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M. Lakshumana Iyya P... v. S. Rajam Aiyar And O...
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
An election was held on 27th August 1928 to fill three vacancies in the 3rd ward of the Wallajah Municipality. The Chairman conducted the election and initially declared the candidates numbered 1, 2 and 3 elected. On 3rd September 1928 S. Rajam Aiyar (the petitioner, candidate No. 4) filed an election petition (O. P. No. 11 of 1928) in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Vellore, alleging undue partiality by the Chairman, improper counting of votes in favour of the successful candidates, employment of an inadequate staff, and announcement of results without checking or verification; the petitioner claimed that, if properly checked, he and other failing candidates would have been elected.
Before the hearing commenced, on 24th October 1928 the petitioner applied for a recount (I. A. 692 of 1928), which the lower Court granted. A recount by a commissioner altered the result so that candidates formerly listed as Nos. 4 and 5 displaced Nos. 2 and 3. Two of the now-defeated candidates, M. Lakshmana Iyer and K. S. Mallappa Chetti, applied (I. A. No. 752 of 1928) for a scrutiny of the ballot papers alleging possible tampering; this application was disallowed by the lower Court.
Revision proceedings were brought raising, inter alia, contentions that the Subordinate Judge lacked jurisdiction to order the recount and that he erred in refusing the further scrutiny. Additional matters arose from the recount: P. Venkataswami Naidu (7th respondent) obtained a seat and was declared duly elected under R. 12(2)(a), and the Chairman, who had been made a party, was ordered by the lower Court to pay costs; the propriety of making the Chairman a party and of the costs order was challenged in C.R.P. No. 4 of 1929.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the learned Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to order a recount in the circumstances and whether the recount application had been supported by sufficient evidence or material to justify such an order.
- Whether the lower Court erred in refusing to order a further scrutiny of the ballot papers as requested by the defeated candidates.
- Whether the Chairman of the election was a proper party to the election petition and, relatedly, whether an order directing the Chairman to pay costs was sustainable.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner (S. Rajam Aiyar) — Arguments
- Alleged that the Chairman showed undue partiality and counted many votes in favour of the successful candidates which ought to have been rejected.
- Contended that the Chairman deputed only one clerk to mark the votes for all candidates instead of employing more than one clerk and that there was no subsequent check or verification before announcing results; if there had been a check, the petitioner believed he would have been elected.
- Supported the application for a recount by a verified petition and by an affidavit stating belief that a proper count would have resulted in his election.
Respondents / Opponents — Arguments
- In a counter-affidavit it was objected that the petitioner was not entitled to the relief (recount) until he had satisfied the Court of the irregularities complained of.
- Two of the originally successful candidates (later defeated by the recount) challenged the recount's consequences and sought a scrutiny of ballot papers to check for tampering; that scrutiny application was dismissed by the lower Court.
Counsel Reliance and Legal Submissions
- Mr. K. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar relied on English law (the Stepney case) to submit that a Court before ordering a recount must have evidence that the original count was or may have been incorrect.
