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Jnanendra Nath Nanda v. Jadu Nath Banerji
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute concerns a strip of land near the boundary between two adjoining lots in the Sunderban area: lot 114/1 (west) and lot 114/2 (east). Before 1896 these were government waste lands. In 1896 two 40-year leases were executed on behalf of the Secretary of State for India in Council by the Sunderban Commissioner — one dated 12 September 1896 to the plaintiff's predecessor (Ex. 1) and the other (2 December 1896) to the defendant's predecessor. The two lease-maps depict the same red line as the common boundary between the lots. Both leases contain clause 12 providing that boundary disputes between lessees are to be submitted to the Sunderbans Commissioner (or other empowered revenue officer), with an appeal to the Board of Revenue whose decision is final.
In the last cadastral survey and settlement the disputed strip was recorded as part of the defendant's lot (114/2). The plaintiffs contend it belongs to lot 114/1, seek a declaration that the settlement entry is wrong, and an injunction restraining the defendants from raising a bund on the disputed area.
The Commissioners for local investigation were appointed to determine the boundary, relay lease map on the settlement map, report if the land is covered by the plaintiffs' lease, draw a map and note special features. The Commissioner reported that, except for a small southern part, nearly the whole disputed land fell within the plaintiffs' lease. The defendants objected but failed to displace the report, and the courts below entered decrees in favour of the plaintiffs substantially in accordance with their prayers. The defendants appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the boundary dispute given clause 12 of the leases which required such disputes to be referred to the Sunderbans Commissioner (and appeal to the Board of Revenue), and whether that clause was void under Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act.
- Whether the Crown Grants Act (15 of 1895), and in particular Section 3 of that Act, applies to these leases (i.e., whether they are Crown grants) and if so whether Section 3 renders clause 12 valid notwithstanding Section 28 of the Contract Act.
- Whether the Commissioner's findings (as accepted by the courts below) were based on sufficient evidence and correct methodology — specifically whether the Commissioner erred by failing to locate terminal points on the banks of the relevant khals and by assuming the khals had not changed in position since 1896.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants / Defendants (as represented by Mr. Chakraburty)
- The Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the boundary dispute because clause 12 of the lease requires such disputes to be referred to the specified revenue authorities; therefore the plaintiffs' remedy must first be obtained from those authorities.
- The Commissioner's findings are unreliable: they are based on conjecture and assumption rather than evidence; the Commissioner failed to locate the exact terminal points on the khals and ignored that the khals are variable in position. The courts below overlooked and left undecided fundamental objections raised by the defendants to the Commissioner's report.
Respondents / Plaintiffs (as represented by Mr. Bose)
- Mr. Bose argued that the Crown Grants Act does not apply to these leases; and even if it did, its purpose is to render inapplicable only the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act to Crown grants (i.e., a narrower scope than claimed by defendants).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 27 All 6341 (Sir Arthur Wilson) | Held that under the Crown Grants Act the Crown in a Crown grant can modify the Hindu law of inheritance — support for a wide scope of the Crown Grants Act beyond merely the Transfer of Property Act. | The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that Section 3 of the Crown Grants Act is not limited to excluding only the Transfer of Property Act; it indicates the Crown Grants Act may affect other laws inconsistent with Crown-imposed conditions. |
| 63 Cal 523 | Decision concerned a grant of Khas Mehal lands where the Secretary of State acted merely as a landlord (i.e., not a Crown grant). | The Court held this case inapplicable to the present facts because the grant in that case was not a Crown grant; therefore it does not contradict the Court's view that the present leases are Crown grants to which the Crown Grants Act applies. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) whether the leases are Crown grants and the scope of the Crown Grants Act; and (B) whether the Commissioner's report was reliable and sufficiently grounded in evidence.
A. Are the leases Crown grants and what is the scope of the Crown Grants Act?
- The Court reviewed legislative history: waste lands of the Sunderbans vested in the Crown by Section 39 of 21 & 22 Vict., C.106; Section 40 authorized the Secretary of State to dispose of such properties; difficulties in execution of instruments in India led to subsequent Acts (22 & 23 Vict., C.41 and later 33 & 34 Vict., C.59) and to a Government of India resolution (28 March 1895) empowering officers to execute Crown grants in India on behalf of the Secretary of State.
