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Musammat Jagtaran Kuer v. Musammat Mundar Kuer

Patna High Court
Dec 15, 1933
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arose from a suit brought by a step-mother (the plaintiff / decree-holder) against her step-daughter for maintenance. The plaint claimed: a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to maintenance at Rs. 25 per month, Rs. 970 for arrears, and Rs. 25 for damages. The plaintiff proceeded in forma pauperis; apparently no valuation figure was set out in the plaint. The trial Court (a Munsif) heard the suit and entered a decree declaring the plaintiff entitled to maintenance (at Rs. 15 per month) and for arrears from the date of the suit. The defendant (appellant in this appeal) unsuccessfully appealed earlier (dismissed for want of prosecution because court-fee was not paid). When the decree was sought to be executed, the defendant raised objections under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, contending that the Munsif had no pecuniary jurisdiction because the suit should have been valued under section 7(2) of the Court-Fees Act (ten times the annual maintenance) and therefore fell outside the Munsif's jurisdiction. The Munsif upheld those objections and dismissed the execution proceedings. The decree-holder appealed to the District Judge, who reversed the Munsif on jurisdiction and allowed execution to proceed in part; the judgment-debtor then brought this second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act applies to this case (i.e., whether objections as to valuation may be entertained at the execution stage where no valuation figure was placed in a plaint presented in forma pauperis).
  2. Whether the absence of a stated valuation in the plaint amounted to "no valuation" (so that section 11 would not apply), or whether the suit was under-valued pursuant to section 7(2) of the Court-Fees Act such that it was beyond the Munsif's pecuniary jurisdiction.
  3. Whether a decree passed by a Court that allegedly lacked pecuniary jurisdiction (for want of proper valuation) is a nullity that may be impeached collaterally in execution proceedings.
  4. Whether a declaratory decree awarding future maintenance is capable of execution or whether a fresh suit is necessary to realise future maintenance (this question was raised but not finally decided by the appellate Court).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The defendant/appellant contended in execution proceedings under section 47, Civil Procedure Code, that the trial Munsif had no jurisdiction because the suit should have been valued under section 7(2) of the Court-Fees Act (ten times the annual maintenance), making the suit beyond the Munsif's pecuniary jurisdiction.
  • It was also argued (by the appellant's learned Advocate) that section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act did not apply. For that proposition reliance was placed on the case Gunga Sahai v. Sheo Lal (reported unofficially), which was said to limit section 11 to cases where valuation depended on the discretion of parties or the Court and to exclude cases where valuation was fixed by rules having the force of law.

Other Positions Raised in the Proceedings

  • The Munsif who heard the execution objection took the view that section 11 did not assist the decree-holder and concluded the Munsif lacked jurisdiction, dismissing the execution proceedings.
  • The decree-holder appealed to the District Judge, who reversed the Munsif on jurisdiction (holding the Munsif did have jurisdiction to try at least part of the claim, characterising the suit as one for arrears of maintenance for a certain period), and did not finally decide the question whether a decree for future maintenance is always incapable of execution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gunga Sahai v. Sheo Lal (unofficial report) Held (as relied upon by appellant) that section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act should be limited to cases where valuation depends on the discretion of parties or the Court and is not applicable where valuation is fixed by rules having the force of law. The Court rejected reliance on this case. The opinion records that the distinction drawn in Gunga Sahai is not supported by section 11's language and further notes that the case was overruled by a later decision (Sardar Khan v. Musammat Aisha Bibi).
Sardar Khan v. Musammat Aisha Bibi (Lahore High Court) Holds that the language of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is comprehensive and includes all cases of erroneous valuation; it does not draw a distinction between valuations fixed by law and those determined otherwise. The Court accepted and relied upon this authority to conclude that section 11 applies generally to cases of under-valuation or over-valuation, including the present circumstances, and therefore limits the ability to raise a valuation objection collaterally unless the conditions in section 11 are met.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Two judges delivered opinions (Wort, J. and Khaja Mohamad Noor, J.), each addressing the questions of valuation, jurisdiction and applicability of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.

