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Bishun Persad Narain Singh And Another v. Phulman Singh And Others
Legal Opinion Summary — Mookerjee, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiffs, wealthy landlords in Champaran, sued for damages for malicious prosecution. The suit had not been tried on the merits: after examination of the Plaintiffs' first witness the Subordinate Judge halted further fact investigation and heard a preliminary objection that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action and that the suit was not tenable. The Subordinate Judge decided that objection against the Plaintiffs and dismissed the suit.
The factual allegations (which the appellate court assumes to be true for present purposes) are that a former employee of the Plaintiffs (the first Defendant), dismissed for misconduct, filed a petition on 9 July 1910 before the Magistrate-in-charge of Motihari under section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code alleging that the Plaintiffs had ordered their servants to beat and prevent the complainant from going to Motihari, and praying for security/recognizance to be taken.
The Magistrate recorded an order referring the matter to a Deputy Magistrate (Babu N.G. Basak) "for enquiry and report by 19th July." The Deputy Magistrate issued notices (14 July) and conducted hearings at which witnesses for both sides were examined (dates in July 1910 are detailed in the record). The Government Pleader appeared for the complainant. The Deputy Magistrate submitted his report on 28 July; the Magistrate-in-charge considered the report and on 2 August 1910 concluded that even a prima facie case had not been made out, criticized the complainant's credibility, and declined to proceed further. The Magistrate directed that the application be filed.
The Plaintiffs instituted a suit for malicious prosecution on 4 April 1911. On appeal from the dismissal by the Subordinate Judge, the appellate court was asked to determine whether the Plaintiffs had any cause of action.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an application to a Magistrate to take proceedings under section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code can amount to a "prosecution" actionable in a suit for malicious prosecution.
- If such an application can be a "prosecution," whether a prosecution was in fact commenced where no formal process (e.g., criminal process or indictment) was issued by the Magistrate.
- Whether, assuming a prosecution was commenced, the prosecution was actionable where the Plaintiffs allegedly did not suffer damage as a result.
- Whether the Plaintiffs could pursue a claim for damages for defamation in the present suit (raised by the Appellants but handled procedurally by the court).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The Plaintiffs (Appellants) contended that the complaint made by the former employee and the subsequent proceedings before the Magistrate and Deputy Magistrate amounted to a prosecution for the purposes of malicious prosecution, and therefore a cause of action existed.
- The Plaintiffs asserted that the proceedings caused them pecuniary and other loss, making the prosecution actionable — an issue of fact to be tried.
- They also sought to recover damages for defamation, though that claim was not pressed through the issues in the trial court.
Respondent's Arguments
- First: An application to the Magistrate to take proceedings under section 107 CrPC is not a "prosecution" and therefore cannot ground an action for malicious prosecution.
- Second: Even if such an application could be a "prosecution," no prosecution was commenced in the present case because the Magistrate did not issue process against the Plaintiffs.
- Third: Even if a prosecution had commenced, it was not actionable because the Plaintiffs did not in fact suffer damage as a result of the proceedings.
