaningless, because there would hardly be a few cases where the instrument, decree, order or award giving property to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would not contain a provision prescribing restricted estate in the property. The social purpose of law would be frustrated and the reformist zeal underlying the statutory provision would be chilled. That surely could never have been the intention of the Legislature in enacting sub-section (2). It is an elementary rule of construction that no provision of a statute should be construed in isolation but it should be construed with reference to the context and in the light of other provisions of the statute so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to sub-section (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, Will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property…”

This view has been consistently followed in Gullapalli Krishna Das v. Vishumolakala Venkayya, (1970) 3 SCC 891 : AIR 1971 SC 361; Partap Singh v. Union of India, (1985) 4 SCC 197; Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai, (1987) 2 SCC 572; Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh, (1987) 3 SCC 674; Jaswant Kaur v. Major Harpal Singh., (1989) 3 SCC 572; Thota Sesharathamma v. Thota Manikayamma (dead) by LRs., (1991) 4 SCC 312 and Mangat Mal (dead) v. Punni Devi (Smt) (Dead), (1995) 6 SCC 88. (Please also see the judgment of this Court rendered in Rakha v. Bansi Lal, 1997 Sim L.C 336.

11. The meaning of the word ‘possessed’ occurring in sub-section 14(1) has been explained in Jagannathan Pillai's case (supra) as acquisition of a right or interest in the property or control over the property and not to actual physical possession or constructive possession of the property acquired by force without any legal right.

12. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to another judgment of the Supreme Court in Gumpha (Smt) v. Jaibai, (1994) 2 SCC 511, to urge that if the property is acquired by a female under a Will in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, it would be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 14 in view of Section 30 of the Act. This submission is fallacious as the learned Judges of the Supreme Court were dealing with a case in which the succession had opened in the year 1956 that is, after the coming into force of th Act, and the precise question for their determination was whether acquisition of property by way of Will by a female in lieu of her maintenance after 1956 creates a restricted estate and falls under subsection (2) of Sec. 14 or it becomes absolute as provided under sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. After considering the case law and the provisions of Sections 14 and 30 of the Act, the learned judges have observed:—

“… Apart from it a right of maintenance under a Will after 1956 would fall under sub-section (2) as even on ratio in Tulasamma it would be creation of right for the first time and not in recognition of pre-exisiting right. Even the expression in any manner whatsoever cannot be of any help for deciding the right and interest of a female Hindu acquired under a Will. The expression is no doubt very wide but its width cannot be extended to those acquisitions which are specifically dealt with by sub-section (2). Its operation has to be confined to such an acquisition which is not covered by sub-section (2) or any of the clauses of the explanation. It is true that the explanation is not exhaustive as is clear from the use of the word ‘includes’ but its ambit cannot be stretched so as to nullify the effect of sub-section (2). A reading of the two sub-sections together indicates that even though the law was revolutionized and a female Hindu was made an absolute owner in respect of any property acquired by her either before or after the date of enforcement of the Act, yet, the law did not intend to confer a higher and better right than what was enjoyed by a male Hindu. In Tulasamma case, it was held by this court that a female Hindu could acquire rights under section 14(1) only if she was possessed of the property and that possession was by some legal authority…… Consequently, if a female Hindu acquire possession after the enforcement of the Succession Act and that possession was traceable to an instrument or a document described in sub-section (2) then she could not get higher right than what is stipulated in the document itself. The purpose and the legislative intention which surfaces from a combined reading of the two sub-sections is that it attempts to remove the disability which was imposed by the customary Hindu Law on acquisition of rights by a female Hindu but it does not enlarge or enhance the rights which she gets under a Will giving her a limited estate under Section 30 of the Act.”

13. However, in a later judgment in C. Masilamani Mudaliar v. The Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Swaminathaswami Thirukoli, (1996) 8 SCC 525 : AIR 1996 SC 1697, a larger Division Bench of the Supreme Court has not approved the judgment in Gumpha's case (supra). It is held in Para 27:

“27. In Gumha's case (1994) 2 SCC 511 (supra) though the Will was executed in 1941 and the executor died in 1958 after the Act had come into force, the concept of limited right in lieu of maintenance was very much in the mind of the executor when Will was executed in 1941 but after the Act came into force, the Will became operative. The restrictive covenant would have enlarged it into an absolute estate; but unfortunately the Bench had put a restrictive interpretation which in our considered view does not appear to be sound in law.

