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Nrisingha Charan Nandy Chowdhry v. Rajniti Prasad Singh And Others
Judgment Summary — Courtney-Terrell, C.J.; Fazl Ali, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs on 24 March 1931 sued to enforce two mortgages over an impartible Raj in the Santhal Pargannas (area stated at about three laks of acres). The first mortgage (2 February 1913) was by Jung Bahadur Singh for Rs. 2,00,000 at 6% compound interest, due 1 February 1925. The second mortgage (16 April 1917) was by Sham Lal Singh for Rs. 2,86,500 at "5a" per cent compound interest, due 15 April 1927. Each mortgage contained a clause enabling the mortgagees to call up the whole amount if interest was in arrears for two years (first mortgage) or five years (second mortgage).
On 9 December 1926 Sham Lal and his younger brother executed a usufructuary mortgage to the defendant (referred to as "defendant 19") for Rs. 40,000; defendant 19 was put into possession on 15 December 1926. He was briefly dispossessed by a receiver in another suit but was ultimately reinstated in possession by the Court on 5 January 1931 and remained in possession, realizing rents and profits under his usufructuary rights. He paid government demands and other creditors and his claim amounted to Rs. 2,18,000. It was admitted that no interest had been paid on either of the first two mortgages since 8 June 1919.
Within three months of defendant 19 gaining possession, the plaintiffs applied for the appointment of a receiver on three grounds: (1) interest on the first two mortgages was in arrears, (2) the security had become insufficient, and (3) the usufructuary mortgagee in possession was committing waste by cutting trees. The District Judge appointed a receiver. Defendant 19 appealed from that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the District Judge's order amounted to an effective appointment of a receiver within the meaning of the procedural rules (O. 40, R. 1 and O. 43, R. 1(s) of the CPC) or merely a decision that a receiver should be appointed.
- Whether a holder of a simple mortgage (under Indian law) is entitled to obtain the appointment of a receiver in the same manner as an equitable or legal mortgagee.
- Whether, on the facts of this case (arrears of interest, alleged insufficiency of security and alleged waste by the usufructuary mortgagee), it was just and convenient to appoint a receiver.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs / Respondents
- Applied for a receiver on grounds that (a) interest due on the first two mortgages was in arrears, (b) security had become insufficient, and (c) the usufructuary mortgagee in possession was committing waste (cutting trees).
- Argued that a simple mortgagee under Indian law is analogous to an equitable mortgagee and therefore should be entitled to the appointment of a receiver (relying on certain observations in earlier cases).
Defendant 19 / Appellant (and respondents on preliminary objection)
- Raised a preliminary objection that the District Judge had not in fact appointed a receiver but only decided that the case was one in which a receiver should be appointed, and that the order therefore did not fall within the terms of O. 40, R. 1 and O. 43, R. 1(s) CPC.
- Relied on authorities said to favour a narrow construction of the rule (cases named in the judgment).
- Asserted that as a usufructuary mortgagee in possession he was entitled to rents and profits, had paid demands and creditors, and that even if a receiver were appointed the receiver could act only in his interests and not in the plaintiffs' interests.
- Contended there was no reliable evidence of waste or mismanagement; and argued that appointing a receiver would be neither just nor convenient in the circumstances.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Upendra Nath Nag v. Bhupendra Nath Nag | Cited as authority for a narrow construction of the procedural rule concerning appointment of receivers (preliminary objection). | Referenced by respondents in support of the preliminary objection; the Court rejected the narrow construction and did not follow these authorities on that point. |
| Narbada Shankar v. Kevaldas Roghunath Das | Cited for a narrow construction of the relevant procedural rule (grouped with other cases advancing the same view). | Relied upon by respondents; the Court preferred a broader, "common-sense" interpretation and rejected the preliminary objection. |
| Ramji v. Koman Das | Another case relied upon for a restrictive reading of the procedure for appointing receivers. | Referred to by respondents; the Court declined to adopt the restrictive approach in this instance. |
| Gobind Ram v. Ganesh Ram | Authority for a broader interpretation of the procedural provision concerning appointment of receivers (favoured by this Court). | The Chief Justice preferred the interpretation adopted in this case and followed it in rejecting the preliminary objection. |
| P.L.S. Palaniappa Chetty v. P.L.P.P.L. Palaviiappa Chetty (Full Bench, Madras) | Full Bench decision expressing a more "common-sense" view on the procedural question. | The Court relied upon and followed the approach of this Full Bench decision in similar vein to Gobind Ram. |
| In re Pope (opinion of Cotton, L.J.) | Illustrates that, since the Judicature Act, a legal mortgagee has been conceded the right to a receiver. | Cited to show the evolution of the right of legal mortgagees to obtain receivership after fusion of jurisdictions; used in discussing distinctions between legal, equitable and simple mortgages. |