- Respondent also urged (in support of the second point) authorities said to show that prior inquiry or referral to police/administrative enquiries without issuance of process will not constitute commencement of a prosecution.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kandasami v. Subramania | Held (as relied on by Respondent) that to sustain malicious prosecution action there must have been a prosecution of the Plaintiffs for an offence. | The court distinguished and declined to accept the narrow proposition as applied by the Respondent, noting the case did not show injury in that report and was distinguishable on facts. |
| Growdy v. O'Reilly | Cited for the proposition that "prosecution" should not be narrowly read and that proceedings to compel someone to furnish surety to keep the peace may ground malicious prosecution. | The court adhered to this view and relied on it to hold that the section 107 application could amount to a prosecution actionable in malicious prosecution. |
| Hopcroft v. Emperor | Used to show that an order under section 107 may ultimately lead to detention under section 123. | The court noted this to underline the seriousness of proceedings under section 107 and to support the finding that the defendant's actions could amount to a prosecution. |
| Meeran v. Ratnavelu | Held (as relied on by Respondent) that prosecution commences with issue of process and prior preliminary proceedings were at most an attempt by complainant to prosecute. | The court rejected Meeran's reasoning: it disagreed with the conclusion that a complainant could escape liability because court procedure was "unauthorized" and held that setting criminal machinery in motion maliciously renders the complainant responsible. |
| De Rozario v. Gulab | Referenced among authorities said to support the view that sending matter to police and absence of process means prosecution not commenced. | The court found this case distinguishable on facts: unlike that case, in the present matter notice was issued, evidence taken, and the Government Pleader appeared, placing Plaintiffs in a different position. |
| Golap v. Bholanath | Referenced with De Rozario as an authority on commencement of prosecution where no process issued. | The court treated it as distinguishable on facts and observed that some dicta in that judgment tended to support Respondent but rejected the broader proposition urged by Respondent. |
| De Rozario v. Golapchand | Held (per Fletcher, J.) that where a matter was sent to Police and no process issued by Magistrate, prosecution was not commenced. | The court distinguished the present facts from that case and declined to accept Fletcher, J.'s reasoning as determinative for the present matter. |
| Golap Jan v. Bholanath | Contains observation quoted that if there is a prosecution commencement is the laying of complaint, but not necessarily if prosecution falls through. | The court rejected the view that commencement depends on outcome, holding commencement is independent of result and occurs when the complaint is made. |
| Parli v. Reed | Cited for authority that a void process procured through malice and without probable cause is reproachable and can support liability. | The court relied on the reasoning to counter the argument that defective or unauthorised court procedure should absolve the complainant from responsibility. |
| Potter v. Gjertsen | Authority that a complainant who procures process to issue is responsible for consequences even if facts do not justify it. | The court cited it to support the proposition that malicious initiation of criminal procedure makes the complainant liable. |
| Pippet v. Hearn | Observation that whether indictment is good or bad, the plaintiff suffers same disgrace and expense in defending himself. | Used to buttress the court's rejection of Meeran's approach and to support accountability for initiating proceedings. |
| Clarke v. Postan | Recognised (by Bosanquet, J.) that there is a prosecution if a charge is made to a Magistrate with a view to induce him to entertain it; prosecution can commence on the laying of information. | The court cited Clarke v. Postan to support the view that prosecution commences when the complaint/information is laid before a judicial officer. |
| Yates v. Queen | Held in context of criminal information under a statute that the commencement of prosecution by criminal information is the filing/exhibiting of the information; discussed in relation to when a prosecution commences. | The court observed that Yates v. Queen addressed a different point and did not materially assist the present question, and treated some of its passages as dicta for present purposes. |
| Gregory v. Darby | Referred to in discussion of authorities that question precise commencement of prosecution. | The court noted it was not binding and was of limited assistance; used only in weighing conflicting authorities. |
| Rex v. Willace | Held that information before Magistrate was the commencement of prosecution (authority supporting Appellants). | The court cited Rex v. Willace as supporting the proposition that prosecution commences on the laying of the information before a Magistrate. |
| Thorpe v. Priestnall | Supports the view that prosecution commences when information is laid (consistent with Rex v. Willace). | The court relied on Thorpe v. Priestnall to reinforce the position that the complaint itself marks commencement of prosecution. |
| Reg v. Brooks | Referred to as supporting the same proposition as Rex v. Willace about commencement. | The court cited it as consistent authority for commencement upon complaint or information being laid. |
| Dawson v. Vansandau | Consistent with Clarke v. Postan on commencement of prosecution where charge is made to a magistrate. | Referenced as consistent authority for the court's view on when prosecution begins. |
| Ahmed Bhai v. Framjee | Contains rule that a prosecution commences when a complaint is made. | The court described this rule as reasonable and adopted it in its analysis of commencement. |
| Crowdy v. O'Reilly | Held that there may be a prosecution even though no action at all has been taken against the accused (supports broader meaning of "prosecution"). | The court adhered to Crowdy's view and used it to conclude there was a prosecution from 9 July 1910 until 2 August 1910 in the present case. |
| Clarke v. Postan (repeated reference) | See above — again cited in discussion of commencement. | The court reiterated Clarke v. Postan as consistent with holding that complaint or information may mark commencement. |
| Laws of England, Ed. Halsbury (Vol. XIX, Article 1433) | Used as an authoritative definition: a prosecution exists where a criminal charge is made before a judicial officer and those making such charge are deemed prosecutors. | The court referred to this exposition to support its general definition of "prosecution" for malicious prosecution purposes. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court set out to determine whether, assuming the Plaintiffs' allegations true, they had a cause of action in malicious prosecution. The court proceeded by addressing the three principal contentions advanced by the Respondent in support of the dismissal:
-
Whether an application under section 107 CrPC is a "prosecution":
The court rejected the Respondent's narrow view. It adhered to the principle in Crowdy (Growdy) v. O'Reilly that the term "prosecution" should not be confined to proceedings under the criminal code charging an offence. Proceedings initiated to compel a person to furnish surety (under section 107) can lead to detention under section 123 and involve the laying of facts before a magistrate which, if true, could render a person liable for criminal offences such as wrongful restraint and intimidation. Accordingly, the court concluded the defendant's actions amounted to a prosecution for malicious prosecution purposes.
