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Aurabindo Nath Tagore And Anr. v. Monorama Debi

Calcutta High Court
May 16, 1928
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Judgment Summary — Page, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This dispute arose among members of the Tagore family concerning the right to administer trusts created by the Will of Kiran (who survived the temple-founder Bonomali Mukherji). Bonomali had founded and dedicated a temple; he died in 1892. The plaintiffs are the two sons (Aurabindo and Rabindra) of Bonomali's daughter Mahaprova Debi.

Kiran died on 9 November 1908 having made a Will appointing one Pundari as executor and trustee. Kiran's Will directed certain religious payments and the investment of Rs. 8,000 in government securities for temple purposes. Pundari (a bare trustee) faithfully executed the trusts until his death on 23 October 1910. By his Will Pundari purported to appoint his wife (the present defendant) executrix and directed that she continue spending the income from the Rs. 8,000 in the same way; the parties agreed that Pundari had no power to appoint himself or his wife to become a trustee of Kiran's trust property.

The heir to Kiran was his widow, Mayabini, and the plaintiffs are reversioners (the reversionary heirs). It was common ground that Mayabini never took possession of the trust property or exercised the trustee rights. From Pundari's death until the time of trial, the defendant had been in exclusive possession of the trust property and had openly carried out the trusts. The plaintiffs sued (in their personal capacity as heirs of Kiran) seeking relief including possession and control of the endowment.

Evidence included the defendant's examination on commission admitting that she continued the sheba (service) in the same way her husband had, that family members knew of the Wills, and that she neither sought nor obtained Mayabini's consent. The trial judge accepted that the defendant had been in open, adverse possession and that Mayabini's rights (if she had any present possessory right) were barred by limitation.

The suit was dismissed with costs on Scale No. 2 (including the costs of the commission).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendant (Pundari's widow) had become entitled to possession and management of the trust property created by Kiran's Will.
  2. Whether the defendant's long, open possession of the trust property amounted to adverse possession so as to bar the rights of Kiran's heir (Mayabini) and, consequently, the plaintiffs who are reversioners.
  3. Whether the rights of reversioners (who succeed to property on the death of a Hindu widow) can be defeated by acts of adverse possession or decrees against the widow, particularly in light of the Limitation Acts (various editions) and the case law interpreting them.
  4. Whether the plaintiffs' suit fell within section 10 of the Limitation Act (i.e., whether they sued in a representative capacity such that a different limitation rule applied), or whether they sued personally as heirs.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs contended that, as reversioners who claim through Kiran (and not through the widow), they could not be prejudiced by any act or omission of the widow (Mayabini). In particular, they argued that the widow's loss of rights by adverse possession should not defeat the plaintiffs' reversionary rights.
  • Mr. A. N. Chaudhuri (counsel for the plaintiffs) relied on Ranchordas Vandravandas v. Parvatibhai (Runchordas v. Parbatibhai) in support of the contention that reversioners have a period to sue measured from the death of the widow and should not be barred by the widow's adverse possession.