- On that basis the Court concluded that grants or leases of Sunderbans lands executed by the Sunderbans Commissioner on behalf of the Secretary of State are Crown grants and thus the Crown Grants Act (15 of 1895) applies to these leases.
- The Court then examined the scope of Section 3 of the Crown Grants Act. It rejected the respondent's narrower construction (that the Act affects only the Transfer of Property Act) and found no ambiguity in the phrase “such grants” in S.3. The Preamble was read as addressing two objects: (1) doubts about the Transfer of Property Act's operation on Crown grants, and (2) the Crown's power to impose conditions and restrictions on transfers made by the Crown. Section 2 addresses the former; Section 3 declares the Crown's unfettered discretion concerning conditions.
- The Court observed that if the narrower construction urged by Mr. Bose were correct, Section 3 would be redundant. The Court relied on the authority in 27 All 6341 to support a broad construction of the Crown Grants Act, confirming that it can affect laws beyond the Transfer of Property Act.
- Consequently the Court held that by reason of Section 3 of the Crown Grants Act, clause 12 of the leases was not invalidated by Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act.
- However, the Court distinguished enforceability: clause 12 is a contractual provision between the Secretary of State and the plaintiff's predecessor; a neighbouring lessee (defendant) who was not a party to that contract cannot claim the benefit of clause 12 on the ground of privity of contract. Therefore the defendants could not prevent the Civil Court from entertaining the plaintiffs' suit on that basis.
B. Adequacy of the Commissioner's findings and evidence
- The Court examined the Commissioner's report and deposition and found critical methodological defects. The Commissioner did not fix the terminal points on the banks of the relevant khals (Sunderbania and Godamathura) from which the red bearing line in the lease maps was to be drawn. He assumed the khals remained exactly in the same positions since 1896.
- Evidence in the Commissioner's proceedings showed that the defendants' pleader contended the khals are variable and insisted on locating the terminal points on the spot. Defence witness testified only that positions were “almost” the same, not identical. The comparative map prepared by the Commissioner showed discrepancies between his relaying, the lease map, and the settlement relaying.
- The Court found that the Commissioner's failure to locate the specified terminal points and his assumption of unchanging khal positions meant his conclusions rested on assumption or guesswork. The defendants' objections, which specifically raised these points (grounds 4 and 5), were not considered by the Courts below.
- Because the lower courts accepted the report without addressing these vital objections and accepted the Commissioner's conclusions on a misconception of evidence, the Court concluded the Commissioner's report could not stand.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside. The Commissioner's report is discarded. The case is remanded to the Court of first instance for rehearing of the boundary dispute after a fresh local investigation by a different Commissioner. Costs are directed to abide the result.
Implications:
- The Court held that the leases in question are Crown grants and that Section 3 of the Crown Grants Act applies, so that clause 12 of the lease is not invalidated by Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act.
- The Court also held that the defendants (as lessees of the adjoining lot) cannot invoke clause 12 to oust the Civil Court because clause 12 is a contract between the Secretary of State and the plaintiffs' predecessor and the defendants' predecessors were not parties to that contract (i.e., lack of privity prevents them from availing themselves of clause 12).
- The direct practical effect is that the boundary dispute may be adjudicated in the Civil Court after a fresh local investigation ordered by the Court; the earlier Commissioner's report is rejected. The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader legal precedent beyond its reasoning that clause 12 is valid under the Crown Grants Act but unenforceable by non-parties to the lease contract in this context.
