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Banshidhar Dobey v. Budangal Das

Calcutta High Court
Aug 3, 1928
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a rent suit concerning land in the Western Duars, District Jalpaiguri. The Plaintiff is a jotedar and the Defendant a chukanidar under him. In 1918 the chukani was purchased by the Plaintiff in execution of a decree. In Chaitra 1325 (1919) the Plaintiff let out the chukani to one Lepta Uraon, who executed a kabuliyat agreeing to pay Rs. 115 as rent. In 1920 the Defendant purchased the land from Lepta Uraon. The Plaintiff sued to recover rent at Rs. 115 per year. The Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff could only recover the rent recorded in the settlement (about Rs. 104) and also raised a plea of payment.

Both lower Courts accepted the Defendant's plea and decreed the suit at the lower recorded rate. The Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Defendant is bound by the engagement entered into by his vendor (Lepta Uraon) and cannot deny liability for the rent fixed in the kabuliyat. The Defendant argued that under the law applicable in the Western Duars the Plaintiff cannot recover more than 50% of the rent which the Plaintiff himself pays to Government.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the purchaser (Defendant) is bound by the contract (kabuliyat) made between the Plaintiff's vendor (Lepta Uraon) and the Plaintiff so as to make the purchaser liable for the rent of Rs. 115 agreed in that contract.
  2. Whether, under the law and settlement rules applicable in the Western Duars (a temporarily settled estate), the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from a sub-tenant rent exceeding 50% of the rent which the Plaintiff himself pays to Government.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The Defendant is bound by the engagement entered into by his vendor, Lepta Uraon; consequently the Defendant cannot plead that he is not liable for the rent fixed in Lepta Uraon's kabuliyat (Rs. 115).
  • Reliance was placed on precedents: Gour Chandra Saha v. Hani Mohan Sen and Zahardar Baksh Mallik v. Ram Lal Hazra to support enforceability of such contracts against subsequent purchasers.

Defendant's Arguments

  • Under the law in the Western Duars the Plaintiff is not entitled to recover rent exceeding 50% of the amount the Plaintiff himself pays to Government; accordingly the Plaintiff cannot demand Rs. 115 when the settlement-record rent is about Rs. 104.
  • The Defendant also pleaded payment in defence to the suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Brojo Kant Das v. Tufaun Das (1) To show that by the repeal of the Act of 1869 the Civil Procedure Code was held to be in force in the Duars. The court cited this case while tracing which procedural law applied in the Western Duars as part of the historical legal background to the dispute.
Gour Chandra Saha v. Hani Mohan Sen To support the proposition that a sub-tenant could enforce a contract for higher rent despite clauses in a lease restricting the tenant's charging of higher rents (cases from permanently settled districts). The court considered these authorities but distinguished them as not applicable: they arose in permanently settled districts where Government acted like a private zemindar; thus they do not control the present case in the temporarily settled Western Duars.
Zahardar Baksh Mallik v. Ram Lal Hazra Similar principle cited as above regarding enforceability of contracts between private parties notwithstanding restrictive lease clauses (permanently settled districts). The court distinguished this case for the same reasons as Gour Chandra Saha — it does not apply to temporarily settled estates where Government may legislate rules binding settlement-holders and under-tenants.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from the historical and statutory context governing the Western Duars:

  • Historical/statutory background: The Western Duars were ceded to the British and governed initially by Act XVI of 1869 (Bhutan Duars Act), later repealed and replaced by Act VII of 1895. Various statutes and notifications (including extensions under the Scheduled Districts Act) brought different enactments and the Bengal Tenancy Act into force in the Duars subject to specified restrictions preserving rights established by settlement proceedings and earlier leases.
  • Settlement practice and executive rules: Periodic government settlements fixed rents for chukanidars and authorised limits on rent enhancement (commonly permitting up to 50% enhancement in certain settlements). The Bengal Waste Lands Manual and the lease practice for waste lands prescribed forms and conditions; the Plaintiff's 1922 government lease contained clause (8) stating he shall not be entitled to enhance the rent of the chukanidar by more than 50% of what he himself pays to the Government.
  • Nature of rules: The court emphasised that the rules and notifications operating in the Western Duars function as executive orders with the force of law in a temporarily settled estate and that the Government has reserved rights (through statutes such as provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, secs. 191–192, as described) to make rules and even to override private contracts by fixing fair and equitable rents.
  • Application to the dispute: Given that the settlement rules and the Plaintiff's lease limited enhancement to 50% of the Plaintiff's own rent to Government, the court concluded that the Plaintiff could not, under the law applicable in the Western Duars, claim rent above that limit from a sub-tenant. The court rejected the Plaintiff's reliance on decisions from permanently settled districts (Gour Chandra Saha and Zahardar Baksh Mallik) as inapposite because in permanently settled areas the Government's position differs (acting akin to a private zemindar) and those cases thus do not govern a temporarily settled estate where the Government can prescribe binding rules on settlement-holders and their under-tenants.

