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Rajagopala Goundar v. Maruthamuthu Asari
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit was brought by plaintiffs acting as trustees of a temple (the "plaint temple") in South Therku Poyyur to recover possession of a plot of land of 71 cents (comprised in old survey No. 83/2-X, included in pattah Ex. A) and mesne profits. The plaintiffs alleged the land was originally mirasidars' property subsequently gifted to the temple and that the defendant and his ancestors had been in long possession only by permission, as the land was a Blacksmith's service manyam granted to predecessors of the defendant for performing blacksmith services to the temple and village mirasidars.
The District Munsif found the temple to be the real owner and that the defendant's predecessor had permissive possession. The lower courts (District Judge and another appellate court) treated the defendant's possession as adverse, holding the suit barred by limitation (including an invocation of Section 13 of the Survey and Boundaries Act of 1897). A particular order dated 28 February 1921 (Ex. D-1)—which affected registry—became central to the limitation question. The matter was remanded by a higher bench to the District Munsif for a revised finding as to whether Ex. D-1 was an order under Section 11 of the Survey and Boundaries Act, which would render it conclusive under Section 13 unless challenged within one year.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the defendant's possession of the suit land, initially permissive as service tenure (Blacksmith's manyam), had become adverse so as to give rise to a title by adverse possession and thereby bar the plaintiffs' suit under the Limitation Act.
- Whether the order evidenced by Ex. D-1 (dated 28 February 1921) came within the purview of Section 11 of the Survey and Boundaries Act (Act 4 of 1897), which, if so, would render that order conclusive against the plaintiffs under Section 13 of the Act unless a suit to set it aside was brought within one year from its date.
- Consequentially, if Ex. D-1 is not an S.11 order, whether the plaintiffs' suit is barred under the relevant article of the Limitation Act (the court ultimately treated the matter as governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Case
- The land was originally mirasidari land subsequently gifted to the temple and included in the temple's pattah (Ex. A); the temple dealt with the land as owner (evidence included cist receipts Ex. L showing the temple paid cist for pattah No. 380 from 1899–1903).
- The temple's title supports recovery of possession and mesne profits; the defendants' possession was permissive at inception as a service tenure.
Defendant / Appellants' Arguments
- The defendant (and appellants) effectively relied on long enjoyment and registry transfer (Ex. D and Ex. D-1) to support a claim of ownership or adverse possession; they contended Ex. D-1 should be treated as an order under Section 11 of the Survey and Boundaries Act, which would be conclusive under S.13 if not challenged within a year.
- Appellants (or their counsel) also relied on authority (Komargowda v. Bhimaji and Nandial Sahu v. Tikait Srinivasa Kuhum Sing Deo) to submit the burden and principles relating to change from permissive to adverse possession.
- It was contended on appellants' behalf that the order recorded as Ex. D-1 was not an S.11 order but should be regarded under Board's Standing Order No. 31, Cl. 7 (summary transfer of registry on proof of 12 years' enjoyment and payment of revenue), which would mean S.13 (Survey and Boundaries Act) would not apply.
Respondent's / Opposing Arguments
- The respondent argued that such an order (transfer of registry at the re-survey) could be passed by the Survey and Settlement Officer and would therefore fall within the scope of Section 11 of the Survey and Boundaries Act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Komargowda v. Bhimaji, 1899 23 Bom 602 | Principle that when possession began as permissive (service tenure), the person asserting title by adverse possession must prove that possession subsequently became adverse (burden of proof lies on that person). | The court accepted this principle to require proof of demand for service and refusal before possession could be treated as adverse; it applied the principle in assessing whether defendant's ancestor's permissive possession had become adverse. |
| Nandial Sahu v. Tikait Srinivasa Kuhum Sing Deo, AIR 1922 Pat 541 | Same principle on burden of proof and change from permissive to adverse possession in service tenures. | The court relied on this authority alongside Komargowda to confirm that mere cessation of service is insufficient to make possession adverse absent a demand and refusal. |
| Ambu Nayar v. Secretary of State, AIR 1924 PC 150 (cited at p. 585 of 47 Mad) | Authority applied to limitation: the suit in the present case is governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act (period applicable where relevant S.11/S.13 protection does not apply). | The court invoked this decision to hold that the plaintiffs' suit was not barred because it was filed within six years from the date of Ex. D-1, and therefore governed by Article 120 rather than being precluded under S.13 of the Survey and Boundaries Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a stepwise analysis focused on title, the character of possession, and the legal effect of Ex. D-1:
- Ownership and initial character of possession: The District Munsif's reasoning that the temple was the owner and that the defendant's predecessor occupied the land permissively as a service tenure (Blacksmith's manyam) was accepted by the appellate tribunal. Documentary evidence (pattah Ex. A and cist receipts Ex. L series) supported that the temple treated the land as owner and paid cist for the pattah.