Defendant's Position

  • The defendant asserted (and by her evidence established) that she continued the sheba in the same manner as her husband had done, that the family knew of the Wills, and that she had been in exclusive possession and management of the trust property from 1910 onward, openly and as of right, without permission from Mayabini.
  • It was common ground between parties (and the court accepted) that Pundari had no legal authority to transfer to his wife the trustee rights which had been conferred under Kiran's Will.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Goluckmani Debi v. Digumbar De Peel C.J.'s observation (pre-1859) that the widow fully represents the estate; adverse possession that bars the widow bars the heir. Used to support the proposition that a widow represents the estate and adverse possession against her can bar reversioners; treated as part of the common law the court applies.
Katama Natchiar v. Raja of Shivagunga (Shivagunga's case) Judicial Committee held that the whole estate vests in the widow for some purposes and that heirs are bound by decrees obtained against the widow. Relied on as foundational authority that a widow represents the inheritance and that the heirs can be bound by decrees or adverse acts affecting the widow's possession; treated as settled law.
Amrit Narayan v. Gaya Singh Quoted passage (Syed Ameer Ali) describing a Hindu reversioner as having only a mere spes successionis until the widow's death. Cited to explain the conceptual basis for the plaintiffs' argument (that reversioners have only a future expectancy) and why that argument, while attractive, does not prevail against the established line of authority binding reversioners to the consequences of adverse possession against the widow.
Nabin Chandra Chakraburtty v. Issur Chunder Chuckerbutty Held that reversionary heirs are bound by limitation where the widow without fraud or collusion is barred; discussed that reversioners cannot escape the bar simply because they could not sue during widow's life. Quoted with approval; used to support conclusion that heirs are bound by limitation when widow is barred by adverse possession or decree.
Jugal Kishore v. Jitendra Referenced as part of the authorities establishing that decrees fairly obtained against a Hindu widow bind reversioners. Part of the cluster of authorities the court treats as confirming the rule that heirs are bound by adjudications or adverse possession against the widow.
Hari Nath Chatterji v. Mathur Mohan (and Harinath Chuckerbutty v. Mathur Mohan) Applied Shivagunga's rule and treated decrees/adverse acts against widow as binding on reversioners. Used as supporting authority; cited in reasoning that the Privy Council and courts applied Shivagunga's rule in subsequent cases.
Ranchordas (Runchordas) v. Parvatibhai (Vundravandas v. Cursondas on appeal) Decision (Privy Council) in which some courts had interpreted later Limitation Acts to give reversioners a period measured from the death of the widow; the reported decision was explained by the Judicial Committee in Vaithialinga v. Srirangath. The judge declined to treat Runchordas as overruling the older authorities; relied on Vaithialinga's clarification of Runchordas and therefore did not accept Runchordas as displacing Shivagunga's rule for present purposes.
Vaithialinga v. Srirangath Judicial Committee's explanation of Runchordas and other authorities; indicated that Shivagunga's rule has been consistently applied where applicable. Treated as authoritative and binding on Indian courts; used to explain and resolve the apparent conflict in authorities and to support the conclusion that the common law rule remains in force.
Srinath Kur v. Prosonna Kumar Ghose Full Bench (Calcutta) held that the Limitation Acts of 1871 and 1877 changed the law so that a reversioner has twelve years from when the estate falls into possession. Discussed as a contrasting view from a Full Bench; the court considered it but did not accept it as displacing the common law after taking Vaithialinga into account.
Ramkali v. Kedar Nath Allahabad High Court took the view that later Limitation Acts altered the prior rule. Not followed for reasons given; the court treated the Judicial Committee's analysis as controlling.
Vundravandas v. Cursondas Bombay High Court held that the legislature had designedly altered the law; later heard on appeal as Runchordas v. Parbatibhai. Not treated as displacing the common-law rule once Vaithialinga's explanation is applied.
Amrita Lal v. Rajani Kant Referenced in relation to Privy Council treatment of the limitations question. Discussed in the context of interpretation of Limitation Acts and accrual of rights; considered in the court's survey of authorities.
Sarada Sundari Dassee v. Dayamoyi Dassee Held that entitlement to possession upon the death of a widow refers to a right in being at the widow's death; if the widow's title had been barred before her death, the reversioner would not succeed to a right to possession on her death. Cited to support the conclusion that a reversioner's relief can be barred by prior acts which destroyed the widow's possessory rights.
Balwant Rao Bishwant Chandra Chor v. Puran Mal Choubey Used to show the scope of section 10 of the Limitation Act and what falls outside it. Applied to conclude that the plaintiffs did not sue in a representative capacity (as trustees) and therefore section 10 did not apply to extend limitation; plaintiffs sued personally as heirs.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in several discrete steps:

  1. Trustee status and possession facts: The court accepted that Pundari was only a bare trustee under Kiran's Will and that he and thereafter the defendant had executed the trusts. It was common ground that Pundari could not lawfully appoint his wife to succeed to the trustee rights under Kiran's Will; the wife did not by that act become the lawful trustee.
  2. Possession and adverse possession: The court found on the evidence (including the defendant's sworn answers) that from Pundari's death in 1910 until the time of trial the defendant had been in exclusive possession of the trust property, had carried out the trusts openly and as of right, and had done so without asking Mayabini's permission. The court characterized these acts and possession as adverse to Mayabini.
  3. Limitation and reversioners: The court reviewed the line of authorities holding that a Hindu widow represents the estate and that an adverse possession or a decree against the widow binds the heirs and reversioners. The judge carefully considered later Limitation Acts and conflicting judicial views (including Full Bench and High Court decisions that had read the Limitation Acts as altering the rule) but relied upon the Privy Council’s and Judicial Committee's explanations (notably Vaithialinga v. Srirangath) to conclude that the common law rule—whereby adverse possession against the widow can bar the reversioners—remained binding law.
  4. Application to the present facts: The trust property in suit was moveable (and thus not governed by Art. 141); regardless of whether the relevant Limitation Act article was Art. 49 or Art. 120, the court held that the plaintiffs' claim to recover possession of the moveable trust property was barred by limitation because the defendant had been in adverse, open possession since 1910.
  5. Scope of the plaintiffs' suit and section 10: The court noted that the plaintiffs sued in their personal capacity as heirs of Kiran rather than as trustees or on behalf of the trust. Their counsel expressly stated they did not sue in a representative capacity; therefore section 10 of the Limitation Act did not apply. The plaintiffs failed to bring their claim within any applicable extended limitation period.
  6. Failure of proof on other parts of claim: On the evidence (including Kiran's own Will statement that he had no moveable or immoveable property and the affidavit of assets), the court found that the plaintiffs had not proved that the defendant was in possession of any part of Kiran's estate other than the debotter (trust) property; their ancillary claims thus failed.

Throughout the analysis the court emphasized fidelity to prior authorities and the binding interpretation given by the Judicial Committee (Vaithialinga v. Srirangath) when dealing with the apparent conflicts among authorities and the effect of successive Limitation Acts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: SUIT DISMISSED WITH COSTS (Scale No. 2, including costs of the commission).

Implications:

  • The plaintiffs' claim to recover possession and to control the management of the endowment was barred by limitation and therefore failed.
  • The defendant's long, open possession of the trust (debotter) property was held to be adverse to the rights of Kiran's widow and, as a result, the reversioners' claim was barred under the law as stated in the cited authorities.
  • The plaintiffs did not establish possession by the defendant of any part of Kiran's estate other than the debotter property; ancillary reliefs also failed.
  • The court applied existing case law and the Judicial Committee's interpretation of conflicting authorities; it did not purport to set out any new precedent or to abrogate prior holdings. In the judge's view, the common law rule (that a widow represents the estate and adverse possession or decrees against her can bind reversioners) remains the law of the land for the purposes of the present case.

Miscellaneous

Solicitors: Messrs R. M. Chatterjee & Co. for the Plaintiffs; Mr. M. N. Sen for the Defendant.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

Page, J.:— The controversy in this case relates to a dispute among certain members of the Tagore family over the right to administer the trusts of the Will of one Bonomali Mukherji.

The suit arises in this way. Bonomali Mukherji founded and dedicated to two deities a temple in Monoharpukur Road, Ballygunge. He died in 1892, leaving, him surviving, Kiranmali Mukherji and a daughter, Mahaprova Debi. The daughter had two sons Aurabindo and Rabindra, and they are the Plaintiffs. On the 9th November 1908 Kiran died, having made a Will of which he appointed one Pundari-kakshya, the executor and trustee. In his Will Kiran stated that he died possessed of no moveable or immoveable properties, and that he had made provision for his wife Mayabini Debi; and he directed the executor and trustee to pay his debts, and to celebrate the pujah of the two deities at the temple in Ballygunge in the same manner that he had done in his lifetime. He further directed inter alia that a sum of Rs. 10,000, the subject-matter of a life-policy, should be collected and that out of the proceeds certain legacies should be paid, and the balance of Rs. 8,000 invested in 3½ per cent. Government securities. Out of the income accruing from the Rs. 8,000 twelve Brahmins were to be fed on the occasion of the anniversary; of the sradh of his father and mother, and the expenses of the pujahs were to be defrayed; and he directed that the balance (if any) of the income should be spent on the construction and repairs of the temple.