-
Whether a prosecution was commenced absent the issuance of formal process:
The court examined authorities relied upon by the Respondent (notably Meeran v. Ratnavelu and decisions holding that where matters were merely sent for police inquiry and no process was issued prosecution had not commenced). The court rejected the reasoning that a complainant escapes responsibility because court procedure was unauthorized or because process did not issue. It reasoned that a malicious person who sets the criminal machinery in motion is responsible for consequences even if court action is defective. The court surveyed conflicting authorities (Clarke v. Postan, Rex v. Willace, Thorpe v. Priestnall, Dawson v. Vansandau, Ahmed Bhai v. Framjee, Yates v. Queen, and others) and found the better view to be that prosecution commences when a criminal charge is made before a judicial officer — i.e., when the complaint/information is laid — irrespective of later outcome or the stage at which the matter falls through.
Applying this to the facts, the court observed that in this case the Plaintiffs had been given notice by the Deputy Magistrate, had appeared and produced evidence, and the Government Pleader had appeared for the complainant. The Plaintiffs had been drawn into the enquiry and could not be said to have suffered no consequences. The court therefore concluded there was a prosecution from 9 July 1910 (when the complaint was made) until 2 August 1910 (when the Magistrate declined to proceed).
-
Whether the prosecution was actionable (i.e., whether Plaintiffs suffered damage):
The court treated this as a question of fact. It noted that Kandasami v. Subramania (as relied upon by Respondent) did not show the plaintiff there had been injury. In the present case, the Plaintiffs alleged pecuniary and other losses from the proceedings. The court held that the question of damage required investigation at trial and could not be disposed of summarily on the pleadings and the limited record before the Subordinate Judge.
On the separate point of defamation, the court noted the Plaintiffs' claim for defamation was not included in the settled issues and that no attempt had been made, during the more than ten months before trial, to amend the issues. Consequently, the Subordinate Judge properly refused to entertain a defamation claim raised for the first time during trial argument.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed. The decree of the Subordinate Judge is discharged, and the case is remanded to the Subordinate Judge for trial on the merits as a suit for damages for malicious prosecution.
Implications and Consequences:
- The Plaintiffs will proceed to trial on the merits on their malicious prosecution claim; the question whether they suffered actionable damage will be a factual issue for trial.
- The Plaintiffs are awarded their costs in this Court and a hearing fee in the Court below assessed at ten gold mohurs.
- Under section 13 of the Court Fees Act, the amount of the Court-fee paid by the Plaintiffs on the Memorandum of Appeal to this Court is to be refunded to them.
- The court declined to entertain the defamation claim for procedural reasons (it was not included in the issues and was not amended), so that aspect remains refused in the lower court on procedural grounds.
- The opinion resolves the discrete dispute between the parties and sends the case for trial; it frames and adopts legal principles on when a "prosecution" commences for malicious prosecution purposes but the decision itself is applied to the facts before the court. The opinion does not purport to set a novel general rule beyond its analysis and application of existing authorities.
