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Sheo Prasad (Decree-Holder) v. Naraini Bai (Objector).
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Lala Sheo Prasad (appellant) obtained a simple money decree against Isri Prasad, husband of Mt. Narainibai (respondent), in the Court of the Munsif of East Budaun (stated in the opinion as obtained on 9th March 1916). Following that decree, the appellant made multiple execution applications over time:
- 12th November 1918: an application for execution was filed.
- 23rd January 1920: that application was struck off with the consent of the decree-holder (the appellant).
- 4th March 1921: the appellant applied again for execution, praying that certain property be attached and sold; the application also contained a reference to heirs (the court and parties later conceded the heirs reference need not be considered for the present question).
- On or before 19th April 1921: the Court observed that the property specified for attachment in the March 1921 application lay outside the jurisdiction of the Munsif of East Budaun and directed the decree-holder to explain how the Court could proceed; the application remained pending while an explanation was invited.
- 29th April 1921: as no explanation was given, the March 1921 application was dismissed and the decree-holder withdrew the process-fees he had deposited.
- 12th January 1923: the decree-holder filed a further execution application in respect of property within the jurisdiction of the Munsif of East Budaun; the Munsif dismissed this 1923 application as barred by limitation, holding that the earlier application of 4th March 1921 did not save limitation because it was not in accordance with law.
The Subordinate Judge agreed that the March 1921 application was not in accordance with law and therefore could not save limitation, but also held the earlier application had been made to a proper Court. The principal legal question in the appeal concerned the legal character and effect of the proceedings on 4th March 1921.
Note: the body of the opinion later refers to the decree being obtained on "March 9th 1915"; the opinion thus contains both dates (9 March 1916 and 9 March 1915) in different passages.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the proceedings on the application of 4th March 1921 constituted "an application in accordance with law to the proper Court of execution, or to take some step-in-aid of execution."
- Whether the March 1921 application was a bona fide application (i.e., made with an intention to obtain execution) such that it could interrupt or restart the period of limitation applicable to the later application of 12th January 1923.
- Whether an application that prays for attachment and sale of property which is outside the jurisdiction of the Court is "in accordance with law" for the purpose of saving limitation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The application of 4th March 1921 was a "step-in-aid of execution" or otherwise an application for execution that should save limitation.
- The application of 4th March 1921 had been made to the proper Court.
- The fact that the property specified in the March 1921 application was outside the jurisdiction of the Court did not render the application "not in accordance with law."
- Counsel additionally argued (and acknowledged as common practice) that decree-holders often file applications to save limitation and that historically the bona fides test had not been consistently applied; he urged that the bona fides test was not required or consistently applied to such applications.
Respondent's Arguments
- It was conceded on behalf of the respondent that an earlier reference to heirs had been made and that that issue need not affect the present determination.
- The respondent relied on the proposition that the March 1921 application was not "in accordance with law" because it asked the Munsif of East Budaun to attach and sell property located outside its jurisdiction—relief which that Court was not competent to grant.