S.C/R.K
1. The subject-matter of the suit out of which this appeal arises is a strip of land near the boundary of two adjoining lots in the Sunderban area. They are lots 114/1 and 114/2, the former being to the west of and adjoining the latter. Before 1896 the lands comprised in these lots were waste lands of the Government. In that year two leases for terms of 40 years were granted by the Secretary of State for India in Council to the plaintiff's and the-defendant's predecessors, the leases being executed by the Sunderban Commissioner on behalf of the Secretary of State for India in Council. The first lease was in respect of the lands described as the first portion of lot 114 and is dated 12th September 1896 and was granted to the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest (Ex. 1). The second lease was in respect of the lands of the second portion of lot 114 and was granted to the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants on 2nd December 1696. The eastern boundary of lot 114 (first portion) and the western boundary of lot 114 (second portion) is depicted by the same red line, as it must be, in the two maps attached to the said leases. In Ex. 1 the eastern boundary of lot 114/1 is described thus:
Sunderbania Khal and a straight line bearing 228 drawn from a point on the bank of the said Sunderbania Khal to a point on the bank of the Godamathura Khal, in both the leases there is a clause (clause 12) which runs in these terms:
That in the event of any boundary dispute arising between the lessee of this lot and the lessee of any adjoining lot already leased under the Waste Land Lease Rules, or which may subsequently be leased, the holders of this lease shall be bound to submit such dispute to the decision of the Commissioner of the Sunderbans, or other officer empowered by the Government to decide such disputes. The decision of the Sunderbans Commissioner, or other officer above-named, shall be appealable to the Board of Revenue and the decision of the Board of Revenue shall be final and binding on the lessees.
2. The office of the Sundarbans Commissioner has been abolished, but the functions of the said Commissioner are being performed by the Collector of Khulna. In the last Cadastral Survey and Settlement, the strip of land in suit was recorded as appertaining to the defendant's loteglct, 114/2 and one particular dag was recorded as a low path. The plaintiffs in this suit say that the said lands appertain to their lot 114/1 and not to the defendants' lot 114/2. They pray for a declaration on that basis that the entry in the settlement record is wrong and for an injunction on the defendants to restrain them from raising a band on the disputed area. Although the consequential prayer is injunction, and not recovery of or confirmation of possession, I am of opinion that the dispute between the parties is a boundary dispute and comes within the terms of clause 12 of the leases. I am also of opinion that the said clause contemplated the decision of such disputes between the lotdars by the revenue authorities and not by the Civil Court. How far the terms of the said clause can be availed of or enforced by the defendants is however a different question which 1 will deal with later on. One of the defences is based on this clause, which is that the Civil Court cannot decide the question of boundary dispute and consequently no such relief as is prayed for by the plaintiffs can be granted by the Civil Court till the plaintiffs obtain a decision in their favour of the boundary dispute from the revenue authorities mentioned in clause 12 of the lease. This defence has been overruled by both the Courts below, the appellate Court holding that the covenant contained in said clause is illegal and void, being hit by Section 28 of the Contract Act. For the purpose of determining the eastern boundary line of lot 114/1, i.e for locating the red line shown in the plans attached to the leases, a Commissioner for local investigation was appointed. He was directed to do the following things: (i) to determine the boundary line between lot 114/1 and lot 114/2, (ii) to relay the lease map on the settlement map, (iii) to report whether the disputed lands are covered by the plaintiffs' lease (Ex. 1, (iv) to draw up a map of the disputed land and (v) to note any special feature shown by the parties.
3. The Commissioner did carry out these directions. His report is that nearly the whole of the disputed land, with the exception of a very small bit in the south is covered by the plaintiffs' lease. The defendants filed objections to the said report but could not succeed in displacing the commissioner's report. The Courts below have accordingly passed a decree in favour of the plaintiffs substantially in accordance with their prayers. The defendants have accordingly preferred this appeal and Mr. Chakraburty appearing for them raises two points before me: (1) that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to determine the boundary dispute, which is the foundation of the reliefs sought for by the plaintiffs, (2) that the Commissioner's findings are based on mere conjectures and assumption and not based on evidence, and the Courts below have moreover overlooked and has left undecided fundamental objections of his orients and has misconceived the commissioner's report and his evidence given in Court. I may at once say that I do not consider the first of the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Chakraburty to be sound) though not for the reasons given by the lower Appellate Court, but there is great force in his second contention and with great reluctance I have to send back the case to the Court of first instance for a fresh local investigation.