Additional note: Beachcroft, J. concurred — the panel allowed the appeal.
Mookerjee, J.:— This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs in a suit for damages for malicious prosecution. The suit has not been tried on the merits. After the first witness for the Plaintiffs had been examined, the Subordinate Judge stopped the investigation of the facts and heard arguments on the preliminary objection that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action and that the suit as laid was not tenable. He decided this point against the Plaintiffs and dismissed the suit. On the present appeal the question for consideration, consequently, is, whether the Plaintiffs have any cause of action, and for this purpose we must assume that the allegations of the Plaintiffs are well founded in fact.
According to the Plaintiffs, who are wealthy landlords in the district of Champaran, the first Defendant, who was formerly in their employ and had been dismissed for misconduct, preferred a complaint against them before the Magistrate-in-charge of Motihari on the 9th July 1910. In this petition, he stated that the Plaintiffs had ordered their servants to surround and beat the complainant on the 6th July 1910 and not to allow him to go to Motihari. He prayed that security and recognizance bond might be taken from them, as otherwise his life and property would be in danger. The Magistrate examined the complainant on oath, who gave details of the incidents mentioned in his petition, and stated additional facts in support thereof. He prayed finally that proceedings under sec. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code might be taken against the present Plaintiffs and their servants. The Magistrate, thereupon, recorded an order in the order-sheet in the following terms: “To Babu N.G Basak for enquiry and report by 19th July”. The Deputy Magistrate, to whom the matter was made over for enquiry and report, issued notice to the parties on the 14th July 1910, to be ready with their evidence at the Madhuban Police-station on the 17th July. On the date fixed, he examined nine witnesses for the first party complainant and ordered that those witnesses be cross-examined and the witnesses for the second party examined and cross-examined at the Motihari Court on the 21st July. The order-sheet, with these orders recorded thereon by the Deputy Magistrate, was put up before the Magistrate-in-charge on the 19th July (the date fixed for the submission of the report); the latter officer recorded the following order thereon: “Put up on 24th July 1910.” On the 21st July five witnesses for the first party were examined and seven were cross-examined; at the same time, the 23rd July was fixed for the examination of the witnesses of the second party. On that date, the examination of the witnesses was completed. The Government Pleader appeared on behalf of the Petitioner, and as he prayed for time to be ready for the argument, the 26th July was fixed for the next hearing. The arguments were heard on that date, and on the 28th July the Deputy Magistrate submitted his report. The report is not on the present record, but we find that the Magistrate-in-charge considered it on the 2nd August 1910 and passed his orders. He expressed the opinion that the Deputy Magistrate had held a fuller enquiry than he had intended; his intention had been that the enquiry should be of an executive rather than of a judicial nature. It may be observed parenthetically that the order recorded by the Magistrate-in-charge, when he sent the matter for enquiry and report to the Deputy Magistrate, gives no indication of such intention, and on the 19th July, when the order-sheet was placed before him, with the orders recorded thereon by the Deputy Magistrate for the examination of witnesses of both parties, he did not instruct the Deputy Magistrate to make his enquiry of a summary character. However that may be, on the 2nd August, the Magistrate accepted the report and came to the conclusion that even a primâ, facie case had not been made out. He added that the Petitioner, on his own showing, was an unfaithful and treacherous servant and a thoroughly unprincipled man, whose statements required very strong corroboration, and that he had made a number of misstatements and an intentional concealment of material facts. In this view, the Magistrate declined to proceed further on the application and directed that it be filed. On the 4th April 1911, the Plaintiffs instituted the present suit for damages for malicious prosecution, on the allegation that the charges brought against them by the first Defendant in his petition and his statement before the Magistrate, on the 9th July 1910, were false, and had been made maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. The Subordinate Judge has held that the action does not lie, as there was no prosecution of the Plaintiffs by the Defendant. We are clearly of opinion that this view cannot possibly be supported. On behalf of the Respondent, a strenuous endeavour has been made to support the decree of the Subordinate Judge from three points of view, namely, first, that an application to the Magistrate to take proceedings under sec. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not a “prosecution”; secondly, that if it be assumed to be a “prosecution,” no prosecution was commenced, as no process was issued by the Magistrate against the Plaintiffs, and thirdly, that if it be assumed that a prosecution was commenced, it was not actionable, as the Plaintiffs did not suffer any damage therefrom.
