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P.K.A.C.T Veerappa Chettiar v. Padmanabha Naidu And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
By a High Court decree in Appeal No. 273 of 1918 dated 25 October 1920 a scheme was settled for the administration of the Sri Arunachaleswarar Devasthanam at Tiruvannamalai. Under that scheme administration was vested in a Board of Trustees subject to the control and supervision of the South Arcot Devasthanam Committee, as referred to in Rule 1(b) and Rule 2 of the scheme and formed under Act 20 of 1863.
Act 2 of 1927 (the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act) repealed, so far as applicable to Hindu religious endowments, Act 20 of 1863. The opinion notes that there is no transitory provision in Act 2 of 1927 expressly terminating committees formed under Act 20 of 1863 or transferring their duties to bodies constituted under Act 2 of 1927. Consequently, after Act 2 of 1927 took effect, no body clearly answering to the description of the South Arcot Devasthanam Committee was in existence for present-day conditions.
In December 1927 one of the trustees died. In November 1928 the President of the North Arcot District Temple Committee (a committee formed under Act 2 of 1927 to supervise devasthanams in the North Arcot district) purported to act as if his committee had replaced the South Arcot Devasthanam Committee and appointed respondent 14 as a trustee on 10 November 1928; that appointment was confirmed by the committee on 18 November 1928.
The petitioner, a life-trustee of the Devasthanam, filed the present petition seeking directions whether the North Arcot District Temple Committee had jurisdiction to make this and other appointments. Joined to the main petition was Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 5607 of 1928, which sought an injunction restraining respondent 14 from taking charge as trustee and restraining the Temple Committee from making similar appointments pending disposal of the main petition. An ex parte injunction had earlier been granted on that ancillary petition. The court observed that any interlocutory order would be academic if the main petition were disposed of, and proceeded to dispose of the main petition and the joined petition(s).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petition is maintainable or whether it in substance seeks a declaration invalidating the election/appointment of respondent 14 such that the relief falls within the mischief of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil P.C.) and therefore must be pursued by suit in accordance with the Full Bench ruling in Veeraraghava Chariar v. Advocate General of Madras (A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 1073).
- Whether a single trustee (i.e., one member of the Board of Trustees) may, by himself, invoke Rule 16 of the scheme and apply to the High Court for directions, or whether only the Board of Trustees as a whole is competent to apply.
- As a factual-administrative issue, what body, if any, currently takes the place of the defunct South Arcot Devasthanam Committee in the scheme (though the court treated this as a question involving scheme modification rather than immediate relief by petition).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Position (as to relief sought)
- The petitioner, a life-trustee, sought directions from the High Court on whether the North Arcot District Temple Committee had jurisdiction to appoint trustees in place of the South Arcot Devasthanam Committee.
- Petitioner's counsel relied on authorities (Karattole Edamma v. Unni Kannan; Kunhan v. Moorthi; Pyari Mohan Bose v. K. Nabin Chunder Roy) said to support the proposition that a single trustee may file actions (for example, for recovery of property or similar reliefs) without consulting co-trustees — deducing a general principle that an individual trustee has inherent capacity to apply in his trustee capacity.
Respondent 14's Position (preliminary objections)
- Respondent 14's counsel raised preliminary objections: (1) the petition is, in effect, a petition to declare respondent 14's election invalid and such relief is within the mischief of Section 92 Civil P.C. so that, following the Full Bench ruling in Veeraraghava Chariar v. Advocate General of Madras, the proper remedy is a suit and not a petition; and (2) it is incompetent for a single trustee to institute the present petition — Rule 16 contemplates application by the Board of Trustees as a whole.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Veeraraghava Chariar v. Advocate General of Madras, A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 1073 | The Full Bench rule that where a court framed a scheme by decree it may allow applications only on matters it deliberately left open; points involving alteration of a final decision or scheme must be pursued by suit under Section 92 Civil P.C. | The court applied this test and concluded the question whether any body had taken the place of the defunct South Arcot Committee was not a matter the original court deliberately left open; therefore the present petition (seeking what is effectively a modification/declaration affecting the scheme) was not sustainable as a petition under Rule 16 but would require a suit under Section 92. |
| Karattole Edamma v. Unni Kannan [1903] 26 Mad. 649 (Full Bench) | Authority stating that a suit for recovery of property or redemption etc. may be filed by one of a body of trustees without consulting the rest. | The petitioner's counsel relied on this authority to argue a single trustee can apply. The court held the authority was not relevant to the interpretation of Rule 16 of the scheme, which expressly contemplates application by the Board and not by an individual trustee. |
| Kunhan v. Moorthi [1910] 34 Mad. 406 | Another authority cited for the proposition that individual trustees may sue without joining co-trustees for certain reliefs. | The court noted the citation but rejected its relevance to the specific scheme provision (Rule 16) which limits the right to apply to the Board of Trustees. |
| Pyari Mohan Bose v. K. Nabin Chunder Roy [1899] 26 Cal. 409 | Authority cited similarly to support the petitioner's contention about the capacity of a single trustee to initiate proceedings. | The court recorded the citation but concluded these authorities did not govern where a scheme expressly requires the Board to apply; accepting the petitioner's reading would amount to modifying the scheme, which cannot be done by petition. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court embarked on a two-pronged analysis corresponding to the preliminary objections.
