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Ramyad Singh v. Rambilas Singh
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs instituted a suit to enforce a mortgage bond for Rs. 3,000. With interest at Re. 1-1-0 per mensem up to the date of the subordinate (trial) court's decree, the amount became Rs. 9,325. The Subordinate Judge decreed that amount, added interest at the bond rate for two months as days of grace (Rs. 198), bringing the decretal total to Rs. 9,523, and ordered that from the expiry of the days of grace interest should run on the decretal amount at 6% per annum until realization.
The defendants appealed to the High Court, which allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. At the time the High Court decree was passed (July 1920), adding interest at 6% to the decretal amount would raise the amount in dispute to over Rs. 10,000. The central procedural question presented was whether, for the purpose of section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), the case satisfied the statutory amount or value requirements for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in computing the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the court of first instance for the purpose of section 110 CPC, future interest ordered by the trial court (either up to the date of realisation or at least up to the date of the High Court's decree) should be added to the decretal amount.
- Whether the second paragraph of section 110 CPC applies — i.e., whether the decree appealed from "involves directly or indirectly some claim or question to or respecting property" of the value of Rs. 10,000 or upwards such that leave to appeal should be granted, even if the subject-matter of the suit in the court of first instance did not meet the threshold.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiffs urged that when determining the value of the suit in the court of first instance the future interest awarded by the trial court (either until realization or at least until the High Court's decree) should be included; if so included the value would meet the Rs. 10,000 statutory requirement.
- Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that the decree or final order of the High Court involved a claim to property of the value of over Rs. 10,000 and thus, under the second paragraph of section 110, they were entitled to leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council.
The opinion does not set out a detailed, separate statement of the defendants' arguments beyond the procedural posture (that the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gooroopershad Khoond v. Juggutchander | The Sudder court should not give leave to appeal where the specified sum of Rs. 10,000 can be reached only by adding interest accruing after the decree. | The court applied this principle to conclude that future interest accruing after the trial court's decree should not be added in computing the value of the subject-matter in the court of first instance for section 110 purposes. |
| Moti Chand v. Ganga Pershad (Ganga Prasad) Singh | Held that interest ordered to be paid until realisation or accruing after the decree should not be added to the lower court's decree when computing the subject-matter value in the trial court; thus the subject-matter was under Rs. 10,000 and no appeal lay. | The court regarded this case as indistinguishable from the present facts and treated it as conclusive on the first issue: future interest is not to be included for computing the trial-court subject-matter value. |
| Dalgleish v. Damodar Narain Chowdhury | Calcutta High Court decision that in suits for recovery of possession mesne profits from institution to delivery of possession (or up to three years) can be included in the subject-matter under the Code; the Chief Justice also made an obiter dictum that the decree involved property of Rs. 30,000 (dictum held to be unnecessary to the decision). | The court noted these Calcutta decisions as establishing a practice for mesne profits, but treated the Chief Justice's dictum about the decree involving property over Rs. 10,000 as unnecessary to that case and of limited weight for the present question. |
| Kumar Basanta Kumar Roy v. The Secretary of State | Accepted the Calcutta practice that mesne profits for certain periods could be treated as part of the subject-matter of the suit under the Code. | Cited as an example of that Calcutta practice, but the court refused to extend that reasoning to include future interest in computing the trial-court subject-matter value for section 110 purposes. |
| Mahabir Prasad Singh v. Anup Narain Singh | Followed the Calcutta decisions on including mesne profits as part of the subject-matter. | Noted as a subsequent case following the Calcutta practice; the court observed prior doubting views and declined to extend the principle beyond mesne profits to future interest. |
| Maharaja Kesho Prasad Singh v. Shwa Saran Lal | Earlier case in which doubt was expressed about consistency with the Privy Council ruling in Moti Chand. | Cited to show that even within the court some doubts had been expressed about extending the Calcutta practice; used to caution against broad extension. |
| A. V. Subramania Ayyar v. Sellamal | Full Bench of Madras High Court did not follow the Calcutta practice of including future mesne profits / similar amounts when determining subject-matter value for appeal purposes. | Relied upon by the court as support for the view that the Calcutta line of decisions should not be extended to allow addition of future interest in computing the trial-court subject-matter value. |
| Nund / Nand Kishore Singh v. Ram Gulam Sahu | Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J., refused to allow future interest to be added to bring the suit's value up to the statutory amount; the High Court refused to grant certificate where the lower court's decree could only reach Rs. 10,000 by adding interest after the decree. | Used as direct support for refusing to permit addition of post-decree interest when assessing whether the trial-court subject-matter met the statutory threshold; the court regarded this as consonant with denying leave. |
| Surendra Nath Roy v. Dwarka Nath Chakravarti | High Court held that where, at the date of the High Court's decree, the value of the property exceeded Rs. 10,000, the case came within the second paragraph of section 110; Justice Mukerjee stated the value is to be determined with reference to the date of the decree under appeal. | The court considered this authority and the textual point advanced (valuation at date of High Court decree) but found it not determinative for the present case and distinguished its facts and reasoning from those before the court. |
| Allan v. Pratt; Mohideen v. Leclaire; Mohideen Hadjiar v. Pitchey | Cases cited by Justice Mukerjee in support of the proposition that the relevant point of time for valuation is the date of the judgment under appeal. | The court acknowledged these citations as part of the reasoning in Surendra Nath Roy, but treated that line as not controlling the present application where the first paragraph's requirements were not met. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the matter in two stages corresponding to the plaintiff's contentions.