Wort, J.:

  • He framed the appeal as depending on two contentions: (1) that no valuation had been placed on the suit, and (2) that section 11 did not apply.
  • He summarised the facts (suit for maintenance by step-mother, plaint in forma pauperis, claim of Rs.25/month, Rs.970 arrears, Rs.25 damages; appeal earlier dismissed for want of prosecution; execution challenged under section 47 CPC on jurisdictional grounds).
  • He analysed section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, which restricts appellate courts from entertaining valuation objections unless (a) objection was taken at or before the first hearing when issues were framed, or (b) the appellate court records reasons that the suit was over- or under-valued and that this prejudicially affected the disposal on merits.
  • He rejected the appellant's reliance on Gunga Sahai. He pointed out that Gunga Sahai had been overruled by the Lahore High Court in Sardar Khan, and quoted the latter's view that the language of section 11 is comprehensive and does not draw the proposed distinction.
  • He found, on the pleadings and the District Judge's own statements, that the suit was properly characterisable as a suit for declaration of right to maintenance together with arrears and thus should have been valued under sub-clause (ii) of section 7 of the Court-Fees Act (i.e., as maintenance valued at ten times the annual amount). Even though the plaint omitted a numeric valuation because it was in forma pauperis, the presentation of the plaint and the nature of the relief meant the suit was effectively under-valued for jurisdictional purposes.
  • Because no valuation objection had been taken at an early stage (in terms of section 11), the objection under section 47 in execution proceedings should have failed; the matter could not be re-opened collaterally after a final decree when section 11 conditions were not satisfied.

Khaja Mohamad Noor, J.:

  • He framed the primary question as whether the decree was a nullity because the Court that passed it lacked jurisdiction.
  • He agreed with Wort, J. that section 11 governs and limits valuation objections: although the general rule is that an apparent want of jurisdiction on the face of the record makes a decree void, section 11 is an exception—if under-valuation or over-valuation led a Court to proceed without objection, the matter is generally concluded except in the circumstances section 11 permits.
  • He rejected the Munsif's characterization that there was "no valuation" in the plaint. He reasoned that by presenting the plaint the plaintiff must be taken to have put some implicit valuation (even if not a numeric figure) that led the Munsif to assume jurisdiction; the Munsif's decision to proceed without objection meant the question of jurisdiction could not be re-opened collaterally at execution.
  • On the separate question whether a decree for future maintenance is capable of execution, he observed the decree itself was not before the appellate Court and the District Judge had left the question open. He declined to express a final opinion on that issue, noting that the answer depends on the nature and form of the decree and the relief granted.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The Court held that section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act applies to the circumstances of this case; the objection under section 47 CPC raised at execution for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction should have failed because the valuation objection was not taken at the appropriate earlier stage as required by section 11. The appeal is dismissed without costs.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the appellant's execution-stage objection that the Munsif lacked pecuniary jurisdiction (based on valuation) fails; the decree is not to be treated as a nullity on that ground in this collateral proceeding, and the execution proceedings should not have been dismissed for that reason.
  • Statutory application: the Court reaffirmed a broad application of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act (consistent with Sardar Khan v. Musammat Aisha Bibi), rejecting a narrow reading that would exclude cases where valuation is fixed by statute or rule.
  • On the executability of a decree for future maintenance: the Court did not decide the issue finally in this appeal because the decree was not placed before it; the judges expressly left open whether a decree for future maintenance is always incapable of execution, noting it depends on the decree's form and the relief granted.
  • No express novel precedent was fashioned by this opinion beyond affirming the applicability of section 11 as interpreted in the cited authorities and applying it to preclude a collateral valuation objection in execution proceedings where the conditions of section 11 were not satisfied.
Appeal dismissed.
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Wort, J.:— This appeal for its success would depend upon two considerations: one that in fact there had been no valuation placed on the suit the particulars of which I shall mention in a moment and the other is that section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act does not apply. In my judgment there is no support in this case to either of those contentions. The facts shortly were these: It was a suit brought by a step mother against her step-daughter for maintenance. The plaint was framed claiming a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to maintenance at the rate of Rs. 25 a month, also claiming Rs. 970 for arrears and Rs. 25 for damages. The action succeeded. There was an appeal which apparently was dismissed for want of prosecution, the reason being that the appellant, who was defendant in the trial Court, failed to pay the court-fee. The decree then came up for execution. The defendant raised an objection under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code based on the contention that the Munsif passing the decree had no jurisdiction. This depended in turn upon a contention that the suit was beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction.