14. The reasons for taking a different view are given in Paras 25 and 26 of the judgment, which are:—

“25. It is true that Section 30 of the Act and the relevant provisions of the Act relating to the execution of the Wills need to be given full effect and the, right to disposition of a Hindu male derives lull measure thereunder. But the right to equality removing handicaps and discrimination against a Hindu female by reason of operation of existing law should be in conformity with the right to equality enshrined in the Constitution and the personal law also needs to be in conformity with the Constitutional goal. Harmonious interpretation, therefore, is required to be adopted in giving effect to the relevant provisions consistent with the constitutional animation to remove gender based discrimination in matters of marriage, succession etc. Cognizant to these constitutional goals, Hindu Marriage Act, Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, Hindu Succession Act etc. have been brought on stature removing the impediments which stood in the way under the Sastric law. Explanation I to Section 14(1) gives wide amplitue to the acquisition of property in the widest terms. It is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. The only condition precedent is whether Hindu female has a pre-existing right under the personal law or any other law to hold the property or the right to property. Any instrument, document, device etc. under which Hindu female came to possess the property-movable or immovable-in recognition of her pre-existing right, though such instrument, document or device is worded with a restrictive estate, which received the colour of pre-existing restrictive estate, possession by a Hindu female, the operation of sub-section (1) of Section 14 read with Explanation, remove the fetters and the limited right blossoms into an absolute right. 26. As Held by this Court, if acquisition of the property attracts sub-section (1) of Section 14, sub-section (2) does not come into play. If the acquisition is for the first time, without any vestige of pre-existing right under the instrument, document or device etc. then sub-section (2) of Section 14 gets attracted. Subsection (2) being in the nature of an exception, it does not engulf and wipe out the operation of sub-section (1). sub-section (2) of Section 14 independently operates in its own sphere. The right to disposition of property by a Hindu under Section 30 is required to be understood in this perspective and if any attempt is made to put restriction upon the property possessed by a Hindu female under an instrument, document or device, though executed after the Act had come into force, it must be interpreted in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case and to construe whether Hindu female acquired or possessed the property in recognition of her preexisiting right or she gets the rights for the first time under the instrument without any vestige of pre-existing right. If the answer is in the positive, sub-section (1) of Section 14 gets attracted. Thus construed, both sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 will be given their full play without rendering either as otiose or aids as means of avoidance.”

15. One more submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the judgments and decrees Ex.P-12 to Ex.P-15 and Ex.P-18 and Ex.P-19, based upon the interpretation of Section 14 of the Act, as given in Mst. Karmi's case, are res judicate between the parties and contrary interpretation given in later judgments in Tulasamma's case and other cases will not make any difference. The learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee, AIR 1953 Sup. Court 65, wherein one of the Judges has observed that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as res judicate between the parties and a decision in a previous execution case that the matter was not within the competence of the executing Court even though erroneous is binding on the parties. In another judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mulamchand, AIR 1973 Madhya Pradesh 293, cited by the learned counsel for the appellants it is held that Article 141 of the Constitution does not confer any legislative power on the Supreme Court. It only interprets and declares the law as it exists but does not amend or enact any law. Subsequent decision in Supreme Court appeal is not an alteration in law affecting the operation of the L.P.A decision as res judicata. For making these observations, one of the considerations was that L.P.A decision could be supported by another later decision of the Supreme Court. One more judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Surjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 Punjab and Haryana 16, wherein it has been held that decision based on certain view of law by a Court having jurisdiction does not cease to be res judicata merely because the view of law on which it is based ceased to represent the correct law owing to a later decision of the High Court. These observations were made in the context of the facts of this case in which the Additional Director of Consolidation of Holdings suo motu took cognizance of the law later declared by the High Court and dismissed the petition under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation), Act, 1948 on the point of limitation, in violation of the directions of the High Court to decide if on merits.

16. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has not disputed that subsequent decision of the Supreme Court is not an alteration in law but only an interpretation and declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution but according to the learned counsel in view of subsequent interpretation and declaration by the Supreme Court, the decisions based on earlier contrary interpretation and declaration of law will not be res judicata between the parties. The learned counsel for the respondents Has referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613 : AIR 1971 S.C 2355 wherein after considering number earlier judgments of the Supreme Court and the High Courts it was observed in Para 9 of the judgment:

“…A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res-judicata. similarly, by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise.”

In Para 10:—

“It is true that in determining the application of the rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question of law, i.e, the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where he cause of action is the same, for the expression “the matter in issue” in Section 11 Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between the parties, i.e the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something whjch is illegal by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.”

(Emphasis supplied).

And in Para 11:—

“…If the decision in previous proceedings be regarded as conclusive it will assume the status of a special rule of law applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in derogation of the rule declared by the Legislature.”

17. In one more judgment of the Supreme Court in Jai Singh Jairam Tyagi v. Maman Chand Ratilal Agarwal, (1980) 3 SCC 162 : AIR 1980 S.C 1201 it is held that where the executing court had refused to exercise jurisdiction and to execute the decree on the ground that the decree was a nullity as the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, had no application to building in Cantonment areas, it cannot operate as res judicata when the said defect was removed by the Validating Act 22 of 1972.

18. The learned counsel for the respondents has also referred to a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman (1996) 6 SCC 424 : 1996 (4) INDIAN CIVIL CASES 787 (SC)], wherein it is held that when previous decision is found to be erroneous on its face, it does not operate as res judicata. It was observed that:

“…. The principle of estoppel or res judicata does not apply where to give effect to them would be to counter some statutory direction or prohibition. A statutory direction or prohibition cannot be overridden or defeated by a previous judgment between the parties. In view of the fact that land had already stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances, the question of divesting does not arise. After the vesting has taken place the question of lapse of notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 would not arise. Considered from this perspective, original direction itself was erroneous and the later direction with regard to delivery of possession of the land, in consequence, was not valid in law…”

19. Applying the ratio of these judgments to the facts of the present case, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the interpretation of Section 14 of the Act is a pure question of law and earlier decisions, Ex.P-12 to Ex.P and Ex.P-18 and Ex. P-19, based on interpretation and declaration of law by Supreme Court in Mst Karmi's case (supra) cannot operate as res judicata when a contrary interpretation and declaration is made by a later judgment of the Supreme Court in Tulasamma's case. No doubt, the Supreme Court does not have the legislative power under Article 141 of the Constitution of India to change and amend the law but, if by its later judgment, if gives a contrary interpretation and declaration of a provision of law, it will be considered the interpretation and declaration of said provision of law from the day it had come into operation in supersession of earlier interpretation and declaration, and the Courts are bound to determine the rights of the parties according to later declaration and interpretation. On the plea of res judicata, superseded interpretation and declaration of law cannot he applied for determining the rights of the parties in a subsequent investigation where the cause of action is also different. In the present case the judgments and decrees, Ex.P-12 to Ex.p-15 and Ex.P-18 and Ex.P-19 were given in the civil suit filed by the plaintiff as presumptive refersioner whereas the civil suit, out of which the present appeal has arisen, was filed by her for possession as owner. So far Ex.P-18 and Ex.P-19 are concerned, these were given after the interpretation and declaration of law by the Supreme Court in Tulasamma's case and other cases. As such, these were erroneous on law point and cannot operate as res judicata. The earlier judgments, Ex.P-12 to Ex.P-15 can also not operate as res judicata as these are based on interpretation and declaration of Section 14 of the Act as given in Mst. Karmi's case, which stood superseded by the later judgment in Tulasamma's case and other cases.

20. No other point is raised on behalf of the appellant. The result of the above discussion is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed and the impugned judgment and decree is affirmed. No order as to costs.

21. Appeal dismissed.