- The respondent cited authorities (including Chattiar v. Nawal Singh; Munwar Husain v. Jani Bijai Shankar; Langtu Pande v. Baijnalh Saran Pande; and Jamilannissa, Bibi v. Mathura Prasad) to support the proposition that an application asking a Court to do what it was incompetent to do is not in accordance with law and thus does not save limitation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jahar v. Kamini Debi (1901) 28 Cal 238 | Cited in discussion of whether an application filed to save limitation can be good if prosecuted bona fide; reliance was placed on Privy Council authority. | Used as part of the line of authorities showing earlier recognition that bona fides of proceedings may be relevant to effectiveness of an application to save limitation. |
| Hira Lal v. Badri Das (1879) 2 All 792 (Privy Council) | Applied principle of bona fides: bona fide proceedings in a wrong Court may give a new starting point of limitation; bona fides relevant under Section 20 (now Article 182). | Relied upon heavily: held to support that bona fide proceedings before a Court believed to have jurisdiction can be effective to enforce a decree and to restart limitation. |
| Gopal Chander Manna v. Gosian Das Kalay (1898) 25 Cal 594 | Application held to be valid where there was no suggestion of lack of bona fides. | Cited to show cases in which bona fide applications were treated as effective to save limitation. |
| Adhar Chandra Dass v. Lal Mohan Das (1897) 24 Cal 778 | Emphasized that bona fide applications for execution should not be defeated by trivial defects of form. | Used to underline importance of bona fides in determining whether an application is "in accordance with law." |
| Mangal Sen v. Baldeo Prasad (1892) AWN 70 | Illustrates where an application was held to be nominal/fictitious and therefore not in accordance with law because the decree-holder showed lack of intention to prosecute. | Cited as authority for the proposition that where the application itself shows mala fides (nominal/fictitious), it cannot save limitation. |
| Chatter v. Nawal Singh (1889) 12 All 64 | Application must ask the Court to do something which by law the Court is competent to do; an application for something the Court is incompetent to do is not in accordance with law. | Relied on to support the view that applications asking a Court to grant relief beyond its competence are not "in accordance with law." |
| Mahtab Kuar v. Sham Sunder Lal (1888) AWN 272 | Held that where an application was not made bona fide to obtain execution it did not amount to a step-in-aid of execution. | Used to show previous judicial insistence that bona fides are essential for an application to be treated as a step-in-aid of execution. |
| Mangal Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri (1881) 8 Cal 51 (Privy Council) | Privy Council treated proceedings as effective where there was no finding that the proceedings were not bona fide. | Referred to as one of the Privy Council authorities supporting the bona fides principle. |
| Roy Dhunput Singh Roy v. Mudhomotee Debia (date cited in text as 11 BLR 23) | Privy Council decision: where an application was made bona fide (despite mistake), limitation began to run from disposal of that application. | Cited to show that bona fide but mistaken proceedings can restart limitation; court relied on its reasoning. |
| Eshan Chunder Bose v. Prannath Nag (1874) 22 WR 512 (Full Bench) | Discussed in context of whether bona fides of earlier application could be used to refuse a later application; Full Bench held a later application could not be refused merely because the earlier was colourable. | Used to explain that bona fides of the later application cannot be judged at time of presentation, but bona fides of the earlier completed proceedings can be examined when used to save limitation. |
| Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495 | Cited for the proposition that particular phrases used in judgments should not be treated as governing on matters not directly considered. | Referred to in explaining limits on extending Full Bench language beyond the precise issues it decided. |
| Mangal Khan v. Salim Ullah Khan (1893) 16 All 26 | Applicant filed no succession certificate; court held absence did not necessarily make the application not in accordance with law where time to supply it could be allowed. | Distinguished by the present Court: the case is analogous in some respects but not controlling because in those instances courts could order execution subject to condition; here the Court could not at all order attachment/sale of property outside its jurisdiction. |
| Aptapuddin Ahmad v. Jogendra Narain Tewari AIR 1920 Cal 172 | Cited by appellant among Madras/Bombay/Calcutta cases seeking to support wider view. | Included in list of cases the appellant relied upon; the Court did not treat these authorities as overriding the bona fides principle or the jurisdictional limitation point. |
| Nathubhai Kasandas v. Pranjiwan Lalchand (1910) 34 Bom 189 | Cited for proposition similar to Mangal Khan regarding defects capable of being cured by court ordering compliance within time. | Distinguished by the Court: in those cases the Court could hold execution subject to a condition; in present case the Court could not grant the relief asked at all. |
| Bando Krishna Kunbargi v. Narsimha Konher Deshpande (1913) 37 Bom | One of the authorities cited by appellant (Bombay case) in support of his position. | Listed among appellant-cited authorities; the Court found the preponderance of other authorities (Allahabad and Calcutta) outweigh them in relevance to the jurisdictional competence issue. |
| Ramaswami Ayyangar v. Bhagirathi Ammal (1883) 6 Mad 181 | Cited by appellant among Madras decisions; concerned defects and competence issues. | Considered briefly; Court noted some Madras cases involved formal or curable defects and did not override the principle that a Court cannot be asked to do what it is incompetent to do. |