First, the court examined the precise scope of the Full Bench ruling in Veeraraghava Chariar. It distilled the rule: liberty in temple schemes to apply to the Court is permissible only where the Court, when framing the scheme, thought it advisable to leave a question undecided for later determination. Otherwise, applications that seek alteration of a final decision constitute modification of the scheme and must be pursued by suit under Section 92 Civil P.C.
Applying that principle, the court considered whether the question before it — what body now fills the role of the defunct South Arcot Devasthanam Committee in the scheme — was a question the original court deliberately left open. The court concluded that it was not such a question. Therefore, under the Full Bench authority, the present petition was not a proper petition under the scheme's liberty-to-apply provision but rather raised matters requiring suit.
Second, the court interpreted Rule 16 of the scheme which provides that "the Board of Trustees... may by petition apply to the High Court for such further or other directions in the matter as may be necessary." Rule 3 defines the Board as consisting of "three or more trustees the committee may appoint" (the court noted the defective grammar but treated the provision on its face).
The court read Rule 16 literally and purposively: the party competent to apply is the Board of Trustees, not an individual member. The scheme envisaged the Board as the administrative body; allowing a single trustee to apply would permit individual trustees to bring matters before the High Court and thereby convert the Court into the administrative body the scheme intended to avoid. The court therefore held it did not intend that a single dissatisfied trustee should be able to agitate such matters by an application for directions.
The court addressed the petitioner's reliance on authorities that permit individual trustees to sue for certain proprietary remedies. It found those precedents inapposite because the scheme's rules unambiguously required the Board to apply and, if the drafter had intended an individual trustee to have that power, the language could have said so. To accept the petitioner's construction would effectively modify the scheme — a material alteration that cannot be achieved by petition.
The court further observed that, even excluding respondent 14, the Board then consisted of the petitioner and another trustee; the other trustee had neither been consulted nor joined the petition nor appeared. Thus, neither in form nor substance did the present petition constitute an application by the Board of Trustees.
For these interrelated reasons — the Full Bench requirement that scheme alterations be pursued by suit unless the original court left the point open, and Rule 16's clear language conferring the power to apply only on the Board — the court concluded the petition was incompetent and liable to be dismissed.
Although dismissing the petition, the court recognized a substantive defect in the scheme: Rule 1(b) "as it stands has no meaning for the present day conditions" because the repeal by Act 2 of 1927 left uncertainty about what body, if any, now performs the role of the South Arcot Committee. The court held that determining that question and effecting the necessary modification of the scheme would require the proper procedure — indicated to fall under Section 57(4) of Act 2 of 1927 — and urged that the Board of Trustees, the temple committee, or the Hindu Religious Endowment Board should take steps promptly to have the modification made.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The court dismissed the main petition as incompetent and also dismissed Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 199 of 1928 and 5607 of 1928.
Direct consequences:
- The petition seeking directions (as presented by a single trustee) was held incompetent and dismissed; the petitioner was ordered to pay respondent's costs.
- The ancillary petition for injunctive relief (C.M.P. 5607 of 1928), which had earlier resulted in an ex parte injunction, was also dismissed as its disposition would be academic in light of the dismissal of the main petition.
Broader procedural implication noted by the Court:
- The material question of what body now fills the role of the South Arcot Devasthanam Committee involves a material modification of the scheme and therefore cannot be achieved by petition; it requires resort to the appropriate procedure under the statute (the court referred to Section 57(4) of Act 2 of 1927).
- The court expressed the hope that the Board of Trustees, the temple committee, or the Hindu Religious Endowment Board would promptly initiate the necessary proceedings to obtain a modification of the scheme.