In support of the first contention that an application to a Magistrate to take proceedings under sec. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not a prosecution, reliance has been placed upon the decision in Kandasami v. Subramania where it was ruled that to sustain an action for damages for malicious prosecution, there must have been a prosecution by the Defendants, of the Plaintiffs for an offence. We are not prepared to accept this view. We adhere to the opinion expressed in Growdy v. O'Reilly that the term “prosecution” should not be interpreted in the restricted sense in which it is used in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that a proceeding maliciously taken against a person to compel him to furnish surety to keep the peace may be made the foundation of a suit for damages for malicious prosecution. It is worthy of note that the Defendant invited the Magistrate to take action under sec. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and an order under that section may ultimately lead to the detention of the person, called upon to furnish security, under the circumstances mentioned in sec. 123 [Hopcroft v. Emperor(3)]. It is further clear that the Defendant stated facts to the Magistrate, which, if true, rendered the Plaintiffs liable to prosecution for wrongful restraint and criminal intimidation. We feel no doubt whatever that the action taken by the Defendant amounted to prosecution of the Plaintiffs, so as to entitle them to claim damages in an action for malicious prosecution. The first ground assigned by the Respondent in support of the view of the Subordinate Judge, consequently, fails.
In support of the second contention, that no prosecution was commenced against the Plaintiffs, because process was not issued against them by the Magistrate, reference has been made to the decisions in Meeran v. Ratnavelu, De Rozario v. Gulab and Golap v. Bholanath. The first of these cases, Meeran v. Ratnavelu, supports the contention of the Respondent, but we are not prepared to accept it as well-founded on principle. In that case on receipt of a complanit the Magistrate issued only a notice to the accused that a preliminary enquiry would be held at a certain time in the matter of the complaint. The accused was represented by counsel at the preliminary enquiry, and the complaint was ultimately dismissed under sec. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The accused then brought a suit for damages for malicious prosecution. Bakewell, J., held that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was not authorised by the Code, and could not therefore be attributed to the Defendant so as to render him responsible for any damage caused thereby to the Plaintiff. He also added that the prosecution of an accused commences with the issue of process after the complaint has been entertained by the Magistrate, and the prior proceedings constitute at most an attempt by the complainant to prosecute the accused. We are not prepared to agree with either of the reasons assigned in support of the conclusion that a suit for damages for malicious prosecution was not maintainable. As regards the first reason, it is plain that if a person, maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, sets the machinery of the criminal law in motion, he is responsible for the consequences and cannot escape liability on the ground that the action taken by the Court was such as he did not intend or was erroneous in law. As was said in Parli v. Reed(7), where this precise question was raised, a void process, procured through malice, and without probable cause, is even more reprehensible, if possible, than a lawful process on a complaint which charges a criminal offence. Similarly, it was ruled in Potter v. Gjertsen(8), that if the complainant procures the process to issue, he ought to be responsible for all the consequences, even though the facts stated in his complaint do not justify it. In Pippet v. Hearn(9), the Court observed: “Whether the indictment be good or bad, the Plaintiff is equally subjected to the disgrace of it and put to the same expense in defending himself against it.” As regards the second reason, it is equally plain that with a view to determine whether a suit for damages for malicious prosecution lay, the prosecution commenced as soon as the complaint was made to the Magistrate. The prosecution might be infructuous, if, for instance, no notice was served upon the accused. In such a contingency, the action for damages for malicious prosecution would fail, not because there was no prosecution commenced, but because there was no damage done to the Plaintiff. Reliance has also been placed upon the decisions in De Rozario v. Golapchand, and Golap Jan v. Bholanath. These cases are clearly distinguishable. In the former case, a complaint was lodged before the Magistrate, who sent the case to the Police for enquiry and report. The complainant informed the Police Inspector that he would not proceed with the case. The complaint was subsequently dismissed by the Magistrate. A fresh complaint was made through another person