| Ramanandan Chetti v. Periatambi Shervai (1883) 6 Mad 250 | Cited by appellant; to be considered among Madras authorities. | Referred to but not treated as determinative; Court considered its assistance limited. |
| Rama v. Varada (1893) 16 Mad 142 | Illustrates purely formal defects in an application. | Distinguished: where the defect is purely formal or curable, an application may be regarded as in accordance with law; not analogous to present case where Court could not grant relief sought. |
| Samia Pillai v. Choakalinga Chettiar (1894) 17 Mad 76 | Example of a bona fide mistake, cited among appellant authorities. | Distinguished as involving bona fide mistakes rather than an application for relief that the Court was incompetent to grant. |
| Munwar Husain v. Jani Bijai Shankar (1905) 27 All 619 | Cited by respondent to support that courts cannot grant what they are incompetent to do and such applications are not in accordance with law. | Relied upon to corroborate the proposition that an application requesting attachment/sale of property outside the Court's jurisdiction is not "in accordance with law." |
| Langtu Pande v. Baijnalh Saran Pande [1906] 28 All 387 | Authoritative All-India decision relied upon by respondent for competency principle. | Used to support the conclusion that where a Court cannot grant the relief asked, the application is not in accordance with law. |
| Jamilannissa, Bibi v. Mathura Prasad AIR 1921 All 208 | Cited by respondent as an authority confirming the competence/competency principle. | Relied upon to show that the Court could not grant attachment/sale of property outside its jurisdiction and hence the application was not in accordance with law. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two linked strands of analysis: (A) the legal meaning of the phrases "application for execution" and "step-in-aid of execution" for the purpose of limitation law, and (B) whether the facts of the March 4, 1921 application met that legal standard.
A. Legal meaning of "application for execution" and the role of bona fides
- The Court held that the legislature, in using the phrases "application for execution" and "step-in-aid of execution," must have contemplated an honest intention on the part of the decree-holder to proceed to execution. Stated succinctly: those phrases mean an application or step taken "for the purpose of obtaining execution."
- The Court reviewed a line of authorities (Calcutta, All-India and Privy Council decisions) which, in differing circumstances, had applied a "bona fides" test—that is, they treated whether the decree-holder genuinely intended to prosecute execution as material to whether an application interrupted or restarted limitation.
- The Privy Council decisions (e.g., Hira Lal v. Badri Das and Roy Dhunput Singh Roy v. Mudhomotee Debia) were stressed as establishing that bona fide proceedings, even in a wrong Court or despite mistakes, can be proceedings "to enforce the decree" and can give a new starting point of limitation.
- The Court distinguished Full Bench authority which held that a later application could not be refused merely because an earlier was colourable; the Court explained that the bona fides of the later application cannot be judged at the time it is presented from the earlier one, but the completed earlier proceedings can be examined later when they are invoked to save limitation.
B. Application of the legal principle to the facts
- Facts found significant by the Court: every property specified in the March 4, 1921 application lay outside the jurisdiction of the Munsif of East Budaun; the decree-holder was informed of this and given opportunity to amend (by applying for transfer), but he did not apply for transfer; the application was struck off on 29th April 1921 and on that same day he withdrew his deposited process-fees; the properties alleged to be attachable were in the adjoining Munsif's jurisdiction (West Budaun) and were not distant or in another province; there was evidence that property within East Budaun jurisdiction existed and was later used in the 1923 application.
- From these facts the Court concluded that the March 4, 1921 application demonstrated lack of bona fides: it was a colourable application made merely to save limitation rather than a genuine attempt to obtain execution. The Court observed that the decree-holder had taken no meaningful steps to make the application effective (no transfer application, withdrawal of fees, and long delay before any further attempt at execution).
- Because the March 1921 application was not a bona fide application "for execution" or "a step-in-aid of execution," it could not operate to interrupt or restart limitation in favour of the later 12th January 1923 application; therefore the 1923 application was barred by limitation.
- In addition to the bona fides conclusion, the Court reached a second and independent ground: the March 1921 application was not "in accordance with law" because it asked the Munsif of East Budaun to attach and sell property outside its jurisdiction—relief the Court was not competent to grant. The Court distinguished cases cited for the appellant where defects were formal or curable and where courts could allow execution subject to condition; here the Court could not at all grant the relief sought.
- The Court refused the appellant's request for a remand, reasoning that the complete history and facts were already before the Court, the appellant's counsel had had adequate time to address the bona fides question, and a remand would not have aided the appellant because the appeal failed on a second independent ground as well.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court dismissed the appeal. The Court concluded two independent points:
- The application of 4th March 1921 was not an application "for execution" or "a step-in-aid of execution" because it was not made bona fide with the intention of obtaining execution; rather it was a colourable attempt to save limitation.