The suit, as I have said, was for maintenance, and it was contended that the suit should have been valued under section 7, sub-clause (2), as a suit for maintenance and, therefore, to be valued at ten times the amount claimed to be payable for one year. One of the difficulties which arose in this case was that the suit in the first place was in forma pauperis and therefore no valuation, so we are informed, was stated in the plaint. The learned Munsif in dealing with this objection came to the conclusion that section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act did not apply. He came to the conclusion also that the valuation of the suit placed it beyond the jurisdiction of the Munsif who tried it and, therefore, he dismissed the execution proceedings.

section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act provides that an objection as to the valuation of the suit or appeal shall not be entertained by any appellate Court unless—

“(a) the objection was taken in the court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues were first framed and recorded, or in the lower appellate court in the memorandum of appeal to that court, or

(b) the appellate court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the suit or appeal was overvalued or under-valued, and that the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has pre-judicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits.

Now it is contended that if section 11 applies to this matter the appellant must fail. It was the contention of the learned Advocate on behalf of the appellant that section 11 did not apply and for that, proposition he relied upon a case which is reported in an unofficial report, being the case of Gunga Sahai v. Sheo Lal, which held that section 11 was limited to those cases in which the valuation depended on the discretion of the parties or the Court, and is not applicable to cases in which the valuation is fixed by rules having the force of law. In other words, where, on the face of the proceedings it would appear that the Court had no jurisdiction by reason of the valuation of the suit, then the provisions of section 11 as to taking objection at the first possible moment do not apply. In my judgment that distinction which would appear to be established by that case is not borne out by anything contained in section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act and indeed the very case upon which reliance is placed by the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant was overruled by the decision of the Lahore High Court in Sardar Khan v. Musammat Aisha Bibi. The learned Chief Justice there deals with the matter in a sentence which seems to me to conclude the matter. He states during the course of his judgment: “The language of the section is comprehensive enough to include all cases, of erroneous valuation and does not suggest any distinction between cases in which the valuation depends upon rules having the force of law and those in which the valuation is determined otherwise.” This, in my judgment, was a clear case of under-valuation. The suit being in forma pauperis the preliminary proceedings relating to the presentation of plaint, were different from those which would obtain in cases in which the plaintiff paid the court-fee. When the plaint was presented to the Court, the Court, we must assume, in the proper, exercise of its jurisdiction ascertained from the allegations contained in the plaint and the nature of the suit whether it had jurisdiction or not. In this case, in my judgment, having regard to the statements which appear in the judgment of the learned District Judge in the Court below it was quite clear that it was a suit for declaration as to the plaintiff's right to maintenance together with a claim for arrears and, therefore, it should have been valued under sub-clause (ii) of section 7 of the Court-Fees Act; and indeed in addition to that we must also assume, by inference at any rate, that the plaintiff herself valued the suit or placed a value upon her suit by presenting it to the Court of the Munsif. It makes no difference, in my judgment, that no figure was set out in the plaint which in that sense affects the valuation. To sum up this part of my observation, it seems to me quite clearly a case in which there has been under-valuation within the meaning of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. Now, as the objection was not taken at an early stage of the proceedings it seems to me that the objection under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code in execution proceedings should have failed. I wish particularly to point out that the opinion of the learned District Judge as to the character of the suit does not seem to be borne out by the statements which he has made with regard to the plaint. The case was clearly a case in which there was a claim for a declaration and, therefore, was a clear case of under-valuation, but the objection not having been taken in the trial Court should have failed when it came before the execution court.

For these reasons it seems to me that this appeal fails and must be dismissed but without costs.