- The Chairman (in C.R.P. No. 4 of 1929) contended that he was not a proper party to the petition and that the order requiring him to pay costs was improper because his personal culpability was not in issue or proved.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| The Stepney case (IV O’ M and H 34) | Recount is not a matter of right; the Court may hear evidence tending to show a mistake by the returning officer and, if satisfied, direct a recount. | The court cited the Stepney case to show the established English practice that recounts are discretionary and based on evidence; it accepted that such evidence may be by affidavit and that the Subordinate Judge applied the correct principle. |
| Halsbury (Vol. XII, para. 891) | Summarises the principle: "A recount is not granted as of right, but on evidence of good grounds for believing that there has been a mistake on the part of the returning officer the Court will make an order for a recount." | The court relied on this statement as an authoritative exposition of the English rule and treated it as consistent with allowing recounts upon reasonable grounds shown by petition and affidavit. |
| Rogers on Elections, 19th Edition, Vol. II, p. 301 (and form No. 35, p. 933) | Practice: order a recount before trial where there is reason to believe a miscount; applications are made by summons supported by affidavits; the form contemplates hearing counsel and reading affidavits. | The court quoted Rogers to support that an affidavit is sufficient to support an application for recount and that the Subordinate Judge's approach conformed with this practice. |
| Appaya Gounder v. Sheik Dawood Sahib (Full Bench) | Authority that a revising Court should not enter into the merits of the lower Court's order on certain interlocutory matters. | The court invoked this Full Bench decision to explain that it could not permissibly review the merits of the lower Court's refusal of the scrutiny application in revision proceedings. |
| Govardhan Das v. Lal Chand (report on Punjab Election Commissioners' decision) | Reported statement that there is no provision in Indian law, as there is in English law, for the Returning Officer being made a respondent. | The court cited this report to support the view that Indian practice may not contemplate making the Chairman a respondent in an election petition. |
| Ramakrishna Reddi v. Nooney Panakalu | Held by Jackson, J., that a Chairman is not a proper party to an election petition and that his name ought to have been struck out. | The court relied on this decision to conclude that the Chairman was not a proper party in the present proceedings and that the order making him liable for costs could not be supported. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the legal standard for ordering recounts by reference to English authorities (the Stepney case, Halsbury and Rogers) and considered whether the Subordinate Judge's order complied with that standard. The Court noted these points of analysis in sequence:
- The English authorities demonstrate that a recount is not a matter of right but may be ordered where there is evidence giving good grounds to believe a mistake in the original count. Although the Stepney case involved oral evidence, Rogers contemplates that an application may be supported by affidavits and that hearing counsel and reading affidavits is appropriate.
- The Court compared that standard to the material before the Subordinate Judge. The petitioner's verified petition contained specific allegations (partiality by the Chairman, inadequate clerical assistance, absence of verification/checking and an assertion that a proper count would have resulted in the petitioner's election). The petitioner also filed an affidavit repeating those beliefs.
- The Subordinate Judge explicitly referred to Rogers and stated: "A miscount is alleged by the petitioner and this application is supported by a verified petition. I am therefore satisfied that there is a reasonable ground for the petitioner's belief that there has been a miscount." The revising Court regarded this as sufficient to show that the lower Court applied its mind and did not exceed its jurisdiction.
- The Court observed that proof that the count was wrong ordinarily cannot be given before a recount—the most that can usually be alleged is cause to suspect a miscount—so an insistence on stricter proof before allowing a recount would be unwarrantable.
- From the standpoint of Indian procedure, the Court relied on R. 6 of the Election Disputes Rules making Civil Procedure Code procedure applicable and on O. 19, R. 2 of the Code permitting affidavit evidence on interlocutory applications; thus the lower Court's acceptance of affidavit material to order a recount was procedurally valid.
- Concerning the refused scrutiny application, the revising Court stated it could not enter into the merits of that decision in revision (citing Appaya Gounder v. Sheik Dawood Sahib).
- Regarding the declaration of P. Venkataswami Naidu as duly elected under R. 12(2)(a), the Court observed that it was competent for the lower Court to make the declaration and that objections based on non-joinder were inadequate when they came from some of those who had been made parties.
- On the Chairman's liability for costs, the Court expressed grave doubt about imposing personal culpability where the Chairman's personal culpability had not been proved and where misconduct by others could have occurred. The Court further reasoned that under applicable rules and earlier decisions (including Ramakrishna Reddi), a Chairman is not a proper party to an election petition in India; by force of R. 6 and the guidance of O. 1, R. 3 CPC, no right to relief was alleged against the Chairman, so he was not a proper party.
- Consequently, the order making the Chairman liable for costs was unsupportable and was set aside.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revision petitions C.R.P. Nos. 1612, 1613 and 1704 of 1928 were dismissed, with costs to the respondents in C.R.P. No. 1704. The court upheld the lower Court's grant of a recount as within jurisdiction and not affected by material irregularity in exercise of that jurisdiction.
Regarding C.R.P. No. 4 of 1929 (preferred by the Chairman), the Court held that the portion of the lower Court's order which made the Chairman liable to pay costs could not be supported because the Chairman was not a proper party to the petition under the applicable rules and precedent; that part of the order was set aside. The petitioner (in that petition) will recover his costs of the petition from the respondents.