Whether Pundari on Kiran's death became the shebait of the deities, with such consequences as would follow therefrom, I do not propose to decide in this case; not because such matters are not relevant, but because in the plaint it is specifically requested that matters connected with the shebaiti should be excluded from the scope of the suit, and, in my opinion, having regard to the nature of the claim, I am in a position otherwise to dispose of it.

Now, Pundari was not a beneficiary under Kiran's Will, but was a bare trustee of the funds which were charged, for debotter purposes. From the death of Kiran until the death of Pundari on the 23rd October 1910, Pundari faithfully and duly carried out the trusts of Kiran's Will. After Pundari's death, however, it was ascertained that under his Will he had left all his property to his wife, who was the younger sister of the wife of Bonomali, and a daughter of the late Maharaja Tagore. He appointed his wife the executrix of the Will, and further provided that “the aforesaid executrix of mine, her heirs or he whom she may appoint, shall continue to spend in connexion with the sheba of the God and Goddess at Ballygunge, in the same manner which I have been spending, the income derived from the Government promissory notes to the value of Rs. 8,000 which are with you, and which belonged to the estate of Kiran.” By his Will, therefore, Pundari purported to appoint the Defendant, his wife, the trustee of the property that had passed to him as trustee under the Will of Kiran. That, in my opinion, he was not entitled by law to do, and it is the common case of both parties that after the death of Pundari the Defendant did not become entitled to act as the trustee of the Will of Kiran or to have the possession or management of the trust property. Who, then, was entitled to act as the trustee? It is the common case of both parties, and for the purposes of this suit I will assume, without deciding, that the persons entitled to the possession and management of the trust property under Kiran's Will were Kiran's heirs. Again, it is common ground that the heir of Kiran was his widow Mayabini, and that the reversionary heirs were the Plaintiffs. Assuming, therefore, that Mayabini was entitled to possession of the trust property, and to carry out the trust created under the Will of Kiran, it is conceded that she never took possession of the trust property, or exercised her rights as trustee under Kiran's Will. From the death of Pundari in 1910 until the present time, I hold that the Defendant has been in exclusive possession of the trust property, and that the trusts of Kiran's Will throughout this period have been faithfully carried out by the Defendant openly, and as of right, and without asking or obtaining Mayabini's permission in that behalf. The Defendant was examined on commission. I refer to certain questions, and the answers that she made:—

Q. 35.—How did your husband entrust you with the charge of the idol? By his Will, and I have carried on the sheba in the same manner in which my husband had been doing.

Q. 36.—Did Mayabini know that your husband had entrusted you by his Will with the sheba? Yes.

Q. 37.—Generally, were the facts that Kiran and your husband by their Will made provisions for the sheba well-known in the family or were they kept secret? Nothing was kept secret. Everybody knew about it.

Did Mayabini ever make any claim against either you or your husband in respect of the sheba? Never.

Q.—Did your husband or you ever take Mayabini's permission or consent in the matter of the Thakur and the sheba? Never.

As thefts had occurred at the temple the Defendant was asked.

Q. 138.—Did you send information to Mayabini of these thefts? Where was she at the time? Well, one thing I remember is that she was alive but why should I inform her when the Thakur was mine?

I hold upon the evidence that from the death of Pundari in 1910 until the present time the Defendant openly and as of right, to the knowledge and without obtaining the permission of Mayabini, or the Plaintiffs, or anybody else, in fact has been in possession of the trust property, and duly has carried out the trusts of ‘Kiran's Will in respect of this debotter estate. I hold further that in the circumstances her acts and possession were adverse to the rights of Mayabini, and if, and in so far as, Mayabini as the heir of Kiran was entitled to the possession and management of the trust property, it is conceded by the Plaintiffs, and I hold, that her rights and title were barred by limitation.