Note: The court did not purport to decide — by way of the present petition — what specific body now fills the role of the defunct South Arcot Devasthanam Committee; it directed that the appropriate statutory procedure be used to resolve and effect the necessary modification.
1. This petition is presented in the following circumstances: The High Court by its decree in Appeal No. 273 of 1918 dated 25th October 1920, settled a scheme for the administration of the Sri Arunachaleswarar Devasthanam at Tiruvannamalai. Under that scheme the adminstration of the Devasthanam was put under a Board of Trustees, subject to the control and supervision of the South Arcot Devasthanam Committee formed under Act 20 of 1863: see Rules 1 (b) and 2 of the scheme. By Act 2 of 1927, the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, Section 8, Act. 20 of 1863, so far as it applied to Hindu religious endowments and therefore to this Devasthanam, was repealed, and the South Arcot Devasthanam Committee formed under the Act (20 of 1863) presumably came to an end. We say "presumably" because there is no provision, transitory or otherwise in Act 2 of 1927 putting an end to such committees formed under Act 20 of 1863 or devolving their duties on similar committees formed' under act 2 of 1927. thus, after act 2 of 1927 came into force in January 1927 no body which could answer to the description of the South Arcot Devasthanam Committee formed under Act 20 of 1863 was in existence. In December 1927 one of the trustees died.
2. The President of the North Arcot District Temple Committee, a committee formed under Act 2 of 1927 to supervise the administration of devasthanams in the district of North Arcot within which District Tiruvannamalai now lies, purporting to act as if that committee had taken the place in the scheme of the South Arcot Devasthanam Committee, appointed respondent 14 as a trustee on 10th November 1928, and that appointment was confirmed at a meeting of the committee on 18th November 1928. The petitioner, who is a life-trustee of the Devasthanam has put in the present petition praying this Court to give directions whether the North Arcot District Temple Committee has jurisdiction to make this appointment and other appointments and for such other directions as the Court may see fit to give in the circumstances. Along with this petition another petition was joined, namely, C. M. P. 5607 of 1928, praying that pending the disposal of the main petition this Court would by an injunction restrain respondent 14 from taking charge of his office as Trustee and restrain the members of the Temple Committee from making further appointments of a similar nature. On that petition, before notice was issued to the other side, an ex parte injunction in the terms prayed for was granted. That petition now comes on for disposal also after notice. But the discussion of it would be academic and is unnecessary since any order on it only enures till the main petition is disposed of and we are disposing of the main petition now. In this connexion we would only remark that it is difficult to see how, under cover of directions to one trustee, other trustees and even the Temple Committee itself could be restrained by an injunction.
3. The main petition is opposed, inter alia by respondent 14, the elected trustee; and on his behalf his learned Counsel has taken several preliminary objections to the maintainability of the petition. Those which call for discussion here are : (1) that the petition is in effect a petition to declare the election of respondent 14 invalid, and that such a declaration is a relief which comes within the mischief of Section 92, Civil P.C., and therefore must on the Full Bench ruling in Veeraraghava Chariar v. Advocate General of Madras A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 1073 be agitated not by petition but by suit, and (2) that it is incompetent for only one trustee by himself to put in such a petition.
4. In dealing with the first point the exact scope of the Full Bench ruling in Veeraraghava Chariar v. Advocate General of Madras A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 1073 which of course is binding on us, must be realized. As we understand that ruling it is this. The reservation in temple schemes framed by decree of Court which gives liberty to apply is only permissible by law when the Court is unable, or for good reasons thinks it advisable, not to finally determine any question arising for its decision or to leave such decision for a future date.