Implications: The decision directly affected the parties by (a) affirming the validity of the recount and maintaining the recount-driven alteration of elected candidates; (b) dismissing the primary revision petitions with costs; and (c) setting aside the costs order against the Chairman and restoring costs to the petitioner in C.R.P. No. 4 of 1929. The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader new precedent beyond applying existing English and Indian authorities and procedural rules to the facts of this case.
These petitions arise out of an election held on 27th August, 1928 to fill three vacancies in the 3rd ward of the Wallajah Municipality. The election was conducted by the Chairman and the result so far as it concerns us, stood as follows:
} Elected. Accordingly Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were declared elected. An election petition (O. P. No. 11 of 1928) was then filed by S. Rajam Aiyar (No. 4) in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Vellore, alleging that the Chairman had shown undue partiality, that he had counted votes in favour of the successful candidates which ought to have been rejected, that he employed, an inadequate staff, that the results were announced without checking or verification and that if there had been subsequent check the petitioner and other candidates who had failed would have been elected. This petition was filed on 3rd September, and on 24th October, before the hearing had commenced, the petitioner applied for a recount (I. A. 692 of 1928). This was granted, and the recount was carried out by a commissioner with the following result:—
It will be seen that Nos. 4 and 5 in the prior list have displaced Nos. 2 and 3. The two candidates who were now defeated, M. Lakshmana Iyer and K. S. Mallappa Chetti thereupon applied (I. A. No. 752 of 1928) for a scrutiny of the ballot papers, with a view to ascertaining whether they had been tampered with, but this was disallowed by the lower Court.
In arguing the main revision petition the contentions are raised that the learned Sub-Judge ordered the recount in circumstances not sufficient to give him jurisdiction, and that he was in error in not directing the further scrutiny asked for. On the first point it is urged, more specifically, that a Court before ordering a recount must have evidence before it that the original count was or may have been incorrect. Mr. K. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar has recourse to English Law in support of this position. In the Stepney case (IV O’ M and H 34) the questions which arose were as to the stage in the proceedings at which; a recount could be applied for and ordered, which does not now concern us and whether or not it could be claimed as a right. Denman, J., in delivering judgment, referring to an interlocutory conversation during the course of the hearing, says:—
“We decided against the contention that the respondent was entitled to a recount as a matter of right, but offered to hear any evidence tending to show that there had been a mistake on the part of the returning officer. We heard witnesses on both sides upon the point, and were satisfied, I may say mainly upon the evidence of one of the witnesses called by the petitioner, that there were strong grounds for thinking that the return could not be strictly relied upon. We therefore determined upon directing a recount…..”
This case forms the sole cited authority for the exposition of the Law on this point in Halsbury (Vol. XII paragraph 891).
“A recount is not granted as of right, but on evidence of good grounds for believing that there has been a mistake on the part of the returning officer the Court will make an order for a recount.”
In Rogers on Elections, 19th Edition, Vol. II, page 301, it is stated that.
“The practice now is to order a recount before the trial where there is reason to believe there has been a miscount. Application for it should be made by summons supported by affidavits showing grounds”
The form of order for recount (No. 35, at page, 933 of the same volume) contemplates the order being passed ‘Upon hearing counsel for the petitioner and respondent and upon reading the affidavits of, etc.’
Thus although in The Stepney case, oral evidence was taken, it is enough to support the application by affidavit.
Let us now see what preceded grant of the application in the present case. I have already summarised the allegations which petitioner made in his main petition. I will now quote the following verbatim extracts from it:
“The Chairman deputed only one clerk to mark the votes secured by all the candidates when he ought to have employed more than one clerk … There was no subsequent check or verification of the votes marked by the clerk. The results were announced without checking or verification. If there had been subsequent check petitioner and other candidates who failed in the election would have been elected.”
In his affidavit in support of his application for a recount he says:
“I have stated in my petition that the Chairman showed undue partiality and counted many votes in favour of the successful candidates which ought to have been rejected … I believe that if the votes were counted properly I would have been elected.”
In the counter-affidavit it was objected that petitioner was not entitled to the relief prayed for before he had satisfied the Court of the irregularities complained of. The learned Subordinate Judge in the course of his order, after quoting the passage in Rogers which I have given, says:
“A miscount is alleged by the petitioner and this application is supported by a verified petition. I am therefore satisfied that there is a reasonable ground for the petitioner's belief that there has been a miscount.”