4. With regard to the first contention Mr. Chakraburty urges that the Crown Grants Act (15 of 1895) applies to the leases and according to the provisions of S. 3 of that Act, cl. 12 of the leases is valid notwithstanding the provisions of Section 28 of the Contract Act. Mr. Bose appearing for the respondents urges in reply that the Crown Grants Act does not apply to the leases and that even if the said Act applies, the scope of the Act is to make inapplicable the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act only to a Crown grant. These contentions of the respective parties have to be considered first.
5. It is first necessary to observe that the waste lands of the Sunderbans were not the property of any subject. The area was in the days of East India Company a vast impenetrable forest and was the property of the said Company. By S. 39 of 21 and 22 Vict., C. 106, the Statute by which the Government of India was transferred from the East India Company to Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria, all lands and hereditament and other real and personal estate of the East India Company vested in the Crown. By S. 40, the Secretary of State in Council with the concurrence of a majority of votes at a meeting of the Council was authorized to sell and dispose of the properties which so vested in the Grown. There was some practical difficulty in the working of this section, for, conveyances and contracts executed in Presidency Towns which required a seal according to previous practice could not be executed in India on behalf of the Secretary of State, as the seal was in England. During the days of the East India Company, there was no difficulty, for although the real seal of the East India Company was in England copies were kept in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay (Ilbert on Government of India, p. 195, Edn. 3). To obviate this difficulty, a statute was passed the very next year (22 and 23 Vict. C. 41). By S. 1 of the said Act, the Governor General of India in Council, the Governors in Council of Bombay and Madras and the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, which then included Bengal, or any officer for the time being entrusted with the “government, charge or care of any Presidency, Province or District in India” were empowered “to sell or dispose of any real or personal estate whatsoever in India so vested in Her Majesty under 21 and 22 Vict. C. 106”. Although the officer in charge of a district in India was one of the officers so empowered, it was held that the officer in charge of a district within a province or presidency was not meant by the term, as for instance a Collector of a district of Bengal was not meant to be included, apparently on the ground that he is not entrusted with government. This section as is stated by Sir Courtney Ilbert was interpreted to mean that only the Governor General of India in Council, the Governors of the Presidencies in Council and the Lieutenant Governors and Chief Commissioners of Provinces only were so empowered. In Madras however the scope of the section was misunderstood and the Imam Commissioner made some grants of Crown lands. That led to the passing of a Statute by Parliament (33 and 34 Vict., C. 59). S. 1 of the said statute validated the grants executed by the Inam Commissioner but a general section (S. 2) was also enacted. That section empowered the Governor General by resolution in Council, to select and empower officers who are to execute in India instruments of grant, etc., of Crown lands on behalf of the Secretary of State for India in Council and the mode in which they were to be executed. A resolution of the Government of India in the Home Department was issued under this section of 28th March 1895. (Ilbert on Government of India, p. 195, Edn. 3.) The history of legislation which I have traced above leads me to no other conclusion than that grants or leases of Sunderbans lands, which are lands vested in the Crown by S. 39 of 21 and 22 Vict., C 106, executed by the Sundarbans Commissioner on behalf of the Secretary of State for India in Council are Crown grants and to these grants the Crown Grants Act (15 of 1895) applies.
6. The next question is what is the scope of the Crown Grants Act. Does it affect only the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or does it affect also any other law, statutory or otherwise, which may be inconsistent with terms and conditions made in the grant. Mr. Bose contends for the acceptance of the first proposition. S. 3 is in the widest possible form, but Mr. Bose contends that there is an ambiguity in that section; the ambiguity, according to him is caused by the use of the words “such grant” occurring therein. He says that in such circumstances it is legitimate to refer to the Preamble of the Act to find out the scope of the Act for the purpose of clearing the ambiguity. He further says that the Preamble indicates that the object of the Act was to make inapplicable only the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act to Crown grants. It is no doubt a principle of construction that the Preamble of an Act can be invoked for removing an ambiguity in an Act, but it is equally a well settled principle that the Preamble cannot be invoked for creating an ambiguity in the Act. It is therefore necessary to see firstly if there is any ambiguity in S. 3 and secondly what is the meaning of the Preamble.