- The application of 4th March 1921 was not "in accordance with law" because it asked the Munsif of East Budaun to attach and sell property situated outside that Court's jurisdiction, which the Court was not competent to do.
DISPOSITION: The appeal is dismissed with costs. The Court held that the subsequent application filed on 12th January 1923 was barred by limitation.
Implications
- Direct effect on the parties: the appellant's 12th January 1923 execution application is barred by limitation and the appeal to overturn that outcome is dismissed with costs; the March 1921 application does not save or extend limitation.
- Legal principles affirmed (as articulated by the Court in this opinion): an "application for execution" or "step-in-aid of execution" must be made bona fide for the purpose of obtaining execution; an application that asks a Court to do something it is not competent to do is "not in accordance with law" and cannot save limitation. The Court relied on and applied prior authorities (including Privy Council decisions) to those propositions.
- The opinion determined the outcome on two independent grounds (lack of bona fides and lack of competence of the Court to grant the relief), so the dismissal stands irrespective of which ground is treated as primary.
This summary is confined to the statements and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No additional facts or conclusions beyond those expressly found in the opinion have been added.
1. Lala Sheo Prasad, appellant here, obtained a simple money decree against Isri Prasad, husband of Mt. Narainibai, respondent here, in the Court of the Munsif of East Budaun on 9th March 1916. On 12th November 1918 he applied for execution. On 23rd January 1920 this application was struck off with the consent of the decree-holder. On 4th March 1921 he applied again for execution to the Munsif of East Budaun. The relief asked for in that application was that certain property be attached and brought to sale. There was a further reference to the heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor, but it is admitted now on behalf of the respondent that there had been a previous application to bring the heirs on the record and that the reference to these heirs in the application of 4th March 1921 can have no bearing on the matter which we have to decide. This matter need not therefore be further referred to, and the application of 14th March, 1921 will be considered as being simply one for the attachment and sale of certain property. On 19th April 1921 if not before, the attention of the decree-holder was drawn to the fact that all the property, for attachment and sale of which he prayed, was outside the jurisdiction of the Munsif of East Budaun and he was ordered to explain how the Court had any power to proceed against it. Pending that explanation being received the application was to remain pending, On 29th April 1921, as no explanation had been given By the decree-holder, the application was dismissed, and on the same date he took back all the process-fees that he had deposited. A further application was filed by the decree-holder for execution on l2th January 1923. This time the property detailed was within the jurisdiction of the Munsif of East Budaun who had passed the decree. The Munsif dismissed the application holding that it was barred by limitation, limitation not being saved by the previous application of 4th March 1921, in that application was not in accordance with law, as the property was outside the jurisdiction of the Court and no application had been made, even after opportunity had been given, to transfer the decree to the Court in whose jurisdiction the property was situate. In appeal the Subordinate Judge held that the application was made to the proper Court; and concurred with the Munsif that it was not in accordance with law and therefore could not save limitation. It is not suggested that during the twelve days prior to the dismissal of the previous application on 23rd January 1920, any act was done by the decree-holder which would bring his present application of 12th January 1923 within the period of limitation. The sole question, therefore, is whether the proceedings on the application of 4th March 1921 constituted an
"application in accordance with law to the proper Court of execution, or to take some step-in-aid of execution."
2. The memorandum of appeal to this Court contains two grounds: (1) That the application of the 4th of March 1921 was a "step-in-aid of execution": and (2) that the application was made to a proper Court. We have noted that the Subordinate Judge held that the application was made to a proper Court and this ground was therefore superfluous. As to the second ground it may be remarked that the application is more correctly to be described as an application for execution rather than as a step-in-aid of execution. For the appellant it has again been argued hare: (1) that the application was made to a proper Court: (2) that the fact that the property specified as liable to attachment was outside the jurisdiction of the Court did not render the application one not "in accordance with law."