But that does not dispose of the Plaintiffs' claim, for learned Counsel contended that the Plaintiffs as reversioners could not be prejudiced by any act or omission on the part of Mayabini, and, although Mayabini through her negligence or otherwise had lost her rights as the heir of Kiran by adverse possession, the rights of the ‘Plaintiffs as Kiran's reversioners were thereby not affected, for they claimed through Kiran, and not through Mayabini, his widow. In support of his contention Mr. A.N Chaudhuri cited Ranchordas Vandravandas v. Parvatibhai . I confess that if the matter were res integra, or if the meaning and effect of the decision in Ranchordas' case had not been explained by the Judicial Committee in Vaithialinga v. Srirangath , I should have thought that the view which the Plaintiff urged upon the Court was correct, as being in consonance with the conception of the widow's estate in Hindu law. And the reason is this, that “a Hindu reversioner has no right or interest in presenti in the property which a female owner holds for her life; until it vests in him on her death, should he survive her, he has nothing to assign or to relinquish, or even to transmit to his heirs. His right becomes concrete only on her demise; until then it is a mere spes successionis” [per Syed Ameer Ali in Amrit Narayan v. Gaya Singh (3)]. No doubt, if by reason of the widow's acts or omissions there is danger that the corpus of the estate may be wasted, appropriate steps may be taken by the reversioner to prevent the wastage taking place, but I doubt whether it is in accordance With the principles of the Hindu law of inheritance that the reversionary heirs, who during the subsistence of the widow's estate have no present right or interest in the property and who do not in any sense trace their title through the widow, should lose their rights as reversioners merely because the widow has suffered her title and interest in the estate to be destroyed by adverse possession. I have ventured to indicate my opinion on this subject because in Vaithalinga's case the Judicial Committee did not think it necessary for the purposes of that case to “make any formal pronouncement upon this point” (Ibid p. 893), although in the present state of the authorities I am clearly of opinion that the contention of the Plaintiffs cannot prevail, and that the Plaintiffs' claim as the reversioners of Kiran is barred by limitation.

The law stands in this way. In 1852 before the enactment of the Limitation Act (XIV of 1859), Peel C.J, observed that “it has been invariably considered for many years that the widow fully represented the estate, and it is also settled law that adverse possession which bars her, bars the heir after her which would not be the case if she were a mere tenant for life, as known to the English law.” [Goluckmani Debi v. Digumbar De ].

Again, in 1863, in Katama Natchiar v. Raja of Shivagunga the Judicial Committee laid down that “the whole estate would for the time be vested in her, absolutely for some purposes, though, in some respects, for a qualified interest, and until her death it could not be ascertained who would be entitled to succeed. The same principle which has prevailed in the Courts in this country as to tenants-in-tail representing the inheritance would seem to apply to the case of a Hindu widow, and it is obvious that there would be the greatest possible inconvenience in holding that the succeeding heirs were not bound by a decree fairly and properly obtained against the widow.”

Now, it is settled beyond doubt or controversy that a decree fairly obtained against a Hindu widow in respect of a transaction in which she represents the estate is binding upon the reversioners [Shivagunga's case , Jugal Kishore v. Jitendra (6), Hari Nath Chatterji v. Mathur Mohan (7) and Vaithialinga's case ] and on principle I can find no ground upon which to differentiate between the loss of the reversioners' rights by adverse possession against a widow, and the loss of such rights by an adverse decree against her. In Nabin Chandra Chakraburtty v. Issur Chunder Chuckerbutty , Peacock, C.J, observed that “it is said that the reversionary heirs could not sue (for possession) during the life-time of the widow, and that, therefore, they ought not to be barred by any adverse holding against the widow at a time when they could not sue. But when we look at the widow as a representative, and see that the reversionary heirs are bound by decrees relating to her husband's estate which are obtained against her without fraud or collusion, we are of opinion that they are also bound by limitation, by which she without fraud or collusion is barred.”

I respectfully agree with the view expressed by Jackson, J., in the same case, when his Lordship observed that “it has been distinctly held by the Privy Council in the Shivagunga's case that a decision fairly arrived at without fraud or collusion in the presence of a Hindu widow in possession of the estate will bind reversionary heirs. That being so decided it appears to me impossible to escape the conclusion that an adverse possession which barred the widow will also bar the heirs.” [Ibid p. 510; see also per Macpherson, J., in Hari Nath Chatterji v. Mathur ].

Now, it must be taken as settled that the law thus stated is the common law of the Hindu community, and when applied to the facts of the present case it is fatal to the Plaintiffs' claim.