and was also dismissed. Fletcher, J., held that as the matter was sent to the Police for enquiry and report and no process was issued by the Magistrate, the prosecution was not commenced. In the present case, notice was issued upon the Plaintiffs by the Deputy Magistrate, evidence was taken on Both sides and the Government Pleader appeared in support of the application by the complainant. Obviously the Plaintiffs in the case before us were in a very different position in the Criminal Court from that occupied by the Plaintiff in De Rozario v. Golapchand. The case of Golap Jan v. Bholanath also is distinguishable on the facts. But it must be conceded that there are observations in both the judgments, which lend to support the contention of the Respondent. In Golapjun v. Bholanath, Woodroffe, J., is reported to have observed as follows:— “If there is a prosecution, the commencement is the laying of the complaint, but it does not follow that would be the commencement, if the prosecution falls through.” With all respect, we are unable to accept the view indicated therein. Surely, the point of commencement of a prosecution is independent of the result of the prosecution. The prosecution—that act of the prosecutor which renders him liable to be cast in damages, if malicious and not based on reasonable and probable cause—commences when the prosecutor has taken the initial step, namely, has made his complaint to the Magistrate. The prosecution may fail at one or other of various stages, but that cannot affect the time of commencement of the prosecution. The action of damages for malicious prosecution is not a creature of any statute and it is rather wide of the mark to investigate the precise meaning of the expression “prosecution” in the Criminal Procedure Code, or the exact point of time, when a prosecution may be said to commence within the meaning of that Code. A prosecution exists where a criminal charge is made before a judicial officer or tribunal, and any person, who makes or is actively instrumental in the making or prosecuting of such a charge, is deemed to prosecute it, and is called the prosecutor; thus, a person, who lays before a Magistrate an information stating that he suspects and has good reason to suspect another or who prefers a bill against him before a grand jury, is engaged in a prosecution (Laws of England, Ed. Halsbury, Vol. XIX, Article 1433). From this point of view, the rule recognised in Ahmed Bhai v. Framjee, namely, that a prosecution commences when a complaint is made, is reasonable. Fletcher, J., refused to accept this view, because it is based on Clarke v. Postan which, according to him, has been questioned in Yates v. Queen and is supported possibly by a dictum in Gregory v. Darby(13). Neither of these cases is binding as an authority in this Court, and they are of value, only in so far as they give reasons for the respective views. Bosanquet, J., ruled in Clarke v. Postan that there is a prosecution, if a charge is made to the Magistrate with a view to induce him to entertain it; it is not necessary to show that it was taken down in writing and acted upon by the Magistrate. In Yates v. Queen the question arose under sec. 3 of the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881, which enacts that no criminal prosecution shall be commenced against any proprietor, publisher or editor for any libel published in his newspaper, without the written fiat or allowance of the Director of Public Prosecutions in England or Her Majesty's Attorney-General in Ireland being first had and obtained. The Court of Appeal held that the commencement of a prosecution by a criminal information is the filing or exhibiting the information, and, that, therefore, the fiat of the Director of Public Prosecutions need not be obtained until the moment before that has been done. Cotton, L.J, considered the question, which, he said, was material, though not essentially necessary, to determine, namely, when can a criminal prosecution be said to be commenced when it is by way of criminal information. On behalf of the Plaintiff in error, it was said that the first application for the rule nisi is such commencement. Cotton, L.J, observed that the application to the Court was merely to direct a criminal information to be exhibited, and many things might have to be done before a prosecution could be instituted, as, for instance, the allowance of the Director of Prosecutions must be obtained. Reference was made to the decision in Clarke v. Postan on which reliance had been placed to show that prosecution by means of proceedings before a Magistrate commenced when the information was first laid before him. It was pointed out that, in that case not only had an information been filed, but the Plaintiff had been summoned before a Magistrate to answer a charge made against her, so that it was not laying an information or making a charge, but the summons before the Magistrate which ought to be considered the commencement of the prosecution. The conclusion, if one may say so without disrespect, does not follow from the premises. It is plain, however, that the