3. A third point taken that an alleged request in the application that the heirs be brought upon the record would in any case prevent the application being wholly one not in accordance with law was, as we have noted, abandoned in this Court as not being justified by the circumstances of the case. We have further pointed out that it was conceded by the lower appellate Court and we may add that it has not been disputed here that the application was made to a proper Court. There is therefore only one question remaining for determination, namely do the facts that all the property specified was outside the jurisdiction of the Court and that there was no prayer at any time before the application was struck off (though the Court allowed time for amendment) to transfer the decree for execution to the Court in whose jurisdiction the property was situated render the application of the 4th March 1921 one "not in accordance with law.". What is the meaning of this phrase? At an early stage of the case counsel for the appellant was asked whether, if it were to be held in the circumstances that the application was not made with any bona fide intention of proceeding to execution but merely with the intention of saving limitation, it could rightly be held to be "an application for execution" or "a step in aid of execution." Counsel very properly and frankly admitted that it was a very common practice for decree-holders to put in a colourable application asking for execution which they did not mean seriously to prosecute, but which they allowed to be dismissed merely with the intention of relying upon the fact that they had made such an application in order to obtain a further period of three years before execution of the decree could be held to be barred by limitation. He urged that the test of whether the application was made in good faith with a real intention to proceed to execution was never applied. It may be true to say that this aspect of such proceedings has been to a great extent lost sight of, but it is not accurate to say that the test has never been applied.
4. On general principles it would seem clear that the legislature, 'when it used the phrases "application for execution" and "step-in-aid of execution," had in mind a bona fide intention on the part of the decree-holder to proceed with his right to have execution. It does not seem possible that the legislature should have ever contemplated an indefinite period being added to the life of a decree by permitting a decree-holder to take colourable steps in a very thinly disguised pretence of a desire to obtain execution when he really did not want execution at all, but only wanted to secure a further period by limitation during which the amount of his decree might go on increasing. It would therefore, seem on the face of it a proper interpretation of the words "for execution" and "step-in-aid of execution" that the decree-holder must really be desiring execution and that the words cannot be read as "an application made with the sole object of extending the period of limitation" and "a step taken with the sole object of extending limitation." The words "for execution" mean "for the purpose of obtaining execution" and the words "step-in-aid of execution" mean "step taken for the purpose of obtaining execution."
5. This, which appeared upon a consideration of Article 182 to be a natural and proper interpretation, research has shown to have the support of weighty judicial authority, though the decisions would seem to have been to some extent lost sight of, or, if we may say so, misinterpreted. In Jahar v. Kamini Debi (1901) 28 Cal 238, while Prinsep and Hill, JJ., held that the application which was filed to save limitation was a good application in accordance with law, reliance was further placed on the fact that even if the alleged defect on account of which it was urged that the application failed in effect was a real defect, the prosecution of the proceedings had bona fide, and reference was made to the Privy Council decision in Hiralal v. Badri Das (1879) 2 All 792. To this Privy Council decision we shall refer later. In Gopal Chander Manna v. Gosian Das Kalay (1898) 25 Cal 594 the application was hold to be a valid application. There was no suggestion (that the applicant did not really desire to press the execution proceedings; in other words, there was no suggestion of a mere desire to save limitation.
6. Banerji, J., in his order referring the case to a Full Bench held: "It is not every informality that would vitiate an application and take it out of that clause. Were it otherwise, bona fide applications for execution would fail to save limitation owing to trivial defects of form, a result which I do not think the Legislature could have intended." Maclean, C.J. in delivering the judgment of a Full Bench of five Judges in which all concurred, said: I am in entire agreement with the opinion he (Banerji, J.,) has expressed upon the question of whether the application for execution of 7th July 1891 was or was not one according to law. I concur both in the reasoning and in the conclusion expressed by Banerji, J., Here we find again a clear reference to the importance to be attached to the question whether the application was a bona fide effort to proceed with execution. In Adhar Chandra Dass v. Lal Mohan Das (1897) 24 Cal 778 Banerji, J., in rejecting various cases that had been referred to as supporting the argument that the application was not in accordance with law said: "None of those cases is in point, and I do not think we should be doing right in straining the law and in holding that an application made bona fide, with the object of obtaining satisfaction of a decree, should be held to be not in accordance with law merely because the Court in which the application was made thought fit for some reason not to allow the same." Stress was here again laid on the aspect of bona fides. In Mangal Sen v. Baldeo Prasad (1892) AWN 70, though there was no detail of the property given in the application, the decree-holder further stated in his application that he would file a list later, but "at present for the purposes of saving limitation this application is made owing to the defendant having become insolvent." The application was registered but no list was filed and no further steps were taken and a month later the application was (struck off. Mahmood, J., held that by the very statement of the decree-holder and the fact that he took no steps to make the application effective the application was clearly shown to be nominal and fictitious, and was therefore not in accordance with law.