| Venkata Rajagopala Surya Raw Bahadur v. K. Basavi Reddy | Support for the proposition that legal mortgagees can obtain receivers after fusion of jurisdictions. | Used alongside In re Pope to demonstrate judicial recognition of legal mortgagee rights to receivership. |
| Venkata Kumara Mahipathi Surya Rao v. Gokuldoss Goverdhandass | Held that when a receiver is appointed at the instance of an equitable mortgagee, the receiver must hold income for the benefit of that mortgagee; contains observations about equitable vs. simple mortgagee rights. | Cited by plaintiffs; the Court examined the case and concluded that some of its discussion on simple mortgagee rights rested on a false premise, and it did not establish a general right for simple mortgagees to obtain receivers. |
| Rameshwar Singh v. Ghuni Lal Shaha | Referenced in contested discussions about whether a simple mortgagee may obtain a receiver; contains obiter remarks. | The Court held this case did not justify the contention that a simple mortgagee has a right to a receiver; its relevant observations were treated as obiter dicta and not decisive. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a sequence of analytical steps:
- Preliminary procedural objection: The respondents argued the District Judge had not actually appointed a receiver in terms of the procedural rules. The Chief Justice rejected this preliminary objection, preferring the interpretation in Gobind Ram v. Ganesh Ram and the Full Bench Madras decision which adopted a "common-sense" approach rather than the narrow construction urged by other authorities.
- Factual findings: The Court found that the security had not diminished and that the allegations of waste by defendant 19 were not established on the evidence.
-
Analysis of mortgage law distinctions:
- The Court distinguished between (a) an Indian simple mortgagee, (b) an English legal mortgagee, and (c) an equitable mortgagee. It emphasized that a simple mortgagee under Indian law only has the remedy of suing on the personal covenant or seeking sale; he cannot realize his claim out of the rents and profits nor acquire absolute ownership by foreclosure.
- An English legal mortgagee historically had immediate rights to possession; after the Judicature Act and the fusion of jurisdictions, legal mortgagees have been conceded the right to a receiver (citing In re Pope and Venkata Rajagopala Surya Raw Bahadur v. K. Basavi Reddy).
- The equitable mortgagee's right to a receiver is grounded in the contractual right to be put in the position of a legal mortgagee; this equitable right underpins the appointment of receivers for equitable mortgagees.
- Because an equitable mortgagee has that contractual right to be placed in the position of a legal mortgagee, he differs from a simple mortgagee; the same distinguishing relationship exists between a simple mortgagee and an equitable mortgagee as exists between a simple mortgagee and a legal mortgagee.
- Consideration of precedent urged by plaintiffs: The Court analysed Venkata Kumara Mahipathi Surya Rao and Rameshwar Singh, explaining that Venkata Kumara concerned an equitable mortgagee (deposit of title deeds) and did not properly establish a rule extending the right to a receiver to simple mortgagees. Rameshwar Singh contained only obiter remarks on the topic and did not decisively establish that a simple mortgagee may obtain a receiver for arrears of interest.
- Practical consequence for the present case: The Court emphasised that defendant 19, as a usufructuary mortgagee, was entitled to the rents and profits. Therefore, even if a receiver were appointed, the receiver could act only in the interests of defendant 19 (the usufructuary mortgagee) and not for the plaintiffs. This undercut the plaintiffs' practical justification for a receiver.
- Conclusion on discretionary exercise: The Court exercised its discretion against appointing a receiver on the present facts and set aside the District Judge's order. Fazl Ali, J. concurred, adding that even if receivership could be granted in exceptional cases at the instance of simple mortgagees, it would be neither just nor convenient here: the possessor was a usufructuary mortgagee (not the mortgagor), there was no reliable evidence of waste or mismanagement, the income of the estate had increased materially (about 50% above the figure the Subordinate Judge assumed), the rule of damdupat made interest less serious, and the suit was likely to be decided shortly, so there was no need to alter the status quo.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal was allowed; the order of the District Judge appointing a receiver was set aside. The plaintiffs were directed to pay the costs of the appeal and of the Court below.
Implications:
- The immediate practical effect was to vacate the receiver appointment and to restore the status quo in favour of the usufructuary mortgagee in possession (defendant 19), subject to the eventual determination of the substantive suit.
- The Court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that a simple mortgagee is entitled, as of right, to the appointment of a receiver on account of arrears of interest; it concluded that the right to a receiver in equity rests on the equitable mortgagee's contractual right to be put in the position of a legal mortgagee, a position the simple mortgagee does not possess.
- The judgment emphasises that appointment of a receiver is a discretionary remedy and, on the facts before the Court (no proven waste, improved income, the position of a usufructuary mortgagee, and promptness of the suit), it would be neither just nor convenient to disturb possession by appointing a receiver.