- Adverse possession analysis: The court applied the established principle (as in Komargowda and Nandial Sahu) that a holding which began as a service tenure (permissive) does not become adverse by mere cessation of performance of service. To convert permissive possession into adverse possession, there must be a demand for performance of service and a refusal or an unequivocal claim to hold free of service. The plaintiffs alleged a refusal by the defendant to render services in the six years before suit; evidence showed a refusal for three to four years and a specific admission by the defendant of refusing a request before the 1920/21 settlement. Accordingly, the court held that possession could not be deemed adverse prior to such demand and refusal, and the lower courts were incorrect to treat long non-performance alone as giving rise to adverse possession.
- Effect of Ex. D-1 and Survey & Boundaries Act: The crucial limitation question turned on whether Ex. D-1 was an order under Section 11 of the Survey and Boundaries Act (Act 4 of 1897). If Ex. D-1 was an S.11 order, Section 13 could make that order conclusive against the plaintiffs unless they challenged it within one year.
- Procedural remand and interim finding: Because the lower courts had assumed S.11 applied without full consideration, the matter was remanded to the District Munsif for a revised finding on whether Ex. D-1 fell within S.11. At one point the court (asked by the High Court to submit a finding) states a finding that Ex. D-1 came within S.11 and was conclusive under S.13 where not challenged within a year.
- Final substantive analysis rejecting S.11 characterization: On fuller consideration in the final judgment, the court examined the wording and factual matrix of Ex. D-1 and concluded it did not appear to be an S.11 order. The order did not indicate it was made under provisions for boundary disputes (the preamble and S.11 relate to boundary disputes arising out of surveys). Ex. D-1 arose on a petition concerning registry transfer and the Survey petition (Ex. D) did not allege a boundary dispute; rather, it related to enjoyment and registry following enjoyment. The officer who passed Ex. D-1 styled himself as Special Assistant Settlement Officer (Mr. Holdsworth), not the Survey Officer (Mr. R. Dasaratha Raman). The court reasoned that the order was for revenue purposes (transfer of registry to reflect enjoyment for revenue assessment) and, even though a Sub-Collector is a revenue officer capable under Board's Standing Order No. 31, Cl. 7 of effecting registry transfer, the record did not show the order was passed as an S.11 Survey Officer order or as an order under Cl. 7. The chronology (notice under S.11, sub-S.4 issued about a year after Ex. D-1) also indicated Ex. D-1 could not have been an S.11 order.
- Conclusion on limitation: Because Ex. D-1 was not shown to be an S.11 order, Section 13's conclusive effect did not apply. The court therefore concluded the suit was governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act and not barred, applying Ambu Nayar as authority that the suit filed within six years from Ex. D-1 was maintainable.
- Relief and compensation: Finding for the plaintiffs on title and possession, the court directed that if eviction followed, the defendant was entitled to adequate compensation for the house built on the suit land; the court fixed the mechanism for the Court of First Instance to ascertain compensation in execution, and made payment of such compensation a condition precedent to recovery of the land.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court ultimately held that the decrees of the lower courts were set aside and a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiffs for recovery of possession of the suit land with the house thereon, subject to payment of adequate compensation to the defendant for the house (to be fixed by the Court of First Instance in execution). The court answered the contested issue of whether Ex. D-1 was an S.11 order in the negative for the purposes of this suit and held that the suit was governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act and was not barred by limitation.
Implications:
- The plaintiffs obtain a decree for possession of the suit land and the house, but recovery from the defendant is conditioned upon payment of compensation for the house as assessed in execution proceedings.