7. In Chatter v. Nawal Singh (1889) 12 All 64 the application asked for something which "the Court was not competent to do." Straight and Tyrrell, JJ., held that the application must be for "something which by law the Court is competent to do" and not for "something which either to the decree-holder's direct knowledge in fact or from his presumed knowledge of the law he must have known the Court; was incompetent to do." Here again is a strong indication that the application must be made with the bona fide intention of getting execution. In Mahtab Kuar v. Sham Sunder Lal (1888) AWN 272. Mahmood, J., held that if ho had not been dismissing the application on another ground he would further have held that it did not amount to a step-in-aid of execution because it was not made bona fide to obtain execution. The decree-holder had failed to pay process-fees, and when called upon to do so had declared his intention of not prosecuting the application. We now come to three decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council:
8. In Mangal Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri (1881) 8 Cal 51, when holding that an application was effective their Lordships of the Privy Council remarked: Nor was there any finding of either of the Courts below that the several proceedings were not bona fide for the purpose of enforcing the decree or of keeping it in force," and they gave reasons why it could not be held that the application of the decree-holder to strike off his application could not be held to be other than bona fide. In Hira Lal v. Badri Das (1879) 2 All 792, which came before their Lordships in 1880, the decree-holder had been prosecuting execution in the Court of a Subordinate Judge who was believed by both the parties and moreover by the Subordinate Judge himself to have jurisdiction, though subsequently he was held not to have jurisdiction. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the principle of Section 14 of Act 14 of 1859 (now Section 14 of Act 9 of 1908) based on bona fides must be applied to Section 20 of Act 14 of 1859 (now Article 182 of Schedule 1 of Act 9 of 1908); and applying that principle, the bona fide proceedings in the wrong Court gave a new starting point of limitation. They referred to Roy Dhunput Singh Roy v. Mudhomotee Debia (1973) 11 BLR 23, and said: "Their Lordships are of opinion that a proceeding taken bona fide and with due diligence before a Court whom the party bona fide believes, though erroneously, to have jurisdiction, specially when the Judge himself also supposes that he has jurisdiction, and deals with the case accordingly, is a proceeding to enforce the decree within the meaning of Section 20." It should be noted that the principle was applied not merely to exclude the time mistakenly occupied, but to give a new starting point. This is clear from the passage quoted and also from the reliance placed on Roy Dhunput Singh Roy v. Mudhomotee Debia (1973) 11 BLR 23. It is also clear from the fact that an examination of the dates quoted by their Lordships shows that if merely the time mistakenly occupied was to be excluded, the latter application would still have been long after the period of limitation had expired.
9. In Roy Dhunput Singh Roy v. Mudhomotee Debia (1973) 11 BLR 23 the application failed owing to a bona fide mistake by the decree-holder as to an attachment that he thought he had made of money standing to the credit of the judgment-debtor while the attachment had in fact been made in another suit. The Privy Council held that the application having been made bona fide the period of limitation began to run from the date of the disposal of the application by the Court, In delivering their judgment at page 31 their Lordships said:
"It is said that this proceeding cannot be held to be one to keep the judgment in force, because it was a petition to obtain execution of a sum of money which it was not possible that the execution could reach and that must have been so to the knowledge of the decree-holder. It seems to their Lordships that these circumstances really affect only the bona fides of the proceeding. If their Lordships could infer from these facts that the petition was a colourable one, not really with a view to obtain the money, if they could come to that conclusion in point of fact, the proceeding would not be one contemplated by the statute; but their Lordships cannot come to that conclusion."They therefore come to the conclusion that the proceeding although abortive, was a proceeding, within the meaning of Section 20 of Act 14 of 1859 (now Article 182 of Schedule 1 of Act 9 of 1908). The above cases suffice to show that the application of the test of bona fides to determine whether an application is really one for execution is not novel.