Reading together the affidavit with the original petition, we find what that reasonable ground is; and if the Court considered the ground for the petitioner's belief to be reasonable, it must have felt, I presume, that there was room to doubt the correctness of the count. It is not for me, dealing with this case in revision to weigh the grounds upon which the Court acted. I have only to see that action was not marked by lack of jurisdiction or by material irregularity in its exercise. It is quite clear that the learned Subordinate Judge was under no misconception as to what at any rate the English Law was, and applied his mind to the question whether or not a recount should be granted. It need hardly be said that from the nature of the case proof that the count at the election was wrong cannot be given before the recount takes place. Usually nothing more can be alleged than cause to suspect the original count. An over-strict insistence that an application should be supported by evidence of miscounting is therefore unwarrantable. I consider accordingly that there was a sufficient compliance with the English procedure applying to this matter. Nor, looking purely to Indian Law, do I discover any irregularity, R. 6 of the Election Disputes Rules for District Municipalities renders the procedure laid down by the Civil Procedure Code applicable; and under O. 19, R. 2 of the Code evidence may be given by affidavit upon any application. From this point of view, the lower Court was dealing with the equivalent of an interlocutory application in a suit, and so far as I can see no question of jurisdiction is raised by the manner in which it dealt with it.
It is then said that having allowed the recount the learned Sub-Judge should have ordered the further scrutiny asked for. Into the merits of the case for this, and of the order dismissing the application, it is not permissible for a revising Court to enter—see the Full Bench case Appaya Gounder v. Sheik Dawood Sahib(1). I can only say therefore that the order appears to have been passed with jurisdiction and so is final.
One of the results of the recount was, as has been seen, to provide P. Venkataswami Naidu with a seat. This man was a party (7th respondent) to the petition, and under R. 12 (2) (a) it was competent to the Court to declare him duly elected. It is pointed out that he put in an application (I. A. No. 806 of 1928) to which he made only the three originally successful candidates parties, and it is urged that it is bad for non-joinder of the remainder. I doubt whether any such application was in fact necessary; but a sufficient answer is that the objection comes from two of those who were made parties.
C. R. P. Nos. 1612, 1613 and 1704 of 1928 are accordingly dismissed with costs to respondents in C. R. P. No. 1704.
There remains C.R P. No. 4 of 1929, preferred by the Chairman. He had been made a party to the original petition and in declaring the petitioner and the 7th respondent in those proceedings duly elected the lower Court ordered that the Chairman should pay their costs. The learned Subordinate Judge found jurisdiction for this course in the carelessness evinced by the Chairman in counting the votes. The propriety of this order is open to the gravest doubt, because the question of the Chairman's personal culpability was not in issue and not tried. It is quite possible, for all that the inquiry shows, that he was the victim of misconduct on the part of others. These, however, it may be said, are not grounds for interference in revision and I turn to a more fundamental objection to this part of the order. The Chairman, it is contended, was not a proper party to the petition, and the Court should have struck his name out. It is no doubt true that in England a Returning Officer may be impleaded as a respondent. (Hals. XII, 821 and Rogers Vol. II, 266). But there is ground to hold that this is not the law in India. Under R. 12 the Municipal Council may appoint a legal practitioner or other person to attend and take such part in the inquiry as the Judge may allow. That does not of course in terms preclude a petitioner from making the Chairman a party, but it does suggest that the framers of the rules did not contemplate that he should do so. There is a statement in a report on a petition decided by the Election Commissioners of the Punjab, Govardhan Das v. Lal Chand that there is no provision in the Indian, as there is in the English Law for the Returning Officer being made a respondent, and that so far as it goes, appears to be correct. In Ramakrishna Reddi v. Nooney Panakalu(2) it was held by Jackson, J., that a Chairman is not a proper party to an election petition, and that the Court ought to have struck out his name. The point has not been so put in the arguments, but I conceive that, by force of R. 6 the Court must guide itself by the terms of O. 1, R. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code; and here no right to relief was alleged to exist against the Chairman, so that he was not a proper party. On this view the order making him liable for costs cannot be supported and I set it aside. Petitioner will recover his costs of this petition from respondents.
N. R. R.
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