- The defendant (or his predecessors) having had permissive possession as a service tenure did not acquire title by adverse possession before the proven demand and refusal; mere long non-performance of service does not, by itself, convert permissive tenure into adverse possession.
- The order Ex. D-1, as presented in the record, was not treated by the court as an order under Section 11 of the Survey and Boundaries Act with conclusive effect under Section 13; therefore the one-year bar under S.13 did not preclude the plaintiffs' suit in these proceedings.
- The court directed that the parties bear their own costs throughout.
This summary is based exclusively on the material contained in the provided opinion. No additional facts, inferences, or external materials have been added.
1. This second appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiffs as trustees of the plaint mentioned temple in the village of South Therku Poyyur for the recovery of possession of a plot of land 71 cents in extent as belonging, to the temple and also for the recovery of mesne profits. The plaintiffs' case is that this land is a Blacksmith's service manyam land which originally belonged to the mirasidars of the village and was subsequently gifted by them to the temple. The suit land which is comprised in survey No. 83/2-X according to the old survey is included in the pattah, Ex. A which stood in the name of the temple and other prominent mirasidars of the village. The defendant and his ancestors have no doubt been in possession and enjoyment of this land for a pretty long time. A number of documents have been filed on the plaintiff's side which have been duly considered by the learned District Munsif who came to the conclusion that the temple is the real owner of the suit land and that the defendant's predecessor must have been let into possession of this land for the performance of the Blacksmith's service, and as such, his possession was permissive at the inception. Though there is no document to evidence the alleged gift in favaur of the temple, there is, in my opinion, sufficient documentary evidence to indicate that the temple was dealing with this land as owner, though the enjoyment of it has been with the family of the defendant. The cist receipts, Ex. L series, clearly show that in respect of pattah No. 380 (Ex. A) the temple was paying the cist from the year 1899 to 1903. The plea of the defendant that the temple had nothing to do with the suit land and had no sort of title to it is obviously untenable. The learned District Judge did not give a definite finding as to who is the owner of the suit land, though he made a reference to a number of documents bearing on this question in para 6 of his judgment. The reasoning of the District Munsif is clear, and should, in my opinion, be accepted in coming to a conclusion on his question.
2. I therefore hold that the plaint temple is the owner of the suit land, which is styled as Blacksmith's manyam land and which must have been granted to a predecessor of the defendant for doing the Blacksmith's service to the temple and to the mirasidars of the village. There is no doubt that the possession of the defendant's ancestor was only permissive in its nature at the beginning. There was thus a relationship of landlord and tenant between the temple and the defendant, the condition for the enjoyment of the land being the rendering of some service to the temple. Both the lower Courts have practically treated the defendant's possession as adverse to the temple by reason of the fact that the enjoyment by defendant had been for over the statutory period without rendering any service. If in the beginning, possession was only permissive the burden of proving that at some later time it became adverse to the owner is clearly on the person who sets up a title by such adverse possession. On this question he principle of law has been laid down in two decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellants, namely, Komargowda v. Bhimaji . 1899 23 Bom 602 and Nandial Sahu v. Tikait Srinivasa Kuhum Sing Deo . AIR 1922 Pat 541.
3. If a land is held as a service tenure to be enjoyed as remuneration for services the fact that no services have been performed for any length of time cannot of itself make the holding adverse. In order to make the possession adverse to the owner, there must be a refusal to perform service or a claim to hold the land free of service. If therefore mere cessation in the performance of service would not change the character of possession into adverse possession, it has to be seen whether there was a demand, for the performance of service and a refusal on the part of the defendant. It is alleged in the plaint that the defendant declined to render service to the villagers and the temple for six years before the date of the suit. The evidence on the side of the plaintiffs also tends to show that the defendant was refusing to comply with the demand for performance of service during three or four years before suit. In fact the defendant himself admits in his evidence that before settlement the temple authorities asked him to do some work and he refused to do it. The settlement referred to by him was in 1920 or 1921.