First, on whether future interest (interest accruing after the trial court's decree up to realization or to the High Court decree) could be added to the trial-court decretal amount in computing the subject-matter value required by the first paragraph of section 110 CPC, the court relied on established authority. It cited the Judicial Committee's decision in Gooroopershad Khoond v. Juggutchander that leave should not be granted where the statutory amount is reached only by adding post-decree interest, and the Privy Council decision in Moti Chand v. Ganga Pershad Singh, which rejected adding such interest and held the subject-matter under Rs. 10,000. The court found Moti Chand indistinguishable and concluded the same rule applies: future interest cannot be added for the purpose of determining whether the first paragraph's threshold is met.
The court considered the Calcutta High Court decisions (Dalgleish and Kumar Basanta Kumar Roy) that treated mesne profits for certain periods as part of the subject-matter and noted these had been followed in some local practice. However, the court refused to extend that reasoning from mesne profits (which those decisions addressed) to the addition of future interest in mortgage enforcement cases for the purpose of satisfying section 110. The court further noted that the Madras Full Bench in A. V. Subramania Ayyar v. Sellammal did not follow the Calcutta practice and that Jenkins, C.J., had declined to allow future interest to be added in Nund/Nand Kishore Singh v. Ram Gulam Sahu.
Second, as to the plaintiffs' reliance on the second paragraph of section 110 (that the decree involves directly or indirectly a claim to or question respecting property of Rs. 10,000 or upwards), the court held that if a simple showing that the subject-matter in dispute on appeal exceeded Rs. 10,000 at the date of the High Court decree were sufficient, the purpose and language of the first paragraph would be rendered nugatory. The court examined the Dalgleish case where a dictum suggested the decree involved property of greater value, but considered that dictum unnecessary to the decision and of limited authoritative weight.
The court analyzed Surendra Nath Roy v. Dwarka Nath Chakravarti, noting that the High Court in that case treated valuation as at the date of the decree under appeal and that Justice Mukerjee cited other authorities to support that view. Nevertheless, the present court concluded that Surendra Nath Roy did not decide the point in the plaintiff's favour for the current facts, and that earlier decisions (notably Nund/Nand Kishore Singh v. Ram Gulam Sahu) supported declining leave where the trial-court subject-matter did not meet the statutory threshold absent inclusion of post-decree interest.
On the basis of these authorities and the construction of section 110 as a whole, the court concluded that the first paragraph's requirements applied and had not been satisfied in this case; the second paragraph did not operate to confer a right of appeal to His Majesty in Council under the facts before the court.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council is DISMISSED, with costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiffs are not granted leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council; the High Court's dismissal of the suit therefore stands and the plaintiffs cannot proceed further to that appellate forum.
- On precedent and broader law: The court refused to extend the Calcutta practice regarding inclusion of mesne profits to permit adding future interest for the purpose of meeting section 110's monetary threshold. The decision does not purport to create a novel general rule but applies existing authorities (notably Moti Chand and Gooroopershad Khoond) to deny inclusion of post-decree interest when assessing the trial-court subject-matter value. The opinion indicates no broader new precedent was intended beyond applying those existing authorities to the facts at hand.
Coutts, J. agreed with the judgment. The application was dismissed.