7. In my judgment there is no ambiguity in S. 3, the words “such grants” clearly mean grants made on behalf of the Crown. The Preamble mentions two objects, namely (1) to remove doubts about the operation of the Transfer of Property Act on Crown grants, and (2) to remove doubts on the power of the Crown to impose limitations and restriction upon grants and other transfers of land made by the Crown. The two following sections of the Act carry out these two objects. Section 2 deals with the Transfer of Property Act and S. 3 declares the unfettered discretion of the Crown to impose such conditions and limitations as it thinks fit, no matter what the general, law of the land be. If Mr. Bose's contention had been right, S. 3 would be redundant. There is high authority also that the Crown Grants Act does not contemplate only the Transfer of Property Act. In 27 All 6341 Sir Arthur Wilson 1 held that under the Crown Grants Act, the Crown in a Crown grant can modify the Hindu law of inheritance.
8. The case cited by Mr. Bose, 63 Cal 523,2 has no application because the grant in that case was not a Crown grant, but a grant of Khas Mehal lands where the Secretary of State for India in Council occupied the position of a mere landlord. (I accordingly hold that by reason of Section 3 of the Crown Grants Act, clause 12 of the leases, is not affected by Section 28 of the Contract Act. The I benefit of that covenant contained in clause 12 of Ex. 1 however cannot be availed of by the defendant. Clause 12 of the lease (Ex. 1) rests on contract and contract only. That is a contract between the Secretary of State and the plaintiff's predecessor, and the defendant, although a lessee of an ad-i joining lot cannot have the benefit of the said clause on the principle that his predecessor-in-interest was not a party to the contract entered into between the Secretary of State in Council and the plaintiff's predecessor. I accordingly hold in this reason that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the boundary dispute.
9. Regarding the second contention raised by Mr. Chakravarty, it appears from the Commissioner's report, which is made clearer by the Commissioner's evidence in Court, that he made no attempt to fix any of the two points on the Sunderbania of Godamathura Khals from which and to which the red boundary line between the two lots was to be drawn. If he had fixed on the locality the two points or only one of them and had drawn the line with the bearing given in the leases after correcting the magnetic variation the result could have been satisfactory, but he did neither. He preceded upon the assumption that the khals had remained exactly in the same position throughout and he has said in his report that was the admission of both the parties. On examining however the proceedings of the Commissioner of 16th March 1934, 1 find that the defendant's pleader contended that the two khals “are always variable”. The said pleader insisted on locating on the spot the two points at the extremities of the red boundary line on the banks of the two khals. Later on, the Commissioner examined one witness produced on behalf of the plaintiffs and one produced on behalf of the defendants. The defendants' witness did not admit that the khals had not changed a bit but remained all along in exactly the same position. He only said that their position was “almost” the same”. The comparative map, which the Commissioner has prepared, shows the position of the relevant portions of the two khals according to his own relaying, according to the lease and according to the relaying by the settlement authorities. In the comparative map their positions do not tally. That shows either his relaying is wrong or that there is no foundation for the assumption on which he proceeded in his report, namely that the khals have remained in exactly the same position since 1896 and that there has been no change in their bends and contours. If any of the terminal points of the boundary line be placed not exactly on the points of the banks of the khal as indicated in the lease map, the boundary line would shift in a parallel way. In their objection to the com-missioner's report, the defendants expressly mention that the said two points on the banks of the khals have not been located correctly by the Commissioner and that he was wrong in assuming that the channels of the two khals have all along remained constant “though in fact they are always variable” (grounds Nos. 4 and 5 of the objections). These grounds which are vital ones have not been considered by any of the Courts below, The Commissioner's evidence would show that what he did was only guesswork. I accordingly hold that in accepting the Commissioner's report, the Courts below have not only left undetermined two very relevant objections of the defendants to the Commissioner's report but have accepted his report on a misconception of evidence, e.g of his report and deposition. I accordingly set aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below and direct the case to be reheard on the question of boundary dispute after a fresh local investigation. The report of the Commissioner is discarded. The local investigation is to be made by a different Commissioner. The appeal is allowed and the case is remanded be the Court of first instance. Costs to abide the result.
S.C/R.K
10. Case remanded.
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