Khaja Mohamad Noor, J.:— The question involved in this appeal is whether the decree under execution is a nullity having been passed by a Court which had no jurisdiction to do so. The suit was by the respondent for a declaration of her right to maintenance from a certain estate in possession of the appellant and also for arrears of maintenance for a certain period. The suit was brought in forma pauperis and it seems that by some inadvertence the value of the suit was not mentioned in the plaint. Under section 7, sub-clause (2), of the Court-Fees Act the proper value for such a suit is ten times the amount of the annual maintenance claimed by the plaintiff. As the plaintiff claimed a maintenance at Rs. 25 per month the value of the suit according to the express direction of law was Rs. 3,000. Then there was a prayer for a decree for maintenance at that rate which had fallen due up to the date of the suit. It is obvious that the suit was not entertainable by the Munsif, but nevertheless he proceeded with it. The plaintiff was duly declared a pauper and the suit went to trial. A decree declaring the plaintiff entitled to a maintenance of Rs. 15 per month and also to get maintenance at that rate from the date of the suit was passed. This decree is now sought to be executed by the respondent. She was met by two objections raised on behalf of the appellant. One was that the Munsif, who passed the decree, had no jurisdiction to do so as the value of the suit under the express direction of law was more than his pecuniary jurisdiction, and the second objection was that the decree was a declaratory one and incapable of execution. The plaintiff respondent was bound to have recourse to a fresh suit for the realisation of the amount declared payable to her by that decree. Both the objections were upheld by the learned Munsif. His attention was drawn to section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, but he held that section did not help the decree-holder, as it was not a question of undervaluation or overvaluation, no valuation having been mentioned in the plaint itself. The decree-holder preferred an appeal to the District Judge who reversed the decision of the learned Munsif. He has held that the suit was not for a declaration of the plaintiff's title to get a certain maintenance per month, but that it was only for arrears of maintenance for a certain period and the Munsif had jurisdiction to try the suit. He did not discuss the application of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. On the second point he seems to have left the question open, holding that the execution under consideration was for the amount of arrears of maintenance decreed by the Munsif. The judgment-debtor has preferred this second appeal.

As to the first point, I entirely agree with the judgment just delivered by my learned brother that the question is concluded by section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. No doubt it has been held that when the want of jurisdiction of the Court which passed a decree is apparent on the face of the record, the decree is a nullity and need not be set aside. But in my opinion section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is an exception to the general rule, that is to say, if there is under-valuation or over-valuation and in consequence of which a Court proceeded to try the suit without any objection being raised by the defendant, the matter is, except under certain circumstances, concluded even for the purpose of appeal. Much less the question can be re-opened in a collateral proceeding after the decree has been passed and has become final. The learned Advocate, however, contended and it seems to me to be the view taken by the learned Munsif that in this case there was neither under-valuation nor over-valuation, but that it was a case of no valuation. This contention cannot be upheld. When the plaintiff presented her plaint to the learned Munsif it must be taken that she put some valuation (though the exact figure cannot be said) which would make the suit cognizable by the Munsif, and we must take it that when the Munsif proceeded to try the suit he held that he had jurisdiction to proceed with the suit. He did so without any objection being raised by the defendant, the present appellant before us. In that view of the case it must be taken that the Munsif in effect decided that he had jurisdiction to try the suit. The matter cannot be re-opened at this stage. The decree is not a nullity on account of want of jurisdiction and the apellant's ground fails though for reasons other than those mentioned by the learned District Judge.

The second question, namely, whether the decree as it stands is capable of execution, though decided by the learned Munsif in favour of the judgment-debtor, has not been finally decided by the learned District Judge. The decree is not before us, and it was not produced even before the learned District Judge. It cannot be laid down that a decree for future maintenance is always incapable of execution and a fresh suit is necessary. That, would entirely depend upon the nature of the suit, the nature of the relief granted and the form of the decree. The decree not being before us and the question apparently having been left open by the learned District Judge the matter was not argued before us in detail and do not wish to express any opinion on that part of the case.

In the result I agree with the order which my learned brother has passed in this case.

Appeal dismissed.