Dawson Miller, C.J:— This is an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. The suit was instituted to enforce a mortgage bond for Rs. 3,000 which, with interest at Re. 1-1-0 per mensem up to the date of the decree of the trial court, amounted to Rs. 9,325. The Subordinate Judge found in favour of the plaintiffs and passed a decree for that amount together with interest at the bond rate for two months, being the days of grace, which amounted to Rs. 198, bringing the total amount decreed to Rs. 9,523. He further ordered that from the expiry of the days of grace interest should run on the decretal amount at the rate of 6 per cent per annum until realization. The defendants appealed to the High Court. The appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed. The plaintiffs have now applied for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. When the High Court decree was passed in July, 1920, the interest at 6 per cent added to the decretal amount would bring the amount in dispute to over Rs. 10,000. The question for determination is whether, in the circumstances, the case complies as to amount or value with the provisions of section 110 of the CPC.
2. It is clear that the amount of the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to His Majesty in Council is over Rs. 10,000. It would also appear that the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the court of first instance was under that amount. The plaintiff, however, contends that in arriving at the value of the suit in the court of first instance the future interest awarded by the trial court up to the data of realisation, or at least up to the decree of the High Court, should be added in computing the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first instance and if that is done the value will comply with the requirements of the statute. They further contend that in any case the decree or final order involves a claim to property of the value of over Rs. 10,000 and, therefore, the second clause of the section entitles them to appeal.
3. In so far as the first question is concerned I do not think the case presents much difficulty. It was decided by the Judicial Committee as long ago as 1860 in the case of Gooroopershad Khoond v. Juggutchander(1) that the Sudder court; ought not to give leave to appeal in cases in which the specified amount of Rs. 10,000 can only be reached by the addition of interest subsequent to the decree. At that time the Order in Council in force was that of the 10th April, 1838, under which the only requirement as to value was that the subject mailer in dispute in the appeal to His Majesty in Council must be Rs. 10,000 or upwards and not as under the present law that the subject matter of the suit in the court of first instance must also be of the like amount or value. I can see no reason, however, why the same rule should not be applied in computing the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the trial court. Again, in Moti Chand v. Ganga Pershad Singh(2) a case in which the requirements as to value were the same as under the present Code, it was argued that to the amount of the lower court's decree should be added the interest which had been ordered to be paid until realization and which had accrued at the time of the High Court's decree in computing the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the trial court.
4. Their Lordships, however, rejected this contention and held that the subject-matter of the suit in the court of first instance was under Rs. 10,000, and as the first of the two conditions had not been fulfilled no appeal lay. The case is indistinguishable from the present and concludes the matter in so far as the first point argued is concerned. It is true that the Calcutta High Court has laid down that in a suit for recovery of possession of immoveable property with mesne profits the subject-matter of the suit in the court of first instance includes the mesne profits claimable from the institution of the suit to the date of delivery of possession or until the expiration of three years from the date of the decree, on the ground that Under the Code of Civil Procedure the court could provide in its decree for payment of mesne profits for that period [see Dalgleish v. Damodar Narain Chowdhury(3), and Kumar Basanta Kumar Roy v. The Secretary of State(4)]. Those decisions have been followed upon that point in this court on the ground that the matter was one of settled practice in the Calcutta High Court which formerly exercised jurisdiction over this province, [Mahabir Prasad Singh…Plaintiff v. Anup Narain Singh…Defendant .(5)] although in the earner case of Maharaja Kesho Prasad Singh v. Shwa Saran Lal(6), I had expressed a doubt as to how far they ware consistent with the ruling of the Privy Council in Moti Chand v. Ganga Prasad Singh. They were not followed by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in A.V Subramania Ayyar v. Sellamal(7), and the ruling in those cases should not in my opinion be extended so as to include future interest in computing the value of the subject-matter of the suit. Moreover, Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J who was a party to the decision in Kumar Rasanta Kumar Roy's case, declined, in the later case of Nund Kishore Singh v. Ram Gulam Sahu(8), to allow future interest to be added in order to bring the subject-matter of the suit up to the statutory amount.
5. It is next contended that the case comes within the second paragraph of section 110 in that the decree appealed from involves a claim to property amounting to over Rs. 10,000. If the only condition necessary to found a right of appeal to His Majesty in Council were that the decree of the High Court should be for a sum of over Rs. 10,600, it is difficult to see what meaning can be given to the first paragraph of the section. In fact that part of the section would be rendered nugatory, if it were sufficient to show merely that the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to His Majesty in Council amounted to Rs. 10,000 or more in value.