actual point required for decision in Yates v. Queen is of no assistance in the determination of the question raised before us. On the other hand, the case of Rex v. Willace(14) clearly assists the contention of the Appellants. The case arose under sec. 9 of 8 and 9 of W. III, C. 26, which provided that no prosecution shall be commenced for an offence under the statute after the expiry of three months from the commission of the offence. Willace was apprehended on the 5th May 1797 for an alleged offence under the statute, carried before a Magistrate and committed to jail by warrant, dated 8th May. The Assizes at Durham were held on the 8th August, so that more than three months had elapsed between the commission of the offence and the preferring of the indictment. The Judges, at a conference, unanimously held that the information before the Magistrate was the commencement of the prosecution. The decision in Thorpe v. Priestnall(15) also supports the contention of the Appellants; there Wright, J., pointed out that Reg v. Brooks(16) is to the same effect as Rex v. Willace and Willes, J., observed that the passages in the judgments in Yates v. Queen which tended the other way, only amounted to dicta, as the decision in that case related to a prosecution for libel by a criminal information filed by order of the Court. It is worthy of note that the view taken in Clarke v. Postan is consistent with that adopted in Dawson v. Vansandau(17) by Cockbum, C.J, and Crompton and Blackburn, JJ. Fletcher, J., concedes in De Rozario v. Golapchand that Thorpe v. Priestnall shows that once summons is issued, the commencement of prosecution must be deemed to be the laying of the information or the making of the complaint. But if this is so, it is plainly logical to hold that the prosecution commences with the complaint irrespective of the result of the prosecution or of the stage at which it may fall through. We must accordingly adhere to the view taken in Crowdy v. O'Reilly that there may be said to have been a prosecution, even though no action at all has been taken against the Plaintiffs. Here, however, the Plaintiffs were, as we know, drawn into the enquiry. Notice was given to them, by the Deputy Magistrate, of the enquiry directed by the Special Magistrate. The terms of the notice are not known, as a copy is not in the record, but we shall assume that it merely gave the Plaintiffs an opportunity to appear and to be heard. The Plaintiffs did, as a matter of fact, appear and produce evidence. If they had not appeared, they would have run the risk of either a prosecution or a proceeding under sec. 107. The Defendant, at any rate, cannot be heard to urge that the Plaintiffs need not have appeared before the Deputy Magistrate at that stage; it is not open to him to suggest that his complaint was so manifestly false and frivolous that the Plaintiffs might have safely allowed the enquiry, whereof they had notice, to proceed ex parte. In our opinion, there is no escape from the position that there was a prosecution against the Plaintiffs from the 9th July 1910, when the complaint was made to the Magistrate, to the 2nd August 1910, when the Magistrate decided not to proceed against the accused. The second ground cannot, therefore, be supported.
In support of the third contention, viz., that the prosecution initiated by the Defendant was not actionable, reference has been made to Kandasami v. Subramania. That case is clearly distinguishable; the report does not show that the Plaintiff was in any way injured by the proceeding taken against him. In the case before us, the Plaintiffs assert that the proceedings have caused them loss, pecuniary and otherwise. This evidently is a question of fact which requires investigation. The third ground cannot consequently be supported.
In the view we take of the matter, it is not necessary to discuss at length the contention of the Appellants that they are entitled to recover damages for defamation. It may be conceded that the claim was made, though not very explicitly, in the plaint, but the question was not raised in the issues, and although the suit did not come on for trial, till more than ten months had passed after the settlement of issues, no attempt was made in the interval to have them amended. In these circumstances the Subordinate Judge rightly refused to entertain the question of damages for defamation, which was sought to be raised in his Court for the first time in the course of argument at the trial.
The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decree of the Subordinate Judge discharged, and the case remanded to him for trial on the merits as a suit for damages for malicious prosecution. The Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs in this Court; they will also have hearing fee in the Court below, which we assess at ten gold mohurs. Under sec. 13 of the Court Fees Act, we direct that the amount of the Court-fee paid by the Plaintiffs on the Memorandum of Appeal presented to this Court be refunded to them.
Beachcroft, J.:— I agree.
Appeal allowed.
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