The court therefore found that the settlement rules did not confer on the Plaintiff the right to claim rent above the settlement-prescribed limit and that the lower Appellate Court's decision (which accepted the Defendant's plea and decreed at the lower rate) was correct.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The decision upholds the lower Appellate Court's decree allowing recovery at the settlement-record rate (the lower rate) rather than the higher contractual rate (Rs. 115) claimed by the Plaintiff.
  • The court held that in the Western Duars (a temporarily settled estate) settlement rules and government-made restrictions — including a limit of 50% enhancement as reflected in the Plaintiff's lease — control and prevent the Plaintiff from recovering rent above that limit from a sub-tenant.
  • The court distinguished authorities from permanently settled districts and did not extend their principle to the temporarily settled Western Duars. The opinion did not purport to create a novel binding precedent beyond applying the existing settlement-based legal framework to the facts of this case.
P.C
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The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

This appeal arises out of a rent suit in respect of some land in the Western Duars in the District of Jalpaiguri. The Plaintiff is a jotedar and the Defendant is a chukanidar under him. In 1918 the chukani was purchased by the Plaintiff in execution or a decree. In Chaitra 1325 (1919) the Plaintiff let out the chukani to one Lepta Uraon who executed a kabuliyat agreeing to pay Rs. 115 as rent. In 1920 the Defendant purchased the land from Lepta Uraon. The Plaintiff has brought this suit for rent at the rate of Rs. 115 a year. The Defendant has pleaded that the Plaintiff is not entitled to recover the rent at which he settled the land but at the rate of Rs. 104 odd which is the rent recorded in the settlement record. Both the Courts have accepted the Defendant's plea and decreed the suit at the rate admitted by him. There was also a plea of payment. The Plaintiff appeals and it is argued on his behalf that the Defendant is bound by the engagement entered into by Lepta Uraon (his vendor) and he cannot plead that he is not liable for the rent fixed in Lepta's kabuliyat. For the defence it is argued that under the law as it obtains in that part of the country the Plaintiff is not entitled to recover more than 50 per cent of the rent which he himself pays to the Government.

In order to appreciate the value of the respective contentions of the parties it is necessary to trace the history of the Western Duars and of the law in force there. The territory known as the Western Duars was coded by the Bhutan Government to the British Government in 1866. By Act XVI of 1869 (The Bhutan Duars Act) the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts taking cognizance of suits in respect of immoveable property, revenue and rent in the territory was excluded and certain rules were framed by the Government which formed the schedule to the Act, which has the force of law there. It was, however, found that the Act of 1869 was defective in many respects and so it was repealed by Act VII of 1895. In 1875 the Scheduled Districts Act (XIV of 1874) was declared to be in force in the Western Duars; and Act XXIII of 1863 (the Act to provide for the claims to waste land) was also extended to the territory. See the Gazette of India of the 24th September 1875. By the repeal of the Act of 1869 the Civil Procedure Code was held to be in force in the Duars. Brojo Kant Das v. Tufaun Das (1). But no substantive law was declared to be in force there except what would be extended under the Scheduled Districts Act. In 1895 the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal with the previous sanction of the Governor-General extended Act X of 1859 and Act V of 1867 (B.C) to the Western Duars under the Scheduled Districts Act. By a notification, dated the 5th November 1898, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal similarly extended under the Scheduled Districts Act the Bengal Tenancy Act to the Western Duars with some restrictions of which the following clause is relevant for our purpose: “Where there is anything in the said Bengal Tenancy Act which is inconsistent with any rights or obligations of a jotedar, chukanidar, darchukanidar, Adhiar or other tenant of agricultural land as defined in settlement proceedings heretofore approved by Government or with the terms of a lease heretofore granted by Government to jotedar, chukanidar, darchukanidar, Adhiar or other tenant of agricultural land, such rights, obligations or terms shall be enforceable notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act.” When the Duars became included in the late province of Eastern Bengal and Assam that Government by a notification, dated the 7th November 1908, extended under the Scheduled Districts Act the Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act, 1903 and the Eastern Bengal and Assam Tenancy Amendment Act of 1908 to the Duars with some restrictions one of which was the same as contained in the notification of the Bengal Government of the 5th November 1898.