4. In this view the possession of the defendant could not be deemed to be adverse to the temple before such demand and refusal. The lower Courts are not correct in treating the defendants's possession to be adverse from the mere fact of non-performance of services for more than 12 years before the date of suit. The present suit is not therefore barred under Article 144, Lim. Act. The Courts below have held that the plaintiffs' suit is barred under Section 13 of the Survey and Boundaries Act (Act 4) of 1897, because it was brought after the expiry of the period of one year prescribed in that section. This bar can be held to be good, if it is proved that there was an order passed by the Survey and Settlement Officer under S. 11 of that Act and it is shown that the procedure prescribed under that Act was duly observed. In February 1921 the present defendant filed a petition to the Survey Collector referring to the re-survey of the village and also to the fact of the Survey Inspector having registered the land in question in his name. He further stated that the counter-petitioners were objecting to his enjoyment and causing obstruction to him. He prayed for the decision of the dispute and for an order in his favour vide Ex. D. Ex. D-1 is a copy of the order passed by the Special Assistant Settlement Officer. The defendant's petition was treated as one for the transfer of registry in his name in respect of S. No. 84/1. It seems some inquiry was made and that officer observed in his order as follows:
“The whole village says that the land belongs to the temple. The Asari certainly occupies the house and has raised the crops surrounding the house. It is admitted that he and his family have lived in the house for 60 years. Revenue registry should follow enjoyment. The temple authorities should evict petitioner by civil suit. Register in the name of the Asari.” (Ex. D-1).
5. In view of Exs. D and D-1 it is contended on behalf of the appellants that the order is not one within the purview of Section 11 of the aforesaid Act, but must be deemed to be one passed under Board's Standing O. 31, Cl. 7. That clause says, that where parties who, have no documents of title are shown in a summary inquiry to have been in possession and to have paid the revenue as reputed owners for 12 years or more, transfer of registry must be made alter notice, as provided in R. 3(1)(a). Such an order can be made by a revenue officer as is indicated in the rule itself, because the action contemplated may be taken by the revenue officers either on their own motion or on the application presented by the parties concerned. If this order should be deemed to have been passed under the aforesaid rule, then Section 13 of the Survey and Boundaries Act, would have no application. It is however argued on the respondent's side that such an order can be passed at the re survey by the Survey and Settlement Officer and would therefore come within the scope of S. 11 of the Act. There is some difficulty in deciding whether this order comes really within the purview of S. 11 or not, in the absence of sufficient materials before the Court. It looks that both the Courts below assumed that the order is one to which the Survey and Boundaries Act applied and therefore this aspect of the question was not fully considered and decided. As the question of limitation turns upon the determination of this point, it seems to me necessary in the interests of justice, that a revised finding should be submitted after giving an opportunity to both sides to adduce any additional evidence which they choose to offer. The point as to which the revised finding is to be submitted is as follows:
“Whether the order evidenced by Ex. D-1 was one coming within the purview of Section 11 of the Survey and Boundaries Act (Act 4) of 1897, which would be conclusive against the plaintiffs under S. 13 of the Act, as no suit was brought to have that order set aside within a year from its date.”
6. The case is remanded to the Court of the District Munsif of Nagapatam for the submission of the finding within six weeks from this dale. Ten days will be allowed for objection. If the plaintiffs' suit should be held to be not barred, then the question of paying compensation to the defendant in respect of the house built by him on the suit site or of allowing him to be in possession thereof, will have to be considered and decided.
Finding.
7. This Court has been asked by the High Court to submit a finding on the following point:
“Whether the order evidenced by Ex. D-1 was one coming within the purview of Section 11 of the Survey and Boundaries Act (Act 4) of 1897, which would be conclusive against the plaintiffs under S. 13 of the Act, as no suit was brought to have that order set aside within a year from its date.”