But has not the law been altered by legislation since these judgments were delivered? That is a question which has occasioned much discussion, and given rise to a serious difference of opinion among the Courts in India.

Under the Limitation Act (XIV of 1859, secs. 12 and 16) the limitation for suits to recover immoveable and moveable property was 12 and 6 years respectively “from the time the cause of action arose.” But under the Limitation Act (IX of 1871, 2nd Schedule, Art. 142) a suit by a Hindu reversioner “entitled to the possession of immoveable property on the death of a Hindu widow” must be brought within 12 years of the time “when the widow dies,” and under the Limitation Act (XV of 1877, 2nd Schedule, Art. 141) a “like suit by a Hindu or Mahomedan entitled to the possession of immoveable property on the death of a Hindu or Mahomedan female” must be brought within 12 years of the time “when the female dies.” Art. 141 of the 2nd Schedule to the present Limitation Act (IX of 1908) is in the same terms. With respect to moveable property, however, there has been no change in substance, for in the later Acts the period of limitation is 6 years from the time “when the right to sue accrues” [Art. 118 (1871). Art. 120 (1877 and 1908)].

Now, in Srinath Kur v. Prosonna Kumar Ghose (9) a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the Limitation Acts of 1871 and 1877 had effected a change in the law, and “that the rule which was laid down under the Limitation Act of 1859 is no longer the law under the Acts of 1871 and 1877. A reversioner who succeeds to immoveable property has now twelve years to bring the suit from the time when the estate falls into possession.” (Per Garth C.J, Ibid at p. 937). The same view was taken by the Allahabad High Court in Ramkali v. Kedar Nath (10) and by the Bombay High Court in Vundravandas v. Cursondas (11), in which case Farran, C.J, observed “that it (i.e, the legislature) has designedly altered the law which formerly prevailed upon this subject as laid down in Nabin Chandra v. Issur Chunder and approved by the Privy Council in Amrita Lal v. Rajani Kant (12) is obvious.” (Ibid at p. 669). In 1899 Vundravandas's case was heard on appeal by the Privy Council under the name of Runchordas v. Parbatibhai , and the decision of Farran, C.J and Tyabji, J., in substance was affirmed, their Lordships, however, further holding that even in respect of moveables to which Art. 141 did not apply the reversioner's “right to this property, if any, accrued at the death of” the widow.

I shall not presume, indeed it would be of no avail to express my own opinion as to what was decided in Runchordas' case , for in Vaithialinga v. Srirangath the Judicial Committee explained what was the meaning and effect of that decision, and the interpretation which their Lordships put upon that case is binding upon all the Courts in India. The Judicial Committee, as I apprehend the judgment in Vaithialinga's case , were of opinion that Sir Richard Couch, who had delivered the judgment of the Board both in Runchordas' case and in Harinath Chuckerbutty v. Mathur Mohan did not intend in Runchordas' case in any way to discredit the rule laid down in Shivagunga's case which had expressly been approved and applied in Hari Nath Chatterji v. Mathur Mohan and that in Runchordas v. Parvatibhai , in the circumstances obtaining in that case, there was no room for the application of the rule in Shivagunga's case . What, then, was decided in Hari Nath Chatterji v. Mathur Mohan ? In that case the question that fell for determination was whether the rule in Shivagunga's case , namely, that an adverse decree against a Hindu Widow bound the reversioners, was applicable to the case where a daughter (by name Sampurna) had succeeded to the widow's estate. Sir Richard Couch delivered the judgment of the Board, and in reference to a contention that the Plaintiff as reversioner “had by the terms of Art. 141 a period of 12 years from her (i.e, Sampurna's) death to bring his suit,” observed that “their Lordships see no ground for this contention. The words ‘entitled to the possession of immoveable property’ refer to the existing law. Under that law the Plaintiff, being bound by the decree against Sampurna, would not be entitled to bring a suit for possession. The intention of the law of limitation is not to give a right when there is not one, but to interpose a bar after a certain period to a suit to enforce an existing right. The purpose of the second schedule in each of the Acts is only to prescribe the period of limitation for the suit. That appears from the 4th section of each Act. The prescribed periods are to be applied to suits founded on the existing law, and Art. 141 cannot be construed as altering the law respecting the effect of a decree.”