6. The appellant relied upon Dalgleish v. Damodar Narain Chowdhry. That was a suit for recovery of possession of lands valued at Rs. 5,460 and mesne profits which had not been assessed but had been claimed in execution at Rs. 30,000. It was argued that future mesne profits awarded by the trial court's decree could be added in estimating the value of the suit in that court and this view was accepted by the High Court. That was sufficient to dispose of the matter. The Chief Justice however, at the end of his judgment, added that in any case be thought that the decree involved directly or indirectly some claim or question to or respecting property of the value of Rs. 10,000 or upwards within the meaning of the section. No reasons were assigned for this view and that part of the judgment was not necessary for the determination of the case. I cannot regard this dictum as an authority of much weight. In my opinion the condition imposed by the first paragraph of the section are meant to apply to all cases where nothing is involved in the decision except that which is the subject-matter of the suit. In such cases it seems to me the second paragraph of the clause can have no operation and both the conditions imposed by the first paragraph must be complied with. This construction gives effect to both the first and second paragraphs of the section. It is also the view taken by the High Court at Madras in dealing with that part of the section [see A.V Subramania Ayyar v. Sellammal] It is also not without significance that, in the case of Moti Chand v. Ganga Prasad Singh, already referred to above, the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the trial court was under Rs. 10,000 but the amount in dispute when the High Court decree was passed exceeded that sum by the addition of interest. It was not even suggested either by the eminent counsel who appeared for the petitioner or by their Lordships that the second paragraph could apply to the case.
7. The case of Surendra Nath Roy v. Dwarka Nath Chakravarti(9), was also relied on by the learned Vakil for the appellant. That was a suit in ejectment which was valued in the lower Court under the Court-fees Act at one year's rental, viz., Rs. 4-4-0. The defendant contended that he held a permanent under mokarrari mourasi tenure and was not liable to ejectment. The suit succeeded before the Munsif who found that the tenancy was not of a permanent character. The District Judge on appeal reversed the finding and dismissed the suit. An appeal by the plaintiff to the High Court was dismissed. The plaintiff then applied for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council contending that the decree of the High Court involved a claim or question to or respecting property of over the prescribed value. It was found on inquiry that at the date of the High Court's decree the value of the property was over Rs. 10,000. There was no direct evidence of the value at the date of the suit in the court of first instance. The court left open the question of whether the case came within the first paragraph of section 110 but held that it came within the second paragraph. The learned Chief Justice on this point said
“I think this matter does come within the second paragraph of section 110 of the CPC. Code sesing that the decree of final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question to or respecting property of the value of Rs. 10,000”
8. Mr Justice Mukerjee dealt with this part of the case upon the hypothesis that the only question to be decided was the point of time at which the value of the property affected by the decree was to be determined. He says
“in my opinion it is plain that when S. 110 provides that the decree mut involve directly of indirectly some claim to question or respecting property of the value of Rs. 10,000 or upwards the indention of the legislature in that the value is to be determined with reference to the date of the decree under appeal.”
9. He than refers to Allan v. Pratt(10), Mohideen v. Leclaire(11), Mohideen Hadjiar v. Pitchey(12) Dalgleish v. Damodar Narain, and other cases in support of the view expressed and adds:
“In my opinion it in perfectly plain that under S. 110 the point of time to be considered is the date of the judgment under appeal. If this principle is adopted there is no room for controversy that in the case before us the decree against which leave to appeal is sought does effect property of the value of S. 10,000 or upwards.”
10. In neither of the lodgments are any reasons given for assuming that the case was not governed by the first paragraph of S. 110 and the question is not discussed. Assuming, however, that the facts of that case justify the conclusion that the second paragraph of the section applied, the judgment does not in my opinion conclude the point now under consideration. In the earlier case of Nand Kishore Singh v. Ram Gulam Sahu, decided by the same High Court, the plaintiff sued to enforce a mortgage. The amount decreed by the trial court could only be brought up to Rs. 10,000 by adding the Interest allowed after the date of the decree although the value of the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to His Majesty in Council from the High Court's decree was over the required amount. It was argued that all that was necessary was that the decree or final order must involve directly or indirectly a claim to property of the statutory value, but the court, consisting of Jenkins, C.J and N.B Chatterjee, J. refused to grant a certificate.
11. In my opinion this case falls within the first paragraph of the section, the requirements of which are not fulfilled, and the second paragraph has no application. The application is dismissed with costs.
12. Coutts, J.:— I agree.
13. Application dismissed.
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