5. In all other cases the application must necessarily relate to a matter already finally decided, and to ask for alteration of a final decision is to ask for a modification of the scheme, a relief which can only be granted by following the procedure in Section 92, Civil P.C., that is, by way of suit. In other words, the test whether the point at issue can be raised by petition and not by suit is whether the Court advisedly left it to be determined later on. This is the law as it stands at present, though we may be permitted to remark that the legal history of this question indicates that the Courts have been influenced, and, if we may say so with respect rightly influenced, more by considerations of surmounting practical difficulties than by strict logic. Strict logic would demand that any direction sought for which is not merely an interpretation of the language of the scheme, but involves an alteration of the scheme, however petty, must be obtained by a suit under Section 92. The Full Bench, realising the practical difficulties of holding that any and every iota of a scheme once framed is unalterable has laid down that additions or alterations are permissible on points which the Court deliberately left open for further consideration and decision. The reason is plain. Just as for suits under Section 92 the sanction of the Advocate General is necessary to ensure that trustees shall not be harassed by frivolous suits, so it is necessary in order to prevent trustees being harassed by frivolous petitions that the questions which can be raised by such petitions should be questions which the Court itself has by the form of its order allowed to be raised at a future date. We have the guarantee of the Court which passed the scheme that the question raised is necessary for the effective administration of the scheme, and therefore its decision thereon is really a part and parcel of the original scheme. Applying this principle, it is not feasible hare to hold that the question of what body, if any, has taken the place of the defunct South Arcot District Committee formed under Act 20 of 1863, was a question which the Court deliberately left open for further consideration and decision. We think therefore that under the Full Bench ruling the present petition is not sustainable.
6. The second preliminary objection seems to us no less cogent. Rule 16 of the scheme says that the Board of Trustees... may by petition apply to the High Court for such further or other directions in the matter as may be necessary.
7. Assuming for the purpose of argument on this point that the present application would be competent if put in by the Board of Trustees, the question is whether it is competent when put in only by a single trustee. The Board is defined by Rule 3 as to consist of " three or more trustees the committee may appoint, the defective grammar being apparently the fault of the draftsman and not of the printer. We think that Rule 16 must be taken as it stands, namely that the party which can apply for directions is the Board of Trustees and not any member of that Board. The scheme contemplated the administration of the Devasthanam by the Board of Trustees, and unless the Board as a whole, the administrative body, wants directions, there is no point in the High Court being approached for guidance. We are clearly of opinion that the High Court did not intend that any one trustee out of several, who is dissatisfied with the conduct or method of (appointment of a co-trustee, should be able to agitate that matter by an application for directions, or should be able to ask the High Court to decide, whether the conduct of his co-trustee was proper or the method of his appointment valid. To allow that is in effect to constitute the Court and not the Board of Trustees the administrative body under the scheme, a position which the Courts have always been solicitous to avoid.
8. On this point the petitioner's learned Counsel has quoted to us the rulings of this and other High Courts, for instance, Karattole Edamma v. Unni Kannan [1903] 26 Mad. 649 (F.B.), Kunhan v. Moorthi [1910] 34 Mad. 406, and Pyari Mohan Bose v. K. Nabin Chunder Roy [1899] 26 Cal. 409, which lay down that a suit for recovery of property or for redemption of a mortgage, or for similar reliefs, may be filed by one of a body of trustees without consulting the rest, and he seeks to deduce therefrom a general principle that the right to apply is inherent in any trustee's position as such. But we do not think that these rulings are really relevant for the present discussion. The rules of the scheme speak for themselves and lay down without any ambiguity that the party who is to apply is the Board of Trustees, and this might very well have been done with intention, in order to prevent the work of the body of trustees from being hampered by continual petitions by dissatisfied individual trustees. If it had been intended that a single trustee could apply, it was quite easy to say so. To accept the petitioner's interpretation of Rule 16 would be in effect to modify the scheme in a, material particular, and that, as already noted, cannot be done by way of petition to apply. Now admittedly, the Board, even excluding respondent 14, consists of the petitioner and another trustee. That trustee was not consulted before the petition was put in, nor has he joined in the petition, nor has he appeared here. Neither in form nor in substance is the present petition a petition by the Board of Trustees. For this reason also we hold that the petition is incompetent and must be dismissed. Petitioner will pay respondent's costs.
9. It is obvious, however, that a very real defect in the scheme has been disclosed in that Rule 1-(b) as it stands has no meaning for the present day conditions. The essence of the present petition is that one trustee wants to know what body, if any, is now functioning in the place of the South Arcot Devasthanam Committee. in the scheme. Clearly the other trustees, if they have the interests of the Devasthanam at heart, must also desire an answer to that question. The answer can only be either (1) that there is no such body now functioning at all, or (2) that such and such a body has taken the place of the defunct committee. Both answers equally involve a material modification of the scheme and such modification can at present be only by way of suit, since so far the legislature has not provided any other solution. Therefore either the body of trustees or the temple committee, or the Hindu Religious Endowment Board itself, must come to the rescue of the scheme and take the proper procedure which appears to fall under Section 57 (4), Act 2 of 1927 for having the necessary modification made in the scheme, and we express a hope that this will be done promptly. Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 199 of 1928 and 5607 of 1928 are also dismissed.
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