- The Court ordered costs against the plaintiffs; the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel binding rule extending receivership to simple mortgagees beyond the reasoning stated, and it treated prior contrary or supportive observations in earlier cases (where present) as not decisive for the proposition urged by the plaintiffs.
Disposition: Appeal allowed.
Courtney-Terrell, C.J:— The plaintiffs on 24th March 1931 sued be enforce two mortgages of an impartible Raj in the Santhal Pargannas with an area of about three laks of acres. The first mortgage, dated 2nd February 1913, was executed by Jung Bahadur Singh the then holder of the estate for Rs. 2,00,000 at 6 per cent compound interest the due date being 1st February 1925. The second, dated 16th April 1917, executed by Sham Lal Singh a younger brother of Jung Bahadur, who had died since the first mortgage, was for Rs. 2,86,500 at 5a per cent compound interest the due date being 15th April 1927. Each of the mortgages contained a clause entitling the mortgagees to call up the whole amount if interest fell into arrears for two years in the case of the first mortgage or five years in the case of the second mortgage. Later, on 9th December 1926, Sham Lal and his younger brother executed a usufructuary mortgage to defendant 19 for Rs. 40,000 with which money certain creditors were paid off and on the 15th of the same month defendant 19 was put into possession. After a very brief period however he was dispossessed by a receiver appointed in a suit between Sham Lal and his younger brother. After various civil and criminal proceedings defendant 19 was however ultimately re-instated in possession by the Court on 5th January 1931 and has been in possession since, realizing the rents and profits under his rights as usufructuary mortgagee. He has had to pay large Government demands and has also paid off other creditors and his claim amounts at present to Rs. 2,18,000. It is admitted that no interest has been paid upon either of the first two mortgages since 8th June 1919.
2. This suit was begun within three months of defendant 19 gaining possession and the plaintiffs applied for the appointment of a receiver on three grounds firstly, that the interest on the first two mortgages was in arrears; secondly, that the security had now become insufficient and, thirdly, on the ground that defendant 19, the usufructuary mortgagee in possession was committing waste by out-ting trees. The Court acceded to the application by the plaintiffs and appointed a receiver. From this order defendant 19 now appeals. A preliminary objection has been argued by the respondents to the effect that the District Judge has not in fact appointed a receiver but has merely decided that the case is one in which a receiver should be appointed and that the order therefore does not fall within the terms of O. 40,. R. 1 and O. 43, R. 1(s) of the CPC. Reliance has been placed upon cases reported in Upendra Nath Nag v. Bhupendra Nath Nag (1), Narbada Shankar v. Kevaldas Roghunath Das (2) and Ramji v. Koman Das (3) in which a very narrow construction was placed upon the rule. I prefer the interpretation adopted by this Court in the case of Gobind Ram v. Ganesh Ram* (4) which follows a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of P.L.S Palaniappa Chetty v. P.L.P.P.L Palaviiappa Chetty (5) and expresses a more common-sense view of the matter.
3. There is no need to review the discussion afresh and I would therefore reject the preliminary objection. (His Lordship after holding that security bad not diminished and that the allegations of waste were not established proceeded). Now the plaintiffs base their claims on simple mortgages but the mortgagee in the case of a simple mortgage merely has the right to sue upon the personal covenant or to bring the property to sale: he cannot satisfy his claim out of the rents and profits of the mortgaged property nor can he acquire the absolute ownership of the estate by foreclosure. In this respect he is in a position different from that of an English legal mortgagee who has a contractual right to the possession of the mortgaged property, and from an equitable mortgagee who is entitled by contract to be put into the position of a legal mortgagee with the privileges appertaining to that position. By reason of his right to possession direct or indirect the Courts, on the application of a legal or equitable mortgagee, may appoint a receiver. It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that a simple mortgagee under Indian law is in a position analogous to that of an equitable mortgagee and that whereas a legal mortgagee cannot obtain the appointment of a receiver, an equitable mortgagee could and so therefore ought a simple mortgagee. But the reason for the early refusal of the English Courts to appoint a receiver on the application of a legal mortgagee was that he already had a higher and legal right to personal possession. Since the Judicature Act and the fusion of legal and equitable jurisdictions a legal mortgagee has been conceded the right to a receiver: see Cotton, L.J, in In re Pope (6) and Venkata Rajagopala Surya Raw Bahadur v. K. Basavi Reddy (7). The right of an equitable mortgagee to have a receiver appointed is based on his right to be put by the Court into the position of a legal mortgagee. The same difference therefore between a simple mortgagee under Indian law and a legal mortgagee under English law exists between a simple mortgagee and an equitable mortgagee.