10. It is only necessary to note that though there are differences between the contents of Section 20 of Act XIV of 1859 and of Article 182 of Schedule 1 of the present Act IX of 1908 there is no difference that is material to the matter we are considering. The words in Section 20 were "no process of execution;" the words in Article 182 are "no application for execution, or to take some step-in aid of execution." In neither section is there any specific mention of bona fides. If their Lordships held that bona fides were necessary to make "a process for execution" effective, it follows that the same interpretation should be put on the words "application for execution or step-in-aid of execution." Counsel for the appellant stated that since 1871 the bona fides or mala fides of the application have been immaterial. He did not develop this proposition beyond relying on a passage that he quoted from a commentary. It is true that the author makes that statement but we have not been able to find any real support for it in the authorities quoted by him. The idea, in so far as it exists, would appear to have its origin in the decision of the Full Bench, Eshan Chunder Bose v. Prannath Nag (1874) 22 WR 512. In that case Jackson and McDonell, JJ., in their referring order wanted to maintain the incorporation of the principle of bona fides to stop a succession of colourable applications. The idea underlying both the referring judgment and that of the Full Bench was that the question was whether the later application could be refused being hold to be colourable merely because the previous application had been colourable i.e., mala fide, as indicated by the fact that the decree-holder had allowed it to go by default.
11. Clearly the Full Bench was right in holding that the later application could not be refused merely for that reason. The decree-holder was entitled to make an application and until he defaulted in prosecuting it (when it would for that reason be struck off) it could not be known whether that latest application was being made with a bona fide intention to proceed or not. The later application might well be made with a bona fide intention to proceed though the previous one was not, and the latter could not therefore be treated as mala fide merely because the earlier was. But the proceedings on the earlier application having ex hypothesi been concluded, it would be possible to determine whether the facts showed it to have been mala fide and, if it was, then, though it could not be held to show that the later application was also mala fide, it could be held not to be an application "for execution" i.e., "intended to obtain execution" and, therefore, ineffective to save limitation. The two aspects are quite distinct. The former was clearly before the Full Bench; the latter was not; and on the principle stated in Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495 particular phrases used by Couch, C.J., should not be treated as a governing question not directly considered.
12. Jackson, J., when reluctantly concurring, remarked that inasmuch as the legislature must be supposed to have been aware of the earlier decisions incorporating the rule of bona fides into section 20 of act xiv of 1859 and as it, as I suppose designedly omitted to incorporate in the Act of 1871 the principle of those decisions, I think we ought now to abstain from qualifying the precise terms of the Act, "It would seem, however, that the legislature would presumably have only legislated if it disagreed with the principle already strongly affirmed judicially. We think that it is clear from the cases later in date that we have quoted that the principle has been frequently recognized that the bona fides or mala fides of the earlier application is an important ingredient in determining whether that application is effective to save limitation for the later application; though the bona fides of the later application cannot be judged at the time that it is presented from anything that has gone before and, therefore, cannot at the time of presentation be entered into.
13. To examine now the circumstances of this case, the decree-holder had obtained a decree as long ago as March 9th 1915. He then made two applications for execution both of which he allowed to be struck off for non-prosecution (budaun pairawi). Next he made an application on November 12th 1918 which he allowed to be struck off on January 23rd 1920. His next application was on March 4th 1921 and this is the crucial application in the case. It contained a prayer that certain property be attached and brought to sale, but none of that property was within the jurisdiction of the Court passing the decree and to which application was made. This was drawn to his attention and he was given an opportunity to amend his application. All that he had to do was to apply for the transfer of the decree. This he failed to do and it was not till a period of nearly two months had elapsed that his application was struck off, and on the same day he withdrew all the process-fees that he had deposited. The property in regard to which he had applied was not situated in any other province or at any great distance; it was situated in the jurisdiction of the adjoining Munsif, i.e., in the jurisdiction of the Munsif of West Budaun, and if the decree-holder had been serious in an attempt to obtain execution there would have been no difficulty in applying for a transfer to the Munsif of West Budaun and prosecuting the execution in that Court. Further we note that when he made the present application in regard to which the question of limitation has to be considered he applied in regard to property within the jurisdiction of the Munsif of East Budaun. It would appear therefore, that there was property within that Munsif's jurisdiction. Finally we note that after his application of 4th March 1921, which was struck off on 29th April 1921 he made no further attempt to obtain execution until he filed the present application on 12th January 1923, nearly two years later. Under these circumstances it is impossible to hold that the application of 4th March 1921, was a bona fide application with the intention of obtaining execution. It was merely a colourable application intended to save limitation and with that intention only. Such applications made only with the intention of keeping the decree alive have, it may further be noted, since 1877 been dropped out of the appropriate article of the Limitation Acts.