8. For the Treason discussed above, my finding is that the order evidenced by Ex. D-1 is one coming within the purview of Section 11 of the Survey and Boundaries' Act (Act 4) of 1897, and that it is conclusive against the plaintiffs under S. 13 of the Act as no suit has been brought to have that order set aside within a year from its date. (After the return of the finding of the Court of first instance, the Court delivered the following)
JUDGMENT
9. The question now to be determined is, whether the finding of the learned District Munsif, on the issue framed and sent to him for a finding should be accepted. Defendant who sets up a special bar of limitation to the suit, has to prove satisfactorily, that the order (Ex. D-1) dated 28th February 1921, is really an order passed by the Survey Officer under Section 11 of the Survey and Boundaries Act of 1897. It is necessary to pay particular attention to the wording of the order itself, for understanding its nature and scope. The order does not specify under what provisions of law it was passed. The petition of the defendant is treated as an application for the transfer of registry in his name for Survey No. 84/1 in Therukupoyyur village, Nagapatam Taluq. The dispute was as to the ownership of this land. By virtue of the defendant's long enjoyment, the registry was ordered to be made in his name. The reason for this order is stated thus: “Revenue registry should follow enjoyment.” It is obvious, that this was not a case of boundary dispute at all. In the petition (Ex. D) on which this order was passed, there is no allegation as to the existence of any dispute as to the boundaries of any land. The preamble of the aforesaid Act, shows that it relates only to Survey of lands and settlement of boundary disputes. S. 11 of the Act, relates to disputes about boundary only. If the boundary between two lands is in dispute and has to be fixed, a proper survey should be made, and the question of possession and enjoyment may have to be determined, for fixing the boundary correctly.
10. In the present case, such was not the dispute at all. It is also clear, that the authority competent to pass an order under S. 11 is the Survey Officer. There can be no doubt as to this. About the time of this order, Mr. Holdsworth, I.C.S, was Sub-Collector and Special Assistant Settlement Officer (as would appear from the History of Services of Gazetted Officers), and the Notification No. 160, Part I, pp. 1000 of the Fort Saint George Gazette of 1920, shows that he was appointed as Special Assistant Settlement Officer, No. 1 Party, Tanjore. Whereas, the Survey Officer was Mr. R. Dasaratha Raman, as shown by Exs. 4 and 7. From the materials available, it is not possible to hold that Mr. Holdsworth was the Survey Officer, when he passed the order (Ex. D-1) in February 1921. The learned District Munsif does not seem to have paid due attention to the scope of the said Act and the nature of the dispute contemplated in S. 11 of that Act, before inferring that the order Ex. D-1 must be one passed under that section. Mr. Holdsworth has passed that order, as Special Assistant Settlement Officer. In that capacity, he had the power to fix the rates of assessment, and-make the classification of the soils, which would be incorporated in the settlement-record. For that purpose, he would have-authority to determine the person liable for paying the assessment fixed for a particular land. It is for revenue purposes, he has ordered the transfer of registry to the defendant's name.
11. Under the Boards Standing Order No. 31, Cl. 7, transfer of registry may be-effected by a Revenue Officer. Mr. Holdsworth, was on the date in question a. Revenue Officer, as he was a Sub-Collector. But in the order Ex. D-1, he-styled himself as Special Assistant Settlement Officer. If it can be said that order should not be taken to be one passed under Section 11 of the Survey and Boundaries Act, as he was not the Survey Officer, it can also be urged, that the-order should not be deemed to be one passed under Cl. 7 of Board's Standing Order No. 31, as he did not purport to pass that order as a Revenue Officer. At any rate, we can safely hold, that the-order in question would not have become conclusive against the plaintiffs after the lapse of a year from its date, under Section 13 of the Survey and Boundaries Act, because the order is not shown to be one passed under S. 11 of that Act. On a perusal of Exs. 4 and 7, there is no difficulty in stating, that the notice-issued to the defendant after the completion of the survey, on 12th February 1922, is one under S. 11, sub-S. 4 of the Act, and not a special communication of an order as per sub-S. 3. Moreover, this notice (Ex. 4) was issued about a year after the date of the order Ex. D-1, and this is an indication that it could not be an order under sub-S. (2). I am therefore unable to accept the finding of the-District Munsif. The issue sent down for a finding, must be answered in the negative and against the defendant. The present suit is, in my opinion, governed by Article 120, Lim. Act, and is? not barred as it has been filed within six years from the date of Ex. D-1: (vide Ambu Nayar v. Secy. of State . AIR 1924 PC 150 at p. 585 of 47 Mad). In case of eviction, the defendant is certainly entitled to-adequate compensation for the house built on the suit land. In the result, the decrees of the Courts below are set aside, and a decree is passed in plaintiff's favour for the recovery of possession of the suit land, with the house thereon, on payment of adequate compensation to the defendant for the house, which will be fixed by the Court of First Instance in execution, after making the requisite inquiry. The payment of compensation so fixed, is a condition precedent for the recovery of the suit land from the defendant. Considering the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.
P.R.S/K.S
12. Order accordingly.
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