After the acquisition of the territory by the British Government there have been periodical settlements by the Government laying down rules to be enforced during the settlements. The first settlement was in 1871, but no notice was taken in it of the interest of chukanidars. The second settlement was in 1880 by which the rents payable by chukanidars were fixed for the term of the settlement and the settlement officer was authorised to enhance the rents of chukanidars up to 50 per cent of the revenue. The third settlement, commonly known as Sunders settlement, was made in 1889 for a period of 15 years under which the rents of the chukanidars were fixed for the term of the settlement on the principle that they should ordinarily pay 50 per cent, above the jotedari rates. The rules laid down by this settlement with occasional modifications have been adopted in subsequent settlements. The Western Duars is governed by the Waste Lands Act and the Bengal Waste Lands Manual, 1919, gives the rules under which leases of waste lands in the Western Duars are made. It prescribes the form of leases (which is Form D at page 32 of the Manual) to be adopted in case of renewal of leases in the Western Duars. The conditions attached to the lease have from time to time been modified and the lease which was granted by the Government to the Plaintiff in 1922 contains a clause—being cl. (8)—that he shall not be entitled to enhance the rent of the chukanidar more than 50 per cent of what he himself pays to the Government. The history of the various settlements in the Western Duars and the rules obtaining there will be found in Chap. VIII of the Eastern Bengal and Assam District Gazetteers by Griming. It is noticeable that cl. (2), part 11, Chap. 1 of the rules given in the Bengal Waste Lands Manual says that the rules are executive orders not ordinarily framed under any particular law; and one of the rules says that in order to avoid sub-infandation, the under-tenants of the jotedars are prohibited to create subordinate tenures and that the Civil Courts shall not take cognizance of cases between such parties. The Government thus assumes the right to make laws for the territory.

This being the state of the law in that part of the country, we have to see if the Plaintiff is entitled to demand rent under the ordinary law of contract higher than 50 per cent, of his own rent. There can be no doubt that in view of the various enactments which have been passed and the ruins framed relating to the Western Duars, the Government in that temporarily settled estate has the power to frame rules which have the force of law. The right of the Government to make laws for temporarily settled estates has been reserved by the Bengal Tenancy Act by secs. 191 and 192. The last clause of sec. 192 empowers the revenue officer to fix a fair and equitable rent notwithstanding anything contained in the contract between the parties. In such districts which are inhabited by aboriginals the Government has reserved to itself the right to make rules or laws by its executive orders ad part of its administrative policy. But it is argued on behalf of the Plaintiff that in spite of the restriction in the Plaintiffs lease with regard to the amount at which he is entitled to sub-let his holding, the Defendant is bound by his contract, rather the contract made by his vendor; and in support of this contention reliance has been placed upon the cases of Gour Chandra Saha v. Hani Mohan Sen and Zahardar Baksh Mallik v. Ram Lal Hazra . The above cases came from the Districts of Nadia and Hooghly respectively which are permanently settled Districts. In these cases the Government let out its khas mehal and in the kabuliyats which the tenants executed in favour of the Government, they stipulated that they would not charge from their sub-tenants rents higher than what they paid and 50 per cent, more. The sub-tenants agreed to pay higher rents than what the Government tenants were entitled to claim. The learned Judges held that the contract between the parties was enforceable notwithstanding the clause in the lease which could only be enforced by the Government and not by a sub-tenant. These cases have no application to the present case as they relate to Government khas mehal in which the position of the Government is that of a private Zemindar; whereas in the temporarily settled estates the Government has the right to make rules governing the settlements and its settlement-holders. In a case like the present there is no question of a third party enforcing a contract between two other parties or that the lessee is bound by the terms of his lease, under which he holds the land under his landlord. The Government has settled this land under rules prohibiting subletting at a rate higher than that fixed by the temporary settlement. The question therefore is whether the Plaintiff has the right to claim rent more than what he has agreed to receive from a sub-tenant by the terms of the settlement. The rules as they stand do not confer any such right to the Plaintiff. The decision of the lower Appellate Court is in our opinion correct and this appeal is dismissed with costs.

P.C