In Sarada Sundari Dassee v. Dayamoyi Dassee (13), Jackson and Tottenham, JJ., had taken the same view, holding that “the person entitled to the possession of immoveable property on the death of a Hindu widow means a person who succeeds to a certain right which is in being on the death of the Hindu widow, and that if the title which would have enabled that widow to hold the estate as a widow had become barred before her death, the reversioner who would be the next taker is not to be entitled to possession of the property on the death of the widow.” Now, in Vaithialinga's case , although it became unnecessary for the Judicial Committee “to make any formal pronouncement upon” the question whether adverse possession obtained against a Hindu widow binds the reversioners, inasmuch as in that case it was held that the reversioner's claim was barred under Art. 129 of the second schedule of Act IX of 1871; nevertheless, as the issue had been raised and canvassed both in the Indian Courts and in the Privy Council, their Lordships proceeded to examine the case law as to the effect upon the rights of the reversioners of a title gained by adverse possession against a Hindu widow. It may be that the observations of the Board upon that matter were obiter, but merely upon that ground I should not be entitled to disregard them, and the less so as their Lordships indicated clearly how in their opinion the law upon the subject stands. After analysing the material cases, and expressing approval of the law as laid down in the earlier authorities, Sir John Edge observed that “the result of the cases to which their Lordships have referred shows, in their opinion, that the Board has invariably applied the rules of the Shivagunga's case as sound Hindu law where that rule was applicable.”

In these circumstances, therefore, I hold that the common law of the Hindu Community, which is to be collected from Goluckmani Dasi v. Digvmber Da , Shivagunga's case and Nabin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Issur Chunder Chuckerbutty is still the law of the land, and has been neither abrogated nor varied by any legislative enactment.

Now, the trust property, in suit is moveable property to which Art. 141 is not applicable, but whether the appropriate article of the Limitation Act is Art. 49, or Art. 120, in either case and notwithstanding Ruhchordas v. Pcirvatibhai I hold that the Plaintiff's claim to recover possession of such property from the Defendant fails, as it is barred by limitation.

That disposes of all the questions raised in this case with respect to the trust property, for it is to be observed that the Plaintiffs have not brought the suit as the trustees, but as the heirs, of Kiran. Mr. Chaudhuri in his reply expressly stated that the Plaintiffs did not sue in a representative capacity as trustees, and it is obvious, having regard to the frame of the suit and the form of the pleadings that sec. 10 of the Limitation Act does not apply. The Defendant did not purport to hold the property in a manner adverse to the trust, and the Plaintiffs did not purport to bring this suit either as beneficiaries under the trust, or on behalf of the trust, but “for their own personal right to manage or in some Way to control the management of the endowment. The consequence is that the case does not fall within sec. 10 of the Limitation Act” [Balwant Rao Bishwant Chandra Chor v. Puran Mal Choubey (14)]. In substance and in fact the Plaintiffs are suing in their personal capacity as the heirs of Kiran to recover possession of such part of the estate of Kiran as came into the Defendant's possession as the executrix of Pundari. But I hold upon the facts that the Plaintiffs have not proved that the Defendant as the executrix of Pundari or otherwise obtained possession of any property that belonged to Kiran other than the trust property. The Defendant has been examined and cross-examined, and her evidence supports the conclusion at which I have arrived. The statement in Kiran's Will that he had no moveable or immoveable property further strengthens that view, and, in my opinion, an examination of the affidavit of assets filed in connexion with Kiran's Will places the matter beyond doubt or controversy. I find, therefore, upon the evidence that the Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the Defendant has been in possession, or is in possession, of any part of Kiran's estate exclusive of the debotter property. The Plaintiffs claim certain other forms of relief, but these are ancillary to the main claim for possession.

For these reasons the suit must be dismissed with costs on scale No. 2, including the costs of the commission.

Messrs R.M Chatterjee & Co., Solicitors for the Plaintiffs.

Mr. M.N Sen, Solicitor for the Defendant.

P.C