14. We have been asked to remand the case. We see no reason to do so as we have the whole history of the case before us counsel for the appellant who has displayed great industry on behalf of his client has had more than a month since the question was raised at the first hearing before us, in which to consider this matter of the good or bad faith of the earlier application, and it is certainly no fault of his if he has been unable in the circumstances of the case to take up any other position than that decree holders habitually file colourable applications merely to save limitation and allow the debt to accumulate and the question of their bona fides is never challenged. As we have shown it cannot be challenged, at the time of presentation and if the application is not prosecuted it is struck off, but it can be and should be challenged when the application comes to be used to save limitation. Further we may note that a remand could not in any event avail the appellant for as we shall proceed to show, the appeal must fail on a second ground also. This being our view of the law and of the, facts we hold that the application of 4th March 1921 was not an application "for execution" or "a step-in-aid of execution" and that the application of 12th January 1923; was barred by limitation and the appeal must be dismissed.
15. As to the second point we hold that the application of 4th March 1921 was not in accordance with law in that it asks the Court to do something which it was not competent to do. On behalf of the appellant we have been referred to Ramaswami Ayyangar v. Bhagirathi Ammal (1883) 6 Mad 181, Ramanandan Chetti v. Periatambi Shervai (1883) 6 Mad 250, Rama v. Varada (1893) 16 Mad 142, Samia Pillai v. Choakalinga Chettiar (1894) 17 Mad 76, Mangal Khan v. Salim Ullah Khan (1893) 16 All 26, Aptapuddin Ahmad v. Jogendra Narain Tewari AIR 1920 Cal 172, Nathubhai Kasandas v. Pranjiwan Lalchand (1910) 34 Bom 189 and Bando Krishna Kunbargi v. Narsimha Konher Deshpande (1913) 37 Bom. In Mangal Khan v. Salim Ullah Khan (1893) 16 All 26 the applicant filed no succession certificate and it was held that did not render the application one not in accordance with law. There is nothing in that case to show that the decree-holder was given any time to file the certificate as he should have been and that he neglected to fit it. The case is clearly analogous to the case in Nathubhai Kasandas v. Pranjivan Lal Chand (1910) 34 Bom 189 quoted by the appellant but which is really against his contention. In both cases the Court was competent to order that the execution should begin on the decree-holder making good the defect within a certain time. In the present case the Court could not order execution at all; it could not do at all what it was asked to do, i.e., to attach and sell. The same remarks apply to Ramasami Ayyangar v. Bagirathi Ammal (1883) 6 Mad 181. In the case of Rama v. Varada (1893) 16 Mad 142 there was a purely formal defect and in Samia Pillai v. Chockalinga Chettiar (1894) 17 Mad 76 a bona fide mistake. In view of the rulings of this Court to which we shall next refer none of the above cages nor the case of Ramanandan Chetti v. Periatambi Shervai (1883) 6 Mad 250 which to some extent helps the appellant need be further considered. For the respondent we have been referred to Chattiar v. Nawal Singh (1889) 12 All 64; Munwar Husain v. Jani Bijai Shankar (1905) 27 all 619; Langtu Pande v. Baijnalh Saran Pande [1906] 28 All 387 and Jamilannissa, Bibi v. Mathura Prasad AIR 1921 All 208. These cases clearly establish the proposition that whereas in this case the Court could not give the relief asked for, i.e., attachment and sale of property outside its jurisdiction, the application is not in accordance with law and at any rate in this Court, must far outweigh any such slight inference as may possibly be drawn from the Madras cases quoted for the appellant. We, therefore, hold that the application was further not in accordance with law because it was made to a Court which was not competent to grant the relief asked for. The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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