4. On behalf of the plaintiffs reliance was placed on observations by Madhavan Nairs, J., in the case of Venkata Kumara Mahipathi Surya Rao v. Gokuldoss Goverdhandass (8). That was the case in which there had been an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds and the mortgagee, at whose instance the receiver had been appointed, prayed that the receiver might be directed to deposit in Court the money realized by him from the mortgaged properties for the benefit of the mortgagee in preference to other creditors of the mortgagor. It was in that case rightly decided that the receiver having been appointed at the instance of the equitable mortgagee must hold the income of the property for the benefit of the mortgagee. The creditors argued that inasmuch as the equitable mortgagee had no immediate right to take possession or foreclose he was in the same position as a simple mortgagee and so had no right to the appointment of a receiver in his own interest. This seems to have led the learned Judge to inquire whether a simple mortgagee could obtain a receiver which was not the point before him. He confronted counsel for the creditors with a case, to be hereinafter mentioned, in the Calcutta High Court, which seemed to decide this point in the affirmative. Counsel unnecessarily conceded that the point as to a simple mortgagee's right was so decided though he argued that it was wrongly so decided; whereupon the learned Judge said that if, as had been decided, a simple mortgagee could get a receiver so could an equitable mortgagee who also had no immediate right to foreclosure or sale. That is to say, he arrived at the correct conclusion but by means of a false premise. At p. 568 (of 54 Mad), he said:
“Admittedly, the rights of the petitioner who is an equitable mortgagee, are the same as those of a simple mortgagee, that is, he is not entitled to the possession of the properties under his mortgage; he can realize his dues only by getting a decree for selling them.”
5. But the learned Judge had I think forgotten to notice that an equitable mortgagee although he cannot like a legal mortgagee take immediate possession has a contractual right to be put by the Court into the position of a legal mortgagee and it is this fact which is the basis of his equitable right to the appointment of a receiver—an equitable right which since the Judicature Act the legal mortgagee has enjoyed and but for the technical separation of law and equity he would always have enjoyed by reason of his right to possession. If the case of Rameshwar Singh v. Ghuni Lal Shaha (9) be examined it will be found that it does not justify the contention put forward as to the right of a simple mortgagee to the appointment of a receiver. The plaintiffs had brought a mortgage suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge impleading the mortgagors and also the mortgagees under a later mortgage. A receiver had been appointed at the instance of the plaintiffs and in the presence and with the consent of the second mortgagees. The right of the plaintiffs to obtain such an appointment of receiver was not made the subject of appeal to the High Court who in the matter before them were merely asked to decide upon the soundness of a subsequent order by the Subordinate Judge that the receiver should pay half the profits and receipts to the second mortgagees and half to the plaintiffs. In deciding that point the Court said that neither the second mortgagee nor the mortgagor was in a position to question the appointment of the receiver. The Court says that it was “suggested” by the second mortgagees that a receiver ought not to have been appointed at the instance of a simple mortgagee and disagreed with that suggestion. But the matter does not seem to have been seriously argued and the observation by the learned Judges on this point are merely obiter dicta. In any case I am quite unable to agree with them. We have not been furnished with any case in which the right of a simple mortgagee to obtain the appointment of a receiver upon failure to pay the mortgage interest has ever been in question and directly affirmed.
6. Lastly, it is clear that under his usufructuary mortgage defendant 19 is entitled to the rents and profits of the mortgaged property and consequently, even if a receiver were appointed, he could act only in the interests of defendant 19 and not in the interests of the plaintiffs.
7. For these reasons I was in favour of the order made by us at the end of the last term allowing this appeal and setting aside the order of the District Judge and directing the plaintiffs to pay the costs of this appeal and of the Court below.
Fazl Ali, J.:— I agree. Even assuming for the sake of argument that a receiver may be appointed in exceptional cases at the instance of one who holds a simple mortgage I am of opinion that it will be neither just nor convenient to appoint a receiver in this case. The person who is at present in possession of the properties is not the mortgagor but a usufructuary mortgagee. There is no reliable evidence whatsoever that he has committed or has been committing any acts of waste or that the property is being mismanaged.
8. The learned Subordinate Judge seems to have been of the opinion that the security in this case is insufficient, but in coming to this conclusion he proceeded on the assumption that the net annual income of the property mortgaged was a little over Rupees 46,000. It has however been pointed out to us that according to the current settlement proceedings the income has increased by almost 50 per cent. The question of interest is not a serious one in this case, because the rule of damdupat applies. The suit was instituted in March 1931 and being now over a year old must be ripe for hearing. It seems likely therefore that the suit will be decided before long and in these circumstances there does not appear to me any particular necessity for altering the status quo.
M.N
9. Appeal allowed.
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